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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation constitutes an attempt to provide explanations 
for the syntactic phenomena currently 1';.nown as "Ross' constraints." 
While there h~ve been a number of attempts aimed at providing 
more adequate (in terms of generality, simplicity, or some such 
criterion) reformulations of the phenomena in question, I know of no 
proposal which seriously addresses itself to the task of explaining 
them. To be more exact, most discussions of Ross' constraints have 
regarded them as formal syntactic universals, and have assumed that 
an adequate statement of them would constitute their ulti~ate 
explanation. . 
The position adopted in this dissertation is that a. mere state-
ment of the constraints at issue, even if observationally and/or 
descriptively adequate (,;hich most treatments with which I am 
familiar are not, as will be shown below), should not be regarded as 
an explanation of the facts. The point of view expressed in the 
preceding sentence applies with equal force to the position that 
Ross' constraints constrain transformations (henceforth: the 
Transformational Position)--taken, for example, in Chomsky (1964a, 
1964b, and 1971), and Ross (1967, and an unpublished proposal known 
as the Island Constraint)--a.nd to the position that the constraints 
in question are global restrictions on derivations (henceforth: the 
berivati6nal Position)--as tajten, for example, in Lak.off (1969)-, 
Postal (1969), and Ross (1969b). The reason why I have serious 
doubts that a mere transformational or·deriva.tional statement can 
constitute the explanation of the constraints in question is that it 
is unlikely, given the present state of the field, that any version 
of transformational grammar known at present could be an adequate 
account of the competence of language users. The large number of 
counterexamples which have so far plagued any attempt to provide a 
reasonably elegant account of significant bodies of data, as well 
as the results of recent mathemati~al investigations of the properties 
of transformational grammars (e.g., Peters and Ritchie, 1968), strongly 
suggest that a. transformational grammar is not a. realistic model of 
linguistic competence. If so, it is not in the least clear what, 
if anything, corresponds to the notion "transformation" in psychological 
terms, and claims to the effect that formal properties of these doubtful 
entities---the tra.nsforma.tions--constitute explanations of observable 
facts must be taken with a considerable pinch of salt. 
Given the questionable explanatory status of purely formal 
universa.l constraints, there r.ema.in two classes of fac:;:!;s which may 
provide explanations for syntactic data.: semantic and beha.viorai ones. 
Such facts a.re on considerably surer grounds, for, while we may doubt 
the existence of transformations, there are no reasons for doubting the 
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existence of concepts, or of perception and production mechanisms. 
With respect to Boss' constraints, there are clear indications 
that they have very little (if anythi!':.£'.) to do with semantics (in 
fact, Ross himself repeatedly emphasized that his constraints 
concerned Q.f.g"ived, rather than underl?ing, structure). Thus, consider 
the fact that sentences with sentential subjects are subject to one 
of Ross' constraints, while the transformational congeners of such 
sentences in which the sentential subject is extra.posed are free 
from the pertinent constraint, even though the two sentence-tyyies 
have identical underlying rep~esentations; consider also the fact 
that in an analysis which regards relative clauses as derived from 
conjuncts, the clause containing the relative is free from constraints, 
while the conjunct which unaerlies it is not; notice also that certain 
rules may operate either by moving or by copying a constituent, and, 
although the two kinds of processes yield exact paraphrases, only the 
former is subject to Ross' constraints; notice, finally, that certain 
feature-changing processes, such as the one that places an overt 
mark on question-phrases, is free from constraints in Japanese, but 
not in English. I believe that the few facts mentioned above show 
ouite conclusively that Ross' constraints cannot be exolained in terms 
~f semantics,' for, if semantic representations were subj~ct to such 
constraints, any Gurface structure derived from ill-formed representa-
tions should itself be ill-formed, which, as we have seen above, is 
not the case, 
As a semantic explanation is not available, and as a mere formal 
· statement cannot be regarded as an explanation (a.t least at the 
present time}, it remains. to investigate the possibility that 
sentences in which Ross' constraints have been violated conflfot 
with certain properties and/or limit.a,tions of tb,e perceptual apparatus; 
the main go~ of this· dissertation is to investigate this possibility. 
tn doing this, I ,till rely, to some extent;, on the theory of the. 
interaction of pel'.'c,eption and. gr.a.mniar proposed in a number of papers 
by Fodor, GE!,rrett, Bever, La.ngendoen, and others. However, given 
the highly tentative and often g_u,estionable status of many of its 
substantive claims, that theory will be used as sparingly as possible. 
Specifically, I will confine :myself to three types of perceptual 
principles in proposing explanations for syntactic phenomena, namely, 
principles which invoke the complexity resulting from erroneous 
clos~, interrupted behavior, and perceptual conflict respectively, 
Closure principles assert that complexity arises when a proper · 
subpart of a structure is mistakenly apprehended as a well-formed 
subpart of that structure, with the result that the remainder of 
that structure appears ill~formed; interruption principles assert 
that a proper subset of the set of discontinuities create complexities 
in proportion to the values of specific parameters, such as the length, 
structural complexity, overall structural predictability, etc., of 
the intervening material; conflict princinles assert that complexity 
arises when two sets of cues assign contradictory values to a ,,stimulus· 
in terms of some para.meter. 
In using closure, interruption, and conflict principles, I shall 
attempt to narrow down ea.ch princiT)le as much a.s possibie, for merely 
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saying that erroneous clpsure,. interrupted behavior-, or ~erceptual 
conflict are complex is general to the point of near-vacuity. Each 
proposed principle will be constrained to the extent allowed by the 
data, considerations of plausibility, and past experimental findings, 
but no attempt will be m~de to. offer a definition of the notion 
"possible perceptual principle"; it seems reasonable to assume that 
such a definition should be hard, if not impossible, to come by in 
the absence of an adequate and comprehensive theory of linguistic 
perception, an extremely remote goal at present. In fact, I believe 
that a definition of the notion "possible perceptual principle" 
should bea major goal of psycholinguistic research, rather than one 
of its prerequisites. .In this sense, each proposed principle ·may 
be vi'eved as a tentative partial definition of the notion "possible 
perceptual principle". Clearly, the tentative character of the 
proposals I shall make is undeniable, and follows directly from the 
non-e.xistence of a satisfactory theory of linguistic :perception; the 
situation is., however, no worse than that obtaining iri other fields 
of linguistic investigation, for no one ha.s, to the best of my 
knowledge, proposed an adequate definition of the notions "possible 
transformation", "possible global constraint", "possible phonological 
rule", etc. , so far. 
The relation between behavioral complexity and acceptability 
judgments is fairly transparent in some of tt~ cases I consider; for 
example, it is rather easy to show that the relative acceptability 
of .discontinuities varies as the length and/or structural complexity 
of the intervening material is varied. However, not all situations 
are equally clear in this respect, as (a) some parameters, especially 
in cases involving confli~t, often exhibit a very limited nwnber of 
possible values, and (b) eveu when an arbitrarily large number of 
values is possible with respect to·some paramet~r, the correlation 
between perceptual complexity .and degree of acceptability is sometimes 
obscured through ~enera.lization, a process which imposes a yes/no 
dichotomy on the scalar acceptability dimension; the underlying! 
1 I ~ using the term underlying rather than initial, to allow 
for the possibility that some instances of grammatization of 
perceptual restrictions do not necessarily occur at some stage in 
the historical evolution of a language, but more or less inevitably 
for each individual learner (presumaqly due to an intolerably high 
degree of complexity). Therefore, I am not ~ak:ing the claim that 
a sentence like *hei said that John; had lef~ was necessarily 
grammatical at some point in the history of English. 
correlation can in fact be further obscured by reinterpretation, 
generalization, and other extremely common phenomena in language 
change.. Such difficulties should z:iot, however, 11reclude inquiries 
into the possibility that certain ungrammatical constructions acquire 
this status because of some high degree of perceptual complexity, 
just as the fact that certain rule-systems are synchronically 
I 
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unproductive has not, in general, preclud~d research as to· the  
possibility of an earlier productive state. In both situations,  
empirical claims are made, and it should be possible to test them,  
in the latter case through an examination of historical records,  
in the fqrmel'.', through psycholinguiat,ic experimentation (of course,  
tests aimed at proving a putative U."1.derlying percept\.1.al-complexity/  
acceptability correlation can obviously not be applied directly to  
structures which have undergone gra:rrunatiza.tion, but rathe:r to (a)  
the same structures, in dialects (or languages) where gra:nunatiza.tion  
has not taken place, (b) other structures, in the same dialect,  
_provided that the relevance of these structures to the :orimary 
ones can be defended, or (c) representations in other.perceptual 
modalities, subject to the condition expressed with respect to (b)). 
It would be ';)Xtremely interesting to try to find out wh~ther 
there is some quantifiable threshold of perceptual complexity which 
when reached, allovs reasonably certain predictions that grwnmatiza.tion 
will occur. To ask this question meaningfully, it would be necessary, 
!:Lt the very least, to know (a.) v{hat all the perceptual varia'l'.>les 
which may increase or' reduce complexity are, and (p) what weights 
should be assigne·d to the various variables in situations where a 
subset (not necessarily proper) of them interact. As the answer to 
the former, let alone the latter, question is not known at the 
present time, it is clear that any attempt to comp1.1te such a 
gra.mmatization thresholq. would be hopelessly premature at this stage. 
For exwnple, one may attempt the general;ization tha,t "total", as 
distinct from "partial", perc~ptual conflict ::is necessarily 
granunatized (for a discussion of the terms in inverted commas, see 
section 4.3); however, this "generalization" will be seen to be 
incorrect in general, precisely because there exist p,.itigating, in 
addition to !¼W~~YJ!,tj,p.e;., factors in perception. 
This dissertation is incomplete in two important ways: (a) its 
theoretical claims are seriously under4etermined by the data, as I 
have not been able to gather enough pertinent facts from a sufficiently 
rich s~ple of languages, and (b) while it is consistent wit:tl the 
results of past e:qmriments, it is not supported by any especially 
designed ~xperiments, owing to the fact that I have had neither the 
time nor the facilities for devising and carrying out pertinent tests. 
Fortunately, both shortcomings ca.n be remedied through future work. 
I believe that despite these two objections whose seriousness should 
not be underestimated, this dissertation does make a. contribution to 
the study of £:1yntax by providing an account which is empirically and 
4escriptively superior, as well aa more elegant, plausible, and 
intuitively satisfactory, than previous tre~tments of the same 
problems. 
The breakdown of this dissertation is a.s follows: 
Chapter One examines the most important earlier proposals ma.de 
within the Transformational Position ahd shows them to be inadequate 
on both empirical and explanatory grounds. The Derivational ·Position, 
which has never been spelled out in detail, is pursued to some extent, 
and it is argued that empirical adequacy could be achieved at the cost 
of making µ,:n~~ use of' global constraints, a,s well a:s allowing 
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reference to ~,m.. of acceptability and to ~1:..matic :information; 
it is further argued that explanatory adequa~?' would be.highly 
improbable under those circumstances, since it is hard to see what 
cotild not be described with such a powerful 1/l,ppe.ratui,, 
Chapter Two consists of three parts: section 2,0 briefly 
outlines the theory of perceptual strategies sketched in Bever 
(1970); section 2,1 provides illustrations of the applicability of 
the closure, conflict, a.nd interruption, principles, and focuses 
essentially on cases in which the complexity/acceptability correla-
tion is rela~ively transpar~nt; s.ection 2.2 examines the validity of 
a putative perceptuiµ strategy (whose correctness has usually been 
assumed) to the·effect that syntactic choices are made on the basis 
of "minimal distance" considerations (the :plausibility of this 
assumption being probably due to the independently attested "recency 
effect" in recall experiments); it is argued that there is little 
or no evidence that tninimal distance principles play a significant 
pa.rt in syntax; such principles are often in conflict with the facts, 
and, when not in conflict, more convincing alternative explanations 
are available. 
Chapter Three presents a detailed defense of my proposed 
reanalysis df three constraints (the Complex NP Constraint, the 
Coordinate Structure Constraint, a.nd a third constraint involving 
adverbials), which, I argue, fa11 · under the same generalization. 
Chapter .Four employs the three perceptual principles discussed 
in Chapter Two to propose explanations for the main island constraints 
in the light of the reanalysis of Chapter Three. 
Chapter Five summarizes the results .of the dissertation. 
CHAPTER I 
THE TRANSFORMATIOlfAL AND DERIVATION.AL POSITIONS 
1.0. The main subdivisions of this chapter, namely, 1.1, 1.2, 
1,3, and.1.4, are respectively concerned with Chomsky's initial 
proposal known as the A-over-A Principle, with the extensive stu~y 
made in Ross (19G7), with Chomsky's r~analysis of much the same facts 
within the framework of his Extended Standard Theory, and with Ross' 
attempt to collapse most of his cons.traints into an Island 
Constraint; all these proposals espouse the Transformational Position. 
The DerivationaJ. Position is discussed in 1.2.6 in relation to Ross' 
original position. 
1.1.1. In Chomsky (1964a), it was pointed out that the question 
and relative clause transformations a.re ambiguous when applying to 
a noun phrase modified by a full or reduced relative clause. Thus, 
in (1.1), both the phrase the boy from Los Angeles and its head the 
boy a.re noun phrases; however, the q,uestion or relative clause trans-
formations must apply only to the former, yielding the sentences in 
(1.2), rather than to the latter, as this would yield the ungrammatical 
sentences in (1.3). 
(1,1) You believe the boy from Los Angeles to be 
unbalanced. 
(1.2) a. Who do you believe to be unbalanced? 
h. The boy from Los Angeles who you believe to 
be unbalanced has won the Nobel Prize . 
.(1.3) a. *Who do you believe from Los Angeles to be 
unbalanced? 
b. 	*The boy who you believe from Los Angeles to 
be unbalanced has won the Nobel Prize. 
Chomsky assumes that transformations must be unambiguous and proposes 
a hypothetical linguistic universal that will eliminate the ambiguit;i,r. 
This universal (which, following Ross, I shall call the A-over-A 
principle) was stated formally as follows: 
(1.4) 	 .•. if the phrase X of category A is embedded within 
a larger phrase ZXW which is also of category A., 
then no rule applying to the category A applies 
to X (but only to ZXW). 
1.1.2, In Chomsky (1964b), a revised version of Chomsky (1964a), 
it is pointed out in note 10 that the A-over-A principle is too 
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strong, as it would predict that sente;nces like (1.5) a.re ungra.mma.tical. 
(1.5) Who do you approve of iny seeing? 
(1.6) You approve of my seeing someone. 
Indeed, on the assumption that (1.6) is the source of {1.5), it contains 
the NP someone embedded within the iarger NP :roi: seeing someone., and 
still 	the question transforma.tion can apply to the lower NP without 
ungra.mmaticality. · . 
I should like to point out at this stage that the failure of 
the A-over-A principle to allow the generation of (1.5) depends 
crucially on the overall structure of the grammar which incorporates 
the principle. Specifically, it depends on :roi: seeing someone being 
dominated by the node NP. If the A-over-A principle is incorporated 
into a grammar which generates all complement sentences under the 
domination of the node NP (as proposed in Stockwell et al., 1968, for 
example), then it becomes a trivial matter to show that the A-over-A 
principle is incorrect, for it would predict that no NP moves out of 
-an embedded clause, and this is clearly not the case (at least for 
English). 
1.2.l. In Ross (1967), the most thorough treatment of the  
constraints at is sue within the Transformational Position, Ros.s  
mentions Chom!3ky 1 s observation 'with respect to sentences like (1.5) t  
and adds· that the A-over.-A principle is also too strong with respect  
to certain cases which exhibit an unbom:ided sequence of NPs, such  
that for any two NPs X e.nd Y, X either dominates Y or is dominated by  
it. Specifically, given a string like (1.7), the A-over-A principle  
predicts that (l.Ba) and (1.9a) alone are grammatical, a.nd incorrectly  
rules out (1.8b, c) and (1,9b, c).  
(1,7) You saw a picture of the master of the house, 
(1.8) a. What did you see? 
b. Who did you see a picture of? 
c. What di.d you see a picture of the master of? 
·(1.9) a. It's a picture of the master of the house 
that you sav. 
b. 	 It 1 s the master of the house that you. saw 
a picture of, 
c. 	 It's the house tbat you saw a picture of the 
master of. 
The failure of the A-over-A principle in cases like (1.7), where 
nodes of some type A can be recursively embedded to the right of 
other nodes of Type A, is in fact more general, since the variable 
A can stand for Sor VP, not just NP. Thus. Topica.lization and Pseudo-
Clefting can apply to any of the S nodes in the underscored portion 
of (1.10), yielding (1.11) and (1.12) respectively, while Pseudo-
Clefting can apply to any of the VP nodes in the underscored portion 
of (1!13),,yielding (1.14). 
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(l .10) I beli.eve that John ctaimed that Macy insinuated 
that Bill was Rttilty of murder. 
(1.11) a. John claimed that Mary insinuated that Bili 
was guilty of murder, I believe. 
b. Mary insinuated that Bill was guilty of 
murder, I believe that John claimed. 
c. Bill was guilty' of murder, I believe that 
John claimed that Mary insinuated. 
(1~12) a. What I believe is that John claimed that Mary 
insinuated that Bill was guilty of murder. 
b. What I believe that John claimed is that 
Mary insinuated that Bill was guilty of 
murder. 
c. Wnat I believe that John claimed that Mary 
insinuated is that Bill was guilty of 
murder. 
(1.13) John decided to try to begin to write a book. 
(1.14) 	 a. What John decided was to try to bep;in to 
write a book. 
b. 	 What John decided to try was to begin to 
write a book. 
c. 	 What John decided to try to begin was to 
write a book. 
1.2.2. After havini considered the cases which were incorrectly 
ruled out by the A-over-A principle, Ross turns, in section 2.2, to 
the six1 cases in'(l.15) which, according to him, can be handled by 
\. 
1Ross alsq mentions a seventh case, suggested by Mccawley and 
involving the Adjective Shift Rule, but concludes in section 2.3 
that the rule itself is inadequate and that a more satisfactory 
formulation would no longer require the A-over-A principle. 
that principle in a satisfactory manner: 
(1.15) 	 a. Elements of relative clauses cannot be 
questioned or relativized; thus (1.16) is 
ungrammatical. 
(1.16) *This is the girl who I know a boy who likes. 
(1.1)) b. Elements of sentences in apposition to 
"sentential" nouns like fa.ct, idea, question, 
etc., may not be questioned or relativized, 
as may be seen in (1.17): 
(1.17) 	*Who did I mention to you the fact that John 
seduced? 
(1.15) 	 c. A clause modifying. e. head.NP cannot be extra-
posed beyond 11the firl:lt sentence up", as 
shown in (l.18).. 
(1.18) 	*A proof that the claim had-been made was given 
that John had lied, 
(l.15) 	 d. The head of. a relative clause cannot be 
questioned or rela.tivized, and neither can 
a noun like fact or idea when it is modified 
by a clause (Ross omits to mention the 
latter case}; these two restrictions are 
exhibited in (1.19a, b) respectively: 
(1.19) a.. *Who did he expect who I was acquainted with 
would show up? 
b. 	*What do I- believe (that) that John had lied 
is well established? 
(1.15) 	 e. A HP which is exhaustively dominated by a 
Detel'.'Jlliner cannot be moved out of the NP 
which immediately dominates th.at Determiner, 
as. in (1 • 20) : 
(1.20) *wllose 	did you buy house? 
(1.15) 	 f. A conjunct or a disjunct NP in a coordinate 
node cannot be moved out of the latter, as 
seen in (1.21). In fa.ct, the A-over-A 
P,rinciple prevents the movement of a member 
qf any coordinate node, and this restriction 
is necessary, for Ss and VPs can also move, 
as seen in {1.11), {1..12), and (1.14), and 
the ungram.ma.tical {1.22) and (1.23) must 
be prevented. 
(1.21) a. *What will you put between the bed and? 
Q. *What ;i:ill 	you put between and the wall? 
(1.22) 	 a.. *What John claimE!d that Mary left and •,1as 
that Bill ran away. 
b. 	*What John claimed a.nd that Bill ran away 
vas that Mary left. 
(1.23} ~. *What John likes to eat and is to drink. 
b. *What John 	liKes and to drink is to eat. 
l.·2.3, Having shown that the A-over-A principle was too strong, 
Ross proposes to handle the cases which the principle was adequate 
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for. by four separate constraints. These four constraints taken 
together are weaker than the A-ove~-A principle, as they account for 
th~ (Ll5a)-(1.15f) cases without starring the sentences in (1.5), 
(1.8), (1.9), (1.11); (1.l2) ~d (1.14), but they are also stronger, 
·as tney can account for additional cases. This last fact does not 
constitute a defect of the A-over-A principle, for the latter was 
never·meant to account for ail the constraint;;; in a grammar; it 
does, however, strengthen Ross' analysis. The main way in which Ross 1 
constraints strengthen the A-over-A principle concerns the fact that 
elements of conjuncts or disjuncts cannot move out of the coordinate 
node; this constraint is not expressed by the A-over-A principle in 
those cases where the coordinate node and the elements prevented 
from moving belong to different categories, as in (1.24a), where the 
underscored element cannot move to yield (1.24b): 
(l.~4) a. John loves Mary and Bob hates Jill. 
b. *It's Mary 1-iho John loves and Bob hates Jill, 
Sentences -like (1.25b) and (1.26b), whose ungra.mmaticality is 
due to the migration of the nodes VP and ADJ respectiy_ely from· a 
complex NP, could also be claimed to strengthen Ross' reformulation 
of the A-over-A principle. 
(1.25) a. 
b. 
I believe the claim that John decided to 
try to write a book. 
What I believe (*the claim) that John 
decided to try was to write a bQok. 
(1.26) a. 
b. 
John heard the claim that Mary was pretty. 
Pretty though John heard (*the claim) that 
Mary was, he never showed much interest 
in her. 
However, these sentences are not relevant in the model or· gr8lllIDar 
Ross proposes, f'or he regards VP's .and predicative ADJ' s as dominated 
by the category NP. 
1.2.4. The four constraints Ross puts forward in ~n attempt to 
overcome the inadequacies of the A-over-A principle are: The Comnlex 
~oun Phrase Constraint_, The Coordinate Structure Constraint, The Left 
Branch Condition on the Pied-Piping Convention, and The Sentential 
Subject Constraint (henceforth, the CNPC, the CSC, the LBC on the PPC, 
and the SSC respectively). The fi.rst two are hypothesized to be 
universals,2 the last two are claimed to be language-specific. 
2The universality. hypothesis was subsequently shown to be 
false by a number of investigators, Thus it appears that the 
Complex NP Constraint does not hold in Swedish (D. Perlmutter, 
personal communication) or in Portuguese (C. Quicoli, personal 
communication). This demonstrates the incorrectness of various 
attempts to explain Ross' constraints on semantic grounds, since, if 
the structures at issue were ill-formed semantically, there should 
- ll,-:
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be no exceptions in any language vhatever. In .contrast, the 
explanation which I shall propo~e, and which ultimately iirvolves 
the violation of conversational and/or perceptual principles is 
not defeated by a few counterexamples, since principles of this 
kind can be violated, 
(1.27) 	 The CJ:lPC: No element contained in a sentence 
dominated by a noun phrase with a lexical 
head poun may be moved out of that noun 
phrase by a transformation. 
Ross treats the feature C±Lexi.calJ as a formal one~ but the examples 
he gives from English and Japanese suggest that the plus-value is 
associated with semantically empty forms, like the English it tha.t 
results from Extra.position, or the Japanese koto, mono, which 
translate roughly as "thing". 
The CNPC takes ca.re of cases (1.15a) .Md (1.15b) that were 
accounted for by tht;! A-over-A principle, and can also block th.e 
movement of any kind of element out of the modifying clause, while 
the A-over-A principle can only block NPs. 
(1.28) 	 The CSC: In a coordinate structure, no conjunct 
may be moved, nor may any element contained 
in that conjunct be moved out of that conjunct. 
It is clear that the first part of this constraint has the same 
effect as case (l.15f) of the A-over-A principle, while the se.cond 
part covers the migration of elements of ~oordina.te terms, not 
covered by the latte.r. A number of counterexamples to (1.28) 
{involving asymmetric coordination and across-the-board operations) 
which Ross brings up will be discussed in detail in Cha?ter Three, 
(1.29) 	 The PPC: Any t;ransformation which is stated 
in such a way as to effect the reordering of 
some specific node ·uP, where this node is 
· preceded and followe·d by variables in the 
structural index of the rule, may apply to 
this MP or to any non-coordinate NP wµich 
dominates it ' as long as there are. no 
occurrences of any coordinate node, nor of 
the node S, on the branch connecting the 
higher node and the specified npde. 
(1.29) has the effect of allowing the sentences (1.8b, c) and 
{1,9b, c) which the A-over-A principle ruled out. As I have already 
pointed out {1.29) needs to b~ stre~gthened in order to account for 
the band c cases in (1.11), {~.12) and (i.14). Of the five language-
specific conditions th~t Ross imposes on the PFC, I shall mention 
only the LBC as the other four strike me as truly idiosyncratic 
gre.mmatical facts and thus of little interest for the Behavioral 
Position I have espoused. 
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(1. 30) The LBC: No NP which is the leftmost constituent 
of a larger NP ·can be reordered out of this 
i~P by a. transformational rule. 
The LBC accounts for cases (1.15d) and (l.15e) of the A-over-A 
principle. 
The fourth constraint R9ss proposes, the SSC, accounts for the 
unacceptability of (1.31b) in contrast to the acceptability of (1.32b) 
and {1.33b). 
(1.31) a. That John loves Mary is ·odd. 
b. *It's Mary who that John loves is odd. 
{1.32) a. It's odd that John loves Mary. 
b. It's Mary who it's odd that John loves. 
(1.33) a. Bill claims that John loves Mary, 
b. It's Mary who Bill claims that John loves. 
(1. 34) The SS.C: No element dominated by an S may be 
moved out of that S if that node Sis dominated 
by an NP which itself is immediately dominated 
bys. 
It is not clear whether the A-over-A principle was initially intended 
· to account for sentences like (1.31b), for 1t is not clear whether 
Chomsky considered complement sentences to be dom-inated by NP. I 
would imagine that-he did not, for counterexamples like {1.32b) and 
{1.33b) are much too obvious. In any event, in a grammar which does 
represent all complement sentences as dominated by NP, the A-over-A 
principle is much too strong, and the SSC is a welcome weakening. 
The four constraints reentioned so far do indeed improve on the 
A-over-A principle. However, there is another class of configurations 
which impose constraints on movement transformations·, namely, the 
adverbials, and neither the A-over-A Principle nor the four above-
mentioned constraints handle these cases adequately. Thus, it seems 
that at least the OJ)tional (in a sense to be made more precise in 
Chapter Three) adverbials cannot lose elements. ·In tallcing of 
adverbials, I shall refer ambiguously to the entire adverbial, or 
to the adverbial minus the "connector" which introduces it (pre-
position, 'subordinating conjunction', or whatever; the term 
'connector' is used for purely mnemonic purposes, and no claim is 
made that a category Connector should be part of the non-terminal 
vocabulary of the grammar); the reason is that the 'smaller' 
adverbial as a whole can sometimes be moved (even though it is an 
element of the 'larger' adverbial), but elements of the smaller 
adverbial cannot be moved, 
In Ross {1967), the adverbs are treated as a subset of the 
complex NP category. That is, it is assui:Jed that all adverbs are 
complex NP's nt some level of representation, and that movements 
out of adverbial clauses occur- prior to some transformation which 
substitutes subordinating conjunctions for the heads of complex NP's 
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(and, perhaps., some more prelexical material) • The hypothesis that 
adverbs. originate as complex NP's is due to M. Geis, wpo supports  
it extensively, and, I think, convincingly, in Geis (1970). Even  
·though Geis does not carry out a detailed analysis of all the forms  
which traditional grammarians have called "subordinating conjunctions", 
he strongly implies that all adverbs should be analyzed as complex 
NP's. 
Given the strong evidence supplied by Geis for the cases he 
analyzed, there is no reason to reject outright the hypothesis that 
all subordinating conjunctions may originate as complex HT''s. 
However, even if such an analysis ultimately turns out to be correct, 
there are several cases involving adverbials in which movements are 
·blocked and whi_ch it cannot account for. 
One such case concerns the parentheticals, which, being 
(sentential) modifiers are (at least surface) adverbials. As (1.35) 
shows, such parentheticals become islands· only upon becoming sentence 
modifiers. The difficulty here is that it is hard to see how they 
could be analyzed as complex NP's. 
(1.35) a. I told John that Bill was sick, 
b. Bill was sick, I told John, 
c. It's me who supposed that John is sick. 
d. *It's me who John is sick, supposes. 
This claim is independently supported by the unamb~guity of  
(1.36c}, which cannot be read as a paraphrase of (1.36b). Neve:rthe- 
less, even though the parenthetical seems to be a deep, rather than  
a surface, structure modifier here (see Nobel, 1971), there is still  
no natural way of analyzing it as a complex NP.  
(1.36) a. I suppose John is sick. 
b. Jo~ is sick, I suppose •  
.c. It's m~ who supposes that ,lohn is sick.  
d. *It's me who John is _sick, supposes,  
A second case which raises problems for the CNPC-reductionist 
hypothesis concerns the comparative and equitative constructions. 
The source o.f such constructions is one of the lea.st well understood 
problems in transformational grammar,3 but I shall assume an analysis 
3Ross (19G9a) proposed (ib) as the source of {ia), in an 
attempt to explain the occurrence of~ or~ inside comparative 
clauses, as in (iia), as well as the ill-formedness .of comparative 
clauses containin~ overt negation, as shown by (ii.b). 
(i} a. John is taller than Bill. 
b. John is tall to an extent to vhich Bill is not 
tall. 
(ii) a. John is richer than any of m.Y i'riends has ever 
been. 
b. *John is richer than Bill isn't. 
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In pis dissertation, Ross no longer defended (ib) as the source 
of (ia), as he had noticed that equitatives exhibit the same pro-
perties as comparatives, as can be seen by comparing (ii) and (iii). 
(iii) 	 a. John is as ricn as any of my friends has ever 
been. 
b. *John is as r.i'ch as Bill isn't. 
As there is no obvious way in which equitatives can be analyzed as 
containing negation, Ross presumably concluded that the facts of 
(iia) and (iib) are not determined by negation and therefore do not 
force an analysis of (ia) along the lines of (ib). 
There is also a second difficulty with Ross' analysis in (ib); 
(ia) and (ib) are not. paraphrases. Thus, if John is taller than 
Bill, Bill is necessarily not taller than John, while if John is 
tall to an extent to which Bill is not, Bill necessarily is tall to 
ari extent to which John is not; in other words the relation between 
John and Bill is asymmetric in (ia) and symmetric in (ib) .. 
I believe, however, that .Ross' initial analysis of comparatives 
made an important point, namely, that comparatives should be 
analyzed as containing negation at some ievel of representation, 
although not necessarily as in (ib), · · 
One fact which suggests that comparatives are inherently 
negative is the manner in which they interact with Coordinati6n-
Reduction. 
Consider first (iv) and (v). 
(iv) a. John thinks that Mary is pretty and John 
thinks that Jill is ugly. 
b, John thinks that Mary is pretty and that Jill 
is ugly. 
c. John thinks that Mary is pretty or that Jill is 
ugly, 
(v) a. John doesn~t think that Mary is pretty and John 
doesn't think that Jill is ugly. 
b. John doesn't think that Mary is pretty and that 
Jill is ugly, 
c. John doesn't think that Mary is pretty or that 
Jill is ugly. 
The reduced paraphrase of (iva) is (ivb), not (ivc), while the 
reduced paraphrase of (va) is (vc), rather than (vb), The. principle 
which determines the change from and to or in (v) is known as 
DeMorgan's laws. I shall now show that DeMorgan's laws operate 
in comparatives, but not in equitatives, which strongly suggests 
that the former, but not the latter, are inherently negative. Thus, 
consider (vi) and (vii). · 
(vi) a. John is as clever as Mary is astute and John 
is as clever as Jill is sly, 
b, John is as clever as Mary is astute and ~s Jill 
is sly. 
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(vi)' c. Jq9n is as clever ~s Mary is astute or as Jill 
is sly. 
(vii) 	 a. John is cleverer than Mary is.astute and John 
is cleverer than Jill is sly. 
b. 	*John is cleverer than Mary is astute and than 
Jill is sly. 
c. 	 John is cleverer tha.n Mary is .astute or than Jill 
is sly. 
In {vi), as in (iv), the reduced form of the a-sentence is the b-one, 
while in (vii), as in (v) the reduced form.of the a-sentence is the 
c-one. It is difficult to see what, outside of DeMorgan's laws, 
could determine the difference between the paradigm in (vi) and the 
one in (vii). 
Another piece of evidence, weak.er than the first one, but 
which nevertheless suggests that comparatives _are inherently negative, 
is provided by the surface structure of French comparatives and 
equitatives. In French, if the verb of the comparative or equitative 
clause has not been deleted, there must be a negative morplieme in 
the former case, but there cannot be one in the latter, as shovtn in 
(viiib) and (ixb), the French counterparts of (viiia) and (xia) 
respectively. · 
(viii) a. John is taller than George is, r :-\ 
b. Jean est 	plus grand que Georges ~:J l' est. 
(ix) a. John is as tall as George is. {" }· · •ne
b; Jean est 	aussi grand que Georges __ l'est. 
Th~ acceptable version of (viiib) is a ·paraphrase of (viiia), not of 
the semantically ill-formed (see below) *John is taller than George 
isn't. The particle ne has no semantic import, which is shown by 
the para.phrase relation between (viiia) arid (viiib), as well as by 
the fact that semantic ne always has a reduplicated clause-mate, 
usually pas, while no ~li"ch reduplication is possible in (viiib), 
as shown by the ungrammaticality of *Jean est ulus grand que Geor~es 
po 1 1est pa~. Rather,~ is probably itself a reduplication of some 
semantically negative morpheme in the string, which seems quite 
plausible in_view of the fact that French has a rule reduplicating 
negation in any case (although the reduplicative rule in (viiib) is 
probably not the same as the rule which yields Jean n•est oas ici, 
since the redupli_cated form is necessarily a clause-mate of the 
original in the latter case, but not in the former). If ne in 
(viiib) is a reduplicated form, it is hard to see what thesemanti-
cally negative element in the string is, outside of plus 1more 1 • 
The import of the above discussion is that negation should not 
appear inside the comparative clause, as in (ib), but rather in the 
semantic representation of more. I have not found, however, a 
satisfactory way of doing this. One possibility would be to 
represent more (than) as NOT EQUAL (TO). However, this representation 
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wollld be incomplete, for not egua1 to is a symmetric relation,  
while more than is asymmetric; in fa.ct, not equa1 to is equivalent  
to more than or less than, so that a seme.nt.ic feature like [-EQUAL]  
could appear in the semantic representation of both~ and less~  
provided that there is another feature which distinguishes between  
· the two relations, by having the value + in one and - in the other;. 
the. problem is that it i.!> not obvious what that feature should be • 
. It should be noted, incidentally, that less has the same inherently 
negative semantic properties as~; this can be verified by . 
substituting less for~ and~ for Elu~ in the above examples. 
Various generative semanticists have proposed that (ia) be  
represented as (x).  
(x) 	 John is tall to an extent which exceeds the extent 
to which Bill is tall, 
This a.na1ysis has certain difficulties vhich I shall touch upon 
further down in the text, but one rather interesting difficulty 
-which , as far as I Ir.now, has not been noticed so far , is that although 
exceed is synonymous with be more than, the latter only is inherently 
negative. T~us, exceed exhibits the paradigm in (xi), which, 
surprisingly ·enough, is similar to the paradigm in (vi) rather than· 
to the .one in (vii), since the b-, .rather than the c-sentence, is 
a paraphrase of the a-one, 
(xi) 	 a. John exceeds Mary in intelligence and John 
exc1::eds Bill in temerity. 
b. 	 John exceeds Mary in intelligence and Bill 
in temerity. 
c. 	 John exceeds Mary in intelligence or Bill 
in temerity. 
In conclusion, I have been unable to discover an adequate  
semantic representation for more than and.less than, beyond the  
observation that they must somehov ;i.nvolve negation.  
It is a1so worthwhile to evaluate the evidence in (ii), which 
led Ross to positing (ib) as the source of (ia). (iia), is, in all 
probability, irrelevant to negation~ in view of the acceptability 
of (iiia); the conclusion seems rather unavoidable that any and 
.ever occur in more than just negative environments, Concerning (iib),
Ross implied that it was out for the same reason as *John didn 1t 
see nothing is out in standard English; in other words, he attributed 
the badness of (iib) to a surface property of English, However, 
I believe that (iib), as well as (iiib), is out on semantic grounds. 
Thus, only sca1ar properties can be compared, and (at least certain) 
negated adjectives do not stand for scalar properties; this can be. 
s1::en by considering the ill-formedness of *~o a verx high degree, 
John isn't clever, *John is exceedin sl not clever, etc. In short,
I am claiming that (iib and iiib a.re bad for the same reason for 
which *John.is cleverer than Bill is an assista.n!,;erofessor is bad. 
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consonant with Geis' reductionist hypothesis. Thus, I shall a.ssu:me  
tha.t; the source of (1.3Ta) is roughly (1.3Tb), and that the source  
o·f (1.3Tc) is roughly (1.37a); these ass·umpti,ons make it possible to  
exclude (1.38a) and (L38b)-. by the CNPC.  
(1.37) a. John loves Ma.:ry more than he hates Bill. 
Q. 	 John loves Mary to a degree whic.h exceeds 
the d,egree to which he hates ·Bill. 
c. John loves Mary as much as he hates Bill. 
d. 	 John loves Mary to a degree which 
[is the same as1·L equals __rthe degree to which 
he hates Bill. 
(1.38) 	 a. *It's Bill who John loves Mary. more than he 
hates. 
b. 	*It's Bill who John loves Mary as much as he 
hates. 
·In Chapter Six of his thesis, Ross points out that feature-changing 
rules are also subject to the CNPC. However, although the rule 
which uermits the occurrence of any or ever can go into a. 
comp~;tive clause, it cannot go into wh~t the reductionist hypothesis 
suggests as its source, as shown in (1.39), 
. (1.39) a. John is richer than any of my friends has 
ever been. 
b. 	*John is rich to an extent which exceeds the 
extent to which any of my friends has 
ever been rich. 
In order to explain both (1!38) and (1,39), it becomes necessary to  
assume that the transformation which replaces .an extent which·  
exceeds the extent to which by more than ;p_re~edes feature-changing  
· rules , but :foJlows_ chopping rules. Unfortunately, there is evidence 
of another sort which requires tha.t the transformation in question 
l!4eced~ chopping rules. Indeed, elements of comparative clauses 
can be chopped following Comparative Deletion, as shown by ( 1.40) ., 
(1.40) 	 a.. John is taller than a. man. 
b. I 	 know a man who John is taller than. 
c. 	*John-is tall to an extent which exceeds 
the extent to which a. man. 
If the lexi~al transformation follows the chopping rules, (1.40c) 
would become the input to -Relativization, and the· latter would be 
blocked by the CI~C, since ~ is i~side a rel a.tive clause; there-
fore, we would wrongly predi~t that (1.40b) is unaccept_able. Thus 
(1.38) requires that the lexical transformation follow Relativization, 
vhile (1.40) requirf;!S the opposite ordering; the resulting paradox_ 
suggests that the lexical transformation ve_ha.ve posited does not 
exist, and therefore that (1.3Tb) and (1.37d). a.re not the s.ources 
of (1.37a) a.nd (1.3Tc) respectively. 
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A third case which creates rather serious problems for the 
reductionist hypothesis is illustrated by the contrast in 
grammaticality/ between the .. members of the pair in (1.41).. . 
(1.41) 	 a. (?)The accident which a reporter has just 
disclosed the place of took five lives. 
b, 	*The accident which the police found Mary's 
body at the place of took five lives. 
In both (1.41a) and (1.41b) an element of the construction the 
place of the accident has been relativized. Regardless of whether 
that construction can be analyzed as a complex NP or not, there 
is no reason to believe that the transformation(s) by virtue of 
which it assumes its surface form is ordered before Relativization 
i; (1.41a) but after Relativization in (1.41b). Thus, unless we 
refer to the fact that the place of the accident is an adverbial 
in (1.41b) but not in (1.41a), there seems to be no way of accounting 
for the difference in acceptability between these two sentences. 
A similar difficulty is created by reduced comparative clauses. 
As (1.40b) sho•.s, the adverbial (without its connector) can be 
moved, but elements of that adverbial cannot, as shmm by the 
contrast in acceptability between (1.42b) and (1.42c). 
(1.42) 	 a. John is taller than a member of the 
coIIIIllittee. 
b. 	 This is the member of the committee who 
John is t_aller than. 
c, 	*This is the com.•1dttee which John is taller 
than a member of, 
Paradigms similar to (1.42) can be constructed using other reduced 
adverbial clauses, as sho-wn in (1.43) and (1.44). 
(1.43) 	 a. John left the city because of a brother of 
the queen. 
b. 	?This is the brother of the queen who 
John left the city because of, 
c. 	*This is the queen who John left the city 
because of a brother of, 
(1.44) 	 a. John left the city in spite of a brother of 
the queen. 
b. 	?This is the brother of the queen who John 
left the city in spite of. 
c. 	*This is the queen who John left the city 
in spite of a brother of. 
To summarize: 	the three types of islands4 we have examined above, 
4This term was coined by Ross (1967, Ch. 6); an island is a 
configuration such that certain rules cannot involve an element 
- 19 -
external, and an ~lement internal, to it. 
namely, parentheticals, qqmparat{ve and e~uitative clauses, and non-
clausal adverbials, have b¢en shown not to be reducible to the CNPC-
case, and thus suggest rather strongly that, given Ross' framework, 
observational adequacy requires the imposition of a fifth constraint 
over and above the CNPC, the CSC, the LBC, and the $SC, which we 
lilay call the Optional Adverbial Constraint (or the OAC), and whose 
statement would have to be sOlllething like (1.45}. --
(1.45) 	 The 9AC: No element of an optional adverbial5 
(i.e., a VP- or $-modifier) can be moved from 
under the dominance of the S-node which 
immediately dominates the node ADV (or the 
corresponding node HP, in a grammar which does 
not employ the symbol ADV). 
511Adverbial" is here used in the narrower sense, i.e., not 
including the connector. 
It is rather easy to see that the three cases which required 
(1.45) cannot be disposed of by the A-over-A Principle either. 
Indeed, the migration of NPts from parentheticals could not be 
bl9cked, for there is no reason to posit a node NP over the parenthe-
ticals; the blocking of movements out of comparatives and equitatives 
would, of course, depend on whether such clauses are dominated by 
the category NP (;)r not; as for cases like (1.ln), the contrast in 
acceptability between the a and the b sentence must go·unexplained. 
In the alternative analysis I will develop in Chapters Three 
and Four, I shall argue that the OAC is a.n unnecessary addition to 
the grammar, and that the three cases which seemed to argue for its 
introduction follow automatically from more general principles 
of analysis. 
1,2.4.2. In addition to the four constraints Ross proposes as 
substitutes for the A-over-A Principle, he also puts forward two 
constraints limiting the scope of ~ovement transformations in 
general. To see why that was necessary, we shall consider how case 
(1.15c) of the A-over-A principle is ,handled in Ross' framework. 
In section 2.3, Ross proposes to acco.unt for the unacceptability 
of (1.18) with the CNPC. Indeed, assuming that the stage inothe 
derivation of (1.18) which precedes Extra.position-from-NP is (1.46}, 
we can see that in order to derive (1.18), we must move 83--an 
element of S2--out of NP1 , and the latter is a Complex NP whose 
modifying clause is S2, 
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(1.46) 
NP1 	 VP 
/"' 
NP S 
2 -----====--:--------
NP 	 VP~-z . 
NP . s3~6 t NP/'-, 
roof that the claim that Joli had lied had been made was given 
However, if NP1 were not a Complex NP, S3 would still be prevented from 
extraposing "t~o far", as (1.47b) cannot be derived from (1.47a). 
(1.47) 	 a. That the claim that John had lied had been 
made was obvious. 
b, 	*That the claim had been made was obvious 
that John had lied. 
It seems rather counterintuitive to claim that Extra~osition and 
Extraposition-from-NP are constrained by different principles, and 
Ross proposes, in Chapter Five, that the notion of boundin~ be added 
to the theory of grammar, Thus, a rule is "upward bounded if its 
domain is restricted to whatever is dominated by the "first sentence 
up". Ross further proposes a putatively universal constraint, the 
Ri t Roof Constraint (henceforth,· the RRC), which easily accounts 
ror 1.18 and 1. 7b). --	 · 
(1.48) 	 The RRC: Rules which move elements to the right 
are upward bounded. 
The RRC severely limits rightward movements. While leftward 
movements are not, in general, limited in scope, they are neverthe-
less limited in l'directionl!, for no eiement can move out of its 
"strip" (or "highest island"). The highest island of an element Y 
is the set of all elements which command Y (the notion command was 
developed by Langa·cker, and, informally, asserts that X commands Y 
if Xis in a sentence which dominates Y), Thus, it turns out that no 
movement transformation is completely fr~e, and Ross proposes an 
additional restriction which he called elsewhere the Highest Island 
Constraint (henceforth, the l!IC), and which can be formulated as 
follows: 
(1.49) 	 The HIC: A transformation can only move an 
element to a position which commands that 
element's initial position. 
1.2.5. In Chapter Six of his dissertation, Ross points out 
that chopping rules are not the only ones which are subject to his 
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various constraints and that feature-changing rules and some 
deletion rules also have this property. For example, (1.50a), is 
claimed to be bad because the rtl.le vhich changes~ to e.riy 
reaches into a relative clause from outside the contl:dninp; complex 
NP, and (1,50b) is claimed to be bad because a deletion rule has 
committed the same offense. 
(l,50) a. *I 	never told.you I had seen the man vho 
ever fought again~t anybody, 
b. 	*Jill is prettier than you are aware of 
the fact that Mary is. 
On the other hand, Ross notices that not all unbounded rules 
are subject to island constraints, For example; copying rules, 
pronominalization rules, a.nd certain deletion rules are not, as 
shown by the acceptability of (l,5la}-(l,5lc), in which the respective 
rules reach inside complex UP's in the same way in which featwe-
changing and deletion rules do in (1.50). 
(1.51) a, Who did I show you a girl who likes him? 
Cdialectally restricted] 
b. John.dislikes all the girls who have 
chased him. 
c. You can certainly use a rifle, but I know 
a gir+ who thinks you can't. 
Ross attempts to make sense of the situation by means of the 
following statement, which I shall call the Dichotomous Behavior 
Principle (henceforth: the DBP): 
(1.52} The DBP: Chopping rules, feature-changing rules, 
andunidirectional rules of pronominalization 
obey the CNPC, CSC, LBC and SSC; bidirectional 
rules 	of pronominalization and copying rules 
do not. 
The following two claims made by the DBP (the first, implicitly, 
the second, explicitly) are worthy of attention: 
(1.53) 	 a, Deletion is a subcase of pronominali.zation, 
and both phenomena behave alike; 
b, 	 The cri.terion which determines the applica-
bility of island phenomena to specific 
rules of pronominalization is whether the 
rules at issue operate unidirectionally 
or bidirectionally. 
Thus, the difference in acceptability between (1,54a) and {1.54b) 
must be accounted for by arguing that the rule which introduces the 
underscored pronoun in (1.54a) is the rule of pronominalization 
which 	operates in other environments, while the rule which deletes 
that pronoilll to :rield (1.5¼b) is a special deletion rule restricted 
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to this specific environment. 
(1.54) 	 a. The mink coat is ready for you to find a 
girl willing to put it on. 
b. 	*The mink coat is readyfor you to find a 
girl willing to put on. 
Notice that the only reason for saying that the deletion rule is 
unidirectional is that the for-to clause cannot prepose; the non-
existence of a preposing rule does not lead Ross to the claim that 
the pronominalization rule which yields (1,54a) is unidirectional. 
Observe now that the rule which yields (1.50b) is clearly the 
same rule which yields (1.55a) and (1,55b), that ..is, VP-Deletion. 
(1.55) 	 a. Although her brother is, I am afraid that 
Mary is not efficient enough. 
b. 	 Jill is conceited, but I don't really know 
a girl who isn't, 
To make this proposal work, Ross would be forced to claim that the 
rule of pronominalization which yields (1,54a) is the same rule 
which pronominalizes in other environments, while the VP-Deletion 
rule which operates in comparative constructions like (1.50b) is 
different from the VP-Deletion rule which operates in non-comnarative 
envii-oMe-nts, since ti.1e latter is (i) bidirectional, and (ii) exempt 
from island-constraint~, as sho~m.hy (1.55a) and (1.55b), respectively. 
Clearly, such a position is inconsi.stent. 
In connection with the DBP, Ross write.,; "rt is at present a 
total mystery ... why unidirectional pronominalizations should obey 
the constraints ... " However, no mystery is involved, since the 
distinction Ross makes between unidirectional and bidirectional 
pronominalization is almost certainly irrelevant. Thus, if we 
examine (1.54) more carefully, it becomes apparent that its unaccept-
ability not only has nothing to do with unidirectionality, but has 
nothing to do with deletion in the first place. The relevance of 
deletion to comparative formation6 was probably assumed because 
6chomsky (1971, note 29) also assumes the relevance of 
deletion in this case, and proposes that the comparee i.s in fact , 
moved by cyclic hopping until it is adjacent to than, after which 
it is deleted. Thus, the island constraints found with comparative 
constructions are blamed on an invisible chopping rule; This 
proposal is untenable for the same reasons as Ross'. 
identity between the 'comparator' and the 'comparee' requires the 
deletion of the latter in English (although not, for example, in 
Japanese) • But it is not necessary to resort to Japanese in order 
to expose the irrelevance of deletion, for English has comparative 
constructions like (1.56), in which no deletion occurs. 
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(1.56) 	 John is taller than it has been assumed that 
Bill is fat. 
Nevertheless, constructions like (1.56) a.re subject to the CNPC, CSC, 
SSC and OAC, as (l,57a)-(l.57d) respectiveiy shov. 
(1.57). a. *John is taller than r J know a boy who is fatl_ am aware of the fact 
that Bill is fat } • 
b. 	*John is taller than Bill is fat and employed 
full-time. 
c, 	*John is taller than that BiJ.l is :fat is 
clear. 
d. 	*John is ta.lier than Mary left Bill because 
he is fat. 
The problems raised by (1.57) for the DBP and for the Transformational 
Position in general will be taken up in the next section. Suffice 
to point out at this stage that they strongly suggest that .VP-
Deletion in (L'50b) is not the factor responsible for unacceptability. 
There remain, however, a. number of puzzling cases; thus,. VP-
Deletion, S-De;t.etion, Sluicing> Super-Equi-NP-Deletion, and perhaps 
other rules, are exempt from the constraints, while Japanese 
Relativization, the rule which transforms (1.54a) into (1.54b). and 
the rule which transforms (1,58a) into (1.58b) are not. 
(1.58) 	 a. This rock is too heavy for you to find a 
boy willing to pick it up. 
b. 	*This rock is too heavy for you to find a 
boy willing to pick up. 
I suggest that what distinguishes the two classes of deletion rules 
is that in one · class of· cases deletion applies to structures subject 
to an obligatory deep structure condition to. the effect that the 
clause which contains the deletee must contain a coreferent of the 
deletor, while in the other class ofcases no such condition exists, 
and consequently no deletion need occur in the corresponding 
structures. The pertinent constraint, ,thich I will defend and 
propose an explanation for in Ch.apter Four, is (1. 59). 
(1.59) 	 Deletion rules are subject to island 
constraints if and only if there exists 
an independent condition requiring that 
an element coreferential with the deletor 
occur within some configuration which 
contains ~he deletee. 
(1.59) correctly predicts that Japanese Relativization is 
constrained by islands, because a relative clause is universally 
ill-formed if it does not contain a coreferent of the head at some 
level of representation; in contrast, rules like Vl'-Deletion a.re 
not coupled with such conditions, as can be seen by considering 
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(1.60), which is identical vith (1.55b) in all respects except for 
the fact that ·the identical ypis in the latter are not identical 
in the former, and no.deletion consequently takes place. 
(1.60) 	 Jill is conceited, but I don't really know 
a girl who isn't in love with herself. 
With respe.ct to (1.54) and (1.58), it will be shown in Chapter Four 
that the occurrence of a coreferent of the subject of the main verb 
within the for-to clause is an inference 'invited' by a semantic 
condition requiring that a resultative relation obtain between the 
main and·the for-to clauses; this invited inference (for a definition 
of this term, see Geis and Zwicky (1971)) has in general the same 
effects as a strictly linguistic condition, an interesting but not. 
isolated fact (I will show below other instances of syntactic form 
being determined by invited inferences or by 'conversational 
implicatures' in the sense of Grice (1968)), 
It should be noted that (1.59) refers .to strict deletion, not 
to pronominalization in general, and .therefore predicts that only 
the b-, but not the a-sentences in (1.54) and (1.58) are bad. 
1,2.6. It is important to notice at this point that if (1.59) 
is correct, the Transformational Position is observationally 
inadequate. 7 The reason is that the conditions which dictate or 
7r am assuming a transformational grammar which does not allow 
arbitrary coding SYlllbols. If such SY1nbols are tolerated, global 
rules can of course be avoided. 
invite the inference of the occurrence of two coreferential NP's 
are semantic, and consequently belong in deep structure. On the 
other hand, the pertinent deletion processes are probably very late 
ones, and belong to a stage very close to surface structure. There-
fore, an adequate statement of (1.59) within the theoretical frame-
work which Ross espouses (Generative Semantics) requires the employ-
ment of a global rule. 
The claim that island constraints should be reformulated as 
global rules has in fact been ma.de by Ross himself in Ross (1969), 
where it was pointed out that there is a deletion rule, Sluicing, 
which, when deleting the remainder of an island out of which an 
element had been moved by Question-Movement, yield~d more acceptable 
sentences than those which would have resulted had Sluicing not 
applied. The point is demonstrated in (1.61) for the CNPC, CSC, 
SSC and OAC. 
(1. 61) a. 
b. 
?I know you kissed a girl who had received 
a coat from someone, but I don't knov who 
(*you kissed a girl who had received a 
coat from). 
?Bill and someone vere dancing, but I don't 
know who (*Bill and were dancing). 
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(1.61) 	 c. ?That John loves someone is well-known, but 
I don't know who (*that John loves is 
well-knovm) • 
d. 	?-John left Mary because she had slept with 
someone, but I don't know who (*John left 
Mary because she had slept with). 
Because of facts like those in (1.61), Ross proposed the following  
a.nunended formulation of islruid constraints:  
(1.62) 	 When an element is moved out of an island, 
unacceptability results; if the remainder of 
the island is later deleted, unacceptability 
of lesser severity results, 
Clearly, both the reduction in acceptability due to island-deletion  
and unacceptability due to obligatory coreferentiality coupled with  
deletion must be global conditions on island constraints.  
With regard to (1.59), one would want to state it more generally 
than just for deletion rules, since there is a.. definite parallelism 
between the fact that non-null pronominalization does not create 
unacceptability even in the presence of an obligatory coreferentiality 
condition, while strict deletion does, and the fact that copying rules 
· do not create unaccepto.bility, while chopping ones do, In both cases, 
no unacceptability arises when the affected element is reduced to 
a non-null pro-form, and unacceptability does arise when the affected 
element disappears completely. The similarity between the two sets 
of phenomena. can be captured more perspicuously if we regard chop-
ping rules as proceeding in two stages, i.e., copying followed by 
deletion (as proposed, for example, in Drachman (1970)). Such a view 
is particularly reasonable for rules like English Relativization or 
Question-Movement, which do not appear as copying ones in the 
standard dialect, but which nevertheless are realized as copying 
rules in many non-standard dialects or even i_n relaxed styles of 
standard-dialect speakers; it is to be assumed that children exposed 
to both possibilities will formulate the rules in question as copying 
ones, followed by deletion in specific situations. If so~ we may 
notice that copying rules resemble the deep structure coreferentiality 
condition in that they also create two necessary coreferents. The 
similarity between chopping and deletion under obligatory identity 
can now be made eJq>licit: in both cases, strict deletion occurs, and 
in both cases an element coreferential with the one acting as 
deleter~ exist. 
The possibility of capturing the generalization just stated with 
global rules depends on the constraints placed on global rules. If 
we req_uire that global rules refer to specific stages in a derivation, 
the generalization cannot be captured, for in one instance it is 
necessary to refer to deep structure and in the other to the out'flut 
of copying. If we do not require global rules to be specific in 
that sense, the generalization can be captured. 
It is noteworthy that there a.re a great deal more global  
conditions which need to be imposed on island constraints. One  
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such condition is necessary to account for the ill-formedness of 
the sentences in (1.57), vhich clearly cannot be blamed on some 
movement or deletion transfor~tion. One may be tempted to impose 
a deep structure condition to the effect that the comparee cannot 
occur in e..n island if the compare.tor is outside that island (equita.-
tive constructions work in the same way, as the reader can convince 
himself by replacing taller than with as tall as in (1.56) and 
(1,5i}). However, the pertinent condition cannot be a deep structure 
one, because (1.63), w~ich has the same deep structure as (1.57c}, 
8rn Urosu fl972a), it was Illistakl:lnlY claimed that the pertinent 
condition is a deep structural one. 
is acceptable, 
(1.63} John is taller than it is clear that Bill is 
rat. 
Also, the well-formedness of comparatives seems to depend on certain 
conditions of formal similarity between the compared elements (I 
have not investigated tnese conditions in detail, as their precise 
statf!ment undoubtedl.y warrants a separate study; suffice to notice, 
however, that such conditions exist), Thus, consider the difference 
in acceptability b~tween (1.64a) and (1.65a), as veil as between 
(1.64b) and (1.65b), which have been claimed to be related trans-
rormationally. 
(1.64} a. 
b. 
It seems that Bill is clever as much as 
it seems that Joe is stupid, 
*John is as willing to please as for anyone 
to offend Mary is easy. 
(1. 65') a. 
b. 
?*It seems that Bill is clever as much as 
Joe seems to be stupid. 
John is as willing to please as Mary is 
easy to offend. 
(1.65a) shows that an acceptable deep structure becomes bad by a 
transformation (Subject-Raising), and (1.65b) shows that a bad deep 
structure becomes acceptable by a transformation (Tough-Movement). 
It would seem that the well-formedness of comparatives and equita-
tives must be determined by a shallow structure condition (in the· 
sense of some .level which precedes post-cycle deletions) requiring 
some kind of formal. similarity between the coi,ipared VP's (the 
condition cannot be a surface one, -since formal similarity cannot 
be determined from the surface in sentences like John is as tall as 
you think Bill is). 
The shallow structure condition suggested above is not 
sufficient to determine the acceptability of comparatives o~ 
equitativea as the latter also depends on the semantic compatibillty 
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of the compared phr~ses. Thus, (1.66a) and (1.66b) are /;Lll right, 
but (1.66c) and (1.66d) are not. 
(1.66) a. John took to his heels a.s swiftly as 
Bill fought bravely, 
b'. Mary is as pretty as Jill is refined. 
c. 	*John took to his heels as swiftly as Jill 
is refined. 
d. *Mary is as pretty as Bill fought brave+Y· 
As semantic compatibility belongs in deep structure, it appears that 
the determination of the well-forrnedness of comparatives and equita-
tives requires at least the following statement: 
(1.67) 	 Comparatives and equitatives are ill-formed if 
(i} the compared elements are semantically 
incompatible, or (ii) the comparator is 
external end the comparee is internal to some 
island configuration in shallow structure. 
Notice that the two co1"1,ditions of (1.67) are disjoined. a.nd 
there is therefore no motivation for regarding (1.67) as a global 
rule, but rather as a set of two independent conditions. Consequently, 
the island constraints must bear a third condition, but a shallow-
structure rather than global one, namely {1.6711). 
It should be pointed out that there is an alternative way of 
accounting for the ungrammaticality of the.sentences in (1.57) without 
recourse to (1.67), Thus, given an analysis of comparative and 
equitative constructions along the lines suggested by M. Geis (and 
other generative semanticists), as in (1,37), one can blame.the 
badness of the sentences in (1.57) on a movement transformation. 
For example, if an earlier stage in the derivation of (1,57b) is 
*John is tall to an extent which exceeds the extent [Bill is [fat 
to 1,hat ~~t_ and an assistant professor.JJ, Relativization will 
move the rightmost doubly underscored one in violation of the CSC. 
The above account is certainly a possible one; however, I have 
not adopted it because it requ~res strong ordering assumptions, 
which do ~ot ·have enough independent support. Specifically, it 
requires that Rela.tivization apply to the de1;ree adverb before the 
lexical insertion rule which replaces to an extent which exceeds the 
extent to which by more than; this lexical insertion rule must itself 
precede the rule of Comparative Deletion which turns John is brighter 
than Bill is into John is brighter than Bill, for this rule can apply 
only when the comparee is immediately embedded to the comparator, as 
shown by the ungrammaticality of *John is brighter than I told you 
that Bill; finally, this rule must in turn precede Relativization~ 
in order to allow I know a man who John is taller than and to block 
*I know a man who John is taller than is. All this could be done 
by making Relativization, Comparative Deletion, and the lexical 
insertion rule cyclic, an ordering for which r·do not know of much 
independent justification (in particular, lexical insertion has 
usually been claimed to take place at the end of the cycle). 
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It should also be pointed out that if Relativization and 
lexical insertion are made cyclic, Geis' proposal that the island 
character of adverbials be explained by the CNPC collapses, for no 
adverbial would be a complex NP at the stage at which Relativization 
moves an element out of it, In other words, Geis could not simultane-
ousi maintain his claims that the restrictions on adverbials are 
reducible to the CNPC and that 1,37a and 1,37c are derived from 
(1.37b) and (1.37d), respectively {notice that Relativization and 
lexical insertion would have to be qyclic not only in order to account 
for constructions containing comparatives, such as I know a man who 
John is taller than, but also in order to account for constructions 
containing other adverbials, such as this is the woman who John 
committee suicide because of, and this is the girl who John became 
a priest in spite of), 
The various problems mentioned above had led me to adopt the 
view that the sentences in (1.57) are bad because the semantic 
comparative relation goes into an island, rather than because of the 
movement of a degree adverb out of that island (even though the 
latter analysis is not untenable, provided that we discard the 
claim that adverbs are islands by the CNPC). It should be noted 
that ascription of island-sensitivity to semantic relations is needed 
independently of comparatives or equitatives; D. James (1972) has 
discovered quite recently that the relation between interjections 
and their scope is also subject to i.sland constraints, and it is 
highly improbable that an analysis involving movement could be 
devised for the cases s.he considered. 
Another condition to be imposed on island constraints concerns 
the distribution of neutralized elements li·ke any or ~· As Ross 
pointed out, such elements, which must be commanded by some neutralizer 
(e.g., negation), cannot occur inside islands if the neutralizer is 
outside the island. This restriction is sho~m in relation to the 
CNPC, CSC, SSC and OAC in (1,68)-(1,71) respectively. 
(1.68) 	*I never said that you met a boy who ever harmed 
anyone. 
(1,69) *I 	never said that Bill is brave and Mary ever 
harmed anyone, 
(1.70) 	*I never said that for you to ever harm anyone 
is desirable, 
(l.71) 	*I never said that Bill loves Mary, because she 
ever harmed anyone. 
At the time Ross wrote his thesis, it was asswned that any is 
introduced by a rule of Indefinite-Incorporation (or Some-Any 
Suppletion), and Ross argued that that rule is subject t6 island 
constraints. This assumption was later questioned by Robin Lek.off · 
(1969), but independently of that fact, it is hard to see what rule 
could be blamed for the occurrence of ever inside islands, Conse-
quently, the occurrence of~. and probably any, must be determined 
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by some.condition on a level. There is no reason that I can see 
why this condition could not be stated at these.me +evel as (l;67ii), 
that is, shallow structure, where the distribution of neutralized 
elements in general could.be stated. There is, however, the problem 
that the level of shallow strllcture has not yet been defined 
precisely enough~ Thus, certain writer$ have suggested that the 
output of the cycle be regarded as she.llQw struc·ture, but such a 
definition wouldn't work if Extra.position is a cyclic rule, for the 
well-formedness of sentences containing neutralized elements must 
be determined after sentential subjects have extra.posed. Moreover, 
if Question-Formation is post-cyclic, it must also precede shallow 
structure, as shown by (1,72) 
(1.72) I 	 never heard about Bill's murdering (Mary } . · 	 anyone 
(1.73} Whose 	murderingf~~one} did I never mention 
to you? 	 l: 
Shallow structure cannot, however, .follow all movement rules. 
In particular, it cannot follow Topicalization (as the acceptability 
of (1.74} shows), and it cannot follow Pseudo-Clefting. 
(1.74) 	 Tpat Bill ever harmed anyone his sister just 
can't believe. 
With respect to Pseudo-Clefting, there ~ave been proposed at least 
three competing analyses, e.nd I shall argue at great length in 
2 ,1.3 that only a.n analysis which involves the "extraction" of the 
pseudo-cleft element from a relative clause in subject position 
is tenable. Suffice to point out e.t this stage tha.t the cleft 
constituent must $till be within the ~omplex-NP subject in shallow 
structure if the ungrammaticality of (1,75a) a.nd (1.75b) is to be 
accounted for by (l.67ii). 
(1.75) 	 a. *Bill is taller than what I told you is that 
Bill is fat. 
b, 	*I never told you that what you fear most is 
that Mary ever harmed anyone. 
Notice that the unacceptability of (L 75a)-(1.75b) has to be accounted for 
by some condition like the CNPC, for predicates in construction 
with the copula are not islands in general, as shown by (l,76a)-
{L76b). 
(1.76), a. This knife is sharper than what you saw 
yesterday is heavy. 
b. I never claimed that what you told me last 
year-was ever surprising to anyone. 
I will not pursue the discussion of shallow structure any 
further, and will content myself with having pointed out that in all 
probability some post-cyclic rules must precede, while others must 
follow, shallow structure. 
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It is important, however, to ask whether Pseudo-Clefting can 
also follow all the unbounded move~ent rules, for those cannot touch 
pseudo-cleft constituent_s, a.s (L77 )..:(1. 79) show. 
(1. 77) *Who do you think that what John wants is to marry? 
(1.78) 	*The girl who I think what John wants is to marry 
is sick. 
(1,79) *Jill, I think what John wants is to marry. 
The unacceptability of (1.77)-(1,79) would be explained if Question-
Formation, Relativization and Topicalization preceded Pseudo-Clefting, 
for the pseud~-cleft would still be inside an island at that point. 
An account along these lines has in fact been attempted by Ross in 
connection with the island properties of clauses moved by Extraposition-
from-NP. Thus, Ross proposed that the badness of sentences like those 
in (1.80)-(1.82) be explained by ordering Extraposition-from-NP 
after all unbounded movement rules. 
(1.80) 	*I don't think that the man has been hired who 
ever robbed anyone. 
(1.81) *John is taller than a boy just left who was tall. 
(1.-82) *Which hat ha:s a boy just left who was wearing? 
Unfortunately, a similar solution is impossible for the sentences 
in (1.77)-(1.79). If (1.84) is.the input to ·Pseudo-clefting in the 
derivation of (1.83) (for discussion, see section 2.1.3), it is 
clear that the extraction of to marry Jill must precede Relativization, 
for it is .only· after extraction that the copy left behind, namely 
something, becomes identical with the head of the relative clause. 
(1.83) What John wants is to marry Jill. 
(1.84) ~s------
1NPI 	 VP 
. NP S 	 Copula NP ----·---	 ~~ . I\ 
NP ~ ~ 
V (§ 
I 
s 
John wants ~ is 
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Now, in o.rder to expla,in the badness of (1.85) by the CMPC within 
the Transformational Position, we would have to claim that the lo'irer 
occurrence of Jill is relativized while the circled NP is still 
dominated by the boxed NP. 
(1.85) 	*Jill, who what John wants is to marry, is my 
cousin. 
But this is impossible whether Relativization is cyclic or post-
cyclic. If Relativization is cyciic (by which I mean that it is 
triggered as soon as the head of the relative clause is reached, and 
not that the relative pronoun 1hops 1 one cycle at a time, as 
suggested in J a.ckendoff ( 1969)) , then Jill must be relativized 
before the circled I.JP in (1.84); in other words, Helativization on 
a higher cycle would have to precede Relativization on n lower cycle, 
with Pseudo-Clefting ordered in between. This would mean a genuine 
anti-·cyclic ordering of Relativization (not merely its sequential 
application from the top to the bottom c;>f the tree), and since no 
one has ever offered any evidence in support of such a position, 
we need not ta.~e it seriously. If Relativization is post-cyclic, 
which means that all instances of Relativization must apply in 
block (i.e., with no rules ordered between various applications 
thereof), a.nd if Pseudo-Clefting nrecedes one instance of Relativi-
zation, it must precede all inst~ces of R~lativizatlon; consequentiy, 
Jill cannot be relativized before the circled NP is pseudo-clefted. 
--The only way in which (1,78) and (1.85) can be excluded by the 
CNPC is through a fourth global condition, which I state tentatively 
a.s (1.86). 
(1.86) 	 Elements which cannot be moved because they 
belong in an island, cannot be moved even 
after they are no longer :part of that 
island. · 
(1.86) can accomplish the desired re·sults with respect to (1.77)-(1.79) 
and (1.85), but it cannot capture the intuition that (1.80)-(1.82) 
is bad for the same reasons as (1.77)-(1,79) or (1.85), namely that 
an element is moved out of a constituent which belonged to an 
island in remote representation. In other words, the handling of 
(1.80)-(1.82) by extrinsic rule ordering and of (1,77)-(1,79) and 
(1.D5) by a global condition seems to say that the two situations 
are unrelated. . 
I will suggest i~ Chapter Four how the similarity between (1,77)-
(1,79), (1.80)-(1.82) and (1.85) can be captured within the Behavioral 
Position, but for the moment we 'may adopt (1.86), which I think is 
observationally correct. We may notice that (1.86-) has at least one 
interestinp; consequence, nwnely, that the level of shallow structure 
referred to in (l.u7ii) cannot exist. To shov this, we must consider 
the propertie::. implicitly or explicitly ascribed to that level.· '.i!he · 
fir13t one (1.87!) is definitional: 
- 32 -
/ 
(1.87} (i} Shallow structure is.not earlier than the 
output of the cycle. 
The second property follows from (1.87ii} and our subsequent 
dis·cussion: 
(1.87) 	(ii) Shallow structure is the level at which the 
correct distribution of neutralized 
elements (Le., comparees, any, ~' 
etc.) is stated. 
The third property follows from (1,72)-(1.73}: 
(1.87){iii) Question-Formation precedes shallow 
structure. 
The fourth property follows from the well-formedness of (1.88) 
(in some dialects} and of (1.89) (in all dialects); with respect to 
the latter, its relevance depends on our accepting Akmajian's claim 
(1970) that clefts are derived from pseudo-clefts: 
(1.88) What do yoµ think that what John prefers ts? 
{1.89) What is it that you think John prefers? 
(1.87) 	(iv) Question-Formation follows shallow 
structure. 
Since in both (1.72)-(1. 73) and (1.88)-(1.89) Question-Formation 
applies last- or post-cyclically, both applications take place at 
the seme stage and no level can exist in between. I conclude that 
a level with the properties {1.87i)-(1.87iv} cannot exist.9 
9Notice that we can use an argument of the same type for 
arguing that the rule which derives clefts from pseudo~clef'ts is 
not Extraposition, as Akmajian claimed. Indeed, (1.89) shows that 
Question-Formation must follow Akmajian's 'Extraposition'; but 
the difference in acceptability between (i) and (ii) shows that 
Question-Formation must follow Extraposition, or (ii) will be 
marked as ill formed by the SSC. 
(i) *Who is that John loves clear? 
(ii) Who is it clear that John loves? 
As Akma.Jian's claim entails a cyclic ordering of Question-Formation 
and Rxtraposition within the last- :or post-cycle, the· rule which 
derives clefts from yseudo-clef'ts cannot be Extraposition. 
The moral of this argument is not necessarily that a level of  
shallow structure cannot exist in principle, put that the distribution  
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of neutralized elements cannot be stated at some well-defined level 
of· linguistic stru~ture,10 
10Notice that even if the distribution of neutralized elements 
were stable in shallow structure, it would still be highly un.natural · 
for island constraints to hold at that level for neutralized 
elements, but at different derivation~l stages in general. The 
reason is that island constraints can certainly not hold in shallow 
structure in general, for this level would then have to possess 
additional contradictory properties such as the following: 
( 1 .. 87) (v) Pseudo-Clefting and Relativization follow · 
shallow structure. 
(vi) Pseudo-Clefting and Relativi~ation precede 
shallow structure. 
(1.87v) follows from (1.67ii) and the 1.Ulgrammaticality of (1. 71a) 
and (l.7lb); (l,87vi) follows from the fact that Pseudo-Clefting 
and/or Relativization may not touch islands, as shown in (i}. 
(i) *What I told you about a boy who saw was the house, 
The point I am trying to make is that it would be highly unnatural 
for a set of nhenomena to constrain sometimes transformations and 
sometimes a given level. 
We have so far noted four situations (in connection with (1.59}, 
(l.62), (1.67), and (1.86)) which cannot be handled within the 
transformational Position. Two more such situations will be discussen 
in this section. 
In his discussion of the CNPC, Ross (1967) pointed out the 
difference in accepta.biiity between (1.90a) and (1.90b) (for most 
speakers, (1.90b) is intermediate in 1:1.ccepta.bility between (1.90a) 
and (1.90c), but Ross did not discuss this fact). 
(1.90) a. *It's Mary I discussed the claim that Bill 
likes. 
b, ?It's Mary I made the claim that Bill likes. 
c. It's Mary I claimed that Bill likes • 
. Noticing the synonymy between (1,90b) and (1,90c), Ross suggested 
that the former be derived from the latter by a rule replacing ~laim 
with mnke the claim, which would follow all the post-cyclic unbounded 
movement .rules, so that no island confi~ration should exist.when 
the unbounded movement occurs, However~ Ross pointed out that he 
could not provide a satisfactory solution within the Transformational 
Position, since the lexical replacement ruie must also precede the 
various unbounded rules; the reason given was that those rules must 
be preceded by Passive, which must in turn be preceded by the 
lexical replacement rule, in order to allow the derivation of~ 
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claim that John likes Mary ha.s already been ma.de by a number of 
people. Of course, the ordering paradox ·noticed by Ross can be handled 
within the Derivational Posi~ion with a statement like the following: 
(1.91} Violations of island constraints are considerably 
reduced in severity if the affected island was 
not an island 	in underlying representation. 
The last problematic case for the Transformational Position I 
wish to discuss concerns the rule of· {non-emphatic) Reflexivization. 
Ross claims that Reflexivization is subject to island constraints, 
because it cannot violate the CSC (the other constraints a.re 
inapplicable, because Heflexiviza.tion is both upward and downward 
bounded, i.e., the reflexive a.nd its antecedent must be clause-mates). 
Hoss supports his claim with the following examples: 
(1.92) a. *Bill understands Mary and himself. 
b. *Bill and Mary washed himself. 
c. *Andy pinched Sarah and tickled herself. 
d. 	*The gun and a description of itself lay 
on the table. 
Notice that the above examples are relevant within the Transformational 
Position only if Coordination-Reduction precedes Reflexivization. If 
Coordina.tion-Heduction follows Reflexivization, then the input to 
the former in the derivations of (1.92a)-{l.92d) will be (l.93~)-
(1.93d). 
(1.93) 	 a., Bill understands Mary and Bill understands 
himself. 
b. *Bill washed himself and Mary washed himself. 
c. *An·dy pinched Sarah and Andy tickled herself. 
d. 	*The gun lay on the table and a description of 
itself lay on the table. · 
It can be seen that, given the ordering Reflexivization • Coordination 
Reduction, the b-d sentences in (1.92} are bad independently of the 
CSC, and the badness of (1.92a) cannot be accounted for by the CSC, 
for the violated islW1d does not yet exist at the stage at which 
Reflexivization takes place. Therefore, Ross' claim depends on the 
ordering Coordination Reduction - Reflexivi:tation being the correct 
one. 
Let us pegin by contrasting the ill-formed (1.92a) with the well-
formed (1. 94). 
(1.94) John admires Mary and despises himself. 
In order to account for both (1.92a) and {1.94), Ross would be 
forced into the highly unnatural ~osition that some instances of 
Coordination Reduction precede, while others follow, Reflexivization. 
This unnatural position could be avoided by regarding the two parts 
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of the CBC (i.e., the one which refers to.entire coordinate terms 
and the one which refers to parts of coordinate terms) as essentially 
independent restrictions (in Chapter Three I will argue that this is 
precisely the correct conclusion), and that Reflexivization is 
subject, a.long with a number of other pronominalization phenomena, 
only to the first part of the CSC. In that case, the acceptability 
of (1.94) need not trouble us. 
It remains to decide on the ordering of Reflexivization and  
Coordination Reduction. Reflexivization must be cyclic, if the  
grammatical (1.95) is to be generated.  
{1.95) Mary·believes herself to have done harm to 
herself in her sleep. 
Coordination Reduction must be either cyclic or post-cyclic but  
not precyclic) because it must follow the cyclic rule of Passive,  
as (1.96) suggests.  
(1.96) John hit Mary and was hit by Bill. 
Making the more conservative assumption that Coordination Reduction  
is cyclic, let us consider the derivation of {1.92a), Its source  
must be something like (1,97).  
(1.97) Bill understands Mary and Bill understands Bill. 
Since Reflexivization is cyclic, it will apply on the first cycle, 
·yielding (1.93a); Coordination Reduction cannot apply on the first 
cycle, because its structural description is not met, and roust there-
fore apply on the second cycle and to the outnut of Reflexivization, 
Consequently, the unacceptabiiity of (1.92a) cannot be blamed on 
the CSC within the Transformational Position, and a sixth r,:lobe.l 
condition like (1.98) seems to be called for. 
(1,98) A rule subject to island constraints is blocked 
even when it affects a structure which is not 
internal to an island, if that structure 
becomes internal to l:)ll island after the 
application of the rule. in question. 
We have considered six non-transformational conditions on 
island constraints, namely (1.59), (,1.62), (1.67), {1.86), (1.91) 
and (1.98), and have seen them to be necessary for observational 
adequacy purposes. There is no reason tq believe that the list is 
closed, but even if it is, there are sufficient grounds for rejecting 
the Transformational Position as observationally inadequate. 
With respect to the Derivatione.1 Position, we have seen that it 
was observationally adequate for the cases considered, and we may 
credit it with observational adequacy in handling other similar 
cases, if such should arise. On the other hand, there is no reason 
for believing that the Derivatione.1 Position ca.n do more than glve an 
observationally adequate account of the facts. The Derivatione.1 · 
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Position could be claime.d to capture an imnortant generalization 
if the six global conditions I have listed could be sh.own.to form 
a natural class. However, tnere is no way that I can see in which 
this can be done. (1.86) and (1.91) might suggest a generalization 
like 1 a configuration counts as an island if and only if it has that 
status in underlying representation', but this bic-:>nditional state-
ment i~ falsified both ways qy (1.62) and (1.98); (1.62) shows that 
the violation of a configuration with island status in underlying 
representation becomes immaterial due to something which happens at 
a later stage, and (1.98) shows that a configuration with no island 
status in underlying representation can impose island constraints 
due to something that happens later on. Until someone can show that 
the list of global conditions 1:,iven above forms a ·natural class, ,,re 
can regard the Derivational Position as descriptively and explana-
torily inadequate, since the statement of the above global conditions 
on island constraints does make the implicit claim that these 
conditions form a natural ,class. 
In Chapter Four, I will argue that the phenomena described in 
this section by global.conditions follow in a natural way from 
independently supported assumptions made by the Behavioral Position. 
· 1.2.7. Before concluding our review of Ross' dissertation, it 
is worthwhile to look at the most important questions Ross considered 
his thesis had raised without answering: 
(1.99) 	 a. Why should rules which adjoin terms to the 
right side of a_variable be upward bounded, 
and not those which adjoin terms to be 
the left of a variable? 
b. 	 Why should it be that chopping rules, 
feature-changing rules and unidirectional 
deletion rules share the property of 
being subject to the constraints, to the 
exclusion of other rules? 
c. 	 Why should there be a difference between 
unidirectional and bidirectional pro-
nominalization? 
d. 	 Why should complex NP 1s, coordinate nodes, 
sentential subject clauses a.hd NP's on the 
left branches of larger NP's all function 
the same in defining islands? 
e. 	 Can islands be shown to behave like psycho-
linguistic entities? 
A large part of the remainder of this thesis wil~ be devoted 
to arguing that the answer to (1.99e) is yes. With respect to 
(l.99a)-(l.99d), I believe they rest on mistaken assumptions and 
should be reformulated before they can be answered. I will discuss 
(1.99a) in 2.1.3 and show that the pertinent constraint is much 
weaker than Ross though. Concetning (1,99b) and (1,99c), I have 
already shown that unidirectional and bidirectional pronominalization 
are irrelevant notions with respect to island constraints; moreover, 
have also pointed out that the notion 'feature-changing rule' I 
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should probabiy be rephrased as 'neutralization', to cover at least 
the comparator-:compa.ree relation, which h_a.!:i nothing to do with 
:feature-changing. Finally, I shall argue in Chapter Three and in 
Chapter Four that only complex NP's, coordinate nodes, and sentences 
or verb phrases modified by optional adverbials function the same in 
defining islands, as they are the only configurations the constraints 
on which are descriptively collapsible and therefore capable of 
receiving the same explanation, Once Ross' questions have been 
·appropriately reformulated, the answer to them will essentially 
consist of 	the answer to (1.99:f), · 
(1. 99) f. How do islands behave as psycholinguistic 
entities? 
1.3. There are two more proposals within the Transformational 
Position which we shall consider in this chanter. The first 
represents a reaction of Chomsky's to Ross' ~riticisni. of the A-over-A 
principle; Chomsky attempts to defend his principle within the 
framework of his E~ended Standard Theory. The somewhat more elegant 
formulation of the principle given in this paper is reproduced 
below as (1,100), although the latter is, as far as I can see, a 
notational variant of (i.4). 
(1.100) 	 If a transformation appliee to a structure of 
the form 
ca .... cA ~ ... J •••• J 
where a is 	a. recursive node, then it must 
be so interpreted as to apply to the maximal 
,Phrase of 	the type!• 
1.3.1. Chomsky writes that "it would be a welcome result 11 if 
a "careful formulation ofthe A-over-A condition", together with a 
set of conditions to be examined below, would turn out to be capable 
of adequately handling the range of examples earlier treated as 
conditions on transformations, for the A-over-A principle seems to 
be an intuitively natural one, while "such conditions as the Complex 
Noun Phrase Constraint seem quite ad hoc". And in(ieed, it· is not 
difficult to assent to the claim that if Ross' treatment represented 
a step forward over the A-over-A principle in terms of observational 
adequacy, it looked very much like a step backwards in terms 9f 
descriptive adequacy. However, as no account can be descriptively 
adequate without also being observationally adequate, it will be 
interesting to consider in some detail the ways in which Chomsky 
proposes to make his analysis observationally adequate. 
Earlier, I mentioned two kinds of cases in which the A-over-A 
principle turned out to be to.o strong; the two kinds were illustrated 
by the examples (1.6) and (1.7), (1.10), (i.13) respectively, which 
I reproduce b.elow for convenience: 
(1.6) You 	 approve .of my seeing someone. 
(1.7) You 	 saw the picture of the master of the hous·e. 
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{1.10) I believe that John claimed that Mary insinuated 
that Bill was guilt¥ of murder. 
(1.13) John decided to try to begin to write a book. 
In connection with (1.6), where the NP someone can be wrenched 
out of the containing NP !llY seeing someone, Chomsky has in fact no 
solution. He proposes to weaken the A-over-A principle from the 
status of a universal constraint to that of a part of an evaluation 
measure on the complexity of granimars , Thus , yrho would yo.u approve 
of my seeing is merely a 'marked' form, rather than an ungrammatical 
one, since the violation of the A-over-A principle does no longer 
necessarily result in ungra.'Illllaticality. What this account leaves 
unexplained is why the above marked form should be perfectly 
_acceptable, while other instances of violation of the principle 
should be totally unacceptable. · 
In connection with (1.7), (1.10) and (1.13), where any of the 
lower HP.' s, SI s, or VP' s can be fronted, Chomsky claims that the A-
over-A principle is not in fact involved. His explanation runs as 
follows: there are~ among other rules, the cyclic rules of wh-placement 
and of wh-movement; the rule of wh-movement refers only to constituents 
that carry a wh (in Chomsky's system, topicalized elements also carry 
a wh-like :feature); therefore, the chopping rule of wh-movement is 
unambiguous, and the A-over-A principle does not need to be invoked. 
However, as Chomsky nowhere says that the A-over-A principle constrains 
only chopping transformations, it is not at all clear why it allows 
the placement of wh on the lower A's. Wh-placement may be regarded 
as a feature-changing transformation, but I think it is more correctly 
de.scribed a.s the overt manifestation of a neutralization phenomenon, 
of the type discussed already; in the case of relative wh-words, the 
neutralization involves conferentiality, in the case of interrogative 
wh-words, it involves the 'target' of a question-verb (in the 
performative analysis, this description covers direct questions as 
well). Such neutralizations are subject to island constraints, as 
ve saw above, and wh-neutralization is no exception. To see that, 
we must consider asituation in which wh-words cannot move; this arises 
when there are more !!h-interrogatives than question verbs, as in {1,101). 
(l.101) 	 a, Someone went to Paris and to some other place. 
b, *Who went to Paris and to which other place? 
The fact that (1.101b) cannot be derived from (1.101a) indicates 
that wh-neutralization must be consc.rained by the A-over-A Principle 
or some equivalent device. 
1.3,2. By denying that wh-,neutralization is subject to the 
A-over-A Principle, Chomsky must impose a whole new list of conditions 
on the rules which move wh-like words; the applicability of the A-
over-A Principle is, of course, severely restricted by this decision. 
On the other hand, the A-over-A Principle becomes applicable in a 
new range of cases, which did not require an.y meta-grammatical 
constraints in Ross' framework, due to some rather radical changes 
in Chomsky 1s theoretical· framework. For example, due to the elimination 
of the Subject-Raising rule and to the definition of the structural 
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index of the passive in terms of categories rather than of relations, 
the A-over-A condition becomes important in preventing ungrammatical 
outputs of the Passive transfor~ation. 
In order to block the movement of one term of a coordinate node, 
Chomsky resorts to a convention proposed by Dougherty to the effect 
that feature complexes are not assigned to coordinate terms directly, 
but rather to the coordinate node first, after which they 'percolate' 
into the coordinate terms. Since a feature like wh has to be assigned 
both to coordinate NP-node and to the NP-nodes that it immediately-
dominates, the A-over-A principle will effectively blqck the move-
ment of one of the latter. It is not clear, however, }'low the move-
ment of an element of a coordinate term will be blocked. If the 
coordinate node is an S, it will be rather artificial to assign it 
a wh, in order that some NP inside the coordinate S's be eventually 
marked with this feature. Moreover, it will be necessary to allow 
the 'across-the-boa.rd' movement of elements in violation of the 
A-over-A principle. 
It is not very clear how the movement of the head of a 
relative clause can be prevented, so long as neutralization manifested 
by wh-placement is not subject to the A-over-A condition. Presumably, 
thepercolation-convention would have to be extended to complex NP's, 
requiring that the .head can only receive a wh if the higher NP node 
received one as well. 
With r~spect to the Left Branch Condition, Chomsky suggests in 
note 10 that it be made part of the larger condition which blocks 
the movement of 'specifiers' of NP1s and AP's (determiners and pre-
adjectival adverbial. modifiers respectively). This more general 
formulation, as well as the separation of the freezing of specifiers 
and of Complex-NP-heads (,rhich were both collapsed under the LBC in 
Ross' treatment), seems to me essentially correct; in fact, I will 
argue that it was wrong to blame the freezing of complex NP heads 
on the LBC. 
1,3,3. A large number of restrictions are taken care of by 
the following rather complex constraint: 
. (1.102·) No rule can involve !, Y in 
•••!•••Ca .••~•.. -WW ••. J••• 
where ( i) 	 Z is the subject of W'fV and is not 
- controlled by a category containing 
X 
or (ii) 	 a is a subject phrase properly 
containing! 
or (iii) 	 Y is in COMP and Xis not in COMP 
or (iv) 	 Yis not in COMP and a is a tensed s 
or (v) 	 Xis in COMP and J is not in an 
adjacent cycle. 
1.3.3.l. (l.102i) concerns a number of cases which were not  
discussed in Ross' dissertation, some of which, Chomsky claims, have  
the ultimate effect of reducing ambiguity in language. These cases.  
will be briefly considered in Chapter Two.  
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1.3,3,2. (1.102ii) is in effect equivalent to Ross' Sentential 
Subject Constr.aint, except that it does not allow for the optionality 
/
of Pied-Piping in subject position, and thus rules out the grammatical 
(1.103b). 
(1.103) a. A picture of John hangs in the dining-room. 
b. 	 It's John who a picture of hangs in the 
dining-room. 
1.3. 3,3. (1.102iii) presupposes Bresnan I s Comnlernentizer 
Substitution Universa1. In this view, all sentences in all languages 
are generated in the base with a node COMPll (for complementizer), 
11Notice that this proposal comes very close to a tacit 
acceptance of the performative analysis, since it is hard t.o see 
what other interpretation could be given to the fact that main 
clauses are introduced by COMP. 
which is necessarily lexically empty. This node may appear to the 
right or to the left of sentences, and it is only in the latter case 
that transformations can insert lexical material into COMP. The 
lexical material that can be so inserted consists by and large of 
wh-like words (i.e., relativized, questioned or topicalized 
constituents in various languages). The condition that COMP-substitution 
transformations cannot operate if the COMP is clause-final is in fact 
equivalent to Ross' Right Roof Constraint. If COMP is not filled by 
a wh-phrase, it is optjonally filled by that (incidentally, .Dean (1967) 
pointed out that verbs like~. croak,~. etc,, require a that 
complementizer). What (l.102iii) does is ensure that the rules that 
Ross views as unbounded and that Chomsky regards as proceeding by 
cyclic 'hopping' will only adjoin a chopped constituent to the left 
of sentences . ' 
1.3.3.4. (l.102iv) prevents elements from escaping from tensed 
interrogative clauses. Thus, in both (1,104) and (1.105) Y (in these 
instances, what) cannot be in COMP, for the COMP position is filled 
by where and how respectively, and the movement of what is blocked 
on the inner cycle. On the outer cycle, however, what can escape in 
(1.105), but not in (1.104), for, in the latter, it originates in a 
tensed clause. 
(1.104) *What did he wonder where John put? 
(1.105) What crimes does the FBI know how to solve? 
In notes (25) and (26), Chomsky admits that (l.102iv) is too strong 
for many speakers in blocking movements out of all tensed interro-
gative clauses (some speakers accept What crimes did he wonder how 
~hey solved) and that (1.102i) is also too strong, as it stars {1.105). 
From. the way·in which (1.102) is formulated, it is not clear 
whether·or not the set (i-v) is intendetl as an exhaustive list of 
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conditions; that is, it is not claar whether the where that precedes 
(1.1.02i) 	is, to be interpreted as a.n if and only i~rmerely as an 
if_. Given the fact that {1.102) is the last of e. number of 
reformu1ations; we can assume that an if and orill if-statement was 
attempted, and infer from (l.102ii) and (l.102iv) that if Xis in 
COMP and !_ is in COMP, the resu1t will be grammatical. In-this 
connection, I should like to point out a rather interestinp; counter-
example from Rumanian. 
In Rumanian, it is possible to move more than one questioned 
constituent in COMP position in the same clause. Thus, the following 
sentences are all grammatical: 
(1:106) 	 Cine pe cine a intinit?  
Who whom met?  
11Who met whom?"  
(1.107) 	 Nu §tiu cine unde a pleca.t. 
I don't know who where went. 
"I don't know who went where." 
(1.108) 	 'ri-a.m spus deja cine pe cine cind a ucis. 
I have told you already who whom when killed. 
"I have already told you who killed whom when." 
Apparently, the base rules of Rumanian generate more than one 
clause-initial COMP-node. One might attempt to maintain the one-
CQMP-per-S hypothesis by proposing that the various 1wh-words' are 
in effect coordinated and that the coordinate node is inserted under 
the COMP-node. Such a hypothesis would be, however, disproved by 
(1,109) and (1,116). 
(1.109) 	*Nu §tiu ci.ne cind unde a murit. 
I don't· know who where when died. 
"I don't know who died where when." 
(l.110) 	 llu §tiu cine unde $i cind a murit. 
I don't know who where and when died. 
Apparently, the C0?1P~nodes of Rumanian have to be marked for the 
category they can accommodate, and there is only one COMP for 
adverbials, Thus, (1.110) is grammatical, for only one (coordinate) 
adverbia.l node has been inserted, while (1,109) is ungrammatical, 
because one of the adverbs has failed to find an empty COMP-node. 
This strongly suggests that there is more than one COMP-node in 
(1.106)-(1.108), and that the various questioned constituents in 
these sentences are not coordinated. 
Another fact which suggests that the equivalents of wh-words in 
(1.106)-(1,108} are not coordinated is the existence of the following 
minima.l pair:12 
12r am indebted to m;y wife, Mariana Grosu, for this observation. 
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(1.111) 	 a. Nu ~tiu cine ne cine a prins. 
a. Nu ~tiu cine, §i ne cine, a prins. 
In (1.lllb}, the wh-words are overtly coordinated, and the a- and b.:. 
sentences are not quite identical in meaning. (l.llla) translates 
roughly as (1.112a), while (l,lllb) translates roughly as (1.112b); 
in the a-sentences, the speaker asserts that he knows one fact, 
while in the b-sentences he asserts that he knows two facts. 
(1.112) a. I don't know who caught whom. 
b. I don't know whoi caup,ht someonej, and! 
don't know whomj hei caught. 
As pointed out above, it would follow from Chomsky's· principle 
that a wh-phrase that has moved into COMP-position can move upwards. 
But this is not the case for Rumanian, as the movement of any of the 
wh-words in (1,108) results in total ungrammaticality; this can be 
seen in (1.113)-(1.115) (the last is grammatical, bu~ only if cind 
when' originates in the matrix sentence). --
(1.113) 	*Cine ti-am spus pe cine cind a ucis? 
Who did I tell you whom when killed? 
(1.114) 	*Pe cine ti-e.m spus cine cind a ucis'? 
Whom did I tell you who when killed? 
(1.115) 	 Cind ti-am spus Cine pe cine a ucis? 
When did I tell you who whom killed? 
What these facts suggest is that the explanation of the 
restrictions on chopping out of interrogative clauses in.terms of 
wh-hopping is mistaken. In addition, it still remains to give an 
observationally adequate account of those cases in which interrogative 
clauses function as islands, since neither Chomsky nor Ross have done 
anything of the kind. Perhaps, the solution to this difficult problem 
should be sought not only in formal features, like the presence or 
absence of tense in the interrogative clause, but also in the 
semantics of each interrogative word. The matter remains open, for 
the time being. 
Since Chomsky req_uires that COMP dominate a null lexical string 
in the base, I assume that he would not want to claim that 
subordinating conjunctions like although, unless, therefore, etc., 
occupy COMP-position at any time. Notice, however, that if such 
conjunctions are construed as complementizers, and if the theory is 
modified to allow their generation in the base in such a position, 
then (l.102iv) is powerful enough to account for what I called 
earlier the Optional Adverbial Constraint. Additional specifications 
would, however, be necessary, since adverbials seem to disallow the 
migration of their elements even when they are not tensed, and even 
when they are not clauses. 
1.3,3.5, Finally, (1.102v) is meant to cover some cases which 
fall under the Complex·NP Constraint. Indeed, although both Sand NP 
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a.re cyclic nodes , it is S a.;Ldne tµa~ has a COMP, and. some ',Th-word 
inside 1.:1. cla;u.se in apposition to a sente.ntia.1 noun can only move 
in the COMP of that clause; it 'will be unable to move on the next 
cycle, s:i,hce the higher lW phrase has no COMP, a.nd (1.102v) prev!,lnts 
y from 'ski.ppirig a cycle' (thisrcondition is unnecessary to prevent 
movements out of relative clauses; since those have a wh-worcl in 
COMP position, and.chopping is thus blocked one cycle earlier). 
. If {i .102v )' is adequ.ite f'oJ;' complex NP' s, it fail fl ag~in by 
being too strong in the case or embedded interrogatives. Indeed, 
it rules out the entirely .a~ceptable (1.116). 
(1.116) 	 This is the book which I am not sure whether. 
(or not) I told. you how to bind. 
This additional example strengthe,!ls the ·case for not atter.1pting 
to handle interroga.tive·-cl.ause islands in purely formal, terms. 
1.3.4. · In conclusion, it appears t.hat. Chom:::;ky's analysis of' 
the phenomena considered by Ross does not go very far in proviq.ing. 
a natural alternative. Chomsky rightly criticizes ·noss. for proposing 
a list of ad hoc qonstraints, but it is d.1ff:i.cu.lt. to see why his 
(l.102ii)-(Ll02v) chould not be subject- to the sa.m:e criticisJT), 
Also, the A.:.over..;A Principle, which did seem to have a.n air gf 
naturalt1ess a.bout itself in t'.!homsky's initial treatment, does ·hot 
live up to expectat;tons in Cllomsky (1971). owing to the large number 
of easel'! in which ft makes wrong predictions, or in which it makes 
correct.predictions for the wrong :reasons c~.g., the blockinp; of 
movemen:ts .of · element.s of. a coordinate te;rm Just in case the e~ement 
to be moved and the coordinate r:iode happen to belong to the same. 
category). I believe we must conclude that Chomsky 1 s 1971 propc,sal 
comes no closer than Ross' 1967 one tp providing a natural solution 
to the phenomena at issue. 
i.4. The last attempt to arrive at a descriptively and ex:plana-
torily· mo.re adequate a.ccqunt of island constr.aints within the Tra.ris-
forma.tionai Positior\ which we shall e;x:amine in this Chapter is Ross' 
Island Constraint (or the IC), orally prClposed in a series of 
lectur.es at The Ohio State Ur:iiversity (spring, 1971). 
(1.117) 	 The IC: If some constituent X of category A 
imme-dia.tely dominates so!lle coi:istitueht Y, 
also of category A, then no constituent Z 
of any .category tue whatever, which is 
dominated (not necessarily immediately) by 
X can be moved from under the domination 
of X. 
The IC revives the A-over-A Principle, and attempts to avoid its 
observational inadequacies by appropriately.weakening and 
strengthening it;" this is dohe by the first and second undersco.red 
specifications respectively. 
Ai.though I <;onsider the specification of immediate domination 
to be a. valuable insir;ht (which I shall incorp9rate i~te> m.v counter 
proposal of Chapter Three), I think that the TC must be re,1ected 
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because of at least the folovi~g observational deficiencies: 
(l.118) a. It wrongly predicts that clauses moved by 
Ex.tranosition (and atached to the first 
S-node up) are islands, as c~n be seen 
in (1.119). 
(1.119) Who it possible that Mary loves? 
(1.118) b. It wrongiy predicts that Ex.traposition-from-
NP is an impossible rule. 
c. It wrongly predicts that Ex.traposition-0i'-PP is ap impossible rule. 
d, If prepositional pharses are regarded as 
NP1s, it wrongly predicts that prepositions 
cannot be stranded. 
3, It wrongly.predicts that nominal complements 
of NP' s cannot be moved, that is, that 
(1.120a) and (1.120b) are ungrammatical. 
(1,120) a. Which house did I show you a picture of? 
b . Of which cars were the hoods damaged by 
the explosion? 
(1.118) f. If complementizers are Chomsky-adjoined to 
the clauses they introduce, it wrongly 
predicts-that (1.121) is ungrammatical. 
(1. 121) Who did you cl.aim that John saw? 
(1,118) g, It wrongly predicts that elements of a main 
clause modified by an adverbial clause 
cannot move, that is, that (1.122) is 
ungrammatical. 
(1,122) The woman who John dislikes, because he suspects 
her of deceit, is seriously il. 
The applicability of the IC to such structures folows from the claim 
made in Ross {1967) that they have essentialy the surface structure 
in (1.123). 
(1.123) ~ ~ 
S {ADV)I... 
Ross defended the structure in (l.123) with two arguments: (i) 
the natural place to pause in (1.124}.is before because, which 
suggests that this is .where the major structural boundary lies. 
(1.124) John hit Bill because he was furious, 
(ii) Extraposition cannot move a clause around the adverbial, a.s 
seen in (1,125), a fact which would follow from a. structure like 
(1.123) and the MC. 
(1.125) a. That Mary is sick is funny because no one 
has been sick for :r~a.rs. 
b. It is funny that Mary is sick because no 
one has been sick for years. 
c. *It is fµnny because no one has been.sick 
for years that Mary is sick. 
The two above arguments are not entirely conclusive, for the 
major break in a phrase does not necessarily allow pause (e.g., one 
does not usually pause between subject and verb nhrase), and the 
facts of Extra.position do not work in the srune way for non-clausal 
adverbs (the reason is, I believe, that the RHC is an incorrect 
principle, as I shall argue in 2.1.3), as can be seen in (1.126). 
(1,126) a. That John was sick was announced yesterday 
at noon, 
b, It wa~ announced that John was sick yesterday 
a.t noon. 
c. 	 It was announced yesterday at noon that 
John was sick. 
As it is rather implausible that adverbs are differently adjoined 
to higher nodes depending on whether they a.re clausal or not, Ross' 
second argument is inconclusive~ But there are better argUlllents 
which can be adduced to support his position, Thus, (iii) As two 
adverbs of the same kind cannot occur in the same clause, we must 
assume that the second adverbial in (1,127n) and (1.127b) belongs 
to a higher clause than the main one. 
(1,127) a. John struck his kid because he had been 
naughty, because Mar:r asked him to do so. 
b, John went out to buy some whiskey, to 
please his fiancee • 
(iv) Negative polarity items like any or~ are toleraQle inside 
adverbs, provided that the latter are not preceded by pause, as 
seen in (1.128). 
(1.128) 	 a. John wasn't arrested because he had ever 
killed anyone (he was nabbed for stronP,-
a.rmed robbery). 
b. 	*,John wan 't arrested, because he had ever 
killed anyone. 
'l'he difference in acceptability between (1.128a) and (1.128b) follows 
quite naturally if we assume that the latter only has the structure 
in (1.123), since the negative polarity items would be commanded by 
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negation in (1.128a); but not in (1.128b). 
· I regard the arguments (iii) and (iv) above as sufficient for 
concluding that sentence-modifying adverbials have the structure in 
(1.123) , and that (1.122) is a counterexample to the IC. 
(1.118) h. The IC wrongly predicts that adverbs cannot 
be clefted, and this is not in .general 
true, as shown in (1,129), 
.(1.129) a. It's because he loves her that John beats 
his wife, 
b. It was (in order) to gain Mary's confidence 
that John pretended not know that she was 
rich. 
c, It's since he began the research on his 
dissertation that Bill has gone nuts, 
d. It's after the battle that scores a.re 
e, 
settled, · 
It's before he arrived that sh~ died. 13 
13r,tany other adverbial types can be clefted, such as the ones 
introduced by instrumental with, before, after, temporal since, 
etc. However, although,~, for, causative since, and perhaps 
others, cannot be clefted; the latter three a.re interesting in that 
they seem to be logically synonymous with because, but behave 
differently with respect to clefting, as (i) shows. 
(i) 	 a. It's because he had.no money that John 
dropped out of school. 
b. *It's r~;r L he had no money that Johnl~inceJ 
dropped out of school. 
M. Geis pointed out to me that the adverbs in (ib), unlike the one 
in (ia), disallow the chopping of elements of the main clause--as 
seen in (ii)--, which constitutes an apparent counterexample to my 
claim (3.2.ii) in Chapter 'l'hree, to the effect that. movements o:f 
elements of the main clause are free in principle. 
(ii) a. Who did John jilt because she had no money? 
b. *Who did Jqhn jilt r;;r }she had no money?l since 
A third distinguishing property is the ability to occur in 
embedded clauses, as shown in (iii). 
(iii) 	 a. I believe (John left the country because he 
was unhappy]. 
b. *I believe [John left the country r~~r }· he 
wa.s unhappy J • l~ince 
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A fourth distinguishing property is ambiguity under negation. 
Thus, (iva) is ambiguous, as pointed out in Lakoff (1970), while 
(ivb) is not, · 
(iv) a. John doesn't beat his 	wife because he loves her. 
b. 	 John doesn't beat his wife r ~;r }he loves her. 
l_since 
A fifth distinguishing property was pointed out to me by J. 
Hutcheson: while (va) can be a well-formed answer to why does John 
beat his wife?, (vb) cannot, 
(v) 
A complete study of adverbs is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, but it seems to me that the data presented so far 
suggest that as-, for-, and since-, clauses must be comments of the 
speaker, whilethis is not necessary for because-clauses. If this 
is correct, we have a fa~rly straightforward explanation for the five 
facts· above. 
Thus, (iiib) is bad, because a comment of the speak.er must be 
directly dominated by the top S-node. · 
(iva) is ambiguous because the because-clause can be dominated 
either by the top S, in which case it comme.nds the negation, or by 
the VP-node of the ma.in clause., in which case negation commands it; 
as the latter situation could not arise for as-, for-, ·or since-
clauses, (ivb) is unambiguous. - -- ---
With respect to the unacceptability of (iib), a nwnber of 
writers have proposed that unbounded movement rules, such as 
Question-Movement, attach an element through Chamsky-adjunction 
(i.e., by creating a superordinate node of the same kind;as the one 
to which the element is attached) rather than by sister-adjunction. 
Very little evidence has been given in favor of this position, as 
far as I know, but if who is indeed Chomsky-adjoined to the top 
S-node, the unacceptability of (iib) will follow from the fact that 
the adverbial clauses a.re no longer dominated by the top S-node; thus, 
the badness of (iib), supported by the conclusions that we drew from 
the badness of (iib) and (ivb), may be regarded as evidence that 
unbounded movement rules perform Chomsky-adjunction. 
The badness of (ib) a.nd (vb) a.re, I believe, different mani-
festations of the same fact. Thus, it has often been pointed out 
that clefted (and pseudo-clefted) constituents, as well as 
(appropriate) answers to questions, represent the main assertion of 
a sentence, or, as certain writers put it, the new information which 
a sentence conveys; this is also mirrored in the fact that cleft and 
pseudo-cleft constituents as well as answers to questions (and 
question-words, for that matter) , must always bear stress, But 
~-, for-, and since-, clauses constitute (parenthetical) comments of 
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the spe~er on the pro~sitio1;1 expressed in the ma.in clause, ·and 
consequently cannot be the main assertion of the entire sentence; 
hence, they cannot be cleft constituents or answers to questions, 
and of course, there can be no question-word, applicable to such 
constituents (that such clauses cannot be -oseudo-clefted is shown 
in (vi) , where the a-sentenc'e is possible for some speakers, w~ile 
the b-one is out for everyone) • 
(vi) a.. Why I didn't want to see you was because 
you had always been nasty. 
las }b, *Why I didn't want to see you was for you had alwa.ys· been nasty. since 
The import of the facts discussed in this note is that very 
slight se'Illantic distinctions can have notable syntactic consequences. 
The same was argued in note 3 to this chapter, where it was pointed 
out that exceed and more than, although apparently logically 
equivalent, cannot have the same semantic representation. Such 
cases U11doubtedly deserve further study (for a discussion of 
related problems, see Shopen (1972)). 
(1.118) i. The IC falsely predicts that adverbials 
cannot be preposed from under the dominance 
of the immediately higher S-node (the 
circled one in (1,123), and this is 
contradicted by (1.130b), which is derived 
from (1.130a). 
(1. 130) a. I wonder whether I could talk to you., in 
case you have a spare minute, 
b. In case you have a spare minute, I wonder 
whether I could talk to you. 
(1.118) j, The ic falsely predicts that all coordinate 
structures are frozen to the same degree. 
In Ross (1967), the weaker claim that 
only symmetric coordination is subject to 
the CSC is ma.de, but it will be shown in 
detail in Chapter Three that the situation 
is much more complicated than that; in 
fact, different types of coordination are 
subject to different constraints. Ross 
failed to consider all the pertinent cases, 
and even the ones he considered are not 
constrained exactly as he thought. 
k. The IC (as well as the CSC) falsely predicts 
that across-the-board movements out of 
coordinations cannot occur, that is, that 
(1,131) is ungrammatical. 
(1.131) It's potatoes that Bill likes and Jill dislikes. 
I t.ake it that the obj~ctions {],.ll8a)-(1.l18k) are sufficient 
to show that the IC is not a·tenable proppsal, ev~n thoug~ I think 
it comes closer to des~riptiye aqequacy than the other alternatives 
we have considered so far. 
In Chapter Three, I shall pre$ent a different proposal. which, 
as far as I can see, avoids the counterexamples that viciate the 
IC, and lends itself to a natural explariat'ion. My criticism of the 
various proposals I have discussed was not meant to belittle them. 
On the contrary, I regard them as highly interesting attempts to 
make contributions to the study of.syntax, and the fact that 
empirical. proposals exhibit flaws should come as no surprise. In 
fact, I have no doubt that my own proposal, even if rat:lking higher 
at various levels of adequacy than those I have re,1ected, will 
itself turn out to be inadequate in a number of ways. 
CHAPI'ER II  
PERCEPTUAL PRINCIPLES AND GRAMMAR 
2.0.0. This chapter is essentially concerned with providing  
linguistic illustrations of the applicability of the three kinds of  
perceptual principles mentioned in the Introduction, namely, the  
principles of erroneous closure, the principles of perceptual  
conflict, and the principles of interrupted _behavior; these three  
kinds of principles will be discussed in sections 2.1.1, 2 .1. 2, and  
2.1.3 respectively (the last will be introduced in 2.1.2). 
The theory of perceptual strategies summarized in Bever (1970)  
is briefly outlined in 2.0.1. The last major section of this chapter,  
2.2, is.concerned with various possible minimal distance principles,  
· and their failure (as far ns I have been able to ascertain) to 
affect grammars in significant ways. 
2.0.1. In earlier writings within the framework of transformational 
grammar, the distinction between "ungrammatical" sentences and sentences 
11 unacceptfble for performance reasons" vas presented as a hard and 
fast one. Most recently, various writers have question~d the validity 
1There has also been a great deal ·of discussion on the treatment 
of semantic ill-formedness, i.e., whether the.latter should be handled 
as a syntactic or extrasyntactic phenomenon, but this is largely 
irrelevant to the issues we shall be concerned with. 
of this absolute distinction. In particular, T. G. Bever has 
claimed, in a number of articles, that the internal mechanisms of 
speech production, of speech perception, and of prediction of the 
acceptability of potential sentences are partially independent and 
mutually influence one another. The part of his hypothesis that we 
shall be essentially concerned with is the claim that the strategies 
employed in speech perception may constrain the acceptability, and 
sometimes even the grammaticality, of sentences, and that the out-
right rejection of certain constructions by native informants may be 
explained in a much more illuminating way by considering possible 
perceptual causes than by seeking a purely formal analysis. 2 
2I wish to stess that my adoption--as a working hypothesis--
of Bever's claim that features of perception may affect the accept-
ability of sentences should not be construed as an acceptance of 
every aspect of his theory of interacting systems. · 
In particular, I disagree with his statement that "transformations 
are irrelevant to most ongoing speech behavior." This statement 
rests on the fairly well supported notion that the production of a 
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sentence does not simulate its generatiop by a transformational· 
grammar, and that its understanding does not simulate a reversal of 
the grammatically pertinent rules. The most obvious argument 
against equating grammatical rules with real--time processes is that 
the rules of grammar operate on the entire _string, while a sentence 
begins to be interpreted as it begins te be heard and need not exist 
in its entirety in the head of the speaker before it is pronounced. 
Notice, however, that this only shows that transformations are 
probably not used as real-time processes, but not that they a.re not 
used at all in behavior. In fact, I find it hard to conceive of a 
person producing or understanding certain sentences without using his 
knowledse about transf'ormational relations, or about other features 
of his language. Indee'd, how could one say or understand 
(i) although he is poor, John married a rich girl, or 
(ii) 	 ?ill killed his wife and was in turn killed by 
his mistress 
without consciously knowing that poor and rich are antonyms, or that 
the active and the passive are converse relations? Conversely, how 
could one construct a pun without being aware of ambiguities? It 
seems to me that everything a person knows about his language may be 
actively utilized in production or perception, even though this 
utilization need not take the form of gran:ima.r-simulation. 
Bever 1 s statement that "competence is performance" has drawn 
sharp criticism. On the face of it, this statement is not just hard 
to believe, but also in flagrant contradiction with Bever's other 
claim that transformations are intuitions not used in actual speech 
behavior, which implies that one's knowledge about language and one's 
linguistic behavior are at least partially distinct, I believe, 
however, that these difficulties are due to Bever 1s failure to define 
his notion of competence caref'ully enough. Indeed, liever uses 
"competence" in the special sense of nwha.t a speaker consciously 
knows about his language," and claims that a speaker's intuitions 
are limited to acceptability Judgments, but shed no light on the 
sources of unacceptabilities. Thus, if comnetence_ is defined as the 
sum of a speaker's intuitions and if expressing intuitions is a form 
if performanc~, it is clear that the distinction between performance 
and competence becomes a trivial one, and one may claim that 
competence if> part of performance, or that "competence j.§. performance" 
(which does not mean that performance is competence}. 
Bever refers to a nwnber of experiments which suggest that the 
various mechanisms which are integrated in the adult are acquired 
independently by the child. Thus, children seem to go through three 
stages during their linguistic development. Very young children 
appear to depend on 11basic linguistic cape.cities," such as the belief 
that words refer to objects and actions in the world, or that there 
are functional internal relations between parts of sentences, such 
that they express the roles ·or the various o.cta.nts. Children around 
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the age of seven begin to be able to appreciate the regularity of 
the relation between actives and passives, which suggests that they 
have begun to acquire a grammar, i.e •. , an abstract system vhich 
enables them to make sophisticated predictive judgments about 
sentences. However, children between.the ages of two and six appear 
to rely rather heavily on perceptual strategies like (2.1) a.nd (2.2),3 
3These are, respectively, the principles Bever labels (B) and 
(D) in Bever (1970). 
(2.1) The first N...v... (N)~ .. clause is the main clause, 
unless the verb is marked as subordinate. 
(2.2) Any Houn-Verb-Nowi {NVN) sequence within a 
potential internal unit in the surface structure 
corresponds to 11 actor-action.:.object." 
Thus, in an experiment conducted with children between 1 1/2 and 
2 1/2, it was found that vhen presented with a complex sentence like 
the cow that jumped walked away., and asked to act out, some children 
11:'~t out the doubly-widerscored portion, It appears that they considered 
the first clause to be the main clause, in other words, that they 
followed (2,1) completely, a.nd that they were unable to make use of 
overt marks of subordination. It is hard to tell whether they can 
recognize such marks at all, but whatever the situation, a strategy 
.like (2.1) appears to override other considerations. Similarly, it 
was found in another experiment that the performance of children on 
"reversible" pa.ssives (i.e •. , sentences in which semantic or contextual 
information do not give any clue as to the roles of the actants) 
deteriorates considerably a.round the age of four. The suggested 
conclusion is that children begin to depend on a strategy like (2.2) 
at that age, 
Bever does not attempt to decide whether strategies like (2.1) 
and (2,2) are inductions over experience or whether they are determined 
by maturational development, He points out, however, that even an 
empiricist v1ew of the acquisition of such strategies which would 
claim that they "are formed in response to natural probabilities in 
the actual·speech that the child experiences," would have to explain 
why the children select precisely these strategies out of the many 
alternative possible generalizations; in other words, it would have 
to "include a nativist component" (Bever, 1970), · 
The claim that children acquire a· number of perceptual strategies 
before they have a complete grammar is crucial for the claim that 
grammar may be constrained by perception. Indeed, if certain 
perceptual strategies already exist at the stage at which grammatical 
generalizations are acquired, the child may constrain the form a,f some 
of his grammatical rules by incorporating perceptual restrictions 
directly into his predictive system, In such a case, we can say that 
a behavioral phenomenon has been 11grammatized. 11 This is, however, 
not the only possibility, for the grammar the child acquires need not 
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be, and in all probabiiity never is, affected by all his .perceptual 
strategies. In a large number of situations, perceptual strategies 
sur.viv·e without affecting the grammar, and they lead to unaccept-
abilities of various degrees, rather than to downright ungrammaticality. 
In addition to the "positive" strategies that children acquire, 
there are almost certainly constraints as to what kinds of strateeies 
can be acquired; To the extent that such constraints reflect · 
limitations of the processing device, they must be universal. However, 
as behavioral limitations determine gradual, rather than abrupt, 
complexity, they can lead to two kinds of situations, exactly like 
the positive strategies: they can either be grammatized, and thus 
become grammatical constraints, or they can survive as purely 
behavioral limitations, in which case the degree of unacceptability 
will be proportional to the "amount of complexity" present in the 
string. 
As Bever himself points out, it is not at all a simple matter 
to decide which cases of unacceptability are due to "purely syntactic" 
· factors and which are due to behavioral ones. Indeed, the only data 
available to us are intuitive judgm~nts as to the relative accept-
ability of discourse, but intuition is not a very reliable tool for 
discriminating between ungrammatical and "strictly unacceptable" 
sentences, and is in general powerless to ferret out possible 
behavioral causes when some unacceptability has been gra.mmatized. 
Therefore, it is to be expected that the causes of certain unaccept-
abilities be undecidable, at least for the time being, and that even 
the most believable claims as to perception affecting gra.mmar may not 
be provable beyond a certain degree of.doubt. I believe, however, 
that we can regard a case as having been convincingly presented when 
it can be argued that some set of apparently unrelated phenomena 
(which could be accounted for formally only by invoking arbitrary 
and ad-hoc features) receive a simple and straightforward explanation 
in behavioral terms. 
With respect to the problem of distinguishing ungrammatical  
from merely unacceptable sentences, it would be unreasonable as I  
pointed out above, to require a fool-proof procedure. However, some  
rules-of-thwnb may prove useful.  
With respect to erroneous closure, whose effect is to "lead the  
hearer up the garden path" (so that the acoustic signal has to be  
reinterpreted if one is to make sense out of it), we may regard the  
difficulty· as grammatized, if the sentence remains bad even after it  
has been pointed out to the hearer that he had been led up the garden  
path; on the other hand, if the sentence becomes acceptable when the  
hearer has been told where closure should take place, we may assume  
that there has been no grallllllatization.  
Concerning cases involving interrupted behavior, we may assume 
that grammatization has not occurred, if we get a gradual acceptability 
~ale (r~ther than a .59od bad dichoto ), as we vary the values of 
the pertinent parruneters length, complexity, predictability, etc., 
of the intervening material). An apparent counterexample to this 
generalization would be the case of rnult.iple center-embeddings, wher2 
there seems to be an abrupt jump from tolerable acceptability to 
very high unacceptability when we move from one uegree ·to two degrees 
of embedding. fiowever, center-embeddings are essentially different 
from the cases in which we get gradual judgments. Thus, the latter 
are found with one instance of interrupted behavior, while center-
embeddings to a degree higher than one involve at least ~wo independent 
instances of interrupted behavior which must be handled simultaneously; 
the situation is therefore radically different, and, in.addition, there 
seems to be some perceptual conflict ipvolved in multiple center-
embeddings (Bever, 1970; for additional discussion, see notes 18 and 
19 t~ this chapter). 
Regarding cases which exhibit perceptual conflict, we may assume 
that gra.mmatization has not occurred if sentences become acceptable 
after we have trained ourselves to overcome the difficulty involved 
and to puzzle out the meaning of the corresponding sentences; if the 
sentences are still bad when·their meaning can be apprehended with 
comparative ease, we may regard this as an indication of grammatization. 
For example, if perceptual conflict is involved in John's father's 
brother or in it's not the case that John's not oin, to the narty had 
no effect on Mary--as claimed in Bever 1970 see also note 1 to 
this chapter)--I believe that the ·conflict is not granunatized; in 
particular, expressions of the former type (and of the same or greater 
length) are probably used quite commonly in anthropological literature. 
On the other hanu, if.perceptual conflict is involved in the badness 
of he; said !,hut John; was sick--as I argue in Chapter Four--grammati-
zation prolJably ~a_s_ occurred, for the feeling of deviance persists after 
it has been made clear to the hearer that he and Jobn stand for the 
same referent. 
By the criterion I have just offered, center-embeddings like 
the boy the teacher the girl kisned spat at died would be regarded as 
ungrammatical rather than merely difficult, for it is hard to beiieve 
that people could become entirely comfortable with such sentences. Most 
writers have, however, argued that the grammatical restriction would be 
hard, if not impossible, to state, as it is not true that all center-
embeddings are as bad us the previous one; for exrunple, the.surgeon 
who the girl!Hthat hoodlum ra ed was afraid of# had won hi"'h 
distinctions in medical school is quite acceptable the symbol# 
indicates overlong pauses). Therefore, it is at least doubtful 
whether multiple center-embeddings should be regarded as ungrammatical 
in English. This indicates that the various criteria I have proposed 
do not al~ays yield the desired results; this is, however, not 
surprising, since I have made .it clear that they are rules-of-thumb, 
and nothing more. 
2.1. We shall now consider the three perceptual principles 
mentioned above in some detail. 
2.1.1. 'fhe strategy (2.1) mentioned in 2.0,1. is one factor 
capable of giving rise to erroneous closure. The point is discunsed by 
Bever (1970), who acknowledges his indebtedneirn to Kirk. Thus, as 
can be seen from the paradigm in (2.3), when a subordinate clause 
appears initially, the mark of subordination is not deletable, even 
though it may be deleted in other positions. 
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(2.3) a. It is odd tha.t John dislikes sweets, 
b. It .is odd John dislikes sweets. 
c, That Jo.hn dislikes sweets is odd. 
d. *John dislikes sweets is odd. 
Bever also points out that strategy (2.1) predicts that subject 
relative pronouns of restrictive relative clauses a.re not deletable, 
as the following tensed verb would be interpreted as the verb of the 
main clause. However, if the tensed verb is be, and if the latter is 
in turn deleted, the result is grammatical, for either the remainder of 
the verb is ·not tensed and can only be subordinate, or there is no 
verbal form. left which would enable (2.J.) to interpret the string 
erroneously. These fµ.cts are exhibited in (2 ,,4). 
( 2. 4) a. 'rhe man vho came late forgot his money. 
b. *The man came late forgot his money. 
c. 	 The senator who was in the saddle shot from 
the hip. 
d. 	*The senator was in the saddle shot from the 
hip. 
e. The senator in the saddle shot from the hip. 
·r. The monkey who was running after the bus slipped 
on a banana, 
g, 	*The monkey was running after the bus slipped 
on a banana.. 
h. 	 The monkey running after the bus slipped on a 
banana. 
The underlined sequence in (2,4b, d and g) is interpreted by (2.1) as 
the main clause, and the remainder of the sentence in question cannot 
be made sense of, 
As i'ar as I cnn tell, (2.1) is grammatized in most {possibly in 
all) dialects of English with respect to the facts exhibited in (2.3) 
a.nd (2,4); that is, there are no dialects that I know of in which 
(2.3d), (2.4b), (2.4d) or (2.4g) a.re gr8ll1Inatical. There is, however, 
an interesting difference between (2,3) o.nd (2.4): while a complementizer 
can be dele~ed in object position--as sho;m by the gra.mma.ticality of 
(2.2b), the deletio.n of a subject relative pronoun is usually 
prohibited in both subject and object position~ even though this does· 
not follow from (2.1); that is, many dialects do not allow J'm a man 
loves his beer cold, although some do (the sentence seems to be at 
least easier to comprehend than (2. 4b) , (2. 4d) , or (2. 4g) for anyone) • 
As I pointed out in the Introduction, the underlying complexity/ 
acceptability correlation may be obscured through rule-generalization 
and other phenomena typical of language change, and I believe that the 
restriction on relative pronoun deletion in non-subject position in 
certain dialects of Modern English is a case in point. I also 
expressed the view that the lack of transparency of a posited under-
lying complexity/a.ccepto.bility correlation should not di::icouraF,e 
ef.forts aimed nt provinr; the exi::itence of such a correlation; in the 
case under discus::iion; supporting evidence ror the relevance of (2.1) 
to (2.3) and (2.~) has in fact been found. 
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µever points out that many subjects judge (2.5a) to be just as 
bad as the starred sentences in (2.4) on .a first presentation. 
(2,5) a, The horse raced past the ba+n fell. 
b. The horse seen past the barn fell. 
However, when it is pointed out to them that (2,5a) should be inter-
preted similarly to (2,5b), they judge (2,5a) as entirely acceptable, 
It appears therefore that (2.1) isgrammatized only when the verb is 
unambiguously tensed. The fa.ct that subjects nevertheless tend to 
reject {2.5a} on the first presentation strongly suggests that a 
strategy like (2.1) is operative, for otherwise we would expect (2,5a) 
to be rejected _only about 50 per cent of the time, depending on whether
4the hearer happened to interpret raced as a tensed or an untensed form. 
4This is, unfortunately, not quite correct, for there are 
additional variables which viciate this conclusion. Thus, (a) the 
causative reading of race, is somewhat less common than the non-
causative reading, a.nd(b) the causative reading requires that the 
verb be passive, vhich, as has already been shown experimentally, is 
a. more complex form than the corresponding active one. Assuming a 
strategy by which, given two options (and all other things being equal), 
subJects tend to select the less complex opti9n (see also principle 
(2.22) below in the text), it is conceivable that this strategy may 
a.lso determine the perception of raced (2. 5a.) as a tense.d verb, over 
and above (2.1); consequently, the initial rejection of (2,5a) cannot 
be unambiguously attributed to (2.1). 
This shows the enormous difficulty of constructing meaningful 
experiments for syntactic perception, for the huge number of inter-
acting cues makes it extremely.hard to control all the pertinent 
variables. 
Another experiment cited in Bever (1970) as supporting evidence 
for (2.1) 
in (4.6). 
concerns the two pairs of second degree center-embeddings 
(2.6) a, The editor the authors newspapers hired liked 
laughed. 
b, The editor authors the newspapers hired liked 
laughed. 
Subjects were asked to paraphrase sentences like the above, and 
experienced much greater difficulty with the b- than with the a.-
type. This can be again.accounted for by (2.1), for, while both 
construction types involve two interruptions, as well as. perceptual 
conflict, the b-sentence also invites erroneous closure (the underscored 
string being a possible sentence in {2.6b) but not in (2.6a)). 
In an interesting recent paper, Cha.pin, Smith and Abrahamson 
(1972) suggest that Bever's strategy is in fact a particular instance 
of a more general strategy which they formulate as follows: 
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(2.7) 	 In imposing an initial structural description on 
a sentence, the S(ubject) attempts at each 
successive point to close off a constituent 
of the highest level possible. 
They argue that (2. 7) can account for all the cases covered by ( 2. i'), 
and also for the following experimental results which they report on: 
Subjects were presented with sentences like those in (2.6c) and (2.6d); 
in the former, the first major boundary is the main break. Clicks were 
located midway between the two boundaries, and subjects were asked 
to report the location of the clicks. 
(2.G) 	 c. The Chairman of the Board should eive 
whoever invented that process a prize. 
d. 	 Women who are over sixty years old and kids 
must have the first chance to escape. 
In sentences like (2.6c)t there was a significantly greater 
tendency to prepose the click towards the earlier bou,ndary than to 
postpose it tow~ds the later one; this was interpreted as a tendency 
for clicks to 'migra.t.e towa.;r-ds the ma.in sentence break. On the other 
hand, in sentences like (2.6d), there was no greater tendency for the 
clicks to postpose than to prepose, although the main break,was the 
second one; Chapin et al. propose that the factor which interferes with 
the attraction exerted by the main sentence break is precisely {2,7), 
which prompts subjects to assume that the underscored strinp; in (2.6d) 
is an argument of the main clause, while it is in fact only a term of 
a coordinate argument of the main clause. 
Another instance of perceptual complexity explainable by {2.7),  
but not by (2.1), is (2.6e).  
(2.6) 	 e.??Artists girls, boys and women hurry a lot 
tend to resent it. 
This sentence was mentioned by Bever in a public lecture at. the  
Linguistic Institute in 1971. This sentence is bad because the string  
ending with lot tends to be misconstrued as the main clause; however,  
(2.1) cannot tell the whole story here, for the deletion of non- 
subject relative pronouns is perfectly possible in principle •  
.	Thus, artists girls hurry a lot tend ·to resent it. is perfectly 
acceptable, presumably because the lack of pause between artists and 
girls prevents a coordinate reading. The cue constituted by the 
absence of pause after artists in (2.6e) is apparently overridden by 
another strategy, vhich-~formulated roughly as 11 e. sequence of the 
form NP *{o81¼1 NP is interpreted as a coordination, 11 Observe, however, 
that (2. 7.) can account for the fact that the underscore.d sequence in 
(2.6e) ten.ds to be perceived as a. coordinate UP, without requiring 
· an additionai strategy: thi.s sequence can be misconstrued as subject 
of the main clause, and premature closure occurs after~' when in 
fact it should have occurred after lot. Thus, as the underscored 
sequence has been misconstrued as the subject of the ma.in clause, it· 
plus the sequence hurry a lot can be misconstrued as the main clause 
(it appears that (2.7) applies twice in this sentence). 
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It should be pointed out that (2.7) is inadequate as _it stands: 
If subjects indeed try to close of.fa. constituent bf the highest 
level possible as soon as possible, then why should they close in 
(2.Ge) after women and not after artists? After all, the latter is 
a perfectly possible subject of some main clause! Similarly, Chapin 
et al. argue that the most natural order of preno.minal adjectives 
in English (which, as pointed out in Vendler, 1961, requires that 
adjectives be arrl!.nged from left to right as they increase in 
"nominality11 ) maximizes the efficiency of (2,7), since it allows the 
HP to be closed as soon as an element of lesser nominality than the 
preceding one is encountered. Thus, the delightful red plastic cup 
is more acceptable tho.n ?the delightful plastic red cu.J?_, because, 
according to Chapin et al., the latter invites erroneous closure after 
plastic, however, why does closure occur after cup in the former, 
rather than after plastic or even red, for both the delightful red 
plastic or the delightful red are theoretically possible NP 1 s? It 
appears that there is something missing in (2.7), and that an amended· 
formulation something like (2.8) would be in order, 
(2.8) 	 In imposing an initial structural description 
on a sentence, the S(ubject) attempts at each 
successive point to close off a constituent 
of the highest level possible; however, closure 
is suspended until some significant cue is 
encountered. 
What can constitute a "significant cue" remains to be investigated 
for each construction type. In the case of the natural order of 
adjectives, that cue apparently is the occurrence of a constituent 
of lesser nominality than the preceding one, which acts as a NP-
boundary marker; in coordinations, a helpful cue may be the presence 
of a coordinating conjunction, which signals that the last member of 
a coordination is about to come (or has already occurred, in lanv,uages 
like Latin); however, this cue is not ava_ilable in languap:es which lack 
an overt morpheme and and conjoin by juxtaposition. In any event, 
closure must be suspended until some cue carryine; sufficient weight 
occurs, or coordinations should be unacceptable, optional sentence-
final adverbial modifiers should create perceptual problems, and 
sentences like John screamed .at me or Bill is eating an: apple should 
receive low acceptability ratings because John screamed and Bill is 
eating are possibl~ English sent~nces. 
Before closing_ this section, it is appropriate to try to pinpoint 
some factors which may tend to favor the grammatization of complexities 
resulting from erroneous closure (of course, complete and rip,6rous 
predictio~s are, as I have st~essed a number of times, strictly a goal 
for the remote future). Specifically, we may ask why (2.5a) "improves 
upon acquaintance," while (2.4b) does not; that is, why the former 
becomes acceptable once it has been. pointed out to the hearer that 
raced is a past participle (as laid down in the rule-of-thumb I gave 
at the end of section 2.0.l). My guess is that gra.mmatization tends 
to be inhibited when there exists some overt feature of the string on 
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which the mistaken initial interpretation can be bla.med. In (2.5a), 
the blame can be laid on the he~rer 1s failure to select the correct 
homonym for the item raced. In the starred sentences of (2.4), 
however, the hearer can only be blamed for his failure to reconstruct 
an item whose logical presence is not signalled by any overt cue; as 
the hearer has not misinterpreted any of the overt features of the 
string, there is no vay in which he can devise a strategy for avoiding 
erroneous closure in the future (i.e., there is nothing to which he 
can try to pay better attention}, and it is reasonable to assume that 
such sentences will tend to be avoided (and ultimately thr6.m out of 
the language} . 
Selection of the vrong homonym is certainly not the only mistake 
which may be corrected by paying better attention to some overt cue 
in the acoustic signal. Thus it is to be expected that supra-
segmental cues may also inhibit gramma.tization; for example, it is 
possible to distinguish intonationally betveen CJohn or Bill or Mary] 
and CJohn or [Bill or Mar;r.:_JJ (essentially, by uttering the lower level 
coordination more quickly), This intonational option preswnably 
enables (2.6e} to improve upon acquaintance, as it should be possible 
to make it clear by pitch, stress and/or use of pa.uses that only the 
la.st three of the first four NP's form a coordination. On the other 
hand, it is hard to see what intonational cues could keep the tvo 
putative readings of the underscored strings in (2.4) apart: since 
only nonrestrictive relative clauses allow the deletion of the pronoun 
in English (compare the man I hit is sick with ·*the man, I hit, is 
sick) there is no way to signal the intended relative pronoun by 
pause; on the other hand, short subjects cannot be separated by pause 
from their verbs either, so that pause cannot distinguish between the 
two readings here, Notice also that the relation the remainders of 
the underscored strings bear to the initial NP is exactly the relation 
they bear to the deleted pronoun, since both elements are subjects; 
as these remainders would be VP 1 s of the same type on either reading, 
there is no way in which their suprasegmental structure could force 
one reading rather than the other. Notice also that the tvo putative 
subjects can always allow the same VP 1 s (since they are coreferential 
and therefore necessarily enter into the same selectional restrictions}, 
while erroneous closure in sentences like '(2.6e) is only possible when 
the verb occupying the position of h(r~ can be construed as either 
transltive or intransitive (compare. 2. e) with the rr,ore acceptable 
artists irls bo sand women hate the uts of usually develo 
suicidal tendencies . I assume that the fact that there are unambiguous 
sentences constructed on the pattern of (2.6e) except for the lack of 
an intransitive reading for the counterpart of ~urrl may also 
inhibit the tendency to throw (2.6e) out of the language. 
I have discussed several linguistic illustrations of the operation 
of a principle of erroneous closure (tentatively formulated as (2.8}}, 
and have also attempted to pinpoint some of the factors that may favor 
grammatization. Additional (mostly grammatized) instances of erroneous 
closure wi.11 be considered in the ensuing sections and chapters, a.nd 
shall argue that their grrunmatization CWl be accounted for 
essentially by the swne principle I have postulated here. namely, that 
I 
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erroneous closure tends to result in ungrammaticality when it cannot 
be avoided by concentrating on some overt feature of the string (which 
may have been overlook~d on the first.take). 
2,1.2. This section is devoted to the so-called "cross-over 
phenomena" discussed in Postal (1971). Postal recognizes two broad 
subclasses of phenomena, namely, cross-over restrictions on bounded 
rules, and on unbounded rules. I shall .argue that the former subclass 
is essentially explainable in terms of a conflict principle~-(2,23)--, 
and that most of the phenomena in the latter can be explained on the 
basis of an interru tion rinci le--(2.37)--coupled with the already 
mentioned principle 2.22 , which, in strategic terms, translates as 
the instruction "whenever possible, choose the simplest alternative." 
In his book, Postal presents the cross-over constraints as 
purely syntactic, on the groun~s that the sentences they rule out 
"have unique interpretations and involve no semantic violations at 
all." Obviously, Postal did not consider the possibility that his 
phenomena might have a psychological explanation, but I shall argue 
that such an explanation can be both simpler and more illuminating. 
The bounded rules that Postal is concerned with are Passive, 
Subject-Raising, Tough-Movement, About-Movement and Flip, and these 
are illustrated in (2,9)-(2.13) respectively. 
(2.9) · a. John sta,bbed Mary. 
b. Mary was stabbed by John, 
(2.10) a. It seems to me that John is stupid. 
b. John seems to ~ to be stupid. 
(2.ll) a. It is difficult for Mary to shave BHL 
b. Bill is difficult for ~ to shave. 
(2.12) 	 a. I talked to John about Mary. 
b, I talked about Mary to John. 
(2.13) 	 a, I am amazed at John. 
b. John amazes ~· 
Postal points out that in his idiolect--and in a large number of 
dialects--the b-sentences in the above set become ungrammatical if 
the underscored NP's are coreferential, as in (2.14)-(2.18b). 
(2.lq) 	 a. John stabbed himself, 
b. *John was stabbed by himself. 
(2.15) 	 a. It seems to me that I am stupid.· 
b. *I seem to myself to be stupid. 
(2.16) 	 a. It is difficult for me to shave myself. 
b. *I am difficul·t for myself to shave. 
(2.17) 	 a. I talked to Bill about himself. 
b. *I talked about Bill to himself. 
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( 2.18) a.. I am amaze.d at myself.  
b~ ·?I amaze myself,  
At first blush, we seem to be dealing with a purely syntactic 
restriction, which prevents pounded movement rules f'rom causing an NP 
to cross over another NP with which it is coref'erential. HO\.;ever, 
there are several problems with a formal· statement along these lines. 
· First, the existence of some of the transformations claimed to 
be involved in the above set has been thrown into doubt by various 
writ~rs. Thus, Jackendoff' (1969); ·offered some evidence against 
Tough-Move~ent, and Postal himself points· out that he does not claim 
that (2.18b) is derived from (2,18a), or that sentences related by 
Flip are necessarily synonymous. Other writers have pointed out that 
if (2.13a) and (2.13b) are claimed to be related transforrnationally, and 
·if a is claimed to be in some sense more basic than b because its surface 
subject is its logical subject (an experiencer), there are other pairs 
of predicates which, like~ and sell, express converse relations, 
and still there are no obvious reasons for choosing one· of them as more 
basic than the other. In addition to this, the existence of a res.triction 
in Postal 1 s Flip-cases is not nearly as clearly established as for the 
other four cases; indeed, most people that I have consulted find (2.18b) 
perfectly acceptable, end this is also true of other sentences tha.t 
Postal stars, e.g., I am acceptable to myself or I am loathsome to 
~self. Still, my informants found other examples of Postal 9s less 
acceptable, e.~., I strike myself as pom£ous. Be this as it ma~, people 
usually find (2.17b) just as bad as (2.1 )-(2.16b), and if.it should 
turn out that there is no To.ugh-Movement rule, the entire cross-over 
principle would be thrown into doubt, 
Second, Postal points out an interesting exception to the 
restrictions on About-Movement: the restrictions do not hold if the 
sentence contains an earlier NP coreferential with the two NP's that 
cross over each other, as in (2.19), 
(2.19) 	 a. I talked to myself about myself, 
b, I t~ed about myself to myself. 
In order to handle this case, Postal invents the notion of pronominal 
virgin, i.e., an NP which has not yet been pronominalized at the stage 
at which some transformation applies, and requires that the cross-over 
restrictions apply only to pronominal virgins. Then, the desired 
result follows, if Reflexivization is ordered before about-movement. 
Postal uses the notion of pronominal virgin also in attempting to 
account for restrictions on unbounded movements, which do not affect 
reflexives, but do affect simple pronouns; his solution is to order 
Pronominalization after about-movement, This proposal ·assumes that 
Pronominalization is a rule [which has been seriously questioned lately), 
and makes a number of assumptions about rule ordering which the author 
himself later regarded as "doubtful" (in Postal, 1970), Moreover, this 
solution gives no insight into the possible reasons for the constraints' 
behaving as they do, 
Third, Postal notes that the constraints do not hold if the second  
NP is heavily stressed, and especially 11 i:f such particles as even are  
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added" (p. 9). Thus, compare the sentences in (2 .20). 
(2.20) a. *John is hated by himself, 
b. John is hated· by himself. 
c. John is even hated by himself, 
Postal points out that his formulation of Cross-Over does not account 
for the acceptability of (2.20b, c) and devotes a separate chapter 
(Chapter 19) to a discussion of this problem, Basically, he proposes 
that coreference can either be bindin~ or predicational, and that the 
latter kind (illustrated by (2.20b, c ) is exempted from the constraints, 
Binding coreference ari s·es when the speaker presupposes two NP' s to 
be coreferents, but the sentence is about something else, while pre-
dicational coreference arises when no identity is presupposed and when 
asserting coreferentiality between two NP 1 s is the comment of the 
sentence, While this account may well be correct, it is not obvious 
why Cross-Over should single out binding coreferentiality as its domain 
of application. 
We shall now consider a possible explanation for the unacceptability 
of the b-sentences in (2.14)-(2.18). Let us begin by noticing that the 
b-sentences in (2,9)-(2.13) are psychologically more complex than the 
corresponding a-sentences (or, to use Prague-school terminology, the 
a-sentences are "unmarked," while the b-sentences are "marked"). Indeed, 
in the case of the passive, it is clear that it is more complex than 
the active, since children acquire it much later and also, many adults 
tend to avoid passives, whenever possible). Bever suggests that the 
greater complexity of the passive is due to the violation of (2.2) 
(in fact, Bev~r's "actor-action-object" should be replaced by something 
like "logical subject-predicator-logical object, 11 to cover cases in 
which the subject is inanimate, and therefore an instrument, or in which 
the verb is stative and the subject an experiencer). I do not know what 
the relative order-of acquisition is for the members of the pairs (2.10)-
(2.13), but if the complexity of the passive is indeed due to a violation 
of (2.2), then a similar violation occurs in (2.13b). Indeed, only the 
NP-slot filled by me is necessarily animate, as can be seen in (2.21). 
(2.21) a. I am amazed at the scenery. 
b. *The scenery is amazed at John, 
c. The scenery amazes me, 
d. *John amazes the scenery, 
With respect to the b-sentences in. (2.10) and ( 2 .11) , they are more 
complex than the a-sentences for they involve logical discontinuities 
in surface structure. Indeed, the predicate~ takes two arguments, 
an experiencer and a sentential object. The latter forms a surface 
unit in the 1 a-sentence (that John is stupid), but is broken down into 
two separate parts in the b-sentence (John and to be stupid). Similarly, 
the predicate difficult also takes an experiencer and a sentential 
object (I assume, following Jackendoff, 1969, and Chomsky, 1971, that 
an earlier stage in the derivation of (2,lla) is it is difficult for 
Mary; for Mary; to shave Bill). Like the sentences in (2.10), (2.lla) 
exhibits a continuous sentential object, for Mar) to shave Bill, 
while (2;llb) exhibits a discontinuous one, J3ill and for Mary to 
shave. Finally, we can argue that (2.12) is unmarked because the 
li:near order of its three HP's expresses the natural hierarchy of their 
roles, since John_ is an experiencer, and therefore necessarily animate, 
while Ma:rz is an object an.d. can be replaced by inanimate or abstract 
nouns, as well as by nominalizations; on the assumption that animate 
roles are higher in the hier13.rchy than·inanimate ones, the failure of 
the linear order of (2.12.b) to reflect this fact makes it more marked 
than (2 .12a). 4 · · · 
4rt would be tempting to generalize from these facts and claim 
that the unmark.ed order of are;uments always reflects the hierarchy of 
their role.s, However, there are obvious difficulties with such a 
proposal, For example, the unmarked orderin~ of Instrumental and 
Objective differs according to construction, as in (i): 
(i) The man broke the window with a harruner. 
(ii) *'l'he man broke with a hammer the window., 
(iii) 	 The .manner broke the window.  
(iv)? ?'l'he window broke the hammer.  
As we can see, (ii) is ill-formed, and (iv), even though it is probably 
well-formed grammatically and odd for non-linguistic reasons, is hot a 
paraphrase of (iii). · 
Furthermore, it is not even clear whether anima~e cases (i.e.~ 
Agent and Experiencer) necessarily precede all other cases in unmarked 
order. 'l'hus, it is not clear that (v·) is less complex than (vi), 
(v) I gave John a book. 
(vi) I gave a book to John. 
Perhaps, then, the feeling that (2.12a) is less complex than (2.13b) 
is merely due to the farmer's greater frequency of occurrence in English. 
In that. case, the phenomenon would be no more remarkab.le than th.at 
place adverbs usually precede time adverbs in '.r:nglish, while the opposite 
situation obtains in other languages,. like French or Rumanian. Be 
this as it may, the explanation of ·cross-over phenomena. that I wish to 
propose depends only on the fact of markedness and not on its cause. 
Hotice, incidentally, that the more general strategy (2.2) musta.lso be 
language-specific, as one wot).ld not expect it to develop in a language 
with unmarked surface order VOS [apparently, Malagasy is such a 
·laneuage, according to E. Keenan (public lecture, 1971 Linguistic 
Institute)], 
Now thut Lhe facts of markedness are established for the pairs in 
(2.6)-(2.13), it is important to notice that if the members of the 
various pairs are cognitively synonymous_, they differ with resp~ct to 
focun.5 
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5The term 'focus' is often used in the literature as a synonym 
of 'comment,' and is thus contrasted with 'topic.' However, I use 
'focus' in this section to mean 1that which is more prominent 
subjectively.' Thus, in (i) below, the focus coincides with the 
topic (John); however, in (ii), the focus coincides with the comment 
(a snak~the stress being contra,stive). 
(i) John saw a snake. 
(ii) John saw a snake. 
This use of the term 'focus' is also found in Partee (1971), who 
notes that 'adding [contrastive] stress [an instance of comment] 
and raising to subject [an instance of topic] are two ways of 
accomplishing the same result, namely the bringing into focus' 
(underscore mine). 
As I have defined it, focus is a relative notion, and there may 
be more than one focus per sentenc~. In fact, the explanation of 
the grammaticality of (2.19b) which I propose below rests precisely 
on the assumption that sentences may be plurifocal. 
Chanee of focus can be achieved in a variety of ways (he.avy 
stress, clefting, unbounded topicalization rules, topic-introducers 
like ~-12£, yith respect to, etc.), and in the cases at issue, it 
can be achieved through the use of a marked fonn, which causes an 
earlier ~ppearance of some argument with respect to the unmarked 
form, thereby throwing this argument into focus and defocusing the 
argument which constitutes a focus in the corresponding unmarked 
form. Thus, Passive and Flip focus on the logical object and defocus 
the logical subject, Subject-Raising and Tough-Movement focus an 
element of the sentential object and defocus the experiencer, and About-
Movement focuses the about-phrase and defocuses the experiencer, Clearly, 
however, as focus is created by displacing arguments within a sentence, 
it is only the earliest appearnace of some NP in that sentence which 
can have focusing effect (the pertinence of this fact will become 
obvious below, when (2.19b) is discussed). 
I shall now introduce two fairly obvious principles based on. 
experience, which, I believe, can explain not only the problems 
connected with the bounded rules, but also with the unbounded ones. 
(2.22) Unless there is an indication to the contrary, 
one tends to assume that people do not 
complicate matters unnecessarily. [This 
principle is a reformulation of a conversa-
tional implicature proposed in Grice (1968)J. 
(2.23) When something is done for a purpose., and that 
purpose cannot be achieved in principle, · 
perceptual conflict arises. 
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(2.23) can provide a simple explanation for the unacceptability 
of the b-sentenccs in (2.14)-(2.18). Indeed, a hearer naturally 
assumes that a apeaker uses the more complex marked form in order to 
focus on some HP and defocus another; hovever, there turns out to be 
no such possibility in these cases, since the focused and defocused 
HP's refer to the same entity. In other words, the use of the marked 
form is pointless. 
To put the matter another way, the sentences in question are 
odd because they create conflicting assumptions in the hearer; the 
fact that the marked form is used leads the hearer to believe that 
the focused and defocused entities are different; on the other hand, 
the existence of a reflexive pronoun tells the hearer that the speaker 
presupposes that the two entities are not different. The reason vhy 
these sentences are odd but interp etable, is that the assumption of 
coreferentiality alone is a logical presupposition, while the assumption 
of non-coreferentiality is merely an implicature. If both assumptions 
were logical presuppositions, the sentences would be semantically ill-
formed, like my brother, Mary, is sick. 
Let us take a quick look at the various problems that I earlier 
claimed arise if the cross-over phenomena are treated in purely formal 
terms. 
First, the cross-over principle, as formulated by Postal, depends 
crucially on there existing a movement transformation. Nothing of the 
kind is required for a principle like (2.23) to be applicable, Indeed, 
all we need is the existence of pairs of cognitively synonymous 
sentences, which differ in perceptual complexity and in focus 
potentiality; the synonymy need not, however, be statable trans-
formationally. I believe that the sentences related·bY the putative 
'l'ough-movement rule are synonymous (at least in the va.st majority of 
cases, since the counterexamples advanced in Jackendoff {1969) are 
sufficiently rare for us to be able to assume that some learners may 
never hear them). Non-synonymy, on the other hand, seems to be the 
rule rather than the exception for 'flipped' sentences, and this is 
probably why the constraints are very much weaker or totally non-
existent for most speakers. 
Second, in order to account for the acceptability of (2.19b), 
Postal had to invent the notion of pronominal virgins and stipulate 
that the cross-over restrictions apply to pronominal virgins only; 
this in turn called for a number of assumptions about rule-ordering . 
.Notice, however, that (2.19b) is not ruled out--or marked as odd--by 
either (2.23) or (2.22). Indeed, due to the fact that there is an 
earlier NP--the subject--which is coreferential with both.reflexive 
pronouns, the about-phrase fronting can no longer have a focusing 
effect, and therefore there is no assumption that it took place 'for 
a purpose,' as required for the applicability of (2.23). The choice 
of the marked form is still an 'unnecessary complication' (see (2.22)), 
and one might assume that the two IfP 1 s which switched places are not 
coreferential, if it were not for their reflexive form, which is 'an 
indication to the contrary.' Thus, (2.19b) is possible, as a 
stylistic variant of (2.19a). 
Third, Postal attempts to explain the failure of heavily  
stressed reflexives to obey the constraints by claiming that the NP's  
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involved are ·not presupposed to be· coreferential at the _stage at 
which their coreferentiality is asserted. Specifically, he derives 
(2.24a) from (2,24b) by a rather complex transformation which he 
calls Contrast-Movement. 
(2.24) a. Bill cut himself. 
b. The onej [whoj Billi cut] was Billi (himself). 
I believe that if (2.24a) a.nd (2.24b) are related tra.nsformationally, 
it is the former, rather than the latter, which is basic, nnd this 
claim will be defended in considerable detail in 2,1.3, The direction-
ality of the transformation relating (2.24a) and (2.24b) is however 
not crucial here, for in either case Bill and himself are not pre-
supposed to be coreferential. One possible explanation of·the accept-
ability of John was shot by himself is that the I~ocus of a sentence is 
in most cases its subject, therefore a change of subject by one of 
the bounded rul.es at issue effects a change of focus; however, if there 
is a stressed constituent in the seQtence other than the subject, that 
one counts as the focus. Since the subject is no longer the focus, 
it ca..~ no longer be assumed that the change of subject was made in 
order to create a new focus; rather, it is assumed that the marked 
form was selected for.some other reason(s). The reason which determines 
such selection.in a case like John was shot by himself_is that this 
sentence presupposes John; was shot by someonej (usually due to a 
previous assertion, such as John was shot by Bill); thus, John wasn't 
shot by Bill, he shot himself sounds much less natural than John wasn 1t 
shot by Bill, he was shot by himself. Notice that this line of approach 
enables us to explain why *John was shot by himself is bad; indeed, this 
sentence presupposes *someone· was shot b himself·. 
We are also in a position to understand why 2.20c) is better than 
(2 ,20b), a fact which Postal I s Contrast Movement rule cannot account 
for. · Indeed, the scope ·of even constitutes a focus, and (2. 20c) has 
two overt signals that the subject is not the focus, namely, even 
and contrastive stress, while (2.20b) has only one such signa~ 
contrastive stress. If the crossover phenomena are due to behavioral 
reasons, as I suggested, then it is quite natural to expect that two 
signals.should be better than one in this situation, for they make the 
shift in focus easier to perceive. 
In stating Cross-Over, Postal restricts its applicability by 
using the notions of mention, peer, clause-mate (we have already 
mentioned pronominal virgin). While these notions do indeed yield the 
desired results, it remains to be shown whether .there is a deeper 
explanation why prec·isely these notions should have to be used in 
precisely the ways in vhich Postal uses them. In other words, it is 
legitimate to ask whether these notions are in. some way connected with 
the fact that there are cross-over constraints, or whether they 
constitute n set of arbitrary, unrelated consitions. I believe that 
the notions in question are natural consequences of the account I have 
proposed. 
The requirement that only NP 1s mentioned in the structural 
description of a transformation be subject fo cross-over restrictions 
(originally made in Ross, 1967), is a totally superfluous requirement 
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in the framework I. am proposing. Consider for example (2.25b), 
which is acceptable--according to Post.al.:.-because him:j is not 
mentioned in the structural description of Subject-Raising, which 
moves it over Johnj. Observe, howeyer, that (2.~3) does not mark 
(2.25b) as odd, because the focus of the unmarked form is John, 
while the focus of the marked form is the woman who loves him, and 
the attempt to create a new focus does not fail. 
(2.25) a. It seems to Johni that the woman who loves 
himi is sick. 
b. The woman who loves himi seems to Johni 
to be sick. 
Similar arguments wi:J_l be seen to apply in the case of the unbotmded 
rules. 
The _notion of peer is meant to account for the acceptability 
of (2.25b}, where the two c<;>referents are not peers. 
(2 .26) a. Johni's wife struck hilllj_, 
b. Johni was struck by hisi wife. 
This specification is again unnecessary in my account, for the 
unmarked form· focus is John's wife, while the marked form focus is 
John, and (2.23) is inapplicable. · 
-- Finally, Postal I s Clause-Mate Restriction must appl7 to NP' s 
which are clause~mates before one of them crosses over the other, in 
order that the crossing movement may be blocked. This causes seriOU$ 
difficulties in relation to Subject-Raising (or It-Replacement, as 
Rosenbaum called it}, because the coreferents are not clause~mates 
in the input to this rule. Postal proposes to Qbviate this difficulty 
by breaking It-Replacement into two steps, one which raises the 
co~plement subject to object position in the matrix sentence and 
one which flips the new object t.o subject position. Thus, rather 
than derive (2.15b} from (2.15a}, he proposes that the source of 
these sentences is to me seems that I run stupid, which yields to me 
~eems I to be stupid, and ultimately *I seem to myself to be stupid, 
This account fails at the level of observational adequacy, since 
speaker~ do not, in general, have the same intuitions about the 
severity of violations arising through Subject-Raising e.nd through 
clear cases of the putative Flip rule. 
In my account, if a clause-mate requirement wer.e needed, it 
would be needed only in the output of the various putative trans-
formations, a condition fulfilled in all of (2.14)-(2.18). This is 
so because the applicability of (2.23} can only be judged with respect 
to the marked form. For (2.23) to reject a marked form, the new focus 
must of course be a clause mate of the unmarked form focus, since 
focus by bounded rules is precisely created by causing an NP to occur 
as an earlier argument of some verb. 
We shall now consider the restrictions on unbounded rules,· 
which I shu.11 try to show :l.re explainable, to a large extent, by 
(2.22). Lei,, us briefly consider the fa.cts o.nd Postal's oolution. 
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Postal concentrates on three 'unbounded rules: Hh-Q-Movement, 
Wh-Rel-Movement, and Y-rfovement. I shall also consider Cleftinv,, 
which is interesting to compare with Y-Movement, on account of formal 
similarities, The data to be explained are given in the paradigm below. 
(2.27) a .• 
b. 
c. 
Maryi thinks that Bill loves heri. 
Whoi thinks that Bill loves heri? 
*Who'i does Maryi think that Bill loves? 
(2.28) a. 
b. 
c .. 
The girli [the girli knows Bill loves the 
girli] is pretty. 
The girli whoi knows Bill loves heri is pretty, 
*The girli whoi shei knows Bill loves is pretty. 
(2.29) 	 a. Mary emphasized Johni must think that Jill 
loves himi. 
b. 	 Johni, Mary emphasized must think that Jill 
loves himi. 
c. 	*Ilimi, Mary emphasized Johni must think that 
Jill loves. 
(2.30) a. John talked toMary about herself. 
b. Mary, John talked to about herself. 
C, Herself, John talked to Mary ·about. 
(2. 31) a. Johni thinks that Mary loves him . 
b. It's Johni who thinks that Mary 1aves himi. 
c. It's h1mi 	Johni thinks Mary loves. 
(2.32) a. John talked to Mary about herself. 
b. It's Mary 	John talked to about herself. 
c. It 1 s herself John talked to Mary about. 
(2.33) a. *[Whosei mother] does Johni admire? 
b. *The mani [whosej mother] hei hates is ·a freak, 
C, [Hisi mother], ohni admires, 
One similarity between the restrictions on bounded and Wlbounded 
rules is that neither seems to be universal. 'l'his is probably a 
consequence of the fact that both (2.22) and (2.23) are perceptual 
principles, but not logical necessities. 
Another similarity between the two kinds of rules is that 
restrictions apply only to NP's mentioned in the index of those rules. 
Thus, Postal points out Wh-:Q-Movement is free to operate in (2.34), 
because it is the wh-word, and not him, which is mentioned in the index 
of these transformations. --
(2,34) a. Charleyi visited some of the men who criticized 
himi. 
b, [Which .of the men who criticized himiJ did 
Charleyi visit. 
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In contrast to bounded rules,. unbounded rules obey the constraints 
·even when the crossing does not involve clause-mates, either in the 
input or in the output, as can be seen in (2.27)-(2.29), 
Another difference is that crossing restrictions are not always 
restricted to peers. As can be seen in (2.33), the constraints hold 
even for non-peers in the case of Wh-Q~Movement and Wh-Rel-Movement, 
although npt in the case of Y-Movement. In other words, even though 
the moved NPi is not a coreferent of any other NPj that it crosses 
over, unacceptability may arise if the moved UPi contains an NPk 
ooreferential with NPj • However, vhy should unaccepta.bility arise in 
(2.33a) and (2.33b) but not in (2.33c)? Postal invokes Ross' notion 
of Pied-Piping, which says that if a wh-word is part of a larger HP 
(and if some additional conditions are satisfied--for which, see 
Chapter One, (1.22)--) the larger-NP may be moved along vith the wh-
word; if, however, the wh-word is on a left branch, the larger NP must 
accompany the wh-word. As (2. 33a) and (2. 33b) have the wh-word on~-
left branch, Postal proposes to regard the wh-word as the mentioned NP, 
and to ascribe the fact that it did not move alone to the LBC. On the 
other hand, Postal claims th~t Pied-Piping is not applicable to Y-
Movement, and thus (2. 33c) is grammatical because hi..§.. cannot be the· 
mentioned NP. However, Postal does not ask why Pied..,.Piping should be 
inapplicable to Y-Movement,· Uotice that Pied-Pipine does not depend 
on a vh-word; rather, it seems to require that the mentioned NP should 
be identifiable by some overt surface mark, thus suggesting that 
perception is somehow involved. This hypothesis is supported by the 
fact that Pied-Piping is applicable to Clefting, which differs from 
Y-Movement only in allowing the identification of the clefted element 
by contrastive stress. 'rhus, it is reasonable to regard his mother as 
the mentioned NP in (2. 33d), but his as the mentioned one in (2. 33e). 
(2.33) d. It's Chisi motherJ Johni admires most. 
e. It's [hfsi motherJ Johni admires most. 
A third difference between the two types of rules is that none of 
the starred sentences in which cross-over violations by unbounded 
rules occur is unacceptable on all its readings. Thus, for every 
starred sentence in (2.27)-(2.33) t~ere is a reading on which the crossed-
over NP 1 s bear different indices~ i.e., they are not presupposed to 
be coreferents (which does not mean that they are presupposed to be 
non-coreferentia.l, for a perfectly natural answer to (2.27c) is Mary , 
herself; also, the following is semantically well-formed: I know who 
M thinks Bill loves it's Mar herself 7 etc. ) • Moreover, when the 
moved NP is a reflexiv~ ~sin 2.30) the coreferential interpretation 
is both semantically possible and acceptable (or grammatical); Postal 
accounts for this fact by pointing out that reflexivization precedes 
w1bounded movements, and that the moved reflexive is not a pronominal 
virgin. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that there are no cross-over 
constraiuts on Clefting--us seen in (2.31)-(·2.32)--at lefl.st for the 
dialect in question. 
In proposing an alternative to Postal's account. we shnll have to 
answer at least th~ following questions: 
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(2.35) 	 a. Why do vlh-Q-'Movement, Wh-Rel-Movement, and 
Y-Movement obey the constraints, but not 
Clefting? 
. b. Why do unbounded movements not result in 
unacceptabilities, and why are reflexives 
exempt from the constraints? 
c. 	 Why are the const.raints confined to "mentioned" 
NP's? 
d. Why is Pied-Piping inapplicable to Y-Movement? 
With respect to (2.35a}, we shall fipst inquire whether the 
constraints can be explained by either (2.22) or (2.23), A guick 
comparison of the paradigm in (2.27)-(2.33) with the one in· (2.14)-(2.18} 
will show us that the choice is between the input and the output of 
some transformation in the latter, but between two outputs in the former. 
Out of the fo.ur unbounded rules considered, only Wh-Rel-Movement and 
Y-Movement qualify for either (2.22) or (2.23), since it is only for 
these rules that the two possible outputs {i.e., the one in which the 
closest possible candidate has moved and the one in which the more remote 
has done so) are cognitively synonymous. Indeed, there is every reason 
to assume that both outputs are derived from the same underlying 
representation: the Rel-Wh-feature can be placed on any coreferent of 
the head, without semantic effect, and Y-Movement, which fronts the 
topic of the sentence, achieves the same effect by moving any of several 
coreferents. On the other hand, when different corefere.nts are 
questioned or clefted, the results are not cognitively synonymous, as 
the various outputs have different underlying representations and 
different presuppositions. Indeed, the source of (2.27b) is ~pmeonei 
thinks that Bill loves her; while the source of (2.27c} is*~~ 
thinks that llill loves s~j. With respect to clefted NP's, they 
are semantically eriuivalent to contrastively stressed ones,. so that 
(2.31b) and (2.31c) are related ·to the semantically distinct John 
,:!;llinks that riiary loves him and John thinks that Mary loves h1m;-
respectively. Some confusion may arise between clefted and topicalized 
sentences, because informants may involuntarily stress NP's fronted by 
Y-Movement, which makes them indeed equivalent to clefted ones. However, 
if one is careful not to put constrastive stress on NP 1 s topica.lized 
by Y-Movement, the different behavior of ~he two rules becomes clear. 
The paradigm in (2.36) shows that clefted reflexives behave like 
stressed ones and topicalized· reflexives behave like unstressed ones 
with respect to the constraints. 
(2.3G) a. *John was cut by himself. 
b. *Himself, John was cut by, 
C, John was cut by himself, 
d. ·It's himself John was cut by. 
As Clefting does not obey the constraints, there is nothing to 
explain, and the inapplicability of (2.22) or (2.23) follows from the 
fact that the various outputs are not cov,nitively synonymous. The 
problem will.be to show why the constraints hold for questions, since 
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the various outputs are not derived :from the same det:p structure, or 
from synonymous deep structures. Thus, questions will have tp be 
explained by a different principle than.relativ~s, which I do not 
regard as a w~akness of my analysis, since there is no logical necessity 
that questions and.relatives r.eceive the same explanation, although· 
Postal assumes such a necessity without connnent or justification. 
We have established that when several outputs are possible for 
Wh-Rel-Movement and Y-Movement, these outputs are expected to be 
synonymous, as they are derived from the same underlyin~ representation. 
I do not see how the fa.ct that the more remote coreferent cannot be 
relativized or to1iicalized ca.n be accounted for by {2.23), since I do 
not see what could qualify as a 'purpose'. In the case of the bounded 
rules, the purpose was interpreted as the creation of a. new focus, and 
this is inapplicable here. I will therefore assume that (2.23) is 
inapplicable, whic·h already provides a partial answer to (2. 35b), since 
(2. 23) , but not (2. 22) , can mark a se.ntence as unacceptable, To ~ee 
whether (2.22) is applicable in these cases, we must first establish 
that the choice of a more remote coreferent would 'complicate matters' 
in some way. I believe that such a choice would indeed constitute a 
complication, especially in view of the fact that the linear distance 
and the nwnber of intervening sentence nodes between the two candidate 
NP's could be arbitrarily large, since the rules invoJ.ved are unbounded 
ones, :t:ndeed, the choice of the more remote constituent would unneces-
sarily strain the hearer's memory, by forcing him to await the 'resolution' 
of the fronted constituent--i.e., its 'plugging' into the constituent 
to which it immediately belongs, thereby revealing one of its roles7--
7F'ronted constituents play at least two roles: they serve as com-
ple~entizers or topic-introducers in their surface position, and as 
arguments of the predicate of some lower clause in their underlying 
position. 
for a longer period of time. I do not know whether the greater 
complexity involved in the choice of a more remote coreferent is 
reflected in the process of acquisition; that is, I do not know whether 
children first learn to relativize or topicalize out of the first 
sentence down, then out of the second, and so on. Such complexity has, 
however, experimentally beensho'Wil to exist for the adult due to the 
following interruption principle {Bever, 1970); 
(2.37) 	 Discontinuous components are perceptually complex 
in proportion to the structural complexity of 
the intervening material. 
riotice that in the output of neither rule is there an indication 
that the two coreferents must be coreferential, as personal pronouns 
need not be coreferential with anything but the relative clause head. 
Therefore, the explanation of the unacceptability of {2.27c) and {2.29c) 
is quite simple: given the fact that discontinuities increase in 
complexity with the complexity of intervening material, there is a 
- 72 -
reasonable assumption that discontinuities will be as 'small' as 
possible; as there is no 'indication to the contrary', i.e., no overt 
mark of necessary coreferentiality, a he_arer _assumes that the 
discontinuities in the two above-mentioned sentences are inini~al, 
and that there is no coreferent of the fronted NP between its surface · 
and underlying positions. The situation is different with respect to 
(2.30c), as the fronted reflexive does constitute an overt mark of 
necessary coreferentiality. The hearer knows that a fronted constituent 
plays two roles (as pointed out in footnote 7). He also knows that 
a reflexive must have a clause-mate coreferent. As no such clause~ 
mate can exist in its surface position, the conclusion is unavoidable 
that it must exist in its underlying position. As the hearer also 
knows that the clause-mate must be to the left of the reflexive, a 
topicalized reflexive already tells him that the latter must have 
'crossed' a coreferent. Therefore, the coreferential interpretation 
is possible (in fact, necessary) because (2.22) is inapplicable, and 
this interpretation is well-formed because (2.23) is inapplicable. 
Notice that the explanation we have proposed has also provided nn 
answer to (2.35b). 
Principle (2,22) can explain an interesting dialectal peculiarity. 
Thus, the paradigm in (2.38) holds for some _speakers: 
(2 . 38) a. Mary told Johni .that she loves himi . 
b. i•Johni' Mary told that she loves himi. 
c. *Himi, Mary told Johni that she loves. 
d. John, Mary told that she loves . 
Neither of the two coreferents can mGVe alone for these speakers, 
under conditions that I have not investigated in detail. For our 
purposes, it is sufficient to notic.e that chopping must occur 'across-
the-board I when both coreferents .occupy object.position. Ross (1967) 
pointed out that the across-the-board condition constitutes an 
_absolute exception on unbounded chopping rules (in the sense of Lakoff, 
1970n) in coordinations. That is, it is not only the case that choppinP, 
must occur in all the tenns of a coordination if each contains a 
coreferent, but also each coordinate term must contain a coreferent 
in specific positions if chopping is to occur at all. We can see that 
the across-the-board condition overrides the strategy which requires 
that unbounded movements be as economical as possible . 
. While the across-the-board condition in coordinations is a very 
strong, and possibly universal, one, there appears to be a weaker 
condition with respect to other structures; moreover, the strength 
of this condition varies dialectally. Thus, for the dialect in 
question, across-the-board chopping ~s mandatory in structures like 
(2,38a), but only i~ the matrix and the complement contain coreferents. 
Thus, we are not dealing here with an absolute exception, for John, 
Mary told that she loves Jack is perfectly well-formed; in contrast, 
*John, Mary loves and Jean hates Bill is not. Moreover, (2,38b) is 
not ill-formed for the speakers in question on all its readings, but 
only with the linkages indicated. It is interesting that if the link-
ages indicated are impossibl~ in (2.38b) in the dialect at issue, there 
are many speakers who accept (2.38b), but find it odd and prefer (2.38d) 
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instead, Ross (1967) mentions a number of adverbial constructions  
which differ from both cases mentioned above in that chopping is  
precluded out of the adverbial, but possible out of :the matrix or  
out of both; however, if the environment for acroi:;s..;.the-board  
chopping e"'ists, chopping out of the matrix alone is sometimes odd;  
more specifically, the acceptability of chopping-out of the matrix  
a.lone when the adverbial contains a coreferent seems to be inversely  
proportional to the acceptability of across-the-board chopping in the  
same cases.  
We shall return to across-the-board chopping later, a.nd will try  
to provide an explanation for the fact that across-the-board chopping  
·is sometimes an absolute exception and sometimes not, as well as for 
the fact that it is possible in matrix and adverbial constructions in 
which the adverbial alone cannot lose an element through chopping 
under any circwnstances. For the time being, we shall only notice 
that the reason!:! for the unacceptability (or marginality) of (2.38b} 
are fairly straiBhtforward: while (2,38d) creates an additional 
discontinuity, as compared with (2.38b), it also makes it perfectly 
unambiguous that the object of the matrix and that of the complement 
are coreferents; on the other hand, (2,38b) leaves the referent of 
him ambiguous, for a.I.though the linkages indicated are a possibility 
in some dialects, they are nowhere a necessity. Thus, (2,38b} appears 
odd, because the hearer may assume that the speaker will not allow his 
discourse to be more ambiguous than necessary; in fact, we seem to 
be dealing with a clash of two strategies: one that assumes that 
discontinuities are not increased without reason, and one that assumes 
that ambiguities are not proliferated without reason (both are 
instantiations of (2.22)), The dialectal variation in the acceptability 
of (2.38b) reflects the reasonable assumption that neither strategy 
is overwhelmingly stronger than the other; the way in which the 
conflict at issue is resolved determines the particular degree of 
acceptability of such sentences in individual dialects. 
The across-the-board condition was illustrated with Y-Movem.ent 
.only in (2.38}, but it holds for all unbounded movements. For example, 
it holds for Clefting (which is in general8 free from cross-over 
81 have found that the speakers who accept (2.31b) reject (2,31c), 
instead of which they say It's himselfi John; thinks Mary loves. This 
fact is again explainable by (2.22), since, so long as the reflexive 
is possible in this situation, it is clearly a less ambiguous, and 
therefore simpler, choice ihan the personal pronoun; thus, the use 
of a personal pronoun creates presumption of noncoreferentiality in 
this dialect. , 
constraints), as sho'Wll in (2.39) (as in the case of Y-Movement~ the 
acceptability of (2.3~b} is subject to.diale~tal variation). 
(2. 39) . a. It I s John Mary told that she love.s. 
_b. *It's Johni Mary told that she loves himi. 
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'.l'he reason is 	that (2-. 39a) has the · same meaning in the dialects in 
.question as (2.39b) purports to have (or that it has, in the 
dialects in which it is acceptable). As a choice between two 
synonymous forms exists, (2.22) forces the choice of (2'.39a). 
I shall now attenipt to provide an explanation for the behavior 
of questions. 
Postal (1971) notes in Chapter 21 that Jackendoff has proposed, 
at the 2nd Annual La Jolla Conference on English Syntax, that wh-
words are wh+some words, and that the ill-formedness of (2.40a) is 
due to the ill-formedness of its source, (2.40b). 
(2.40) a. *Whoi did shei claim Jack kissed? 
b. *Shei claimed Jack kissed someonei. 
Postal rejects Jackeridoff's proposal, but since he later admits in  
Postal (1970a)9 that he had done so for 'larcely wrong reasons,' I  
9Postal (1971) first appeared in 1968. 
shall not try 	to show that Postal 1 s initial criticism was mistaken. 
It will be interesting, however, to look at what Postal regards (in 
the more recent paper) as 'right reasons'. Postal gives four arguments: 
(2.41) 	 a. In order to make the argument go through, it 
is necessary to show that restrictive and 
appositive relative clauses obey the 
constraints for the same reasons as questions. 
b. 	 It is not true, as Jackendoff claims, that some-
words can never refer backwards to a personal 
pronoun, as (2.42a) shows. Moreover, there 
are a number of cases in which the wh-word is 
not fronted, e.g., (2.42b) and in those cases 
the wh-word ~ refer to a preceding pronoun. 
(2.42) 	 a. Although hei thought hei should run, I 
explained to some mani (I know) that the FBI 
would catch himi in no time, 
b. 	 The ne~sman who criticized himi later belted 
which officiali? 
(2.41) 	 c, The constraints hold not only for wh-words, but 
also for a certain class of nominals which 
contain them. But although n sentence like 
(2.43a), is ill-formed, it~ source, (2.43b), 
is well-formed. · 
(2.43) 	 a. *1.fuosei fatherJ's brotherk did his f J_i] 
sister criticize? lk 
b. His(!} sister criticized the brotherk of 
the fatherj of someone1 . 
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(2.41) 	 d. In question clauses with more than one wh-word, 
the wh-word which does not move can refer 
backwards to a pronoun. However, if that 
wh-word is fronted, it can no longer refer 
forwards to that pronoun, as shown in (2.44). 
(2.44) 	 a. What company had hisi wife spy.on what well-
kno.m industrialisti? 
b, 	*What well-l~nown industrialist. did the company 
hav~ hisi wife spy ~n? 
1 
With respect to (2.41a), I think it is sinply wron~. Indeed, if 
the same constraints obtain in two separate instances, it.might be 
desirable, but certainly not necessary, to show that the same cause 
determines the restrictions on both cases, 
With respect t.o (2 .4lb), I think that Jackendoff 1 s claim is too 
strong, due to his failu,re to distinguish between the properties of 
stressed and unstressed some, Althouc;h I have not conducteid an 
exhaustive investigation~some, I wish to propose the following 
tentative generalization, based on Postal's examples: 
(2.45) 	 a. unstressed~ cru;inot refer backwards to a 
pronoun. 
b. 	 stressed some can refer backwards to a pronoun, 
subject'"tc,°the general constraints on back-
wards pronominalization (i.e., some cannot 
be both commanded and preceded by the pronoun). 
By way of illustration, consider (2.46) and 
(2.47), 	 . 
(2.46) 	 a. That he, was sick disturbed Johni, 
b, That hei
l. 
was sick disturbeq some boyi. 
c. *That hei was sick dist\lrbed some boyi. 
(2.47), a. That hisi mother was dyini:; disturbed Johni...b. That hisi mother was dying disturbed s~meone1 . 
C, *That hisi mother was dying disturbed someonei, 
If ,;.re -assume that question wh-words come from the EEEl~ which 
ultimately receives stress, rather than from the one i-rhich does not, 
and if Jackendoff's proposal is modified to incorporate this assumption, 
Posto.l's argument loses its strength. Indeed, consider Postal's 
example (36), which I reproduce below as (2.48a) _and (2.48b) and 
which purports to show that questions can be well-formed when the 
underlying structure that Jackendoff assigns to them is ill-formed; 
however, if the underlying structure is taken to be (2.48c), rather 
than (2.48a), we see that the question and its Gource a~ree in 
grammaticality, 
(2.48) 	 a. *The tyrant tortured heri mother in front of 
some helpless princessi. 
b. 	 What tyrant tortured heri mother in front of 
what helpless princess1? 
c. 	 '.Phe tyrant tortured heri mother in front of 
some helpless princessi. 
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There are independent reasons for believing that interrogative 
wh-words come from the some which ultimately gets stressed. First, 
interrogative wh-words also receive stress; this fact, taken in 
isolation, caniiot be ascribed too much sggnificance, for relative 
wh-words never receive stress, but their sources have in general been 
regarded as full-fledged ar·,s, which can be stressed. However, the 
stress correlation, tor;ether with the second fact I shall mention, 
does carry weight. Thus, stressed some has been described as 'specific,' 
whole wistressed some has been described as 'non-specific'. 
Specificity is a complicated notion, much more so than it had initially 
been thought, and must be defined with respect to (often proper) 
subparts of sentences (Dean-Fodor, oral communication). Thus, ·in 
(2.49a), someone is specific with respect to John, but not with 
respect to the speaker of the sentence. 
(2.49) a. John thought that someone was in the building. 
b. John wondered who was in the.building. 
Similarly, in (2.49b), who is specific with respect to John rather 
than with respect to the speaker of the sentence. The hypothesis 
that wh-words are specific can explain the fact that (2.49c) is non 
tautolo.gous, for (2.49d) is not tautologous either, but (2.49e) is. 
(2.49) c. Where is John? 
d. John is s6mewhere. 
e. John is somewhere. 
Making the notion 'specificity' precise is a task far beyond the 
scope of this discussion, but if it can be argued that interrogative 
y.!!_-words are always specif.ic with respect to at least some clause, this 
will be sufficient motivation for regarding such words as derived 
.from specific some, which will account in a straightforward fashion 
for (2.48). -·· 
With re~pect to (2.41c), I can report that I have presented 
various native informants with a more complete version of (2.43), 
which I render below as (2.50), and that none accepted (or had heard 
speakers who accepted) any of the sentences in (2.50) with the _J_ or 
~ linkages. 
(2.50) 	 a. Whosei fatherj's brotherk did 
sister criticize? 
risi~b. ll~sj 	 sister criticized someonei's 
Hisk  
fatherj's brotherk.  
D
c. 'l'he brotherk of the father.I of whomi did
~t:~} sister criticize? 
~lSk 
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(2.50} d. 
Hisj sister  
( His  
rasu·· 9riticized the brotherk of 
the father j of someone1• 
Until more data can be gathered which corroborate Postal's, I 
think we can regard his data as suspicious and far-fetched. But even 
if we accept theni, Postal 1 s case is not yet established. Indeed, 
Postal discusses only (2,50a) and (2.50d), which he assumes are 
transformationally related, a not at all obvious point (and not a 
universally accepted one}. But even conceding this point, we cannot 
be sure that crossing over a coreferent is responsible for the unaccept-
ability of (2.50a} with the J. and!_ linkages, so long as. Postal does 
not tell us vhat his Judgments are about (2.50b). If he rejects it 
( which is sur,ge.sted by his failure t6 discuss it} , the unac~epta.bility 
of (2,50a) might be due not to cross-over, but to the preposing of 
genitives. 
With .respect to (2.41d}, I have also been unable to find anyone 
willing to agree with (2.44). In fact, every informant felt that the 
b-sentence is better than the a-one, al~hough both were judged 
acceptable. Postal.himself points out that the unacceptability of 
(2.44b) is dialect-restricted, ~nd I would guess that the dialect in 
questiqn constitutes a definite minority. In any event, the existence 
of speakers who accept (2.43) or (2.44} does not constitute a difficulty 
for my proposal, for it is perfectly possible that certain lan1T,Uage 
learners may reinterpret certain grSilllOatical facts, when the crucial 
counterevidence is fairly rare and may not be encountered a.t the 
pertinent moment. Thus, rather than extracting the generalization 
that questions are ill-formed when their sources are ill-formed,~ 
learner may i?!,fer that questions a.re Ill-formed :when there are 
coreferents of the question-word between its sur:t'a.ce and deep positions. 
Guch reinterpretation of data is perfectly possibl~ when the facts do 
not unambieuou~ly force some unique interpretation; for example, 
Carden cites the case of a family in which every member spoke a 
different 'dialect' with respect to quantifiers end ne~ation. There-
fore, although certain speakers may have reinterpreted the cross-over 
restrictions on questions as purely formal ones, it is still the case 
that these restrictions can be eiven a .!!_~tural e?f]?la.nation for a 
large number of speakers. 
There remains to answer questions (2.35c) and (2.35d) and the 
answer to both is quite simple. Concerning (2,35c}, the constraints. 
are con.fined to mentioned NP 1 s for Wh-Rel-Movement, because it is only 
in this case that there exists a. choice between two synonymous trans-
formational outputs. Thus, if a crossing NP displaced by \fa-Rel-
Movement were not the one mentioned, i.e., were not a wh-word, the 
head of the relative clause would not be coreferential with it, and 
its crossed coreferent could not have been relativized. With respect 
to questions, where the constraints are due to generai constraints on 
pronominalization involving stressed~. non-mentioned NP 1s are 
exempt, so long as they do not violate pronominalization constraints; 
for example, him is not prevented from referring to Charley either in 
(2.34b) or init·s source, (2.34a) •. Finally, non-mentioned NP's are 
exempt in the case of Y-Movement, because the mentioned NP is different 
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from the coreferent of the unmentioned one, and the sentence is 
different in focus from the one that would result if the crossed 
coreferent were topicalized. Thus, the pertinent output is not ruled 
out by (2.22), since the complication has not been 'unnecessary', and 
it is not ruled out by (2.23), since the purpose for which a more 
remote HP was chopped is a valid one. 
As far as (2.22) is concerned, fronting is the only means of 
identifying the mentioned JiP in Y-Movement, but not so for q_uestions 
and relatives, where the mentioned NP is identified by the .rh-feature. 
Therefore, even if Pied~Piping applies, it is still clear which 
element is questioned or relativized; but if Pied-Piping were applic-
able to Y-Movement, it would be impossible to know what is topicalized. 
If it can be argued that choppin[\ a larger NP is perceptually more 
difficult than chopping a smaller one, the situation can be explained 
by (2.22), as the hearer will always assume that the smallest possible 
NP has been moved, unless he is given a clear counterindication in the 
form of the wh-feature. 
As I have pointed out already, any overt feature identifying 
the mentioned NP should do, whether it is wh (as in qu~stions and 
relatives) or heavy stress (as in Clefting)-(see (2.33)). 
2 .1. 3. 'i'hi s section is concerned with the complexity of interrupted 
behavior (brought up in the preceding section in connection with the 
cross-over restrictions on Relativization and Topicalization), and 
especially with two structural discontinuities that must be ho.ndled 
concomitantly, which, as argued in 2.0.1,,create a comparatively hi~h 
decree of complexity. The center of the discussion is the pseudo-
cleft construction in English, a topic of considerable interest in 
its own rir,ht. Numerous analyses have been proposed for pseudo-
clefts; none of them is entirely satisfactory, but I shall argue that 
an analysis based on the 'extraction' of the pseudo-cleft phrase comes 
closer to being adequate than analyses of other types so far proposed. 
'l'he analysis I defend is weakened to some extent by the use of sol:le 
ad hoc formal apparatus, but I argue that this drawback does not 
invalidate the essential claim of the section, nrunely, that the 
pseudo-cleft phrase is a member of a structural discontinuity, and 
that pseudo-cleft sentences become perc.eptually complex when that 
discontinuity is combined with nnother one, such that the two are 
improperly nested. I also argue that the ad hoc apparatus I use is 
a consequence of the presently available descriptive models which do 
not allow a viable alternative to movement transformations in stating 
the existence of discontinuous components. Ultimately, the purpose 
of this section is to show that the low acceptability of concor:iitant 
double discontinuities is'(at least in part) responsible for the 
1,)henomena which led to the postulation of Ross' Hight Hoof Constraint 
(see (2.48) in section 1.2.4). Movements to the rir;ht mny create 
several.types of percepLunl difficulty, and Hos~, on the basis of a 
number of cnscs exhibitinr; gramma.tization conclndcd that the 
HRC is u purely formal constraint on grammars. Ba.sine: himself on 
Hoss' claim, Bach (1971) attempted to provide a principled explanation 
for the observation that GOV languages do not seem to have a question-
movement rule. Ilach made the general assumption that syntactic 
categories and major transformations are identifiable across 
languages, as well as the following four specific assumptions about 
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question-movement rules: 
(2.51) a. The question phrase is based on an indefinite 
pro-form; 
b. The question movement ruie is unbounded; 
c. The movement is to the front of the sentence 
or toward a governing verb (in fact, in the 
performative analysis, which Bach accepts• 
the movement is always toward a governing 
verl::!); 
d. The RRC. 
Assumptions (2.5lb)-(2.5ld) above can account for the absence of 
question-~ovements in a large number of derivations in SOV languages, 
Indeed, if the movement must proceed in one swoop, which is consistent 
with (2,51b), rather than by cyclic 1 hoppirig', and if the movement is 
toward_a governing verb which is necessarily to the right of the phrase 
to be moved, it follows that there will be a lar~e number of derivations 
in which the question phrase will have to move to the right and outside 
the dominance of.the sentence node which most irmnediately dominates it. 
Since such move~ents are precluded by the RRG, (2.51) successfully 
accounts for the la.ck of question phrase movements in such cases. 
However, as illustrated in {2.52) with a Japanese example, 
question-movements never occur in SOY languages, not even when the 
question phrase belongs to a clause immediately embedded to the 
governing verb and when question movements would not violate the RRC. 
{2.52) a. Wataku~i-wa dare-ga pan o tabeta no kl;!. to kiita • 
.I who bread ate ask,ed 
'I asked who ate the bread.' 
·b. *Watakusi-wa pan o tabeta no ka dare-ga to kiita. 
'l'o account for the ungrammaticality of {2. 52b) , Bach makes the 
followine additional assumption: 
(2.53) 	 Asswnptions like (a.) to (d) [in (2.51)] are 
assumptions constitutive of possible trans-
formational components, rather than possible 
derivations. 
Let us call the positio~ expressed in (2,53) the Strong Trans-
formational Position, and the position upheld in Chomsky (1962. 1971) 
antl Ross (1967) the Weak-Transformational Position. The latter claims 
that a transformation is blocked only when its application violates some 
constraint, the former cla:i,ms that if a. trans.formation violates a 
constraint in some derivations, then it can never apply in any 
derivation. It is clear that (2. 53) can account for the J.;ack of a 
question-movement rule in SOV languages (or for the fact that such a 
rule, if it exists, is ·a1ways blocked), but it is also clear that 
the Strong Transformational Position cannot be correct in general, for 
practically every transformation I can think of is subject to some 
constraint, and the position in question would in fact prevent a.11 
transformations from ever applying. 
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Bach is not explicit on vhich constraints he wants to _be subject 
to (2. 53) , but we can be reasonably sure that he does no.t regard all 
transformations as ::.trongly constrained in the sense of (2.53); he 
:was undoubtedly aware that other constraints of Ross', such.as the 
Cr!PC or CGC, sometimes block Relativization or ·Question-Movem~nt, but 
do not, for that matter, push these rules out qf the grammar. f5ince 
Bach does not elaborate on this matter, I will interpret his phrase 
'assumptiot1s like (a) to (d)' in (2.53) as 'the assumptions (a) to 
(d)'; that is, :t shall assl,l.llle that he only claimed th.e RRC to be a 
· strong tr·ansfor.rrfational constraint. 
There is clearly something unsatisfactory about postulating 
strorig arid weak transformational constraints without some principle 
able to explain why certain constraints are strorig rather than weak . 
. r wi.11 attempt to show in this section that the HRC is neither a stronp; 
nor a weak transformational constraint. but essentially a behavioral 
one. 'rhe fact that there are apparent strong transformational· 
constraints need mean .no more than that gramma.tized percept.ual 
limitations have been generalized. 
For my clairh concerning the RRC to be e"inpirically verifiable, it 
is necessary to find cases in vhich the pertinent restrictions are 
not grammatized (ruid, preferably, some plausible justification.for 
~ra.mmatization in the cases in which it has occurred), Specifically, 
,..fe must find at lea.st one instance in which elements are allowed to 
move indefinitely far to the right, but in which the result varies tn 
a.cceptab~lity according to the values of some (.set of) para.'lleter(s). 
I wish to cla.i1:i that there are at lea.st two cases in point in Enr.iish: 
(a) the rule :which moves· pseudo-cleft phrases (following l<nimondi 
(1969a), I shall call it Focus Placement) nnd whose discussion formi:; 
the bulk of this section, and (b} the rule of Coordination-Reduction 
from left to rieht, which is briefly touched upon in note 19 (for ah 
extensive defense of·this rule, see Hankamer; 1971). As I have pointed 
out already, the.extraction analysis involves an undesirable formal 
i'eature, namely, the postuiation of empty nodes in underlying repre-
sentation; s:uch empty n.ocies are n_o great. embarrassment for the Extenq.eq. 
Stiµidard ·Theory (Emmonds, for example, uses empty nodes qu.ite freely, 
and, I shall argue, too freely), but they have no place in Generative 
Semantics which claims that only well-forr.ied or J11eaninp;ful semantic 
r.ia.terial has a legitimate place in underlying representation. I will 
attempt to show, however (in this section and in Appendix One), that 
m,v analysis, while postulating semantically irrelevant r.i.aterial, does 
not postulate ill-formed material in underlying representation;. in 
additi_on, I 11ill sur,e;est a way of severely limitinv. the use of empty 
nodes. On the· other hand, the anaiysis proposed by such r;enerative 
Sl:lmanticists as Hoss or i.\ach does involve an incoherent underly:inr: 
representation. and milst therefore bl:! judged h!ferior t·o mine. In 
fact, I do not kno:w of uny analysis so far formulated which enabic both 
a seina.ritically Justifiable underlying representation and an observa-
tionally adequate statement of the pertinent syntactic ~eneralizatioris; 
therefore, ut)til a more adequate analysis becomes possible, I propose 
the provisional adoption of the acqount- which follows. . 
Consider the pseudo..,cle~- se~tence in (2, 54), Let us call (2. 54b) 
the non-pseudo-cleft counterpart of (2.54a), and the underscored 
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constituent, in either (2.54a) ·or (;2.54b), the focus. 
(2.54) 	 a. What John ate vas ~_apple. 
b. John ate an apple. 
I make the following assumptions abo'!lt the pseudo-cleft construction: 
(2.55.) a. 'I'he source of a pseudo-cleft sentence includes 
its non-pseudo-clefted counterpart with 
relative clause status. Specifically, I 
propose that a.remote representation of 
(2.54a) is roughly (2,5G). 
(2. Sli) $ 
/@"'-. 	 VP ~ 
[k_p~ ®~ Copula ~ 
NP VP 
~ 
V 	 NP L 
J ~ 
wh John ate an apple was 
~resupposition: John ate somethinei~ 
The presupposition is the non....:pseudo-cleft counterpart, exc.ept 
·that. the focus is replaced by a pro-form. The pro-form in·the pre-
supposition is the antecedent of the head of the relative clause in 
the underlying representation. This explains why the pro-form is 
inde.finite and the. head of the relative clause is definite.10 
lOThe problems involved in the ser.m.ntic interpretation of pseudo-
clefts are discussed in Appendix One. 
(2.55) 	 b. (2.54a) is derived from (2.56) by 
(i) pla~ing wh on the focus; 
(ii) 	 copying the focus into the empty Predicate 
by a rule of Focus-Placement, such ,that 
a pro-form i:tleft behind; 
(iii) 	 applying the rule of Helativization to 
attract ~he resulting wh pro-form to 
the head of the relative clause; 
(iv) 	 making optional morphophonemic adjustments. 
c. 	 The result of applying Focus-Placement is 
unacceptable 
(i) 	 if the instantiation of the essential 
variable11 which intervenes between 
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the end of the sentence .which most 
inunediately contains the focus and the 
empty predicate is non-null, and 
(ii)· in pfoportion to the size and the nature 
of that variable. 
11 ( ·. )See Postal 1971: Ch, 13 for a discussion of this term. 
First, I shall att·empt to justify (2,55a) and (2,55b). All 
grammarians who have concerned themselves with pseudo-cleft constructions 
have recognized that the soU+ce of the pseudo-cleft must somehow 
incorporate its non-pseudo-cleft counterpart. This is so for at least 
two reasons: 
(a) The selectional _restrictions between the focus and its verb 
in the non-pseudo-cleft counterpart are the same as the selectional 
restrictions between the corresponding verb and the pseudo-cleft focus, 
as illustrated in (2.57); 
(2.57) 	 a, John broke a glass. 
b.· What John broke was a p;lass. 
C, *John broke a book. 
d. ·lfwhat John broke was a book. 
(b) Certain elements appearing in position of neutralization, 
such as ~ver, an_.y_, nnd reflexive pronouns, are grammatical only if 
commanded by the appropriate neutralizing elements as shown in (2.58); 
however, this requirement need not be satisfied in pseudo-cleft 
constructions, provided that it is satisfied in the non-pseudo-cleft 
counterparts, as shown in (2,59); the neutralizing elements are under-
scored in both (2.58) and (2.59). 
(2,55) a. I do not beli.eve that Mary ever harmed anyone. 
b. *I told the man who did not finish .his dinner 
that Mary e·ver harmed anyone. 
c. John admires himself, 
d. *The girl who loves John also admires himself. 
(2.59) a. What I cannot believe is that Mary e.ver harmed 
anyone, 
b. I cannot believe that Mary ever harmed anyone. 
C. What the missile did was destroy itself. 
d. 'l'he missiie' dest-r6ycd itself. 
'l'he fact that the comnmnd-requirement with respect to neutralization 
is suspended in pseudo-cleft constructions, provided· tho.t it is satisfied 
in the non-pseudo-cleft cowiterpart, iu quite r,cncral in English. 
(~.60)..:.(2.63) illustrate the point with Emphatic Reflexivization, ~11:!.-
Placemcnt, and Sequence of Tenses, 
- 83-
(2.60) a. Jill believes that the letter was written by 
An d f herself } 
n an l:*himself 
b. What Jill believes is that the letter was 
writteh by Ann and [ herself}
(!.himself 
(2.G1) a. 
b. 
("'told me }
John l.,::believed where to go. 
What John f told me .) was vhere to go.
\....*belhived 
(2.62) a. John r realizedfJ that he is stupid.
{:believed 
b. 	 What John [. realized} is that he is stupid,
L"believed 
A representation like (2.56) is, however, not the only lor:ically 
possible t1ay of in.corpora.ting the non-pseudo-cleft counterpart into 
the underlying reJ)resentation of pseudo-cleft constructions. (2.56). 
which is essentially the representation proposed in Chomsky {1970) and 
Ak:ma.jian (1970),12.has been challenged by Peters and Bach (1968) on 
12Actually, (2.'.)6) differs in two respects from Chomsky's und 
Akmajian 1s proposals, r'irst, it places the presupposition in under-
lying structure, while C}Jomsky and J\.kma,1ian regard it as a feature of 
surface structure. Second, and more important, Chomsky proposes that 
the head of the relative clause is a dummy it, while Akraa.jian proposes 
that it is :;ometitiies a ,genuine UP and sometimes a dummy, as in ( i) 
and (ii) respectively: 
( i) The object that I sav ,ms the house. 
(ii) What, I saw was the house. 
My mm view is that all free relatives such as (ii) have p;cnuine 
heads at some remote level of representation. Akmajian's reason for 
postulatinr; free relatives with dummy heads io that some free 
relatives do not have well-fanned surface counterparts with genuine 
heads in his dialect; thus, (iii) is acceptab~e to him while (iv) is not. 
(iii) 	 Where John went was to Boston.  
(ivr The place where John went was to Boston.  
But surely this is no more than a surface phenomenon, because 
sentences like (tv) are acceptable. to a great many speakers. In 
addition, headless relatives create much more serious problems, sine~ 
the whole process of Relativization is based on there existing inside 
the relative clause a coreferent of the head; but how could a dummy be 
coreferential with anything?. Notice also that overt forms of the 
dummy it, such as those associated with 'meterological' verb:; 
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or resulting fron Extraposition, cannot be modified b;-,,r relative 
clauses, as shown in (v) and (vi): 
(v) *It, which i dislike, is raining. 
(vi) 	*It, which nobody yet knows, is certain that John 
has defected. 
For a convincing argumentation that free relatives introduced by 
where, when, and while:_ have meaningful heads in remote representation, 
see M. Geis (1970). · 
two grounds: 
(a) 'l'here is no natural way of carrying out step (2.55b,i) in 
such a way as to ensure that wh will be attached to only one NP. 
(b) Since the pseudo-clefted constituent cannot be selected in 
the base, it must be selected by an attaclunent transformation; however, 
the pertinent attachment transformation cannot be formulated, since 
the only NP's which can. be pseudo-clefted are those which can be 
replaced by ~thing with preservation of r,rarnmaticali ty, and the :'IP 
to be pseudo-clefted and the verb with which it participates in 
selectional restrictions may be arbitrarily far apart at the stage 
at which wh-attachment would have to apply. 
Peters and Bach (1968) conclude that any analysis which involves 
the 'extraction' of the focus from a non-pseudo-cleft construction is 
inadequate, and propose an alternative· analysis, oriRinally sugf.ested 
by Ross in personal communication: 
(2.63) 	 The source of a pseudo-cleft sentence contains the 
non-pseudo..:.cleft counterpart in preq.icate position 
in construction with the copula, while the 
subject consists of the NP the thing modifie~ 
by the non-pseudo-cleft counterpart in whic)'l 
something has been substituted for the focus. 
Gpecifically, the source of (2.54a) would be (2.64). rather than (2,56). 
(2.64) 	 s 
~jNPI~ 	 VP 
/"---------@ ® 	 Copula HP 
I~"-... 
NP 	 VP s 
~~-
NP VPv 	 NP 
/-............._  
V NP 
IA 
The thing John ate something was John ate an apple 
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In this analysis, the rule of Focus-Ple.c.ement is replaced by a rule 
which deletes the whole of the predicate except for the focus. 
It is rather easy to subvert Peters and Bach's two objections 
to the extraction analysis and to shqw that their o,m proposal is 
inadequate on much more serious grounds. 
Regarding their first objection, the difficulty they mention 
arises only because they propose to identify the focus by wh-placement, 
and because they propose to allow any UP to occur vith wh-morphemes. 
This was understandable, in view of Chomsky's original proposal (see 
Footnote 12) which posited dunnny-headed relative clauses for pseudo-
cleft constructions. However, if we posit n meaningful head for the 
relative clause, the difficulty disappears, for the correct placement 
of Vh reduces to a problem which must be solved for relative clauses 
in generai. 13 One vay in which this has been handled in the literature 
131 am grateful to A. Zwicky for pointing this out to me. 
has been to place wh on a coreferent of the head inside the relative 
clause. (For w:a.~,s~f dealing with relative clauses which contain r;iore 
than one coreferent of the head, see Postal (1971)}. In the case of 
structures like (2.)6}, if wh-placement precedes Focus-Pl~cement (which 
is·the order given in (2.J~b) because it is the one Peters and Ba.ch 
criticize), wh can be placed on the constituent of the relative 
clause which-has no identical counterpart in the presupposition. However, 
since the focus can be identified merely by comparison with the pre-
supposition, Focus-Placeme.nt ma:, precede Wh-Placement, and the latter 
can apply in perfectly straightforward rashion to the output of the 
former, i.e., to (Al,8) of Appendix One. 
With regard to their second objection, it is simply }ncorrect 
that only UP's pronominaliza.ble vith somethin,g can be pseudo-clefted. 
'.i:hus; a great many speaker$ accept not only (2,54a), but also the 
EJentences in (2. 65} , which Peter.s and Bach reject. 
(2.65) a. Where I met John was in Paris. 
b. When I saw Harry was in the afternoon. 
c. \fuy John left was to catch a plane. 
d. ?Who Nixon chose was Ar,;new. 
Clearly, however, the non-pseudo-cleft counterparts of (2.65a)-(2.65b) 
do not tolerate the replacement of the focus with something, therefore 
the Peters-Bach proposal fails to generate a larp;e number of .pseudo-
cleft sentences in a large number of dialects. More important still, 
the P1;ter~-Ba.~h proposal fails to account for pseudo-clert rientertces 
like (2.66).l which are undoubtedly acceptable in all dialects, 
14That sentences like (2.66) are instances of the pseudo-cleft 
construction follows from the fa.ct that they exhibit the two properties 
typical of pseudo-cleft sentences which were mentioned at the beginninp, 
of this section. Indeed, 
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(a) The selectional ·facts exactly para.l.lel those found in 
ordinary pseµclo~c.left sentences; as can he seen by compaj'ing (i) 
;md (2.57) fospec'tively. 
( :i,) a. Jolln b,roke ,a glass. 
b. ~'he 	 ob,ject ,wlli;h John. broke was a. glass. 
c. *~olm broke a book. 
d. *'l'he 	opJect which ,John broke was a· QOOk., 
(b) The predicate can contain !IJiY- or ever~words when the 
latter are not commanded by the neutralizing elements in surface 
structure, although this is illlp9ssible in general, as shom:i in (ii) . 
. ( ii) a. '.l'he insinua.ti~n wllich nol?.ody could believe was 
that Mary had eyer been involved with any 
shady charact~rs, 
b. 	*The insinuation which nobody could, believe 
suggested that Mary had ever been involved 
with· any l'!hady characters •. 
In addition, sent~nces like.(2.66} a.re subject to.two constraints 
typical of pseu~o-cle.fted sen1:;ences wlltch are discussed below in the 
text, namely,, ;t:;llJ~ CUPC an~ :t.he RRC11 , as can be seen by ~or:1purinr, 
(2.64} ~d (?./{4) with (iLi.) and .(iv) bel.:0:w respectively: 
(iii) 	 a, l: sµspect t.h~ idea which 1:;ortures bill is t,hat 
Mary l9ves .John. 
b. 	*It's Bill. who I suspect the· idea which tortures 
is that Mary loves J ohi'l • 
c. 	*It's dohn who I suspect the idea which tortures 
Bill is that Mary loves. 
(iv) 	 ?*The. dri.nk, I told you John lu;i.d at· 3. o I cl.ock at 4 
o'clock is whiskey. 
includinc 	theirs. 
(2:66) 	 a. 'The girl who just left is Mary. 
l>. The one who Mary admires most is herself. 
Therefore, the Peters-BELch proposED. is inad,eguate on observational 
grounds. The way to prevent the generation of the sen\ences in (2.65) 
in tl1e Peters~Duch dialect is clearly not by limiting pseudo-clefted 
constituents to positions which may be qccup;i.ed by somethine, but 
rather by blocking soMe of the mol'phophonemic rules reciuired by (2.55b.iv) 
under the a,ppropriate circumstances •. Thus, while rules like the place 
!:.t which=> :where, the time at ~hich ~when 2 the mnnner in which ::> ,!lo'l,r, 
etc. ( which are independently needed for adverbial clau'ses in non-
pseudo-cleft constructions, as shown in Geis (1970)), may be allowed to. 
operate freely in ~ost dialects, or1ly the rule the thiri.g which~ what 
would be aliow,ed such freedom.in the Peters-Bach dialect, while the 
rem~inqer wouid have to bi;! blocked ii; pseudp-cleft constructions 
(preuuma.bly hy restricting them to ·non-sub,Ject position). 
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.Tjms, neither of Peters and Bach's objection~ to an extracting 
analysis really go through. On the other hand, the alternntive 
lilce (2 .64) for (2. 54a), must be rejected for the followinp; two 
reasons (a third reason is provided at the end of'. this section) : 
{a.) 'l'he most obvious def'ect of (2.64) is that it is semantically 
incoherent. Indeed, the meaning of (2,5.4a.) is t.hat the .object which 
John is supposed to have eaten was an apple; it most certninly is 
not that the object in question was the preposition John ate a.n ~.15 
l5rn personal communication, Ross has attempted to avoid the 
char.ge of' mea.ninp;lessness by proposing that the sub,l ect of pseudo-
cleft constructions is not a free relative, but an interror,ative 
clause. Thus, the underlyine; representi~tion of (2. 54a) would no 
longer be (2.64), but somethin~ like (i). 
(i) 	 The answer to the question 'What did John eat?' 
is 'John ate an apple.' 
While (i) is meaninr,ful. it cannot be correct for tvo reasons: 
(a) it does ~ot allow the generation of pseudo-cl~ft sentences 
with non-reduced heads in surface strt,1.cture, such as (2.66). 
{b) there is overwhelminr: syntactic evidence that the sub,ject 
clauses of pseudo-cleft sentences are free relatives and riot interro-
r,atives. A lari~e number of tests for discrimina.tinp.; between the tuo 
types of constructions wns proposed in C, Baker (1968), and they all 
suggest that pseudo-cleft cons'tructions involve ·rree relatives~ This 
is illustrated below with a few tests: 
(1) Relative pronouns,°unlike interrogative ones, cannot be 
stressed: 
(ii) *What John ate was an apple. 
(2) Subject interrogative clauses require singular verb agreement, 
while pseudo-cleft subject clauses do not: 
. h [wasj(iii) 	 a. Who walked into t e room * clear. . .__ were 
b. What copulated r*was 11 the do,,. and the bitch. · l_were '' 
(3) Relative pronouns, unlike interror,a.tive ones, cannot be 
modified by ~l_s~_: 
(iv) o.. What else you saw in the room is the question. 
b. *What else you saw in the room is- the apple •. 
(4) Interrog!:!,tive claµ!:)es can cdntain more than one wh-word, 
while relo.tive clauses cannot: 
(v) a. What happened to whom isn't clear. 
b. *What I saw when was Bill in the morninf!:. 
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More recently, in Ross (1971), the Bach;,.Peters·proposal is 
defended on the grounds that (vi) is a possible sentence in certain 
dialects. 
(vi) 	 What I ate is I a.te an apple. 
However, the fa.ct that (vi) is a. possible surface st.ructure does not 
make it a coherent semantic repres.entation. All the existence of 
(vi) means is that the whole circled S-node may be 'drap:p;ed alonR' by 
Focus-Placement in the pertinent di~lects. If (2.64) is the underlying 
representation of (2.54a), its semantic interpretation can only be 
given by an interpretative rule which applies to the output of deletion 
in the standard dialect and to surface structure in the dialects 
which tolerate (vi). It is rather strange that Bach and Ross, who 
have consistently supported Generative Semantics in their work, seem 
to advocate an interpretivist ~pproach in just this one instance. 
(b) Neither elements of the subject nor. elements of the predicate 
can be moved out of pseudo-cleft constructions, as shown in (2. 67) ·. 
(2.67) 	 a. I suspect what Mary told you Bill wants is to 
kill his mother. 
b. 	*It's you who I suspect what Mary told Bill 
wants is to kill his mother. 
c. 	*It 1s his mother who I suspect what Mary told 
you Bill wants is to kill. 
Given an analysis of pseudo-cleft constructions a.sin (2,64), (2,67b) 
can be excluded in a principled way by invokinp: the Complex Noun Phrase 
Constraint (see discussion in 1.2.6), However, given a. deletion 
analysis, or Pasta.l's analysis described in App~ndix One, there is no 
general principle which could exclude (2.67c). for elements can in 
general mip;rate quite freely from predicate position, and an ad hoc 
condition would have to be specified for blocking movements out of 
pseudo-clefted constituents, To see this more clearly, contrast 
(2.68a.), which is ambiguous between a pseudo-cleft and a non-pseudo-
cleft reading, and (2.68b), where the non-pseudo-cleft reading alone 
is possible: 
(2.68) a. The discovery John announced was a proof of 
Mary's defection. 
b, It's Mary's defection which the discovery 
John announced was a. proof of. 
On the other hand, Riven an analysis of pseudo-cleft constructions 
as in (2.56), both (2.67b) and (2,67c) can be excluded by the CNPC,16 
16I have found that there are speakers who can question (but not 
relativize) the whole focus, even though elements of the focus can 
be neither questioned nor rela.tivized. That is, the paradigm in 
(i) holds for 	those speakers. 
- 89 ...  
(i) a. What do you think that yhat John ate was? 
b. 	*The Eqlple which you think that what John ate 
was had been bought in Canada. 
If we accept AkmaJian 1s (1970) claim that cleft sentences are 
derived from pseudo-cleft ones, the distinction between questioning 
and relativizing the focus can be seen more clearly in (ii). 
(ii) 	 a. What is it that John ate? 
b, 	*The apple which it is that John ate had been 
bought in Canada. 
The point I wish to make is that the acceptability of (iia) and/or 
(ia) is no counterexample to my claim that the focus originates inside 
a complex NP, The questioned constituent is the triangled NP in 
(2.56), which does not originate inside a complex NP, and is therefore 
free to move. -- . 
The reason (ib) and (iib) are bad is that foci are nece$s~ily 
stressed, while relative.pronouns (unlike interrogative ones} are 
necessarily unstressed. 
In fact, I believe that a deeper explanation is possible here: 
a cleft or pseudo-cleft constituent is the comment of the sentence 
(i.e., the new information that it imparts), as opposed to the remainder 
of the cleft or pseudo-cleft construction, which constitutes the topic 
(or old information, since it is presupposed); as new information 
usually receives stress, the fa,ct that; the cleft or pse1.1do-cle:ft 
phrase constitutes new information is (at least in part) responsible 
for the fact that it is stressed. Questions are similar to cleft or 
pseudo-cleft sentences (this·fact ha.s been noticed before); thus, what 
John saw was a dog presupposes John se.w something, while in the case 
of What did John see? the speak.er believes John saw something to be 
true. Question wh..,words e.re indicators of where the comment should 
be supplied in the 'expected answer' (i.e., in a declarative sentence 
identical with the question in all respects, except that the wh-word is 
replaced by a more informative phrase); therefore, it is n9t 
surprising that cleft or pseu~o-cleft constituents should.be able to 
be questioned, since the expected answer necessarily has the comment 
in the position of the wh-word. 
On the other hand,a relative vb-pronoun is the topic of the 
relative clause, while the remainder of the clause is its comment 
(this is probably why relative pronouns are al1,1ays unstressed). 
Therefore, constructions like (ib) or (iib) imply that the relative 
pronoun is both a topic and a comment, that is, both old and new 
information, an obvious impossibility. Notice the.t we are dealing 
here not with perceptual conflict, but with semantic ill-formedness, 
for it is possible to infer a contradiction from (ip) or (iib), 
namely, that which is simultaneously new and old information; 
consequently, I would not expect {ib) or (iib) to be possible sentences 
in any dialect of English (or in any language in which identical 
conditions are allowed by the grammar). 
since tne pseudo-clefted constituent, which contains mother in 
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underlying representation, originates inside a complex.NP (such as 
the cir~led ohe in (2.56j)~ 
Notice that sentences like (2,67b) and (2.67c) provide 
independent ::iupport for the cla.im I made in footnote 12 that all 
free relatives should be·represented with genuine (i.e., lexi~a.1) 
heads in remote structure, for unless we make this assumption, neither 
(2.67b) nor (2.67c) can pe ruled out by the CNPC, and both would 
necessitate ad hoc conditions •. 
I take it that the arguments given so far demonstrate the 
superiority of (2.55a) a.nd (2.55b) over the Ross-Peters-Bach analysis 
of pseudo~cleft constructions. Now I address myself to the main point 
at issue, namely, the interplay of the .rule of Focus-Placement and 
the RRC. 
Let us first notice that.Focus-Placement must be an unbounded 
rule, as sugr,ested by (2.69). 
(2.69) 	 What I forgot to tell you that Mary insinuated 
that Bill was prepared to instruct Gree; to 
tell the FBI was that you intended to defect 
to Russia. 
Therefore, given Ross' formulation of the RRC, Focus-Placement should 
be an impossible rule, and this argument has in fact been used by Ross 
agaip.st al}, analyses of pseudo.lcleft constructions involving extraction. 
Chomsky (1971) has replied ·to this objection by oft:'ering a sliRhtly' 
modified version of the RRC, which we shall call the RRC'_, and which. 
stipulates that unbounded rightwards movements are unp;ramrnatical only 
if the esse·ntilil variable they cross is non-null (this is equivalent 
to my (2.J5c.i)). The RRC' undoubtedly rises higher in observational 
adequacy than the RRC, for it makes it possible both to derive sentences 
like (2.69) through extraction, an analysis which, as we saw, is to be 
preferred to the Ross-Bach-Peters one on independent /:".rounds, and to 
block all the sentences wldch the RRC can ulock. To see this, we need 
only examine some of the cases which supplied the motivation for the 
RRC and reco~nize that the ungranunaticality of the crucial constructions 
may be ambiguously attributed to the RRC or the the RRC'. Thus, 
consider the rules of Particle-Movement, Extraposition, F.xtraposition-
from-NP and Rir;ht-Dislocation exemplified in (2.70)-(2.73) respectively; 
the a-sentences arise when the corresponding rule has not applied, 
the b-sentences when it has applied without crossing the boundary of 
the sentence immediately containing the moved constituent, and the c-
sentences when it. has applied and crossed the boundary in question. 
:iotice that in each of t.he c-sentences, the r.1oved constituent has 
crossed not merely an essential variable, but a ~on-null one. 
(2.70) 	 a. You testified that my brother had looked over 
the desk, althou~h you knew that your 
testimony could send him to ,lail. 
b. 	 You testified that my brother had looked the 
desk over, nlthou~h you knew that your 
testimony coulq send him to ,lnil. 
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{2.10) c. *You testified that my brother liad'looked the 
desk, although rou knew that your testimony 
could send him.to jail, over. 
(2.71) a. 
b. 
c. 
That that John has disappeared is odd is 
surp;rising. 
That it i!> odd that J.ohn ha~ disappeared is 
surprising, 
*Th~t· H is .odd is .surprising that John has 
disapp~ared. 
(2.72) a. 
b, 
c. 
That the claim that John is a traitor is 
unbelievable is odd, 
That the claim is unbelievable that John is 
a traitor is odd, 
*That the claim is unbelievable is odd that 
Jo~. is a traitor, 
(2,73) a. That you have.been annoying my sister is 
unbelievable. 
b, 
c. 
That you have been annoying her, my sister, is 
unbelievable. 
*That you have been annoying her is unbelievable, 
my sister, 
Despite its greater appeal, the RRC' itself cannot be correct, for 
it wrongly predicts that (2. 74} is ungrammatical, This is so.,/if we 
accept the claim, which I defended in (.14) in connection vith. objection 
(g) to the IC, that the strUbture of the non-pseudo-clefted counterpart 
of (2.74) is esentially (2,75), 
(2.74} What John drank at 4 o1clock was a ~).ass of whiskey, 
(2,75) 
@ 
ill 
ADV , 
.~ ~.
John drank 	a·glass of whiskey 
Indeed, the focus a glass of whiskey must cross the non-null at 4 
o'clock vbich lies outside the boundaries of the boxed S. On the other 
band, we would be ill-advised to reject the RRC 1 completely, since it 
correctly predicts the unacceptability of (2.76)-(2.78), 
(2.76) 	 ??What I told you John believes in on Monday . 
. morning a.t 4 o I clock is God. 
(2.77) 	 ?*What I told you John drank at 3 o'clock on 
Monday morning at 4 o'clock is a. glass of whiskey. 
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(2. 78) *What. I told you Joh.n cl.rank in order to please his 
~irl friend from Chicago at 3 o'clock on Monday 
morning at 4 o'clock is a gla:rn of \,•hiskey. 
How can we preserve all. the advantage.s of the RRC' and at the seme 
time account for the acceptability of (2.74) as well as for the gradually 
increasing unacceptability of (2,76)-(2.78)? I propose to do this by 
taking into account riot only the .fact. of a non-null instantiation of 
a vij,tiable, but also the size and the· nature of such an instantiation, 
as required by (2,55c.ii). (We shall call this proposal the RRC".) 
With ;respect to size, it should be pointed out that sentence's like 
(2,74) become increasingly awkward in proportion to the l~nrrth and 
complexity of adverbials, as shown by (2,79)-(2.80). 
(2,79) ?What John drank before our 'hiir,.fat neighbor 
living on Front Street and wearing a red beard 
cwne in is a glass of whiskey. 
(2.80) 	 '!?What ,Tohn drank :before our hip; fat neip;hbor who 
lives in Chica.go ·and whose only da~ghter had a.n 
unfortunate love affair came in is a r;lass of 
whiskey. 
The awkwardness of sentences like'(2,79) was ascribed by Bever to the 
already mentioned interruption prin'ciple (2.37): 
(2.37) 	 Discontinuous components are complex in proportion 
to the stru~tural complexity of the jntervening 
materi~l. 
(2.37) is n plausible principle, since, given an imrn.ed~ate memory with 
limited capacity, we may expect that retention of the first member of 
a discontinuity to be heard in proportion to the a.'lloun1:. of processing 
that must go on before the remainder of that discontinuity is encountered 
and its first mer!lber can be discarded :'rom immediate memory, 
With respect to the nature of the instantiation of the pertinent 
vnriable, let us first notice that it rnuBt be taken into account in 
addition to considerations of size, since the size of the a.dverbial is 
the same in- ( 2. 74) and (2. 76) , but the two sentences differ sharply 
in acceptability. '£he cruc·ial difference can be appreciated by comparing 
(2.81) (a slightly mo!}ified version of. (2.74) to make it similar to 
(2.7G) in all respects except the crucial orie) and (2.76). 
(2.81) 	 What I believe John drank on Monday morninP, at 
4 o'clock is whiskey. 
In (2.76), but not in (2.81), the adverbial forms a constituent with 
material which rirecedes the sentence from which the.pseµdo-clefted 
constituent was extracted. I suggest that the unacceptability of 
(2.76) is due to the fact that two interrupted sentences are continued 
separately, so that a hearer has t"o figure out which co.ntinuation is 
to be associated with which previously interrupted sequence. I therefore 
propose the following tentative principle: 
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(2.82) 	 Two interrupted sentences are perceptually complex 
i~ one of them is at least in part intern~l 
( i . e. , 	 center...:embedded) to the other. 
It is easy to see that (2.82) can account for the unacceptability of 
all the c-sentences in (2.70)-(2.73). For example, in (2.70c). t·he 
interrupted tha!_-clause is internal to the matrix sentence which the 
that-clause itself interrupts; the difficulty restµ.ts from the ~act 
that both sentences have been interrupted after desk, and fron the 
fact th.at the· ali?hough-clause must be associatedwi19 z.ou testifie:d, 
while 9.v!:!. must be ai:;soc iated with the tha.!_-cla.use. An independent 
17The rules illustrated in (2,70)-(2.73) also provide evidence 
against both the RRC and the RRC' and in favor of the RRC", for the 
limitations on their scope are not in fact identical, as Ross thought. 
'rhus, in structures like (2,75), the scope of Particle-Movement is 
indeed the boxed S, but the scope of Extra.position is the circled 8, 
as sho\.m in {i) and {ii) respectively. 
(i) I:!,. That John may die was announced .~t noon. 
b. It 	was announced at noon that John may die, 
(ii) a, 	 John looked over the desk at noon. 
b. .John looked the desk over at ·noon. 
c. *John looked the desk at noon over. 
The restrictions on Particle-Movement are reminiscent of the 
situation found in connection with question phrase movements in 
Japanese: ~he RRC11 has been both gramma.tized .and strengthened. 
Extra.position provides an illustration of the intermediate situation 
in which the RRC" ha.s been grammatized, without strengthenin~. 
virtue of (2.82) is that it can account for the complexity .of center-
embedded sentences to a degree higher than one, such as (2.83), 
(2.83) The girl who the teacher that the school fired 
==-rlunl~d 	cried:--~=,. 
-·------	 =~ ' 
The triply- and doubly-underscored sentences are both interrupt,ed, 
and the doubly underscored one is 'at least in part internal' to the 
triply-underscored one; as in t.he previously considered examples, the 
difficulty is mainly due to the fact tho.t t'lunked and cried_ must be 
paired with the appropriate distinct sequences.18, 19 
18My proposal is similar, but not identical, to the following 
explanation o:f the complexity of sentences like (2.83) proposed in 
Chomsky and Miller (1963} and Chomsky (1965): 
(i) 	 A device cannot interrupt a given procedure more 
than once in order to use that very pro~edure. 
I 
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believe 	(2.82) to be superior to (i) in two respects: 
(a) (2.82). but not (i), can account for both (2.83) a.rid for 
(2,7G)-(2.77) (as vell as for (2.70)-(2.73c)). 'rhis is so because 
(i) depends crucially on their existing a third seri~, such as the 
singly-underscored one in (2.83), which must moreover be of the same 
kino. as the two interrupted sequences, while ·( 2. 82) merel:r requires 
that two distinct interrupted SE!quences be ~.cparatel:y-_ continued; 
(b) As Bever has· pointed out, it seems ad hoc to .propose that 
one interruption of a procedure by itself is perfectly acceptable, 
while two such interruptions are totally unacceptable; this criticism· 
does not apply to (2.82), since it is irrelevant whether the two 
sequences are interrupted by a third one, as in (2.133), or by each other, 
as in (2,76). It is interesting to note that the alternative explanation 
proposed by Bever, which I reproduce as (ii) below, cannot explain all 
the facts about centerembedding either, even though it niay be able ·to 
explain some of the facts, 
(ii) A stimulus may not be 
having two positions 
dimension. 
perc
on 
eived 
the sa
as 
me 
simulta~eously 
classificatory 
Indeed, 	Bever blames the unacceptability of (2.83) entirely on the 
'double-function' of .£..lunked; notice, however, that (iii) and (iv),. 
in which the underscored elements also have-,double-function, are 
infinitely better than (2,77), 
(iii) 	 The buckles of the collars of these coats are strong. 
(iv) John's father's brother is sick, 
--------.------------------------.----------. ----------.--.--------
191-lotice that the requirement that the two sentences b~ s~_paratelv. 
continued (which follows from (2.82), can explain the acceptability of 
sentences like (ii) below, which is derived from (i) throur,h 
Coordination-Redu~tion, in violation of the RRC and of the RRC'. 
(i) 	 I told Mary that John bought the cake, and I also 
told her that he later ate the cake. 
(ii) 	 I told Mary that John bought, and I also told her 
thnt he later ate, the cake. 
Given an analysis of the Conjunction-Reduction which copies 1he cake 
simultaneously out the two conjuncts and Chomsky ad,1oins it to the 
coordinate nocle, the c·opying of ~l_le cake out of the second con,1unct 
violates the HHC and its copying out of the first conjunct violates 
the IlRC 1 • However, the derivation of (ii) fro:in ( i) does not violate 
(2.82), since the -second conjunct is not. internal to the first; in · 
fact, both discontinuities are resolved simultaneousl~ by the cak~, 
rather than ~eparately, as in (2.76). or (2.83), 
If the unacceptability of (2. 76) can be attributed t.o ( 2. 82) , the 
greater unacceptability of (2.77) and (2.78) can be attributed to the 
combined effect of (2.82) and (2.37), Indeed~ in (2,77) and (2.78) 
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the instantiation of the pertinent variable is both longer ~nd_ more 
complex than in (2:76), since it must be segmented into at least two 
parts, each of which must be paired·with different sequcnces,20. 
20'.l.'herc ar.e speakers who reject all the sentences in (2;76)-
(2.78).indiscrirninately. I consider that (2.82) has be.en gr,ammatized 
in their dialects. 
I take it that the arguments I have advanced in support of (2.37) 
a.nd (2.82) have shown that the RRC" (i.e., (2,55c,i) and (2,55c,ii) 
with size aI1d nature inter.oreted in the sense of (2.37) and (2.82) 
respectively) is superior to both the RRC and the RRC' as an account 
of the Right Roof' Constraint. But now we have an additiopal reason 
for adopting (2,55a), (2,55b) and rejecting the Ross-Peters-Bach anal~rsis. 
This is· so, not because the former involves movement of the pseudo-
clefted phrase (indeed, the behavioral positio~ does not depend on 
there being a transformation involv.ed--since (2.82), .for example, is 
applicable t9 structures like (2.~3), where the pertinent discontinuities 
do not .result from·the application of a transformation); r~ther this is 
so 1,ecause, r;i ven a representation like (2. 64), the f.irst occurrence 
of J(?hn ate. and ~!1 apple do ~ form a discontinuous component. 21 That . 
21My claim that the margiqal status of sentences.. like (2. 76) is 
due to the existence of a perceptually complex discontinuity mnk~s it 
irrelevant--at the explanatory level--whether Focus-Placement proceeds 
in one swoop or by cyclic hoppin.g. 
they should be represented as forming a discontinuous component is 
also shown by the difference in accepto.bility between (2.84a) and 
(2.84b), which differ only in that the former is a pseudo-cleft sentence 
while the latter is not. 
(2.84) 	 a. ??What I said that John likes most in front of 
all the people who had .assembled in front of 
his house is a bottle.of good French wine. 
b. 	 What I said that John likes most in.front of 
all the people who ha.d assembled in front of 
his house is no concern of yours. 
Before concluding thi~ section, an evaluation of the merits and 
demerits of the particular analysis of pseudo-clefts I have proposed 
·1s in order. 
The underlying representation I propose for (2.54a), n~ely,  
something like (2.85)--(See Appendix One), has the disadvantar;e of'  
alloving empty nodes in underlying representation.  
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(2.85) 
' . ------ G ~ 
]]fl VP 
~ . ~ 
NP ®--- Copula NP 
I\ ;,-~ I\ 
.U wh John ate an apple ~ 
Presupposition: John ate something. 
Empty nodes have been extensively used by Emmonds in his dissertation 
and in other·papers in an effort to show t_hat certain transformations 
are _structure preserving (i.e.' they do not create more structure). 
'ro c;i ve his hypothesis elllpirical content,- Ernmonds requires that empty 
nodes be allowed only where a non-empty constituent of the same type 
can be generated b;,,r the base rules (empty nodes carry catep;oricai 
labels and are subject to subcategorization). The empirical test of 
the hypothesis is that constituents should not be movable to a 
position where n constituent of the swne type cannot be generated in 
the base. Basing himself on this assumption, Emmonds (1969b) presents 
a rather ingenious argument for there insertion into an empty node. 
He argues that !?_e. usually require a subj ec_t and a complemerit, as in 
my uncle is very old, but that with indefinite subjects, it looks like 
the complement may be missing, as in *a huge fire was, in which case 
there-J.psertion is obl~gatory arid yields there was .a huge fire. 
Emmonds proposes a 'simpler' solution for the latter case: a hur.;e 
!i.F~. is the complement rather than the subject, the subject-;;-is 
generated empty by the base, and ther~ is inserted into it. ·The 
problem with this analysis is that it implies that the form be 
occurring in these two exwnples is the same ve:r1J, However, it is 
clear that in the former case, be is a two-place predicate asserting 
a relation between my uncle and--the property of being very old, while 
in the latter, it is a one-place predicate as·serting the existence 
of a liuge fire. Consequently, the generation o.f an empty node for 
there is quite ad hoc in this case and with no semantic Justification 
(fti"U:ve criticized Enunonds' principle for its unnaturalness, while 
assuming it can do the j~b it is supposed to do; however, Emmonds' 
treatment of ~her_e-Insertion is i~adequate on observational grounds, 
for while the one-place predicate be usunlly reriuires ther~-Insertion, 
there are a few expressions in -which it does not, such as God is, 
or I think 1 therefore I run, which Ernmonds woµld be for~ed t-o claim 
have an empty node in !mrface structure and are therefore ill-formed). 
A more restricted proposal involving empty nodes would r\!quire 
that empty no.des should be allo\led only if they. together with the 
non-empty arguments, add up exactly to the number of nrr;uments that 
the pertinent predicate allows on logical grounds. This requirement 
is not viplated in (2.85), for be is a two-pie.ce predicate in pseudo-
clet't construction, and empty nod ..es may be allowed with the provision 
stated above, when their presence h_as ·corisiderable independent 
advantages, I review·and evaluate these advantages below. 
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First ~. · the :t'act that the ,pseudo-cleft· phrase originates inside 
the circled S-node in (2.85) enables µs to account for the fact that 
its sele"ctional restrictions are deteI'Illined by the verb of which it 
is an argtimEmt in the non-pseudo-cleft counterpart. However, .J. 
Gundel ~e.s pointed out to me that an alternative account is possible, 
Thus, the copy which the extracted phrase was claimed to leave behind 
is coreferential with the head of the relative clause; as the head 
can enter into the same selectional restrictions as the relative 
pronoun it attracts (since ·they are coreterential) and as the pseudo-
cleft construction asserts coreferentiality between the referent of · 
the head (further identified by the relative clause) and the more 
specific predicate NP, it is not surprising that the latter can take 
part in the same selectional restrictions as the less specific head 
of the relative clause, and therefore of the ~opy which is ultimately 
relativized. Therefore, extraction is not the only possible solution 
here. 
Second, the extraction analysis accounts for the island character 
of cleft and pseudo~cleft phrases. I do not see what alternatives are 
available, but P. Schachter (personal communication) has pointed out 
to me that some non-pseudo~cleft copular constructions exhibit the 
same properties. Thus, the doubly-underscored element 'in the discovery 
was that John likes Mart cannot be questioned, as *who do you think 
the discovery wa.s that""'John likes is just as ba.d as (2.67c). True, 
most copular subjects whiqh disallow movements out of the predicate 
are themselves para.phrasable by a .sentence (thus, a more remote 
representation, which Generative Semantics woula.assign t~ the discovery 
was that John likes Mary might be something like the thing which was 
discovered was that John likes M8:!'.Y)• However, the claim that *who 
did you say the discovery was that John likes. is bad by the CNPC would 
be somewhat contrived, 
Third, the extraction analysis makes it possible to say that 
the pseudo-cleft phrase .and some sentence in the subject clause form 
a discontinuous component. It may legitimately be asked-whether 
extraction is the only way of expressing a discont-iriuity. Personally, 
I do not know of a viable· alternative, but I would undoubtedly welcome_ 
one which would do the sa:me work as my analysis and would not need 
to employ empty nodes. I would, however, like to point out that 
movement or copying transformations have already been used in the 
literature to express the tact that a structural discontinuity exists, 
even t·hough those cases involved exactly the same kind of difficulty 
as my account of pseudo-clefts with respect to underlying representation. 
For example, Ross (1967) posited a rule of Right-Dislocation to 
account for sentences containing after-thoughts, such as (2,73b); 
specifically, Ross proposed that (2.73b) is derived from its •non-
dislocat,ed counterpart', (2.73a). That right-dislocated structures 
involve a discontinuity is strongly suggested by the fact that they 
obey the RRC (see (2.73c)), as well as by the fact--not mentioned by 
Ross--that they allow (apparent) violations of the command-requirement, 
as far as f.eature-changing is concerned, in exactly the same way as 
pseudo-clefts do. Thus. in pa.rallel manner to sentences like (2.59a} 
or (2.59c) tllere are sentences like I don't believe it, that Mary ever 
harmed anyone or she did it, compromise herself irrevocably respectively, 
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The difficulty is ·that the main clause and the afterthought can  
be separated by such items as L. mean, namely, .that is, etc. , arid  
it is not possible to regard I_don 1t believe it; namely, that Mary  
ever harmed anyone_ to be derived from *I don't believe ·that Marv  
ever harmed anyone; namely, for such a r·epreseritation is semantically  
ill-formed~ as it inakes the implicit claim that !!_a.mely is a one-place  
predicate. It seems.to me .that it would be more acceptable to·regard  
the source of sentences containing namely as having the latter as  
a t~o-place predicate, one argument being the 'non-dislocated  
counterpart' and the other being einpty; the dislocated phrase can  
then be copied into the empty node by Right-Dislocation, just as the  
. pseudo-cleft phrase is copied into an empty node by Focus-Placement. 
As in the case of pseudo-clefts, .empty nodes strike me as more 
tolerable than no nodes at all, 
Fourth, the extraction analysis makes possible a straightforw·ard 
account of the behavior of all feature-changing_processes, as 
shown in (2. 58)~ (2. 62) , and this seefms · ~o be the strongest argument 
in its favor. The fact that all the feature-changing processes 
behave as if the neutralizee were commanded by the neutralizer cannot 
be accounted for by an analysis which takes the underlying -form 
of pseudo-'clefts to be essentially their surface form; it can, of 
course, be accounted for by the Peters-Bach-Ross analys·is, but 
that analysis postulates an incoherent underlying structure, while 
mine merely involves unnecessary material. Consequently, until a 
superior analysis of pseudo-clef:ts is proposed, I believe the extraction 
one can stand. 
Regardless of these theoretical considera_tions, my fundEllllental  
concern in this s_ection has been to show that the intei:play of Focus- 
Placeinent and the RRC" can be handled adequately only within the  
Behavioral Position. which predicts that the derivations in which the  
RRC" is violated can be rated on a gradual scale of unacceptability  
in a. principled way. The Strong Transformational Position fails with  
respect to Focus-Placement, for it predicts t~t there are no pseudo- 
cleft sentences in English. The Weak rransformational Position,  
which predicts that the derivations in which a constraint is violated  
are all ungrammatical, seems to be supported by those dialects which  
indiscriminately reject (2. 76 )-( 2. 78) ( see footnote 20), but cannot  
account for the majority dialects,. On the other hand, the Behavioral  
Position can account for the dialects described in footnote 21., by  
assuming the grammatization of (2.82).22  
22As I pointed out in the Introduction, t_he problem of grammati-
zation cannot be seriously considered before the significance of all 
the pertinent variables is known. The problem might be even more 
complicated, for grammatization may depend not only on the cognitive 
endowment of language learners, but also on their motivations; in 
other words, we may need not only an explicit theory of .cognition, 
but also explicit theories of thought, behavior, and human interaction--
still a remote goal at the moment. If, however, I may allow m.vself 
to speculate on some motivational factors with respect to the cases 
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considered in this section, it seem.s tc;i me that a not iinpla.usible 
guess as to the failure.of the RRC11 to:gra.mmatize in pseudo-cleft 
constructions is that the likelihood or·occurrence·of psettdo-cleft 
sentences which violate the RRC11 as compared with those which do not 
is relatively flmall. Moreover; sentences like (2,76)-(2.18) have 
stylistic variants which do not violate the RRC11 ; for example, (2. 78) 
can be rendered by the quite acceptable (i). · 
( i) What I told you on Monday morning a~ 4 o I clock that 
John drank a.t 3 o'clock in order to please his 
.girlfriend from Chicago is a glass of whiskey. 
In contra.st, if question-movements had to occur in SOV languages, the 
RRC" would probably be violated in a large number of derivations, and 
consequently a large number of questions would be marginal or totally 
ungrammatical, since the material over which the question phrase would 
move would have to contain verbs (as shown in (ii)) , as there are no 
stylistic variants in which t~ese verbs can be .fronted, for the verb 
is necessarily final in Japanese. 
(ii) Watakusi-va Biru-wa dare-ga suki ta to Mary-wa 
I Bill who like Mary 
shinjite iru to John.-wa. utagatte iru no ka to kitta. 
believes John suspects asked 
'I asked who John suspects Mary believes Bill likes. ' 
One objection which cotild be rELised against this accoun_t is that, 
so far, no ~OV lan_guage has been found in which question-movements 
operate, and if the RRC" is ind.eed a perceptual principle, we may expect 
that there should be SOV languages in which question-movements operate 
freely frqm the sentence immediately below the question verb, and 
with increasing awkwardness as we question from deeper levels of 
embedding. While such an objection c~not be passed over lightly, it 
should be pointed out that the predic;ited likeli.hood of finding question-
movements in an SOV language is very small, as there is really no 
pressure in this direction. Indeed, so long as the question phrase 
is overtly identifiable, there is no stringent need to move it. Thus, 
there a.re dialects of English in which q_uestion-movements are optional, 
that is, in which (iia) is interpretable as a genuine request for 
information; moreover, question verbs can govern more than one wh-word, 
only one of which is allowed to move _and still sentences with more 
wh-words than question verbs are perfectly interpretable, as shovn 
by (iiib). 
(iii) a. You were talking to whom? 
b. I wonder who saw what. 
The assumption that motivational criteria like the one proposed 
above can determine grammatization is supported by the behavior or 
~elativization in Japanese, This rule is subject to the CNPC, the 
CSC and the Crossover Constraint (Ross (1967)), unlike the Japanese 
rule of Question-Formation (analogous to wh-placement), which is subject 
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to. none of these· constraints, As Relativiza.tion obeys most of the 
constraints on movement rules, we would expect it to obey the RRC", 
but it does. Qdt, as the acceptability of 0.v) :;;hows. 
(iv) Biru-ga suld ta to Mary:...ga shinjite iru·· t·o John-ga 
Bill likes Mary believes John 
utagatte iru onha no ko wa ki~ee da. 
suspects girl pretty. 
'The girl who John suspects Mary believes Bill 
· likes is pretty.' 
This suggests that constraints can be violated when the functional 
. motivations for doing so ~re strong enough, for if Relativization were 
also subject to the RRC", there would hardly be any relative clauses 
in Japanese, and apparently a language cannot easily get by without 
relative clauses. (iv) also supports my hypothesis that the RRC11 is 
a behavioral principle, for it is conceivable that a behavioral 
principle can be violated, but it is hardly possible to claim that a 
univ:ersal syntacticconstraint sometimes holds and sometimes does not. 
Concerning the rules illustrated in (2. 70 )-(2. 73) , we may consider  
some possible reasons for their graJDlllatization. Notice that in the  
case of the pseudo--cleft construct.ion and of Coordination-Reduction  
to the right, there are reasons for the dislodged constituent to rise  
to a certain height: the pseudo-cleft phre:se must be a clause-mate of  
the head of the subject relative clause, and the reduc·ed constituent  
must be lifted high enough to escape from't.he domination of the  
coordinating ~onjunction (and or or). No such motivations exist  
with respect t,o the rules exhibited in (2.70)-(2,73), and we find no  
movement even when the extracted constituents would cross a null- 
variable.  
In addition to considerations of double-interruption, there may 
b.e additional factors contributing to the unacceptability of the c-
sentences in (2.70)-(2.73), Thus; consider the case wheh the 
remainder of the sentence form which some element has been.displaced 
to the right by a non-constituent, as in (2. 70c) .- This would force 
the hearer to keep in mind~ non~constituent, presumably a more 
difficult task than the retention of a constituent (this has, I believe, 
been shown experimentally); in contrast, since rules d9 not move non-
constituents, unbounded movements to the left could never force the. 
retention of a non-constituent, and this difference in the effects 
of movements might contribute to the timita.tion of rightward movements 
more severely thnn of left-ward movements. 
On the other h!lnd, Particle-Movement does not necessarily leave 
behind strings which look like non-constituents, as for example in 
*that ou claim that Bill had seen Mar is odd throu h; in this situation 
we may reasonably assume that the closure strategy 2:8) increases the 
complexity of this sentence, for th~ occurrence of the new predicate 
is after Mary_ presumably constitutes a sufficient encouragement for 
the hearer to regard the strong Bill had seen Mag as a complete . 
sentence. The same situation favoring erroneous closure exists in 
{2,72c), a.nd probably even in (2,71c}, With respect to (2,73c), its 
unaccepta.bility,may look puzzling, for antecedents (more correctly, 
( 
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postcedents) can usually come arbitrarily far after pronouns. However, 
we are not dealiµg, here ·witll an orcii:na.ry postcedent, but rather with · 
a tag exp:i;-essing an after-:thought, like I mean, my: sister. Notice 
that such tags ire awkward when delayed even if they have not b.een 
lifted into a higher cla.us.e, as show~ by the unacceptability of *you've 
been pursuing her .althou h I e licitly forbade you to et out of 
your room, , I .mea.ri, · my sister, in which- the although clause is an 
inserted pare:rit·hetical. Contra.st this 'lotith clauses moved by Extra-
posi~ion; which allow the insertion o.f long patentheticals: It is 
surprising to me 2 although I might have expected it all alon~at 
~ohn has left with eilother.woman. The general conclusion we may draw 
is that erroneous closure is much.mo+e likely when elements move to 
the right than to. the left, for leftward displaced elements usually 
carry a distinguishing mark which alerts the hearer to the fact that 
a discontinuity exists.· Such closure is, however~ less likely in the 
highly characterist~c pseudo-cleft construction than in sentences 
like those iri (2. 71 )-(2. 73). 
2.2.0. This section discusses various 'minimal distance' 
principles which .have been ofte1;1 claime.d 'to exist in order to reduce 
the amount of ambiguity·' that would othervise occur in natlll"al 
languages. I believe that, put in this way, the claim is misleading, 
since it suggests a teleological orientation of speakers .aimed at 
minimizing ambiguity; if speakers really followed a strategy like 
'reduce ambiguity vhenever possible,' it is difficult to see why they 
should allow ambiguity at all. I pref~r to think that there are 
principles "'hich have the indirect effect of reducing ambiguity in 
certain cases • One such principle could be .( 2. 22) , which prompts 
speakers to select, in the absence of indications, to the contrary, 
the simplest reading of a.n a.mbiguous utterance as the most likely; 
whenever gr8lllI!latizEttion occurs (marking the less likely reading as 
ill-formed), the .result is a reduction in potential ambigu:i.ty. One 
(usually) grammatized instance ·was seen in connection with the cross-
over restrictions on Relativization and Topica.lization; some non-
gra.mmatized cases are considered belo'lf. 
It· will also be argued that in cases of equal likelihood, 
ambiguity is possible only when the potential readings are~ in a 
sense ill-understood at present, minimally 'distinct.' For example, 
the sentence •John has a dog; Mary has a cat; and Bill has on~ too is 
impossible, for ,the hearer has no basis on which to ·select·one of 
the (at least) two potential antecedents of one; as no reading is 
more likely than the other, both are impossible. 
Granted that reduction of ambiguity· is not a primary goal of 
speakers but an indirect effect of independent i-riteracting principles, 
it·still looks· 'intuitively reasonable 9 to expect that minimal distance 
might increase the likelihood of one 9.1lt of two or more potential 
readings. In fact, a linear minima.l distance principle might even. 
appear to derive experimental support from .such well-attested facts 
of perception as the recency and primacy effects ~ch say that the 
first and last elements of a sequence are more easily remembered than 
the remaining ones). · Such a clai.m would, ho:w:ever, be fallacious. for 
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the closest pertinent element (for exeJ11pie, the .most .:recent of a 
number of pos!3fl:>le antecedents) ;~e.ed·not be the last element heard 
before the pro-form; therefor~, the recency.effect does n.ot support 
a linear min~mal distance principle in generai. 23 In fa.ct, I will 
23There is one case in which t}:le recency or primacy effect 
seems to be involved. Thus, a ques:tion iike would.you like milk, . 
tea., or coffee? can be answered if.es in some languages, with the meaning 
of either milk or coffee (but not both for the same language). The 
meaning milk seems to be possible in a number of ,American dialects, 
while.the meaning coffee is possible,in Burmese (I owe this piece of 
information to A. Zwicky); I do not know of any language in which the 
answer yes to the above question can mean~. and if none in ef'fect 
exist, this'would follow from the non-existence of a strate~ which 
selects a medial element in a sequence. 
at:tempt to show below that whenever~ minimal distance principle se~ms 
to be operative, there exists a more plausible alternative explanation. 
2.2.1.1, One of the most simplistic proposals involving a 
minimal distance principle can be found in some traditional textbooks 
which lay down that if a pronoun has several possible antecedents, 
the actual ante.cedent will be the closest to the pronoun, in terms 
of line.ar distance. That his claim is empirically false is shmm by 
the ambiguity of (2.86). · · · 
(2.87) John told Bill tha.t he had.become a father. 
(2.86) shows clearly .that the prescriptive pronouncement r~ferred 
to above is not a rule of English. In fact. the choice of the closer 
antecedent is not even more likely,. which suggests that the choice 
of a. remote antecedent creates no perceptual problems in principle; 
in other words, ~he antecedent pronoun relation does not seem to be 
subject to the usual perceptual constraints on discontinuities (such 
a.s (2.37)). 
That choosing the more remote antecedent in the case like (2,86) 
is not perceptually complex is also suggested by the fact that there 
is apparently no limit to the amount of discourse that can separate 
a pronOWl from its antecedent, SQ long as the topic of the. discussion 
has not changed radically in-between •. Imagine, for example, one girl 
asking another how she had spent her honeymoon with John in Paris, 
and the newly married one .launching into a description of the beauties 
of Paris, of the magnificence of the Bois-de-Boulogne, of the splendor 
of the Jardin-des-Tuileries, which she would.conclude with the 
sentence: and in front of the statue of Louis XIV at Versallies, ~ 
~issed me passionately. It seems to·me that even if the account 
contained no reference to John, there is still no difficu1ty whatsoever 
in associating he in the above underlined sentence with John. The · 
hypothesis that.establishing. a. connection between two NP"isis ~ 
complex in proportion to the amount of intervening discourse will 
play an important part in my attempt to account for what I called in 
Chapter One the Dichotomous Behavior Principle. 
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2.2.1.2. My claim .tha.t linear di§tance plays no part in 
resolving a.mbiguitie13 in Standard Englisli:might seem somewbat 
surprising, i:n viev of the ·important pa:rt played by surface oI'der 
in signaling the roles of various arguments. However, there is no 
m..vstery here: surface order is perceptually important in role-
discovery, and in nothing else. Moreover, it is only important to 
the extent tha.t it. contributes to role-discovery, The latter point 
can be illustrated with an interesting observation of Lek.off's (1970c) 
to the effect that potential ambiguities are sometimes unacceptable, 
unless there is some feature with disambiguating effect. Thus he 
points out that ambiguity is not tolerated in (2.8Tb), although it 
is tolerated in [2.8Ta.), and assumes that the distinction is due to 
the configurational peculiiµ-ities of·tµe former. Moreover, these· 
configurational factors .do not lead to unacceptability in th.e presence 
of a disambiguating feature, like the fact that~ is [-~.ALEJ in 
(2 ,87c). 
(2.87) 	 a. John told Bill that he had won the Grand 
Prize. 
b. 	*John and Bill walked in, and he took off his 
coat. 
c. 	 John E!Ild Mary walked in, and he took off his 
coat. 
It seems that for ambiguity to be tolerated, the various readings 
must achieve a minimal level of 'distinctness.' Distinctness, in this 
sense, is an empirically discoverable notion, not one understood in 
advance, and undoubtedly deserves to ·serve the object of a separate 
study. It is sufficient, however> for our purposes to notice that 
the different surface ordering of the two putative antecedents of he 
assigns them different roles in {2.87a), while nothine of the kindis 
the cas.e in (2.87b). Instead, surface order is irrelevant in a 
coordination, for, whatever the 'roles' of coordinate terms {if one 
accepts the Generative Semantics claim that logical and and or are 
predicates), these are clearly identical; moreover, ~rdinate terms 
are commutative. It vould seem, therefore, that role-distinctness 
is required2 in order for ambiguity to be allowed in such instances, 
24rn the absence of disambiguating information, role-distinctness 
between the two putative antecedents is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition for ambiguity to be possible. An exhaustive 
study o'f: this sufficiency condition is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but the paradigm below suggests that (2.87b) is unacceptable 
for at least two reasons, namely (a) that the path connecting the 
. sntecedents goes through a coordinate no.de, and (b) that there is 
some node which domi.nates both antecedents and which is connected 
with the propoun by a path which traverses a coordinate node. 
(i) *John a.nd 	Bill decidedt.hat he must go. 
(ii) 	*John saw Bill lying on a sofa., and he dropped dead 
soon after. 
(iii) 	*That Bill loves Mary and that Joan loves Jack seems 
odd to him. 
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(iv) 	 Johni spoke to Billj and mo"ther. 
(v) That Johni and motner were sick surprised[~~=ji}· 
Billj. 
(vi) 	 Billi is sick, but ·neither Johnj nor { are.:1:~} wife 
Whatever the explanation for conditions (a) and (b) above, (b) is the 
same condition which prevents a discourse-boundary (like full stop, 
question mark, etc.) to intervene between the.two antecedents on the 
one hand and the pronoun on the other, althoush such a boundary is 
allowed between the antecedents, as shown by (vii) and (viii) 
re·specti vely. 
(vii) a. Has John spoken to Bill about the impending 
bankruptcy? 
b. *Yes, and his mother was most upset. 
(viii) a. Does Johni know about the bankr~ptcy? 
b. Yes, and Billj has told fh~si}
l h1.sj 
mother too. 
and the different surface order of John and Bill in (2.87b) cannot 
P,rovide the kind of distinctness required for ambiguity, precisely 
because it is not semantically or rol~-wise significant. This 
supports my earlier claim that lineal:' distance in itself is irrelevant. 
I believe that the solution to the unacceptability of (2 .87b) 
should be sought by investigating the notion of 'distinctness' I 
proposed above, and not by imposing a trahsderivational constraint, 
as Lakoff proposes. Lakoff 1s solution is, I think, inadequate, because 
the problem is not statable in purely grammatical terms. Thus, the 
transderivational constraint should be formulated in such a way as 
to allow all cases where there is a disambiguating factor, as in 
(2.87c), and this factor need not be strictly line;uistic. For 
example, (2.88a) and (2.88b) seem to me perfectly acceptable, although 
the disambigu~tion is effected by extra-linguistic information; this 
information is context-supplied in the former case, and presupposed 
by the speaker in the latter case. 
(2. 88) · a. John and Bill waJ.ked into and out of the room 
where I was sleeping respectively, and then 
he struck me a big blow on the h~ad, 
b. 	 Mao-Tse-Tung a.nd Jack had a nice chat together, 
and he started boasting he had made China 
the most powerful nation on earth. 
I do not see how a grammar could have access to the disambiguating 
information in cases like (2.88). In (2.88b), for example, the 
grammar would have to be able to check whether what is asserted of 
the pronoun is true of both putative antecedents, nnd this would 
require the ascription to Mao-Tse-Tung of a feature like [+~OASTS 
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HE HAS MADE CfiINJI. THE MOST POWERFUL NATION Oi-i EARTHJ ! 
2.2.1.3; In section 1.3.3,1, I m~ntioned Chomsky's claim tha.t 
'condition (1.102.i)' (which I reproduc~ below for convenience) 1 in 
some cases, has the effect of reducing ambiguity, or to put it 
differently, of increasing the reliability of a reasonable performance 
strategy which seeks the nearest UP to a verb (or the head noun of 
a nominal phrase} as its subject.' 
(1,102) i. No rule can involve!,!_ in 
••• X••• C ••• Z••• '""'!'ltTY1!, •• J • • • . 
where ( i} ! i~ the aubject of WYV and is· 
not cont.rolled by a category containing ! • 
a 
The cases of possible ambiguity which Chomsky has in ~i~d involve 
transformation proposed in Dougherty {1970) which derives (2.89a) 
from (2,89c} through (2.89b). 
(2.89) · a. The men hated each other. 
b. The 	men ea.ch hated the other( s}, 
c. Each .of the men hated the other(s}. 
Chomsky claims that each-movement must sometimes operate across . 
sentence-boundaries, specifically in those cases where the subject of 
the embedded clause is a PRO-form controlled by a category in the 
matrix els.use. Thus, he requires tlia.t (2.90a) be derived from (2,90b} 
and not from (2,90c), on grounds of synonymy. 
(2.90) 	 a. We want to kill each other. 
b. Each of us wanted to kill the other(s). 
c. We wanted each of us to kill the others, 
Condition (1.102,i) serves to prevent the derivation of the b-sentence 
from the a-sentences in (2,91), where~ is not controlled by anythine, 
being non-specific, in (2,92), where! is controlled by the wrong 
category, and in (2. 93) , where ~ is ~ specified non-controlled NP. 
(2.91) 	 a. Each of us heard about plans to kill the other(s). 
b, *We he·ard about-pians to kill each other. 
(2.92) 	 a. Each of us ordered John to kill the other(s}. 
b. *We ordered John to kill each other. 
(2. 93) 	 a.. Ea.ch of us expected the soldier ( s} to shoot 
the other(s). 
b, *We expected the soldier to shoot each other. 
c. We expected the soldiers to shoot each other. 
(2,93c) is one of the cases Chomsky claims would be ambiguous without 
(1.102.i}, since it could then be interpreted as derived either fr9m 
(2.,93a) or from we' expected each of the soldiers to shoot the other(s}. 
In that case, one might claim that there is a minimal distance strategy 
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which, at least in part, .ca.used the introduction of (l, 102. i) into the 
grammar, This would contradict my earlier proposal that minimal 
distance is not an operative criterion in English. However, I see 
some rather serious problems with such a proposal. 
First, one would have to explain why the strategy was granunatized 
not just in (2.93c), but also in (2,93b) ,· where no risk of amb:Lguity 
exists. Rule-generalization arguments seem to me rather forced in 
th;i.s instance. 
Second, as Chomsky himself notes in his note 31, the input and 
output to the each-movement rule are not always synonymous, since :t;pez_ 
shot each other.does not imply each of them shot the other(s), although 
they hate each other does imply each of them hates the other.( s) . 
Similarly, it seems to me that we pr.omised to respect each other is 
consistent with a situation in which one person perfoI111ed an act of 
promise on behalf of a group, while we each promised to respect the 
other(s) implies that each member of the group promised individually. 
The lack of synonym,y in some cases does not argue against the each-
movement rule, since transformations are allowed to change meaning in 
Chomsk..v's Extended Standard Theory, but it does weaken the motivation 
for a minimal distance strategy, by reducing the number of possible 
ambiguities. 
Third, I find the rule of each-movement itself doubtful, as I 
cannot think what the source of sentences like those in (2,9li). would 
be, if each must originate as a quantifier of some NP to the left of 
its surface position. 
(2,94) a. John talked to Bill about killi~g each other, 
b. Bob showed Jill a picture of each other. 
It seems to me that both the each-movement and condition (l.102.i) can 
be dispensed with, and that all we need to do is to allow the generation 
of each other in its surface position, with the requirement that the 
expressed or understood subject of the clause each other is it be a 
plural or a collective. This would ~utomatically explain the un-
grammaticality of (2.91b), since unspecified subjects are not necessarily 
understood as plurals; in fact, if Un~pecified Subject is understood 
as !'omeone, it will be a singular. 
2.2.2. A more sophisticated minimal distance principle, based 
not on linear distance, but on path-length me.asured along tree-branches, 
was proposed in Rosenbaum (1967) in order to determine t~e unique 
antecedent of a. deleted complement subj e·ct. This principle was, 
however, convincingly argued not to exist in Postal· (1968b), where it 
was shown that deleted complement subjects have no unique antecedents 
in general, as shown in (2.95a), and that antecedent-uniqueness was 
determined by independent factors in the subset of cases where it was 
found. 25 Moreover, even when the antecedent is unique, the minimal 
25A natural characterization of this subset was attempted in 
Grosu (1970), 
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distance principle does not al~ays correctly predict it, as demonstrated 
by the contrast between (2.95b) and (2.:95c)--aminima,l pair discovered 
by Jesl)ersen. 
(2.95) a. 
b. 
c. 
John talked to Bill about kissing Bertha, 
He allowed her to go. 
He promised her to go, 
2.2.3, In sections 2.2.1 and 2.2,2 I argued against a strategy 
making use of linear distance or of distance measured along tr.ee 
branches. Other minimal distance principles could be devised, and in 
this section, I shall inquire whether there is a principle that resolves 
ambiguit_ies in te.rms o.f node-height. ponsider, for example, (2,96), · 
where the underlin.ed constituent has the structure exhibited in (2.97). 
(2.96) 	 This is the cat with three kittens, which caught_ 
a lot of mice last week. 
(2.97) 
~NP1~ 
NP PP
I\ ~.  
L\ r A  
The cat with three kittens 
The non-restrictive relative clause could modify either three kittens 
or the cat with three kittens. In neither case would linear distance 
make a difference, .for the relative clause is ·adjacent to both putative 
heads. Neither would branch-countine; prefer one reading, for the same 
number of branches would connect the relative clause to its head, 
regardless of whether the latter is NP1 or NP2, However, NP1 is higher 
up on the tree, and one may conceive of a strategy associating the 
relative clause with the lower node NP2 . As far as I have been able 
to ascertain, (2.96) is ambiguous and offers no support for such a 
strategy. 
2.2.4.1. I shall now consider a number of cases in which linear 
distance appears to effect disambiguation. Perlmutter, at the 1970 
Conference on English Syntax, proposed a transderivationa.l constraint 
to handle the unambiguity of cases like (2.98a), which most peoplb 
cannot perceive as a paraphrase of (2.98b). 
(2.98) a, A woman hit a girl who was pregnant. 
b. A woman who was pregnant hit a girl. 
c. A woman just left who was pregnant, 
d. A woman hit the curb who was pregnant. 
Thus, although one would expect the relative clause in (2,98a) to be 
perceived 	as havin~ arisen in one of two different ways, i.e., by being 
generated 	as a modifier of a girl or by F.xtrapoaition-from-NP, the 
latter reading seems to be out. An examination of the entire paradi~ 
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in (2,SJ8a) will quickly reyeal th13.t the reading involving Extraposition-
from-HP is out Just in cas~ ambiguity could arise, Perlmutter's 
transderivationa.l constraint was formulated .roµghly as follows: 
(2.99) 	 A derivation Dis ill-formed if_Extraposition-from-
NP appl1es in D, and if, by virtue of this, the 
last line of D becomes stringwise identical with 
the last line of D', where D and D' differ in 
semantic representation, 
I do not believe that a transderivational constraint is the 
correct solution in this case, because there are dialects (e.g., A. 
Zwicky's) in which (2,98a) is ambiguous, but in which the reading 
ascribing pregnancy to the girl is far more likely. The greater likeli-' 
hood of one reading cannot be captured in the transderivational 
constraint, which can either allow or disallow a reading, I believe 
that, as in other cases we have already seen, there is a perceptual 
principle at work (which is grammatized in Perlmutter's idiolect but 
not in Zwicky's), namely, (2.22), according to which simpler readings 
are preferred to more complex ones. The greater complexity of the 
structure resulting by Extraposition-from-NP in (2,98a) is due not to 
minimal distance considerations, but to strategy (2.37), As non-
discontinuity is the extreme case of non-complexity of the intervening 
material, (2.37) correctly predicts that one reading is far less 
complex than the other. · 
There is, however, a ,far more serious problem with (2.99), 
namely, that it predicts that (2,100) is ill-formed on botp potential 
readings. 
(2.100) A woma,n sent a girl spinning who was pregnant. 
This is so, because on either reading (2,100) arises through Extra-
position-from-NP, and thereby becomes identical with the surface 
structure of the other potential reading. In contrast, ( 2. 37) correctl:r 
predicts that the reading associating the extra.posed relative with the 
£!.rl is far more likely than the other (or the only possible one, if-
grammatization has occurred). 
2.2.4.2. (2.37) predicts that, all other things being equal,_a 
continuous readine will be preferred to one involving discontinuities 
Mhenever this situation arises, not only when it is brought about by 
Extraposition-from-l!P. Another rule which can create this kind of 
situation is Particle-Movement. (2,101a) shows that the resulting 
discontinuity is possible, with some awkwardness when the intervening 
material is fairly complex, but that it is extremely unlikely (probably 
out in most dialects) when -a continuous reading is possible, with the 
result that (2.101b) cannot in general be read as a paraphrase of· 
(2 ,lOlc). 
(2.101) 	 a. ?John pushed the little girl who arrived 
yesterday do'l-m. 
b. John pushed the little girl who had fallen do1,m, 
c. John pushed down the little girl who had fallen. 
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I:t is interesting that the discontinuous reading can be forced 
in (2.1,0lb) by pa.i,;sing between.fallen and gown, since the continuous 
reading; although le.ss complex, becomes thereby ungrammatical. This 
cannot be done, qowever, in (2.98a), since ·a ·pause before the relative 
clause could be int·erpreted a.;3 marking the lattel". as a non-restrictive 
on~, and the cont~nuous reading would be possible and preferred. 
2.3. I have attempted in section 2,1 to defend the claim that 
the complexities of erroneous closure, perceptual 'conflict, ~d 
interrupted behavior have linguistic relevance. Such perceptual 
limitations will be argued in Chapter- Four to be significantly involved 
in Ross' constraints (as reanalyzed in Chapter Three). 
The most inportant conclusion of section 2.2 for what follows is 
t:tia.t certain remote relations (such as t:hose between discontinuous 
components) a.re subject to perceptual limitations, while others (such 
as antE!cedent-anaphor relations) are not. This distinction will turn 
out to be crucial in proposing an explanation for the Dichotomous 
Behavior Principle. 
\ 
CHA.Pl'ER 	 III 
' ' THE. '~CLEUS-AND-SATTE~ITE' CONSTRUCTION 
3.0. The t...ro main: pi.µ-poses of 1;his chapter are to argue that 
complex noun phrases, synnnetric ~nd asynunetric coordinate structures, 
and sentences or verb phrases modified by optional adverbials are 
special instances of a -construction type which I call the 'Nucleus-
ami.-Satellite' construction, and :to show that they obey two constraints 
weaker than R9ss' Island Constraint (see 1.4) (which pr~di~ts the 
complete :freezing of 'A-inunediately-over-A' structures) • 
. , 3,1. The liucleus-an~-Satellite construction is defined in (3,1): 
and,the co.nstraints to whiqh it is subject are stated in (3-.2). 
(3,1) Given three nodes X, Y, Z, such that 
· ( i) X and Y belong to the s.ame g:rammat:1,ca.1 
category;, 
(ii) 	 X. is properly .analyzable ·as Y, z,l and X 
immediately dominates bothy .and z, 
(iii) 	 Z is optional, both in underlying and 
surface structure , · 
We 	 call X i:i. Nucleus.. and Satellite construction 
(N & s), r a Nucleus, Z a Satellite 
l Tl:le linear order of Y and Z is not relevant 
(3,2) Def'inition: · Gi-ven a trans.formation T and a 
constituent G, 
a. ·If T 	moves C, T chops C, and 
b. 	 ·If' T moy~s an element of C, T maims C. 
With respect to movement transforrlll:).tions, 
N & S's exh~bit the following na.radigl!l: 
(i) The 	Nucleus cannot be chopped 
(ii) The Nucleus can be maimed 
(iii) The Sat~l:lite can be chopped 
(iv) 	 The S1'1.tellite cannot be mained 
from under tb.e. domination of the N &: S node. 
(3.li) ii.; the A-over-A C!Ot\cl:iti9n, while (3,li:i,) includes the 
c·ondition of immediat.e domination vhic.h Ross introduce.d in hi.s Island 
Constraint. (3.liii) ·1s the condition I have added in -order to keep 
out prepositional phrases~ usuallt .analyzed as [fu_ NP:J,. complement 
-sentences, 9ften represented a.s C ~er SJ, and .second coordinate terms, 
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. X r anci'l',"'.' ., 
on the assumption that they are analyzed as l or .5 ·X • The 
reasons for this added condition will become apparent in a moment. 
(3.1) is an effort to capture the notion of Head and optional 
Dependent. Both the .notion of Head and that of optionality of the 
Dependent are hard to define operationally, although there have 
been numerous attempts in that direction {a succint sumr.iary of several 
structuralist and transforma.tionalist attempts is given in J. 
Robinson's 11Dependency Structures and Transf'ormational Rules". in 
which she proposes a dependency-grammar solution).. Although there 
is a string intuitive feeling that the head of the ·construction the 
doe; is dop: rather than~' it is not at all obvious how such a --
claim could be justified. Robinson proposes that the h~ad is 
always obligatory, while the dependent may or m~y.not be, and 
although this test is as good as any .other I am aware of, it is by 
no means~ perfect one. The difficulty is that it cannot be applied 
by simply inspecting a given structur~, but requires an examination 
of' all possible similar structures; some of the obvious dif'ficult.ies 
are that we can never be sure we have insnected all the nertinent 
structures, ~e do not have a procedure by, which to identify 'corres-
ponding' elements in similar structures, etc. In fact, Robinson 
regards the head as the 1cha:ractarizing' ·element of a construction,.· 
which is undoubtediy an intuitively satisfactory definition, b~t not 
one that makes possible a mechanical·decision. As I do not have a 
mechan;cal procedure either, I shall set.tle for the hope that 
intuitions as to which element is the head of a particular construction 
will in general agl'!ee. 2 · 
2t,ince Robinson's main interest was not to explicate the 
semantic feeling that some element is central to a construction, 
qut rather to fin~ a characterizing, necessary terminal element 
which could be. identified as the 'governor' (in the sense of G. 
Lakoff (1970a)) of various transformations, she posits heads for 
all constructions, including those that have usually been regarded 
Mexocentric. Thus, she has an abstract element T (sentence-Type) 
which constitutes the head of sentences, and she regards the 
preposition as the head o'f a prepositional phrase (because it is 
terminal). It is not entirely clear to me how the doubly under-
scored string in that John will leave his wif~ is perfectly nossible 
would be analyzed in this approach; indeed, it is not only an·s, but 
also a UP, and what the nominal head could be is not easy to see 
(although some a,bstraction like 1the event' or 'the proposition' 
could certainly be posited), In any event, this approach is not of 
interest to our present discussion. Although I have no non-
intuitive arguments, I do not think it would be easy to make 
informants agree that a preposition is 'modified' by its NP, that 
a complementizer is 'modified' by the following sentence, or that 
a sentence 'modified' its Type. There is no conflict involved 
here, for Robinson makes it clear that she is talking about 
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'characterizing elements 1 , not about I c.enters 1 • I iish; however, 
to keep the notion I head I for endocentric CC>nstructionS only, 
The optionality of constituents is also a notion definable 'in 
general I and with some appe'al to intuition, but unfortunately not · 
in a mechanical wa;y either, Thus, it is not difficult to assent to 
the proposition that any term of a symmetric coordination is,.in 
some sense, optional, since the other terms can, in principle, play 
the same role·within the containing framework as the entire coordina-
tion does, The best operational test for optionality would.be inter-
changeability in all contexts, but it is already a conunonplace that 
this strong form of optionality is hardly, if ever, encountered. 
Thus, although a coordinate term and the entire coordination are 
often interchangeable; as in (3,3) and (3.4), counterexamples can 
easily be found,as in (3,5)-(3,7), 
(3,3) a;, 
b. 
That Bill murdered John and Mary is awful. 
That Bill murdered Mary is awful. 
(3,4) a, 
b. 
Either Bill or Mary will have to lE!ave. 
Bill will have to leave. 
{3,5) a. 
b. 
John and Mary went their separate ways, 
*John went his .separate way. 
( 3 . 6 ) a, 
b, 
John , Mary.· and Bill are my three best friends , 
*John and Bill are my three best friends:, 
( 3 :r) a.. 
b. 
Bill, Sally and the merchant divided the 
money among themselves. 
*Bill and the merchant divided the money among 
themselves. 
Moreover, interchangeability in context would bee. necessary, 
but not a sufficient, condition for a. mechanical decision; thus, 
although the singly- and the doubly~underscored material in (3,8) 
are interchangeable with preservation of grammaticality, it seems 
counterintuitive to regard the singly-underscored material minus the 
doubly underscored one as optional, 
(3. 8) The man who talked to the lady with ~ :friendly. do_g_ 
in her arms is corning towards you, 
It appears that both the notion of head. and that of optionality 
of constituents are theoretically ill-defined at present, although · 
both a.re intuitively clear in a. large number of ·cases. I shall use 
both these notions in what follows, because I believe that interesting 
generalizations hinge on them; without ·however pursuing the task of 
defining them formally any further. I have coined the terms Nucleus 
and Satellite because, as I shall.argue below, coordinate constructions 
satisfy both the structural definition in (3,1) and the·beha.vioral 
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prediction in (3.2);·and calling a. coordination a head-and-dependent 
construction might ,appear as a.. more startling claim than it really 
is. 
The beha.viol:' of N & S's vith respect to movement transformations 
as predicted by (3, 2) is clearly less rigid than the predict ion: made 
by the IC. Indeed, 'the latter predicts that neither Nuc·lei nor 
Satellites are either choppable or maimable, while (3.2) predicts 
that Nuclei i::a.n 'be maimed but not chopped, while Satellites ca.n be 
chopped but not maimed.3 
3(3,2ii) and (3.2iii} do not, however, make the claim that 
each language will have rules capable of maiming every single 
instance.of Nucleus and/or of chopping every single instance of 
Satellite; the claim is merely that there is no general constraint 
blocking all movements out of N & S1 s, as the IC predicts. 
It can be seen already why condition (3.liii) was imposed; 
indeed, prepositional phrases, complement sentences, second coordinate 
terms, and in general, constituents introduced by obligatory 
connectors, do not behave.as predicted by (3.2). Indeed, the NP 
of a. prepositional phrase ca.n·be freely moved in English~ thus 
failing to comply with (3,2i), and the connector can never be moved, 
while Satellites in general can (as predicted by (3.2iii)). I 
suspect ·th!;tt the freezing of such c.onnectors is a very strong,· probably 
universal, constraint; although my knowledge of languages is quite 
limited, I would be very surprised if a rule moving connectors 
(whether these precede or follow the elements they introduce) turned 
out to exist in some languege. 
The problem of proposing an explanatorily adequate account of 
the conjunction of ( 3 .1} and ( 3. 2) .;,,ill be taken up in Chapter Four, 
but it can be shown rather easily at this point that my pronoso.ls 
escape the objections I raised ~gainst the IC in (1,118). I show 
this in (3,9) 1:/elow: 
{3,9)  a. 	 In simple Extrapositioni the extraposed Sis 
maimable, although immediately· dominated 
by the category s, because (3.liii) is 
not satisfied•. 
b. Extraposition from NP is permitted by (3,2iii). 
c. Extra.position-of-PP is permitted by (3.2iii). 
d. 	 Prepositions can be stranded because (3.liii} 
is not fulfilled, 
e. 	 An NP complementing another NP can be chopped, 
because of (3.2iii). 
f. 	 Complement sentences can be maimed because 
(3,liii) is not fulfilled. 
g. 	 The maiming of matrix S's modified by 
adverbial ·cla.uses is permitted by (3.2ii L 
h. 	 The chopping of adverbials is allowed by 
(3.2iii). 
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(3.9) i. 
j. 
Adverb Preposir:ig is allowed by (3.~iii). 
The behavior of assyinetric coordination will 
be shown to be eritireiy consistent with · 
the conjunction· (3.1), (3.2). 
k. A complete an$wer is_not possible at this 
point, but it will later be shown that 
across-the-board chopr,_ .ng is not an 
instance in which a Satellite is maimed 
'from ~der .the domination of the·N & S 
node'. 
The IC has thus been replaced by two weaker constraints, 
(3.2i) and (3.2iv). I shall now show that these two constraints 
are in fact largely independent, both with respect to the structures, 
and to the kinds of phenomena, to which they are a.ppli~able. 
As far as structural applicability is concerned, (3.2iv) alone 
is restricted to Satellites, while (3.2i) is applicable to heads 
in general. Thus, if ve accept the currently held views (which, as 
I sa~d, ·r cannot prove) that the noun is the head of the NP a..11d the 
verb is the head of the VP, there are hardly any rules which move . 
just the constituent N ~r y, The fact that NP's can move out of 
PP' s leaving a stranded preposition i.s not a counterexample, since, 
as I pointed out before, I consider the notion 'head' applicable 
to endocendric constructions only (this is precisely the intuition 
which has led previous writers to posit the endocentric/excentric 
dichotomy); unlike Robinson, who posits heads in exocentric 
constructions like PP as well. On the other hand, (3.2iv) cannot· 
be extended to modifiers in general, for, if VP is regarded as an 
endocentric construction with the Vas head, a complement of V can 
most certainly be maimed, 
With regard to the sets of phenomena which obey (3.2i) and 
(3,2iv), neither of·which is restricted to chopping, it is ipter-
esting that they do not coincide. The phenomena which obey (3.2iv) 
have been discussed in Chapter One, as they constitute one member of 
the partition determined by the Dichotomous Behavior Principle. 
Which phenomena obey (3,2i) has not been studied in detail, but it 
is sufficient to show that one kind of phenomena obey one constraint 
and disobey the other in order to show that these constraints 
determine different partitions of syntactic processes. (3.10a) and 
(3,lOb) show that any neutralization 'into' complex NP 1 s is 
constrained by (3.2iv), but·not by (3.2i). 
(3.10) 	 a. •I never heard of the claim that John ever 
killed anybody. 
l:>, 	 I never knew anybody who claimed that Bill 
was unfriendly, 
There may vell be other rules which behave differently with respect 
to the two constraints, but the facts are not entirely.clear to me. 
Thus, it would appear that copyin~ rules, which we recall are 
exempt from (3.2iv), a.re subject to (3.2i), We exemplify this 
property in (3.11) with the rule of Relativization in Hebrew. 
,~. 
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(3.11) 	 a. Raita. et ha:ieled (,_) she kva.r holex lebeit-
sefer. 
'You.saw 	the child(,) who already goes to 
school. · 
p. 	 -Haieled she raita oto (*( ) she kvar holex 
. lebeit-sf;!fer .( ,) ) xaxam: 
1The child.who you saw him(*( ) who already 
goes to school(,)) is cleve:t. 
Referential pronouns, of the kind that result from copying, 
cannot in general be heads of relative clauses. The point is 
illustrated with respect to Hebrew and English in (3.12a) a.nd (3.12b) 
respectively (the latter is a.translation of the former). 
(3 .12) a. Raiti et haialdai, veata. gam. ·raita ot_ai 
( * ( ~) she kvar holexet lebeit-sefer) . 
b. 	 I saw.the girli, and you also saw heri 
(*(j) who already goes to school). 
It is not entirely clear if (and/or to what extent) (3.2i) is 
responsible for the unacceptability of (3.12). On the restrictive 
reading of the relative clause, the hea:d does not refer independently 
of the N & S which it heads, and thus cannot be i::oreferential.with 
anything. ~ut it is not ovious why the non-restrictive reading of 
the relative clause should .be bad (at least when the latter ·is a 
comment of the speaker, sirice some speakers accept (3.12b) with the 
relative expressing an after-thought; however, on the after-thought 
interpretation, there is no way of knowing whether the clause 
modifies the girl or her!). A possible reason for the unacceptability 
of (3.i2a) and (3.12b) may be that it is odd to make a conrrnerit on an. 
NP whose referent· is not ident:i.fied uniquely, and it seems to make 
more sense to attach a comment to the more fully specified antecedent, 
which has.a better chance of achieving identification of the -pertinent 
re·ferent. This assumption is supported by the fact that ( 3 .12c) is· 
bad in general, but good if spoken with heavy stress·on he a.pd in 
the presence of the referent of he. 
(3.12) c. He, who is my best friend, is very sick. 
In the latter case, he is in fact a deictic, and deictics are 
perfectly a.11 right with non-restrictive relatives; notice that 
deictics identify uniquely (I will argue below that precisely for 
that r.eason deictics cannot take restrictive relatives) , and thus 
support my point. 'All this suggests that the badness of (3~12a) and· 
(3.12b) may not be due to (3.2i) on either the restrictive or non-
restrictive reading. It should also be noticed that reflexives 
function similarly: 
(3.12) d. John cut himself(*(,) wno is my best friend)). 
(3,12d) is tolerable with the relative as an a.fter-thought, but as 
in the case of (3,12b), it cannot be shown that the after-thought 
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necessarily modifies the re:flexive rather· than the antifo'edent. 
One additional reason for doubting that p:ronomihaHz:e.tiori is 
subject to (3.2i) is that non-referential pronouns ca.n be heads of 
restrictive relatives, as (3.13) shows. 
(3 .13) I saw a pretty girl; and you saw ·one wl1~ wa.sn 't 
too attractive- · 
The fact that (3.13) is accenta.ble ties in nicely with rrry hypothesis 
that referentiality was'resp;nsible for the unacceptability of
4(3.12b) on the restrictive reading. It should also be noticed that 
4Pronouns having the surface shape of referential pronouns 
like the one in (3.12b) can be used nonreferentially, in which case 
restrictive relatives are perfectly possible, as in (i.): 
(i) He who commits murder shal1 be severely punished, 
(3.13) is ba~ if~ is unstressed and the relative is non~ 
restrictive; this also fits my hypothesis concerning the unaccept-
ability of (3,1·2)' on the non-restrictive reading,· sinc_e unstressed 
one ·is non-specific, and therei'ore does not identify a referent. On 
the other ha.nd, (3.13) is possible with a non-restrictive reading if 
~ is stressed, for ~ is then specific and does identify a 
referent. 
· NP's modified by complement sentences behave essentially in 
the same way as NP's modified by relative clauses, that is; they 
cannot be referential pronouns, but can be non-referential ones, as 
(3.14) shows. · 
(3.14) a. *I heard the hypothesis.that Bill has cancer 
and you heard it that Mary has mieuinonia.. 
b. I heard a prognosis that Bill has cancer and 
you heard one that Mary has pnetimonia,5 
c. *I am aware of the fact that Bill is sick, but 
you are not aware of one that Mary is sick 
as well. 
5(3,14b} is good only if one is stressed (and, therefore, 
specific). Thus, complement sentenc.es function like non-restrictive 
relat:lves, rather th~ like restrictive ones, which is con.sistent 
·vith the observation that complement·sentences supply additional 
information on the head NP, ,but do not provide .narrover identification. 
The ungrammaticality of (3.14c) is d~e to independent reasi:ms; 
indeed, ~ is indefinite~ and the structure *you are aware of a 
fact that Mary is sick is also ill-formed. In general, pronominal-
ization with one in such cases is bad just in those cases in which 
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the corresnonding full NP,is also bad (the constraints on the 
determiner~ of NP' S, with complement sentenc~s are discussed at the 
erid of s~ction 3,2,3). . . 
Concerning copying rules, I wish to point out that if they are 
made subject to (3. 2i) , it becomes possible to explain a baffling 
fact. apou1; the c,sc' in languages with copying rules. ·Thus, an 
element of a coordinate term can be copied, but e.n entire coordinate 
term .cannot. The situation :i.l:l illustrated in (3.15a) and (3.15b), 
with examples i'rqII) Heqrew (R. Wojctk informs me that the same 
situation is found in Breton). · 
(3 .15) · a. Haieledi she raita et ima sheloi ve et aba 
shel · xaim iatsa, 
'The childi who you say his. mother and 
Cl:;l,aim I s father has left. i 
b, *Haieledi she rai1;a otoi ve et xaim iatsa. 
'The 	childi who you saw hi_mi and Chaim has 
left. 
If, as I shall argue later, coordinate' ·structures are N & l3' s, the 
parad~gm in (3,15a) and (3,15b) is 8.CCO\Ulted for by (3,2iv) ru;td 
(3.2i} respectively. - . 
The behavior of copied pronouns differs from that of ordinary 
referential pronouns, as th1: perfect acceptabili1;y of (3,16)_, in 
cqntras:J; t,o the ll.Ilacceptability. of (3, 15b) , shows. 
(3.16) 	 Haieled ,be.bait, ve raiti et xaim ve oto kori~ 
sefarim. 
'The 	child is at home, and I saw Chaim and him 
reading books. 
The difference l:>etween ordinary pronouns and the ones that result 
from-copying is that .the latter are subject to coreferentiality 
neutr_a.lization. Thus, when such a situ~tion arises in English ( even 
by invited inference, as argue·d in Chapter One) the result is far 
from good, although. less bad than wheh the prono~ is removed 
completely, as shown in (3.17), 
(3.17) 	 a. ?*The rock is too heavy for me to.try to 
. Jit and the hammer}
pick lthe hammer and it up. 
b. 	**The rock is too heavy for me to try to 
ick rand the hammer} un_ . 
P Lthe hammer and. 
Although it is hardly possible to compare degrees of accepta,bility 
across languages, there is indirect evidence that structures like 
(3;15b) in Hebrew are less.unacceptable than structures in which a 
coordi.nate t~rm has been removed; in other word,s, the unaccepta,bility 
of (3,1.5b) is like (3.17a), ra.tller than_ like (3~17l:>). The res.son 
for beli'eving this is that structure!:l like (3.15b} become accep:table. 
:under certain conditions, one of which is topica.lization, a.s shown 
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in (3,·18). 
(3.18.) Haieled she oto ve et xai.m her ?eti leha lats~ 
min habait, 
'The 	child that him and Chaim I showed. you has 
left the house'. 
Although I am at a loss to explain why topica.lization should i.mprove. 
acceptability in such cases, it is reasonable to assume that copying 
a he!:1,d is less bad than chopping it. This is confirmed by evidence 
internal to Hebrew; question formation is .a chopping rule, and we 
see that (3.19) is out, despite topicalization. 
(3.19) *Mi ata xoshev she ve et xaim her?eti le imi? 
'Who 	 do you think that and Chaim I showed 
my mother?' 
The contrast in acceptability between (3,15b) and (~.16) reduces 
the likelihood that the unacceptability of (3.12a) or (3.12b) have 
much to do with (3.2i). On the other hand, the fact that reflexives 
and ordinary definite pronouns are both bad as heads of relative 
clauses (as shown by (3,12d) and (3.12b) respectively) does not mean 
that Reflexivization is not subject to (3,2i), for (3,12d) could be 
out both by (.3,2i) and by ·the semantic constraints on ordinary 
pronominalization discussed above. If Reflexivization is made 
subject to (3.21) but not to (3.2iv), it becomes possible to explain 
the contrast in acceptability between (1,92a) and (1:94). The 
following pair suggests even more strongly that Refle;x:ivization, 
6obeys (3.2i) rather than the IllllCh stronger CSC, as Ross thought. 
6rr ordinary pronominalization and feature~changing rules are 
not subject to (3,2i), it is rather startling that Reflexivization, 
Yhich is both a pronominalization and a feature-changing rule, be 
subject to it; nevertheless, the facts seem to suggest it.
In Chapter Four, where-I suggest a natural e;x:planation for 
(3,2iv) and (3.2i), I argue that there is a unique principle which 
determines which phenomena are subject to the former. v{ith respect 
to the latter, I have doubts that Reflexivization and chopping rules 
obey it for the same reason, as will become clearer in 4,5, where 
the e;x:planation for chopping rules being subject to (3,2i) is 
offered. · ' 
(3.20) a.. *John hit .:[Mary } 
; Lthe book 
and himself. 
b. · John put a knife and a picture of himself 
on the table. 
With .respe~t to the copying of sentences modified by adverbials, 
I have been unable to find examples in Hebrew in which a Sis 
copied. An illustration Yould be a sentence like *That Bill is 
crazy, mother·believes it, if it exi'sted. Notice, however, that the 
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pronouns that wol.ild occur from such copyingwould bediff'erent 
from both referential pronouns .and non:..referentia.l ones like.~, 
s;Lnce they would inVo1.ve identity-of-sense anaphora.· Although no 
identity-of-sense copying is fpund in,English, it C{Ul be sliown that 
such phenomena a.r.e .constrained by (3,2i) quite independently .of · 
copying: 	 · · · · · 
(3,21) a.. Jo.hn rese.nts Mary's going a.round naked., but 
Bil.l does not resent Mary's going around 
11aked i:or purpq13es,, of publicity. 
b.• *John resents Ma.ry's~going around naked, but 
Bill does not resent it for purposes of 
publicity 
Cwhere for pur;eoses of publicity modifies · 
it_, not re_sent). 
Notice that there is a. foJm of identity-of-sens~ pr9nomine.l.ization, 
which :j.s to one ":".pronominalization what it in (3,,21b) is to 
referential pronouns, as (3.21c) shows. Presuma.b1yi it in identity-
or-sense phenomen1;1. implies total identity {as refer~ntia.l pronouns 
do)' unlike pro-forms like one and the underscored constituent in 
(3.21c). - '. 
(3.21) 	 c, John rese11ts Mary's going aro~drna:lced, but 
Bill does not resent such behavior for 
purposes of publicity. 
Iri conclusion, it is not clear to me to what extent the copying 
and ·pro.qominaliza.tion of Nuclei is constrained by (3.2i) and by 
independent (semantic) con1;1t;ra.ints on pronomiµE!.l-izat'ion. Whatever 
the situation,
" 
it is clear 
.-
that (3:2i) and (3.2iv)
, ' 
differ with
' . . t ' 
respect to t.he ·phenomena they affect, as vas earlier shown with 
feature-ch~nging rules. · ' 
In: this sect.ion·, we have discarq.eo. the not:ion of A-over-A· 
configUration (defined by (3,li) and (3.lii)) ·in fay.or of the notion 
of N & s (defined by (3.li), (3.;lii), and (3,liii)) ~and of' head · 
(undefined but assumed to ·be understood intuitively). We have. also 
weakened the prediction that the structures thus defined are totally 
in:iperv~ous to certain 1:1yntactic operations by introducing the more 
limit~d constre.ints (3. 2i) !:!,nd {3.2lv) • · · 
The remainder qf this. chapter, that is, the .se~tions 3. 2, 3. 3, 
and 3,4, is devoted to complex NP's, optional adverbials motj.ifying 
S1s or VP's, and coordinate structures respecitvely~ Each section is 
broken down.into subsections corresponding to the basic subtypes found 
for each construction type. In each subsection, it 1 is argued th~t 
the construction under dificU:ssion satisfies the req1;1irement$ in {3,1) 
(and therefore is /:L legitiJlll:(te N & S), and that it behaves, with 
respect to movement tr!lllsformations, as predicted. by (3.2i) ... (3.2iv). 
3,·2. In this section~ whicl'l is devoted to complex NP's, I 
diseuss non-restrictive relatives, restrictive relatives, and nominal 
complements, in that order·. 1 • 
( 
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3 .2 .1. We begin by considering non-restrictive :relatives, as 
.in (3;22). 
(3.22) A girl, who you know, just left. 
3.• 2.Ll.. I shall first argue that the under],ined .string in 
(3.22) satisfied the first part of (3.lii), that is, that it is  
properly analyzable into two constituents, for it is conceivable  
that it might have the structure DET NS, The tests for showing  
that the string DE'!' N forms a constituent in t~is case are not  
numerous; indeed, the usual way of proving that a string is a  
constituent is by showing that it can be moved by various syntactic  
processes, but the constituent at issue is frozen by (3.2i). Tests  
can nevertheles be found; I offer three below.·  
The first test concerns the output of Coordination Reduction  
when this rule applies to the right. Indeed, when the output  
contains a coordination of non-constituents, the latter are obliga- 
torily separated by pause, as we can see in the contrast between  
(3.23) and (3.24). 
(3.23) a. Joh!! and Mary ate the cake. 
b. John, and Mary, ate the cake, 
(3. 24) a. John baked, ~d Mary ate., the cake. 
b. *John bake_d and Mary ate the cake. 
Consider now (3.25). If the underscored strings in (3.25a) were 
not constituents, we would expect (3,25b) to be ungrammatical, 
like (3,24b). r.nie fact that it is granunatical suggests that (3,25b), 
like (3.23a), contains a conjunction of constituents. 
(3.25) 	 a. The boy, who wants to go to Paris, and the 
girl, who wants to go to Paris, are in 
love with one another. 
b. 	 The boy and the girl, who want to ~o to 
Paris, are in love with one another. 
The second test concerns a. 'hierarchical constraint' on  
identity deletion in coordinate structures proposed in J. H. Y.  
'I'a.i (1971):  
(3, 26) Higher fdentical constituents must be deleted 
before lower identical constituents. 
On the assumption that the underscored strings in (3.25a) are 
constituents in construction with the following relative clauses, 
(3.26) can explain the grammaticality of (3.27a) and the_ unp;rammA.ti,-
cality of (3.27b). 
(3. 2'{) a.. 'rhe boy and p;irl, who want to r;o to 
Paris, are in love with one another. 
b. 	*The· boy, who wants to f'.O to Paris, and p;irl, 
who wants to go to Paris, a.re in love 
with one. ~other. 
- ;1,2i ... 
Indeed, (3.27a.} can be deriv~d tram (3.25a) through the intermediate 
stage (3.25b), while (3.27b) is derived directly fr.om (.3.25a}. The 
contra.sf in ~ra:mmatica.lity can be accounted for by (3.26) if the . 
conJiincts of. (3 ,25a) ·are analyzeg as cgP sj, but nqt if t~ey are 
ana.lyzf:1d a.s C~~T N SJ or cir cg .SJJ. ~e .cohstra:i,nt on Coordin~tion 
Reduction is apparently stronger than predicted by (3.26), for 
lo..rer.o+d.er const;tuents·cannot be reduced to the left eve.n if they 
are the only identical ones, as shown in (3.28). For reasons I do 
not UI1derstand, the reduction of lo~er constituents to th~ right 
exhibits a gradual decrease in acceptability, rather than abrupt 
ungra.mmati~a.lity, as shown in (3~29).· 
(3.28) 	 a. ~he boy, wqo wa.nts to see Paris, and the 
girl, who intends to visit London, are 
in love with one another. 
b. 	*The bqy, who wants to.see Paris, and 
girl, wh~ jntends to visit London, are 
in love with one another. 
(3.29) a. _Mary ·baked,, and John ate, the cake. 
b; 	,?I claim tha..t Mary ba..lced, and you think 
that Johri: ate, the cake. 
c. ?*I. claim that my· si_ster bel.i.eves that Mary 
baked., a1td you think that your mother 
imagines t_ha.t J c:ihn ate, the cake. 
The third test is of more limited interest, since it shows 
that.structures like (3.22) cann9t have ~he structure [~f c: SJJ~ 
blf .it does not shov that they ·cannot have the structure 
tN~T N SJ,· I shall p~sent it nevertheless, since the elimination 
of even one alternative is worth conslderinp:. 
',l'he heads of genitives can·be d~l~ted under certain conditions 
which need not concern us here. Thus,· (3~29a) can l:i'ecome (3.30b). 
(3.30) .a. I kndW' .Jill's boy-;-friend, but not Mary's 
boy-'friencl.. 
b, I know Jill's ooyfriend, but not Mary's. 
If co_nstru~tions like (3.22) ha<;!. the internal structure DE'!' c: SJ, 
we would expect (3.31b) to be derivable from (3,31a); and 
(3,32b) 	not to be derivable frolll (3.32a). Bo.th expectations a.re 
thwarted. 
(3.31) 	 a. I know Jill's boy-friend, who is from 
Columbus, and you know Mary's boy-friend, 
who is from Columbus. 
.,. 	 b. I know Jili 1 s boy-friend, who is from 
Columbus;, and you know Mary's. 
(3,32) a, t 	know Mary's boy-friend, who is a. doctor, 
and you·~ow Mary's boy-frien~, w~o is 
an engineer. 
- 122 	-
(3.32) 	 b. I kno.r Mary's boy-friend_, who is a doctor, 
and y9u know Mary's, w::t;i6 is an engineer, 
Having shown that structures like. (3. 22) satisfy tl:le first part of 
(3.:1:ii) we have in fact shown that they satisfy the second part of 
(3.lii). True, the preceding arguments would be consistent with an 
analysis of (3.22) such as in (3.33), but we Cl;Ul avoid the latter by 
imposing the condition (3.34) which, as far as I am aware of, has 
been :assumed by all writers in transformational gra.mma.r •.· 
(3.33) 	 NP 
. ??---------------I 
NP 
~ 
DET N 	 s 
I I ~ 
a 	 girl, who you know~ 
(3.34) 	 Never posit more structure than you have evidence 
for. 
With respect to (3. li), notice that there is an implicational 
relation between it and (3,liii). Thus, the latter implies the 
fo;rmer, although the oppo~ite is not true, as shown by prepositional 
phrases, sentences in construction with complementizers, etc. There-
fore, if we can show that (3 .liii') holds, we no longer need to show 
that (3.li) holds. I believe that non-restrictive relative clauses 
are among the clearest cases of optional constituents, although, as 
I pointed out earlier, I know of no operational tests for nroving 
optionality. Thus, interchangeability in all contexts with preserva-
tion of grammaticality would be a good test (if appropriately 
constrained to a.void counterexamples like {3. 8)), but it would be · 
inapplicable in any event, since we could never look at all contexts; 
besides, the requirement could presumably be shown not to hold even 
for non-restrictive relatives, by cases like (3.35), 
(3.35) 	 a. Mary~ who sieeps.with anybodyfwho asks her, 
is planning a trip to Europe, and believe 
it or not, her mother doesn't even know 
that she is that kind of girl. 
b.?YMary 	is planning a trip to Europe, and believe 
it or not, her mother doesn't even know that 
. she is that kind of girl. 
The relevance of optionality to the problem at issue is discussed 
at gre·ater length in Appendix Two. . 
· 3.2.1.2. We now turn to the relation between structures like 
{3. 22) and ( 3. 2) . (3.2i) is illustrated in (3.36). 
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(3,36) a •. I told ,.io.hn,., who is sick, that he ca.xmqt 
gq <:>µ liv~ng here. 
b~ *It's Jqhn that I told, who is sick, that 
he cannot go ori living here, 
(3.2ii) appears not to be realized in English, since there are 
no rules which maim the conf'igura.tiori CDET NJ. There is nq violation 
involvE:d.? however, f<;>_r (3. 2~) • a~. I have poi~ted out a.l~~ady, . · · 
applies not ~ust to Nuclei~ but to Heads in general. There:fore, the 
constituent N is blocked by {3,2i;; the constituent PET is blocked 
by the Left Branch Condition in .EI'!;gli sh, but appare.ntly not in 
Latin or Russian. · 
(3.2iii) is illustrated by E,i;tra:position.-from-NP, although the 
latter is. not accepted with non-:-:testricti ve relatives in all dialects. 
Thus, (3.37) is acceptable to some speakers and unacceptable to 
others. 
(3.37) a. 
b. 
A girl, who I couldnwt care less about, has 
just left., 
A girl l:!a;s just left, who I couldn't care 
less ll.pout. 
(3.2iv) is illustrated by (3.38). 
{3.38) a. I 	know a girl, who is greatly interested in 
Bill. 
b. 	*\fuo 4~ I kpow a girl, who is. g.reatly 
interested in1 
3 .2.2.J... The tbree tests inyolv.ing Conjunct:,lon Reduction that 
we used in arguing that non-restrictive relative con~truC!tions 
satisfy {3.lii) are mechanically applicable to restrictive 
constructions. The same examples (3.25), (3.27), (3.• 28) and 
(3~31)-(3,32) 'Witl'! the appropriate commas removed ca.h be used to 
support the corre§popding ar~erits. . 
With regard tp requirem~nt.s (3. ii) and (3.liii) ,, they a.re also 
satisfi.ed in most instances. There are, ho.wever, a ifew apparently 
embarrassing ca.ses, which I discuss below. 
Thus, nouns like time, place, manner seem to require restrictive 
relatives when they are preceded by certain determiners, and 
particularly when they form optional adverbials. Relative clauses 
are apparently required by !_, the, every., optional with soine, arid 
usually impossible with that. However, .it would be rather unnatural 
to claim that t.h~ syntactic representation of these fev cases is 
radically dif'ferent from that of 9ther restrictive relative 
constructions. First, notice that the optionality o.f the relative 
clause seems to depend upon the optionality of the higher order 
construction which it forms with ,its head, 'l'hus., whlle the 
sentences in (3.39) are always ba.d,·the sentence in (3.40) are· 
a~ceptable, if' some previous'context is furnished. 
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(3,39) a. 
b, 
c, 
*He arrived at a·time. 
*Ee kille9- John at a. •Place, 
*He slapned Midp:e iri a. mahrier . 
(3.40) a. 
b, 
c. 
Fe ~reposed a time. 
He went to a Place, 
Ee decided on a. manner, 
The most interesting pair is {3,39b)-(3,40b), since both ~re 
adverbials distinguished only by optionality. Thus, the counter-
argument that one may raise to the effect that a time and a manner 
can be nronominalized with it in (3.40) hut not in (3,39) is 
irrelev~nt here. since neither (3,39b) nor (3,40b) can be nronominalizea 
with it. But if the nertinent'sequences have the same structure in 
(3.39Jand in (3.40), it can be shown that they are a.11 NP's (i.e •• 
that (3,li) is satisfied). since they can be con,1oined with other NT' 1 s 
as in {3.41). · 
(3,ln) a.. He mentioned the time and the nerson that T 
was interested in. 
b. 	 He discussed the woJ11an and the place that I 
had found .out a.bout. 
c. 	 I told h:tm about the ririncinle and the manner 
that he •,1as curious ahout. 
I wish to suggest that the. sentences in (3. 39) are out not because 
they are semantically ill-formed, but because they are semantically 
odd, or, more specifica.11:,, be~ause they violate an accented 
conversational principle like (2.23), which J repeat belqw for 
convenience: 
(2.23) 	 When something is clone for a purpose, and 
that purpose cannot be achieved in principle, 
perceptual conflict ·arises, 
Indeed, the adverbials in {3.39) are optional in surface structure, 
·since it can be inferred that when so~eone does something, he does that 
at some time, at some place, an·d in some manner, Therefore, if one 
goes to the trouble of m~htioning the adverbials exnlicitly, the 
assumption is created that these will carry additional information, 
and this turns out not to be the cas-e. Notice that the presence of 
completely uninformative ontional constituents is-hi~hly unaccentahle 
in other cases as. well, in fact, to such an extent that it is difficult 
to tell whether the unacce~tability of (3.42) has been r.rammatizcd or 
not (the offending constituents are underscored). 
(3.42) a, ?*The car was p:iven away to a human being. 
b. 	 ?*The president he.s ·neen ml,ll"dered .PY n human 
being. 
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Ifotice that the sentences in (3.39) and (3.42) remain bs.d if 
a is repiaced by the ·in the UAdersc.ored ·portions, The reason is 
basically the same,· t thipk, sine~ the is referential in non-'opaque 
contexts like the above, but fails to identify uniquely if un~ualified 
by a relative clause; therefore, the above sentences with the in the 
appropriate places fail to fulfill their purported purpose:-and are out 
too, as predicted by (2 .23). . 
The problem with every seems to be a little different. Thus, 
every seems to be bad not just in sente~ces like (3.39), but also in 
sentences like (3.40), as shown by (3.43} and (3.44) respectively. 
The reason is, I suggest, the implausibility of the assertion made. 
(3.43} a. *He visits her at every time. 
b. *He kissed Mary in every place. 
c. *He tortured her in every manner. 
(3.44)· a.. *He mentioned ever, time. 
b. *He went to every place. 
c. *He discussed every manner. 
An apparently idiosyncratic fact for which I have no explanation is 
that all is not subject to the same restrictions as )very. Thus, 
visitsher at .all times is ac~ept~ble, µnlike (4.43a, because the 
former can be understood with some qualification, such a.s 11he visits 
her at all conceivable times", or "he does so at all times when he 
is available'' • etc. ' 
The behavior of that is fairly clear. Thus, apart from certain 
constructions like he is looking for that which nobogy has yet 
discovered, that i.s referential, a.nd if so, it identifies uniguel;r. 
Therefore, the addition of a restrictive relative, whose purpose is 
precisely to achieve unique identification, appears as a superfluous 
endeavor and is ruled out by (2.23}, That the unacceptability of 
referential that with restrictive relatives, as in (3.45), is not an 
idiosyncrati~operty of that but rather follows from some general 
principle like (2.23) is shown by the fact that restrictive relatives 
are wiacceptable in two other cases in which that is not found, but 
uniqueness of refere~ce is achieved independently of·the relative 
clause. The first case involves the oddity of constructions consisting 
of a head MP and a restrictive clause which in turn form the head of 
construct.ion of the same kind. The second case concerns the unaccept-
ability of restrictive relatives modifying NP 1s 'Whose referents are 
empirically known to be unique. These two unacceptable constructions 
a.re illustrated in (3.46) and (3.47) respectively. 
(3.45) *I 	showed John that house which is white. 
(3.46) 	*[[This is the boy who ia tail] who you saw 
yesterday]. 
(3.47) *I 	showed Midge the sun which burns fiercely. 
(3.45) is unacceptable bees.use both the deictic properties·of that and 
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the relative clause co u;p;I.ed with a_. definite head NP can. tdentif'y  
uniquely; and the fa.ct_ that both devices have ,been used.suggests  
that one of them cannot identify uniquely, which conflicts ·with the  
presupposition of uniqueness associated with .either. (3~46) is ba.d  
because the secorid relative clause al.so suggests tbat :(ts NP head can  
be more narrowly specified, and.this agaiµ contradicts the pre- 
supposition of the first reiat'ive ~la.use. fimi.l.ly, in (3. 47} , even  
though there i_s no linguistic feature a.bout the sun reqiiring that  
it have a unique refer:ent, it is ~ ~mpirical assumption .that_ there  
is only one sun, 8.Iid the restrict!ve relative is just as b_a.d as in  
(3.45) or (3.46) .. 
It re?llains to explain the behavior of some, since it is not  
obvious why the sentences in (3.39) should be out, while those in  
(3.48} ·should be acceptable.  
(3.48) a. He .arrived at spme time.• 
b. He slayed Ha.ry at some place. 
c. He stole the money in some manner. 
·To begin with, notice that the sentences in (3 ._48} are acceptable 
only if some is stresseq.. If some is unstressed, a sentence like 
../
(3.48a) can only be used as an evaded answer to when did he arrive? 
If sollie is stressed, hoifev'er, sentences like those in (3. 48) can be 
used when the speaker does not wish to reveal certain facts to the 
hearer~ or. when he does not wish the.facts in q_ue;:;tion to be over-
heard by a third party and, perpaps,, hopes :that the hearer can guess 
what he has in mind, etc. The difference in acceptability between 
(3,39) and (3.48} is that ~,unlike a, constitutes an explicit 
signal to the effect that some information will not be revealed, Eind 
therefore (3.48) is not ruled but by (2.23), since there is no longer 
any reasori to believe that the adverbial is used for the purpose of 
adding information. 
3.2.2.2. The applicability of (3.2i) is illustrated by (3.49): 
(3.49) a. I showed the boy who was from Chic~go to 
the girl with a red hat. 
b. 	*It's the boy I showed who was from Chicago 
to the girl with a red hat. 
(3.2ii) is inapplicable in English, but this is not a. .counter- 
example; the reasons are the same as those given in the discussion of  
non-restricted relatives.  
(3.2iii) is illustrated by Extra.position-from-UP, as shown in  
(3. 50):  
(3.50.) a. A man who was c;lrunk walked in. 
b. A ma.11 walked in who was drunk. 
The applicability of (3.2iv) is shown in (3.51); 
(3.51) a. I showed you a boy who likes bananas. 
b. *What did I show you a boy who likes? 
3.2.3'.l. While my earlier claim tha.t rela.ti've clauses with 
hea~S- have th:. surface ,5.tructi.lre. repre~entation, r:}g 9J i'S, as far as 
I know, the view held by most wr~ters in tranl;!forma.tiohaJ,. grii.rmniµ-, it 
has been proposea by a number of \i.uthors {Chomsty (i~TQ') ,,- {r~'71) in 
particular> ·that :nouns with cornNrement seritences: have the surface 
st;M.Ictlire representation· C~f' [M SJJ. \fuile .the nicrtivation~· for 
positing s_uch a s'l;ructure are fa~rly clear (the d~sire to exp:i;ess 
the pardlism between John's'.claim that Mary is dead and Jolin claimed 
that M.!lry was dead), tµere·is clear syntactic ·evidence against positing 
the sµrface ·strut?ture that Chomsky defends. 
To begin with, the three tests that I used in arguing that 
relative clauses are properly ahaiyzabie· into two constituents yield 
the same results for nouns with complement sentences. . 
First, (3. 52) exactly parallels (3, 25) , as (3. 52b) is grammatical 
even though there is no pause between the underscored conjuncts (as 
we recail, non-const'ituents canl)qt be coordinated -without intervening 
pause). · · 
(3.52) 	 a. The suspicion that John may be a spy and the 
ciaifu that John may be a spy were bo~h 
discussed by the FBI investigators. 
b, 	 The suspicion and the ·claim that Johp may be 
a spy were both discussed by the FBI 
ipvestig~tors, . ·· · 
Contrast also 	(3,53a) and C3~53b): 
(3.53). a. John believes, and Mary claims, that Ike is 
stupid. : 
b, John's belief an& Mary's claim that Ike is 
stup:fd are ·odd, 
Uot;i.ce·that the second conjunct must be flanked by pauses in (3.53a) 
but not in {3.53b), which _suggests that only tlje conjuncts in. the 
former a.re non-constituent.s. 
Second, if the determirier were inde~d "the subject 11 of the NP, 
as Chomsky claims, then we would · expect ( 3. 54b) · to be grammatical. 
This is se>, becau~e (3,45a), a clear case of determiners in construction 
with the con~tituent N, does indeed r~duce to (3,55b). Moreover, the 
grammaticality of (3,56b) ;in conjunction with the ,mgra:mma.ticality of 
(3.54b) argues agafnst Chomsky's :claim that NP 1·s arid S's have the 
·same internal strueture except :t;or node-labels. · 
{3. 54) a. ( ~!;11' 6 } claim that Bill was a spy and 
li~~n '·1 ins inua.tion that Mary had 
recruited him came as a. big surprise. 
b. • {~:n 1 :} claim that Bill ,,.. a spy an.d 
insinuation that Mary had recruited him 
cwne as a big surprise. 
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(3.55) a. John's ideas a.na.:john's beliefs are shocking. 
b. John's ideas and be:t.iefs are shocking. 
(3.56) 	 a. J:ohn claimed that the boys were dead and 
John insinuated that Mary had murdered them • 
.b. John claimed that the boys were dead and 
insinuat~d that Mary had murdered them. 
Third, recall the rule which deletes the constituent Nin 
construction with a genitive determiner. If Chomsky's analysis were 
correct, we would expect (3,58a) to reduce to (~.58b) in th~ same way 
in which (3. 57a) reduces to (3, 57b). However, (3, 58a) .and (3; 58b) 
are not paraphrases, since the missing constituent in the latter can 
only be understood (if at~all) as claim but not as claim that Mary 
deceived Bill. 
(3.57) a, I like John's ideas, but not Mary's ideas, 
b. I like John's ideas; but not Mary's. 
(3.58) 	 a. I heard of John's claim that Mary deceived 
Bill, but J:'.lOt of Jack's claim that Mary 
deceived Bill. 
b.??I 	heard of John's claim that Mary deceived 
Bill, but not of Jack's. 
DET Mjreover, if the construction at issue had indeed the structure 
CNP CN SJJ, that is, if the DEI' were indeed in construction with a 
larger N consisting of N and S rather than with the smaller N, we 
would predict not only that (3. 58a) reduces to (3. 58b) , but also that 
(3,59a) does not reduce to (3.59b). As can be verified, both 
predictions are incorrect. 
(3.59) 	 a. I heard John's claim that women a.re equal to 
men but not Mary's claim that men are 
inferior to women. 
b. 	 I heard John's claim that women are equal to 
men but not Mary's th.at men are inferior to 
women. 
A fourth undesirable consequence of accepting Chomsky's analysis 
is that the extraposition of relative clauses and of sentences in 
apposmtion could no longer be stated as one rule; instead, we would 
have to formulate a rule·of Extraposition-from-N, in addition to 
Extra.position-from-NP. This is so because it is necessary to specify 
the category of the constituent that the extraposable clause is in 
construction with, or we would predict extraposition in cases like (3,60)~ 
(3.60) 	 a. Although I hate the idea, that -Bill will have 
to go to prison is something we will have to 
face, sooner or later. 
b. 	 As I once told a little ·boy, who steals my 
purse steals trash. 
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We have thus ~~ ~ four re~soAs ·for believing that constructions conta.inin~ sentences in apposition a.re :g:roperly analyzable into two · 
constituents from which we may conclude that they satisfy (3,li), 
We now atempt to .show tha:t; such constructions satisfy (3.li) by showing tltat they satisfy (3.lii). 
As f~ as I am avELre, N):' 9s which alow sentences in apposition 
do not re4uire ~hem. Thus~ a.hypothes~s, the hYpothesis, ~. hypothesis and Bil's :h;y:pothesis can a,11 occur as independent NP's 
without ~()difying clauses. True, (3.61a.) is preferable to (3,61b), 
but the ·1ater see~s to me no worse than (3.61c). (3.61b) and (3.61c) are strange without sufficient context~ because the implies a known referent~ but does not make unique identification possible. 
(3.61) a. I heard the claim that the earth is round. b, I hear.d the claim. 
c. I spoke to the boy. 
On the oth~r ~a.~d, some of the abstract nouns which al9w sentences in apposition disalov certain determi?_lers, or disalow 
sentences in. appps ition with certain determiners. Thus, we have 
neithf.:!r *Bil's fa.ct nor *BilIs fact that Mary is a thief (for 
semantic reasons, presumably since it is hard to see what such constructions can mean). Specific combinations of determiners and 
modifying sentences are also bad, as seen in (3.62). 
{3 62) I wn a.ware of (a) [*a L ~that the earth 
• . ~: ~ ' *:~:tJ 
is round. 
Both (3,62a) and (3.62c) imply that there is more than one fact that 
the earth is round, and are therefore out on semantic grounds. Notice th9:t (3,62c) i.s excluded by a principle ve have already considered, 
namely, that pa:rrower specj,ficaticin of an already necessarily unique 
referent is contradicto:ry, Notice that if we substitute claim for 
fact· in (3. 52), al;i.' th~ readings become acceptable; the reason is 
that claim, unlike fact, is ambiguous between the content of a claim 
and aninstance in ~h that claim was expressed, and the lat~er 
reading is possible with~ and~' for there can be more the.µ one 
occasion on which a claim is given expression. !W!~is not ambiguous in the wa:y claim is, but it can be safely substituted for fact in {3.62) , beca,usethere can be more than one hypothesis claimingthat tbe earth is round.7 
7There are apparent counterexamples to my hypothesis that a unique referent cannot be more narrowly specified with preservation of acceptability. Thus, (i) is acceptable, although the sun is a 
unique object a.nd nevertheless!!:!!!. carries the deternli~er that. 
{ i ) Every time I look at the. tcruel sun , I curse it• 
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~he explanation is, ·however, quite ·straightforward.: preposed 
adjectives like great in the great man are .ambiguous petween a 
restrictive and a non-restrictive reading, and properties denoted 
by 'nouns are ambiguous in the same wiJ.y. Thus , if a man is analyzed 
at some level. as a X which is a man (as suggested IiiTach (1968}), 
the relative clause which predicates a property of X cc;,uld be either 
restrictive or non-restrictive •. I. suggest that the .acc~p't;Eibility of 
(i) can be explained by analyzing that cruel sun as that X,which 
is cruel, and'which is· a sun, an analysis which seems to me correct 
on intuitive semantic grounds as well. 
3.2.3.2, having shown that nouns with sentences in apposition 
satisfy (3.1) we shall now show that they satisfy (3,2). 
· (3.2i} is illustrated in (3,63). · 
(3.63) a. I heard the claim that Bill is mad. 
b. *What did I hear that Bill is mad? 
As was explained in connection withNuclei of relative clauses,  
(3.2ii) cannot be illustrateBE.'¥ith the structure cl SJ, since the  
maiming of t.he constituent CNP NJ is independently prevented by  
(3.2i) and the Le:ft Branch Condition (in English).  
. {3,2iii) is illustrated in (3.64).  
(3,64) a. ThE: claini th13,t ]}ill is mad is odd. 
b. The claim is odd that Bill is ~d. 
c. 	 A hypothesis that the number of primes is 
infinite was proposed. 
d, 	 A hypothesis was proposed that the number 
of primes is infin~tei 
(3.2iv) is illustrated ;i.n (~.t,5), 
(3.65) a. I heard tqe clai.m that Bill loves Mary. 
b. *Who did I qear th.at claim that Bill loves? 
3.2.4. We have considered three kinds of complex NP's in this 
section so far, and have argued that they satisfy both the requirements 
in (3.1) end the predictions in (3.2)!.. There is, however, a kind of 8construction which, albeit not a complex IUJ, is nevertheless a N & S; 
8That the construction I am about to introduce is a N & S (i.e. , 
that it satisfies (3 .1 )) can be· shown by using the same kind of 
arguments I have used for NP's modified by relative clauses or comple- · 
ment sentences. The argumentation in this case raises no new.problems 
e.s compe.1"ed with the already considered cases, and I leave its 
construction to the reader. · · 
however, this N & S-type is not subJ ect to (3.2iv'). Thus , consider (3.66) . 
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(3,66) a. I showed you a: picture of .im owner ;2f that 
island. · ·· 
b. Tliimand, which I shoved. you -a pictµre 
of a1'owner. of, is quite large. 
In deriving (3,660) from a· structure which contains (3:66a.), the 
triply-underscore~ NP ha.s b~en chopped. As the chopped element is 
the Satel,lite of the doubly,.,u,nd,ers.cored NP, its chQpping is ; or 
course, allowed ·by. (3.2iii-), but since the doubly-underscored HP is 
in turn the Satellite of the singly underscored, NP, (3.66b} in effect 
violates ·(3,2iv), since it arises through the maiming of the Satellite 
of the singly-underscored NP. 
Construction like (3,66a) were studied by .Ross in connection with 
the optionality of Pied-Piping, and he pointed, out that no S-node ce.n 
intervene between the NP to be cpopped and sonie higher MP which 
dominates it.9 · 
9Ross introduces the further restriction that coordinate NP-
nodes cannot be reordered, in oriler to preve~t (ii} from being 
derived from (i). . 
(i) I watched 13ill and tqe boy. 
{ii) *The boy Bill and whom I w~tched was vain. 
Notice however, that the added condition is unnecessary, since 
wh-marking is a feature~changing rule prevented from going into 
coordinations in any case. ' ' 
Such constructions have the distinguishing property tha'I;; they 
can be generated by the recursive application of-one rule, such that 
it embeds an NP as complement to .a head NP. In other words, given 
the chopped element, the structure of the highest N'& S to which it 
belongs is entirely predictable (~xc·ept fo_r the internal constituency 
of the various head NP's) by one rule. While this property sheds 
ll'l;;tle light on the peculiar behavior of the structures which possess 
it and wo.uld hEl.ve to be stated t!.S an .ad hoc ri~er on (3.2iv) so long 
as the latter is regarded as a formal constraint, I shall argue in 
Chapter Four the.t if (3,2iv) is :regarded as a pc,:lrforma.nce oon$traint, 
cases like (3·.66) no longer constitute counterexamples; with;tn that 
framework, the inner predictability of the structures at issue will 
emerge as a significant dist:i,nguishing property. 
3.3. This section is broken down into two main sub.sections 
devoted to a·discussion of optional adverbials modifying sentences 
and verb.phrases respectiveJ,y. Tp.~t at l~ast t;hose two classes of 
adverbials shquld be recognized is a fairly well-established point; 
thus, it has often been pointed out tha.t only S-adverbials cen be 
preceded by pause or preposed, while only {some) VP-adverbials may 
undergo Passive or be1ong to antecedents of do so. Additional 
reasons for recognizing this distinction were given in {1.118g), and 
I repeat them below in some detail. 
- 132 -
First, it is a generally accepted. as.sumption tllat. two adver.bs 
of the s~e k_ind cannot occl.µ' iri. the same .claµse. There.fore, the 
existenc~ of grammatical -sentences like those in (3.67) suggests that 
either the singly and the doubly unqerscored.strings in each example 
are not adverbs of the same type or that they do not b~long tp the 
same clause; I think that_ only the latter position is tenable. 
·(3.67) a. Johnj slapped his kidi because he; had been 
too quiet, p~cause hisj "!ff:i_fe asked hirnj 
to do that. . 
b. 	 John went to the store in order to buy some 
whiskey, Jn order to antagonize his 
mother-in-law. 
The conclusion that the doubly underscored strings belong to higher 
sentences than the singly underscored ones seems to ine rathe_r unavoid-
able. · 
Second, one condition on neutralization to which I know of no 
exceptions is that the neutralizer must co~nd th~ neutralizee (if 
not in surface structure, at least at s.ome (usually iater) point in 
the derivation). Most informants agree that (3.68a) is considerably 
more acceptable than (3.68b) . 
. (3.68) a. John didn't beat up his wife because .he 
ever enjoyed any of that. 
b, *John didn't beat up his wife, because 
he ever ·enjoyed any of t~at. 
Th_e distinction in grammaticality betwee11 (3.68a) and (3.68b) can be 
readily explained if we assume that in the former, but not ih the 
latter, the neutraliz_e.r commands the rieutralizee, alid ·failure of 
command ca.rt be achieved in (3.68b) only if the adverbial belorigs to 
a higher clause than the main one. 
Third, the neutralization of comparees by comparators can only 
be accounted for by assuming that comparative and equitative clauses 
are VP-modifiers. The grammaticality of (1.66a) and (1.66b) and the 
ungrammaticality of (1.66c) and (1.66d) shows that· such neutralization 
must be recognized. 
3.3.1.l. Concerning the behavior of S-adverbials with respect 
to (3.1), if it can be shown that the underlined string in (3,69) is 
a constituent of type S, it will tl}ereby have been shown that (3,69) 
satisfies (3.li) and (3.lii). 
(3.69) 	 John left Mary, because he was in love with 
Claire. 
Notice that the first two arguments given in section 3.3 hold only 
if we assll.Ille that (3,69) has the structure schematically represented 
in (3,71), but not that represented in (3,70). 
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. (3,70) . S. 
~~NP6~· 
John left Mary, because he was in love with Claire. 
(3,71) s ~----ss 
NP~  I  . . 
John left Mary, because he was in love with ClEdre. 
Indeed, only given a. structure like (3.71) do the two ~dve:rbs in (3.67a) or (3,67b) belong to separate clauses, and only then does 
Negation fail to command ~or any. in (3.,68b) • But if (3.71) .rather than (3,70) is the correct representation of {3,69) th·en the underlined 
string in the later is.indeed a. constituent (that it is a constituent of type S hardly requires argumentation, since what el;le could it be?). 
As I pointed out in (1.118g), Ross offered two arguments of his own in defense of the position that (3,69) involves s-, rather than VP-modification. I review them below. 
Ross first argument was that the pause indicated by comma.in 
(3.69} is not obligatocy, but if we pa.use at al, the natural place for pausing is after the main clause, rather than after John; this, he 
claimed, shows that th'e immediate constituents of (3.69}zire the main 
clause and the adverbial, rather than John ~d the remainder of (3.69). 
This argument is unconvincing beca.use:"lIT pa.uses between (short subjects and VP's are quite bad in general, as shown by (3.72), 
(3.72) *John, left Mary. 
and {i} if we do not pause after the mai~ clause in (3,69}, it is 
no longer necessarl that the adverbial be a S-modifier;, as the singly underscored string in (3.67b} shows. . Ross' second argument is directed against La.ngacker (1969), where it is claimed that the ungrammaticality of (3,73c} is due to the 
requirement that extraposed clauses be commanded by the constituent 
they cross. Ross proposes that the paradigm in (3.73} be accounted for by .his RRC, since Extra.position can also operate from object, in 
which case no constituent is crossed, 
(3.73) a. That John is free is surprising because criminals belong in jail. , 
b. It is surprising that John is fr~e because criminals belong in jail. c. *It is surprising because criminals belong 
in jail that John is free. 
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Ross concludes that the adverbial in (3,73a) must have the structure 
represented i~. (3~71) for the RRC to -yield the ~~rrect results .. 
As I pointed out in ·c1.118g), this argUlllent does not really go 
through, for extraposed clauses can cross non··clausal adverbials,. 
as shown in (1~126c). The unacceptability of (3,73) is probably due 
to the fact that rightward movements are fairly bad when crossing a 
sentence, whether the latter is an adverbial or not; thus, {3.74) is 
no better than (3.73), although no adverbial is involved. 
(3,74) *I 	looked the desk which I had received from my 
brother-in-law over. 
An additional 	reason for rejecting this argument of Ross' is provided 
by (3.75). 
(3.75) 	 a, A girl·who was sick just left because a storm 
was raging·outside. 
b, 	*A girl just le:f't because a storm was raging 
outwise who was sick. 
(3,75), unlike (3.73a), is ambiguous between a sentential and a verb 
phrase reaQ.i.ng of the adverbial, If Extraposition-from-NP were 
constrained by the RRC, as Ross claims, we would expect (3.75b) to 
be ill-formed on the S-modification reading, but well-formed on the 
VP;.,.modification reading; the fact that (3,75) has no well-formed 
readings falsifies Ross' hypothesis, 
I conolude that the above tw arguments of ·Ross' do not go  
through; nevertheless, I h_ave given other arguments for- believing  
that the position he was trying to defend was essenti.ally correct.  
Having shown that $-adverbials satisfy (3,li) and (3.lii), it 
remains to show that they satisfy (3,liii). It seems to me that the 
, optionality of S-adverbials is intuitively as clear as that of non-
restrictive relatives. But since I have already pointed out that 
·foolproof operative tests are, in all probability, impossible to find, 
I shall not press the matter any further. Apparent counterexamples 
like {3,76) may be handled by requiring that some features of Tense 
and/or Aspect form a component with specific adverbials in underlying 
representation (see Mccawley (1971)), and that the discontinuous 
component c,onsisting of Perfect and o,f the time adverb in {3. 76) be 
regarded as an optional dependent of the main clause. 
(3,76) John has been in Columbus since the beginning 
of the term. 
3.3,1.2. That the behavior of S-adverbials confirms the 
predictions, in (3.2i) -(3.2iv) is ~hown by (3,77)-(3,80), respectively, 
(3,77) a. That John left, bec~use he was sick, is obvious, 
b, *What because he was sick is obvious -is that 
John left. 
c~ *{It) because he was sick is obvious is that 
John left. 
-----
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(3,78) a. John left the city., because he .was sick. b, The city ,which ~Qhn left, because he was ' sick, i,s a real megalopolis.·' 
(3,79) a. Mary thinks John left t}le ~ity, because he 
. couldn •t stand the atmosphere. b. 	It's because he couldn.'t stand the atl'iosphere that Mary thinks John.left the city, -
{3.80) a. John found Mary at the place of the accident. ' b, *The accident which John· found Mary at the 
place of was a. tragic one. 
3.3 ,2 .l. In showing that optional VP-adverbials satisfy (3.1}; the main problem is to show that the structure of (3,81) is essentialy (3.83) rather than {3,82}. 
(3,81) Mary loves Bil as much as she hates Jack. 
(3,82) ~J-------__ 
NP VP 	 S 
~~ ~ 11~Mary 	 loves Bil as much a.s she hates Jack. 
(3.83) . s 
NP VP-----VP S 
Mary 
V ~~NP Iloves Bil as much as she hates Jack. 
To begin with, it s.eems to me that the facts of optionality a.re 
no more obscure for certain VP adverbs than they a.re for S-adverb$ in general, Thus, it seems intuitively clear that the adverbial clause in (3.81) is optional, while the adverb in {3.84) is not·, the 
distinction is le'ss obvious, however, for (3.85), where the instrumental 
adverb is, I claim, optional on the surface, but not in underlying structure·. · · 
(3.84) John went to school. 
(3.85) · John cut some bread (with a knife). 
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Th.ere is, however, one fact which suggests that the structures 
of (3,8i) and ·(3,85) are different: c:>ptional adverbs are subject to 
(3.2iv) , . but obligatory ones are nqt, as the contrast in acceptability 
between (3,86) and (3.87) shows, 
(3.86) 	 a. John cut the bread with an edge of his sword. 
b, ?What did John cut the bread with an edge of? 
(3,87) a, Johll left the city in spite of the owner 
of the palace. 
b, *What did John leave the city in spite of the 
owner of? 
This fact can be made sense of if the structure of (3,81) is (3,83), 
but not if it is (3.82), ~his, together with intuitions about 
optionality, support my claim that optional VP-adverbials satisfy 
(3.1), 
· 3.3.2.2~ That optional VP-a,dverbials satisfy (3.2i)-(3.2iv) is 
shown by (3,88)-(3,91) respectively, 
(3.08) a. That John loves Mary as much as Jack hates 
Jill is obvious. 
b. *What as much as Jack hates Jill is obvious 
is that John loves Mary. 
c. *(It) as much as Jack hates Jill is obvious 
that John loves Mary, 
(3.89) a. John loves M~cy more th~n Jack hates Jill. 
b. It's Mary who John loves more than Jack 
hates Jill;· 
(3.90) . a. I suspect J.ohn loves Mary as. much as .Jack 
hates Jill. 
b. It's as much as Jack hates Jill that I suspect 
Jo1m loves Mary. 
c. John likes ~ill more than the owner of the 
house. 
d, It's the owner of the ho.use who Joh_n likes 
Bill more than.10 
10An intriguing fact, for which I have no explanation, is that 
(iia) and (iib) are unambiguous, although the source, (ia), is 
ambiguous bet.ween (ib) and (ic). 
(1) a. 
b. 
c, 
John likes Mary more 
John likes Mary more 
John likes Mary more 
than ~ill. 
than Bill likes Mary. 
than John likes Bill. 
(ii) a. 
b. 
?It's Bil~ who John likes Mary more 
?Who does John like Mary.more than? 
than. 
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Indeed, (iia) or (iib) can only be derived from {ic), :where the 
constituent to be moved is an object, but not from {ib), where it 
is a subject. This'is extremely puzili!Jg, for there is no general 
principle preventing the movement of subjects, as (iiib), derived 
from (iiia) shows. 
(iii} a. John is taller than Bill (is tall). 
b. It's Bill who john is taller than. 
(3.91) a. John likes Mary as much as Bill hates Jill. 
b. 	*It's Jill vho John likes Mary as much as 
Bill hates. 
c. 	 John likes Bill more than· the owner of the 
house, 
d. 	*It's the house that John likes Bill more 
than the owner of. 
3.4. This section is ·devoted to coordinate structures, and is 
broken down into two ma.in sul)sectiona devoted to asymmetric and 
symmetric coordination respectively. 
Various writers (Le.k.off and Peters (1968), Zwicky (1969). 
Mccawley (1971) • R. Lakoff (1971)) hav~ .pointed out and discussed 
the distinction between symmetric coordination (in whlch the terms 
are reversible salvo sensu).and asY1{Ulletric coordination (in which the termo 
are not so · reversible).. Asymmetric coordination has been defined 
in a. narrow and in a. broad sense. The narrow sense (which is the one 
proposed by Zw-icky, if I understand his account correctly) concerns 
instsnces of coordination which are necessarily a.symmetric, such as 
(3,921:1.), which cannot be understood synonymously with (3.92b). 
(3,92) a. John was shot in the chest and then died 
of that wound. 
b. John .then died of that wound and was shot 
in the chest. 
A subset of necessarily asymmetric coordinations consists of those 
which cannot be reversed with preservation of grammaticality as 
shown in (3,93), 
(3,93) a. John went and solved the problem. 
b. *John solved the problem and went. 
The broad sense of 'asymmetric coordination' (proposed by R. Lakoff) 
concerns any coordination in which an interpretation of causaiity or 
temporal order betveen the terms can be imposed, even by using extra.-
linguistic inforniation.11 'rhus (3.94) is regarded by R. T,akoff 
11H. La.koff says that, in asymmetric coordination, the firot 
term is not only as~erted, but nlso presupposed by the second. 
However, this use of 11presuppose" is rather misleading, for 
11presupposition11 has been generally used in the literature to refer 
- 13U -
1 
to those. ass)Jll\ptions definable on purely linguistic eround.s:. ~ more 
adequate terin in this case might be. ,iinvited inference", as defined 
in Zwicky ahd Geis (1971). For a discussion of some sloppy uses 
of the term "presupposition", see Garner (1971). 
as eit.her an instance of symmetric conjunction of poor acceptability, 
or an instance of ~syrnrnetric conjuncti9n based on the assumption 
that John owns a Ford. 
(3,94) Fords can go fast, and John just got a tick.et 
for speeding. 
R. Lakoff is careful to point out that the predicate CAUSE or PRECEDE 
holds betveen (sometimes very elabo'rate) inferences which ce.,n be 
made .from the coordinate terms, and not simply between the coordinate 
t~rms, ~s suggested in Postal (1971). That t'he latter proposal 
cannot be correct is shown by asymmetric coordinations like (3,95), 
(3,95) ':I.'he boy who cursed him is dead now, and John 
was revoltingly ha~py throughout the morning. 
Clearly, it is absurd to assume that th·e fact that the boy in 
question is dead !!2.;! preceded John's feelings of happiness in the 
morning; rather, the event which preceded and caused John's happiness 
is "the boy who cursed John died", and the latter can ori:)..y be 
inferred froll! the first conjunct in (3,95). 
The various writer.s who have concerned themselves with coordina-
t.ion noticed that it is not easy to disti_nguish between symmetric 
and asymmetric coordination formally, The only difference in '-. 
surface structure (pointed out by R. Lakoff) is that, given a sequence 
of more tha,n two coordinate terms, the latter must be grouped by 
two if they a.re asymmetric, while -this is not necessary when they 
are symmetric. In other words, given a string like (3 ,96), its 
phrase structure can be either (3,97) or (3,98) on a ·symmetric 
interpretation, while it must be (3. 98) . o·n on asymmetric Qhe. 
(3,96) Every day, John eats , drinks and goes t.Q vork. 
(3,97) VP 
__.---r---.__ 
VP VP VP 
(3,98) VP 
VPVJ> ----------~ 
VP VP 
However, this distinction is neutralized in binary coordinations, 
whose surface structure is (3.99), rep,nrdless of symmetricity. 
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{3,99) 
T~e existence of the boxed-X-constituent was convincingly 
defended in Ross (1967), but I think the.re are good reasons f'or 
regarding the poxed X as different in kind (in the-sense of 
Appendix Two) r'rom the circled X's , the main reason being that the· 
boxed one cannot occur a.lone--whethl;!r it is a S, a. NP or a VP--while 
the cir~led ,ones c~. 
The interesting feature of (3.99) for our purposes is that both 
kirids of coordination a.pp~ar to be N & s·• s. Indeed, Xo directly 
dominates x1 , both nodes belong to the same category, and th'e boxed 
X· is op,tipnal., because Xo and x1 are categorical nodes of the same 
kind. Moreover, since the boxed X cannot occur alon_e; there is a 
principled reaso.n. for rt:ig~rding X1 as the Nucleus and the boxed X 
as the Sate~lite of x0 . : 
I .am well aware tliat my claim that coordinate structures are 
N & S's is rather startling, as. it flies in the face of most 
syntactic analyses, which consi~er coordination and subordination 
as entirely distinct and unrelated structures, In the remainder of 
this chapter, I shall try to show that iizy' proposal is more than mere 
terminological jugglery, ma.de, possible, perhaps, by insufficiently 
strong constraints. placed on the definition of N & S by (3.1). It 
should be . ciear,, how~ver; tha.t I do not claim that coordination 
and subordiA!:1,t:i.on are indistinguishable, but merely that they share 
more prop~rt~es than meet ;th_e eye. Thus, my claim ·that coordinations 
a.re N'& S's is not 'different in spirit from the claims made by a 
number of writers to the effect that v.erbs. adjectives, prepositions' 
etc, , all belong to the larger Category I predicate I ; ObViOUSly, none 
of these writers meant that no disti-nction is ne'cessary between the 
various kind.s .of predicates, but only that their coilllTlon features 
must be recognized; 
3, 4 ,1. 1. We begin .. our discussion with asymmetric coordination. 
I suggested earlier that in {3.'99), x1 should be regarded as the 
Nucle'us and the boxed X as the S(J.tellite because the former can 
occur alone while the latter ,cannot. However, we need to find 
stronger criteria for identifying the Nucleus and ~he Satellite, since 
(a) there are languages without an overt morpheme and, i~ which 
conjunction is expressed by juxtaposition; (.b) the first coordinate 
term may be introduced by both or either, and it is no longer obvious 
then that it is optional; ~(3.liii) requires that optionality be 
proven with respect to both surface a.nd underlying structure, not 
just the former, In view of these facts, it seems preferable to 
choose the Nucleus and the Satellite between x1 and X2, rather than 
between the former and the boxed X (in keeping with the suggestion 
made in Chapter One that a.dverbials--and, by extension, dependent 
terms in genera.1--be ambiguously defined in such a W.8¥ as to include 
or exclude the connector). . 
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Thus, if we confine our .choice to x1 and x2 , we find that there 
are semantic r~asons for regarding the former as the Nucleu~ and 
the latter as t.he ·satellite in as:rmmetric coordination, since the 
latter,.but not the former, is semantically optional, This is so 
because x1 or its negation is 1presU:pposed' ( in the sense of R. 
Lakoff [see footnote lJ) by X2 in asymmetric conjunction or disjunction 
respectively,. while x2 is not presupposed .by Xi. To see this, 
consider (3.100) and {3.101). · 
(3,100) Two and two are four, and I'll fail you for 
writing that two and two are seven. 
(3,101) You will leave my room, or I'll shoot you. 
The meaning of the second conjunct in (3,100) is incomplete without 
the presupposition that two and two a.re four, for, without it, my· 
decision to fail you appears arbitrary (we must asswne an arithme-
tically naive speaker-listener, who needs to hear the first conjunct 
in order to be awe.re of the presupposition). Similarly, if I utter 
only the second disjunct in (3,101), part of its meaning will be 
lost, for it is not the same to make the threat that I will shoot 
you and to say that I wil+ do so only if you don't leave my .room 
( the bicondi tional inference is in fact O.t:I invited one, as ..shown in 
Geis and Zwicky). In cont.radistinction, the meaning of the first 
term is complete without the second, for two and two are still four, 
even if you write that they are seven on a test, and the only thing 
I am asking you to do in (3.101) is to ·leave the room, regardless 
of what I intend to do·in case you don't. The point can perhaps be 
made clear by considering the analogy of antecedents and pro-forms. 
A pro-form ·presupposes an antecedent; bu.t W1 antecedent does not 
presuppose a pro-form. Thus, in John told.Mary that he had a son, 
part of the meaning of he is lost if we don't know it stands for 
John, while no ·part of the meaning of John is lost if we don 1t know 
~ the same person is later referred~with he·. Thus, the 
optionality of the second· term in asymmetric coordination (x2 or 
the boxed X in (3,99))suggests that this type of construction is 
similar to a main clause modified by an adverbial clause. 
A seco·nd reason for regarding second asymmetric coordinate 
terms as similar to adverbials is provided by the behavior .of 
backwards pronominalization. Thus G, Lakoff (1968) noticed that 
backwards pronominalization can proceed from adverbial clauses into 
main ones if the pronoun is a non-subject, but not if it is a 
subject, as (3,102) and (3.103) show:, However, as the distinction 
in acceptability between (3.103a) and (3.103b) shows, the length of 
the second term is important, as i-t determines the level of phonetic 
stress on the antecedent, and the result is acceptable only if the 
antecedent is weakly stressed. On the .other hand, as can be seen 
in (3.102a) no amount of stress reduction can save backwards 
pronominalization into a subject. 
u 
(3.102) a. *Hei was hit by Mary, before John1 had the 
slightest chance to get up ~d leave. 
b, *Hei was hit by Mary, before Johni left. 
. . . u
{3.10'.°3) .a. Me.ry hit him1 , before 'John.1 h1:1d 1:he 1;1lightest 
chance to get up and leave. 
'b. *Ma.ry Chit liim1~ :before Jotm1 left. 
The. interesting fact is that a.syimnetric conjunctiqn .behaves exactly 
.like ma.in clauses lltOdified by adverbial clauses vitl",l respect to 
backwards pronomina.lization, as the·perfect parallelism between the 
paradigm in (3,104), (3,105) and that 1n (3.102}. (3...103) shows 
(it is, of course, necessary to put an asymmetric 1nternretation on 
the sentences in (3 ..104) and ( 3 .105). . . 
u(3.104) a. *He1 was kHlell by Mary, and John1 was buried 
with full honours in the family mausoleum. 
b, *Hei was killed by Mary, and J$im1 was buried. 
1,1(3.105) 	 a. Mary kiµed himi, and.JotJni was buried with 
full honours in the family mausoleum.
I\ ,. . ' 
b. *Ma:ry killed himi, and John1 was buried. 
The unacceptability of (3.104a) can only be explained if we 
assume that a fil".st asYJllllletr:i.c conjunct :l.s :i.n s.o.me sense similar to. 
a main, rather tllan a subordinate, cla-use . :it follows therefore 
that tiie suggest.ton made in Postal (1971) to tM effect that asymmetric 
coordination is derived,from subordination, in the sense that the 
terms are .arguments of some predicate like PRECEDE.or CAUSE, is 
definitely wrong. · This is ·shown quite' clearly by (3,106), ~ince, 
if the b-sentence were indeed derived from the a,..:..pne, there should 
be no difference in acceptability betw~en the two. 
(3,106) a. That shei was shot in the chest brough1; it 
about that, Maryi eventually died. 
b. 	*Dhei was shot in the chest, and MarYi 
eventually died. 
A third reason for regarding asymmetric coordinate st:i:'udures 
as N &S's is their behavior under rita.iming. Indeed, maiming a first 
asymmetric coordinate term is infinitely more acceptable than 
maiming a second one, 8.S rredicted by ( 3,2ii) and (3, 2iV) , and 8.8 
2sh?wn by (3,107)-(3.109). . The contrast between the b- ru:i.d the 
12rr some of the b-sentences are not fully acceptable to a.11 
speakers, this is probably due to the fact that there a.re more· 
explicit and less ambiguous ways of indicating subordination than 
through asymmetric coordination (where subordination is usually 
discovered through elaborate inferences from extralinguistic 
assumptions), a.nd the sentences in {3.107)-(3.109) viola.t.e to some 
extent Grice' s conversational principle that statements should b.e 
a.s clear as possible; in other words, i.t may be harder for a hearer 
to realize that the sentences in (3,107)-(3.109) i.nvolve N & s,.,,s 
then in casea containinp; exrl t cl t ninrka of auhordi.nation. 
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c;..sentences in (3.107)-(3.109) can be explained neither by the CSC, 
nor by Ros.s' ciaim that a.symrnetri_c coor<iihation is exempt t'rom 
the CSC. 
(3.107) 	 a. John murdered the girl, and her father 
(subsequently) suffered a heart attack. 
b. ?The girl who John murdered, and her father 
·(subsequently) s.uffered a heart attack, 
was my cousin Alice. 
c. 	*The heart attack, which John murdered the 
girl, and her father (subsequently) 
suffered, was a fatal one. 
(3,108) a. Mary is beautiful, and Bill is happy to 
be married to her. 
b. 	?Beautiful though Mary is, and Bill is happy 
to be married to her, I definitely like 
Sheila better. 
c. 	*Happy though Mary is beautiful, and Bill 
I/ 
is to be married to her, I definitely 
like !Jheile. better. 
(3,109) a. Bill will have to eat the sandwich, or 
his mother will tell uncle Joe, 
b, The sandwich which Bill will have to eat, or 
his mother will tell uncle Joe, is a 
fairly +arge one. 
c. *Uncle Joe, who ~ohn will have to eat the 
sandwich, or his mother will tell, is a 
rather unpleasant fellow. 
A fourth reason for regarding asymmetric coordinatio.n as N & S's 
is that they obey the following principle: 
(3,110) If an element. of. a Sateilite is removed from 
the containing N & S, that element must also 
exist in and be re.:moved from the· .Nucleus 
(under certain condltions which remain to be 
made precise),13, 14 	 · 
13 	 .
An explanation for (3,110) and a refutation of an implied 
counterproposal made in Neubauer (1970) are offered in Appendix 
1''our, 
14 	 · I have not investigated in detail the exact conditions under 
which.a.cross-the-board maiming can occur. However, it seems clear 
that the·identical elements must be in ·1stmilar positions', since 
two elements cannot be subject and object respectively, as shown 
by {i). 
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(i) 	 a; Johni likes Mary and (therefore) Bill h~tes 
· him. 
b. 	*It's J~hn ~ho likes Mary and ·(therefore) Bill 
h'!ites. 
On the other hand, the.two elements need not be objects of the same 
kind, as demonstrated by ( ii )·. 
(ii) a. John loves Ma:ryi but can never agree with heri. 
b. 	 It's Mary vho John loves but can never agree 
with. 
If across-the-board maiming depends on the parallelism of the 
positic:;ms of the moved elements, the parallelism of t,he la.rp;er 
structures from which the elements in question are removed is 
also a pertinent factor. Thus,·while across-the-board maiming of 
coordinate structures of any kind seems to be universally acceptable 
(subject to the restriction men-t;ioned at the beginning of this note}, 
acros·s-the-board maiming of ma.trices and complements , as in (iii ) , 
are marginal to some speakers, and so are (3.llld) apd (3.112d). 
(iii) a. John told Mary that he loves her. 
b. It's Mary who John told that he loves. 
The marginality of' these sentences is presmnably due to the fact 
that the structures containing the identical elements do not belong 
to.categories of exactly the same kind. When the containing 
structures belong to clearly distinct categories, as in (iv), where the 
categories are Sand NP respectively, the result is considerably 
worse. 
{iv) a. The doctor cured John in spite of himself, 
b. 'l*It 's John the doctor cured in spite of. 
A strange effect of parllllelism is 'that it seems to improve 
even st.ructures w:hich would otherwise be una.cceptal,le. (v) ::ihowo 
that violations ot the CNPC nre less -eevere when they occur ncross-
the-boa.rd. 
(v) a. 	*It's John who I believe the claim -that you killed. 
b.?*It's 	John who I believe the ~!aim that you killed 
and disbelieve the allegation that you tried 
to help. 
(3.110) is a formalization of an observation made in Ross 
(1967, sec. 4.2), a.nd illustrations a.re provided in ·(3.111} and 
(.3.112). 
(3,111) a. John likes Mary'i more than Bill hates t~~~i}. 
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(3,111) b. It.'s He.ryi .:Tohn likes more than Bili hates 
(heri.} . 
. L,T~·+ .· 
c . 	*It I s Jill} John likes Mary i more than 
heriJ . 
Bill.hates. 
d. It's Mai-y J.ohn likes more than Bill hates. 
(3.112) 	 a. Joh~).qre the ru~i in rolling 
1iti up 1,.. 
l_µp the curtainj · • 
b. It's the rug, John tore in rolling 
-G~it~~ curtain} , 
c, *It's (the.curtain} John tore 
lthe rugi 
in rolling up. 
d. It's the rug John tore in rolling up. 
That asymmetric coordination behaves in the same way as sentences 
modified by adverbial clauses .,Tith respect to (3·,116) can,.be seen by 
comparing (3.113), (3.114) with (3,111) and (3.l:12). 
(3,113) a. John murdered Alice, and Bill swore to 
avenge her. 
b. 	 Alice, who John mµrdered, and Bill.swore 
to avenge her death, was a very nice ~irl •. 
c. *It's )Alice} John will have to marry
lher 
f~:ce} or let 	go. 
d. It's -Klice 	John will have to marry or let go. 
3.4.1.1.2; Regarding asymmetri~ coordination and (3,2), (3,115) 
shows that (3.2i)_ is entirely confirmed. 
(3.115) 	 a.. I t·old you that John murde_red Alice, and 
her father subseQuently suffered a ·heart 
attack. 
b. 	*What I told you, anp. her father suffered a 
heart attack, is that John murdered Alice. 
c. I told 	you to get out, or I'll hit you. 
d. 	*What I told you, or I'll hit you, i.s to r;et 
out, 
The conf.irma.tion of the predictions in (3.~ii) o.nd (3.2iv) was 
uiscmrned in 3.ILl,1.1 a.lid illustrnted wil.h (-3,10·()-(3,109), 
'l'he prediction ii1 (3,2iii.} is not confirmed in E:nr,lish nn there 
nre no convincing ex1U11nles of second asymmetric coordinate terms 
being moved, with or without the connector. I.do not, however, 
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r~gnrd. :this fac~ as particularly da,magJng to my· ana.iysis, since 
instanceis o:f 'split .conJuncts' have peen uncovered in e>ther languap;~s, 
and, ~s I pointed out already, there is no guarantee that the option 
offered by statements like (3. 2:ii 1 and (3. 2ii i ) ~ill be taken in 
each and every ia~guage. The instances of split conjuncts which I 
have come across in the literature involve symmetric conjunction, 
and wtli be ta.Ken up 1·n section 3.4. 2. 2. I see no reason ror · 
believing that cbrijunct-splitting is limited to symmetric conjunction, 
but since I do not know of any discussion involving asymmetric 
conjunct-splitting in other languages (particularly when a.symmetry 
is not decidable by strict linguistic criteria) I will not pursue 
the matter any further. · 
The absence of split'conJt?-ncts (and coordinate terms in general) 
in English is, I believe, due to a phenomenon of contlllllinat.ion of 
the restrictions on symmetric and and dr to all the forms which 
superficially resemble tho~e i;:oordina.ting conjunctions. Thus, there 
are inst.ances of and which, on·strictly linguistic grounds .. are 
obviously not conjunctions (see also 3,4,1.2}, such as it1 (3.116~), 
which is in all .probability related to, or even derived from, 
(3.11Gb); nevertheless, the constituent introduced by and cannot 
move, as shown in (3,ll7a),·unlike the eonstituerit introduced by 
to, which can, as shown in (3.117b). 
(3,116) a.. You will have to try and.finish your paper. 
b. You will have to try to t'inish your paper. 
(3 .n·n a. *What you will have to try is and finish 
your paper. 
b. 	 Wha.t you \<rill have to try is to finish 
your paper.· 
The behavior of this kind of a.rid parellels symmetric and with respect 
to copying as well; thus (3.118a} is marginal compared with. (3,llBb). 
(3,118) a. ??What you will have to try and do is finish 
your pa.per. 
b. 	 What you will have to try to do is finish 
your paper. 
(3.i18a.} seems to have. the same degree of acceptability as (3.119b), 
where we are dealing with symmetric and; the restriction is prohahly 
the same as that which marks as margi~al conjunctions or indefinite 
and definite forms in general, as shown in (3:120). 
(3.119) a. Mary tried to laugh and to dnnce. 
b. 7'/What Mary tried to laugh nnrl to do WM 
to dance, 
{3.120) e..'liSomeone and Bill valked in. 
b. 'l 1A cat and the dog ran ava.y. 
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It is interesting that this conta,mination ·phen.6menon does not 
extend to but in the sense of except; thus , { 3 .• 121) strikes me as 
fairly tolerable. 
(3,121) a. You've been talki.ng about nothing but John. 
b. John, you've been talking about nothing but. 
In conclusion, even though the absence of confirmatory evidence 
for (3,2iii) is an embarrassing fact, it is probably not a genuine 
counterexamnle. 
3;4.1.2. Before leaving the topic of asymmetric coordination, 
we shall consider a subclass of asymmetric conjunction which 
apparently violates (3.2iv), and which led Ross to the ciaim that 
asymmetric conjunction is exempt from the CSC. The phenomenon is 
illustrated in {3,122) and {3.123). 
(3.,122) a. I'll have to try and finish that book 
'before dark. 
b. Wha.t will I have to try and finish 
before dark? 
{3,123) a. J oim went to the store and bought some 
whiskey, 
b. 	 It's some whiskey that John went to the 
store and bought. 
I believe, however, that the conjunctions in {3,122) and (3,123) 
are not N & S's, since ne.ither term is semantically optional; thus, 
we seem to b~ dealing with two stages of one event, so.that each 
term presupposes (in the sense of R. 11:lkoff) the other~ ·Indeed, 
in (3.107a), there is no necessary connection between the girl's 
death and the heart attack her father suffered (John might have 
committed th'e murder for the purpose of bringing about the attack, 
but the sentence is non-specific on that score). In contrast, in 
(3,123), there is a strong suggestion that the two conjuncts 
express stages of the same event, and both, consequently, presuppose 
each. other; the coordination is thus not an N & S, for (3.liii) is 
not satisfied, 
'l'he ~uggestion (or invited :inference) that we a.re dealing with 
one.event is due, I think, to the fact that the two c.onjuncts have 
the same subject and to.the fact.that the second occurrence of that 
subject is reduced. Consider the gradual increase in acceptability 
exhibited in the following paradigm:. 
(3,124) a. *This is.the whiskey which Johni we·nt to the 
store and Paul bought. 
b. ?*This is the whis~ey which Johni went to the 
store and hei bought. 
C, ?This is the woiskey which Johni went to the 
store and hei bought • 
" 
d. 	 This is the whiskey which J.ohn went to the 
store and bought. 
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· In (3,124a), the subjects are different; in (3.124b), the subjects 
are.the same, 'but. the.second on~ is unreduced; in (3.124c), the 
second cubject is partly reduced, while in (3.124d).;it is totally 
reduced. This paradigm shows that the stronger the invited 
inference to the effect that the.two conjuncts -refer to parts of 
the se.Ine event, the easier it is to maim the second. · 
It is noteworthy that mutual presupposition--as in (3.124d)--
has the same effect on cert~in purpose adverbs.as on second conjuncts: 
both cease to be SatelJ.ites (and therefore bei::onie maimable). Thus, 
(3.125) 	shows the same increase in acceptability as (3.124). 
(3.125)15a. *This is the whiskey which John went to the 
store in order that Pal.11 may buy. 
b.*?This is the whiskey which John went to the 
store in order that h~ may bw. 
c.??This is the whiskey whi9h John went to the 
store in order that he may buy. 
d. 	 This is-the whiskey which John went to the 
store in order to buy. 
15Poutsrna {1929) and Hoss (19G7) have in fact proposed that 
{i) be derived from (ii). 
(i) John went to the store ~nd bought some whiskey. 
(ii) John went to the store to buy some whiskey. 
Later writers {e.g., Zwicky {1969)) have pointed out, however, that 
{i) and (ii) are not synonymous, for the latter, but not the former, 
allows the continuation ••• but he didn't bn anything. . 
Another difference between ·(i) and (ii waa pointed out in 
Schmerling {1972): only from the latter; but not from the former, 
is it possible to infer that the going to the store must have been 
undertaken with the intention of buying the whiskey, as shown by the 
contrast between {iii) and (iv}. 
{iii) Th'is is the whiskey which John went to the store 
and bought, although he had no intention of 
buying anything. 
(iv) 	·:i<fhis is the whiskey which John went to the store 
to buy, although he he.d no intention of buying 
anything, 
Just a.s. the ideal situation for conjunct-maiming is one in which 
the conjuncts are VP's, the ideal situation for purpose-adverbial 
·maiming is one in which the adverb is a VP-modifier. To see ·this 
even more clearly~ contra.st (3,125d) and (3,125e) where the purpose 
adverbials a.re VP- and fl-modifiers respectively. · 
(3 .125) e. *Thio is the whiskey which ,John went to 
the otore, !n order to buy. 
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In Partee (1971), it is argued that Conjunction-Reductio~ is 
sometimes associated with changes in meaning and the paraqigms 
in (3.123) and (3.124) support her contention. However, (3,125) 
suggests that the facts Partee d:i:scusses hinge on VP-modification 
(as. against S-, NP-, etc~ , modification) , . rather thari on 
Conjunction-Reduction; this is also suggested by_ (3,126). 
{3,126) a.. Jqhn wants [to go to the store·~a. to 
buy some whiskey], 
b. 	*This is the whiskey which John wants [to 
go to the store and to uuyJ. 
c . 	 ,John wants to [gci to the store and buy some 
whiskey]. 
d. 	 This is the whiskey which John wants to 
[go to the store and buy]. 
The difference in acceptability between (3.126b) and (3.126d) 
suggests that the bracketed constituent in the former is a coordinate 
S-node, while the bracketed constituent in the latter is a coordinate 
VP-node. This suggestion is supported by the fact that (3 .126c), 
but not (3.126a) allows the con~inuation and Mary wants to do 
so too, as well as by the fact that the pseudo~clefting of the 
bracketed string in (3.126a) does not leave behind a do pro-form 
(or an underlying action verb do, according to Ross (1971)), while 
the pseudo-clefting.of the bracketed string in (3.126c) does, as 
shown by (3.126e) and (3,126f) respectively, 
(3.126) e. What, John wants is to go to the store 
and buy some whiskey. 
f, 	 What John wants to do is go to the store 
and buy some whiskey. 
The fact that VP-modification behaves alike with respect to 
coordination or subordination is an additional reason for believing 
the claim I made earlier that the distinction between·these two 
construction-types is na.t nearly as hard and fe:st as it had 
generally been assumed. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that Ross' contention that 
sentences iike (3.122a) and (3,123a) are exempt from the CSC is 
only partly true. Indeed, the conjuncts can be maimed, but not 
chopped, as discussed in 3.4,1.1.2 and illustrated in (3,117a). 
3.4,2.1. In 3.4, I pointed out that coordinations of etther 
type do satisfy (3 ,1) and should therefore be re·garded as N & S's, 
with X1 as the Nucleus and the boxed X as the Sf.l.tellite. In 
3.4.1.1.1, I pointed out that a deeper insight mny be achieved 1>y 
considering the roles of x1 and x2 , r.ather than of the former and 
of the boxed X. In thi:1 section, we con::dder X1 rmd -Inx2 
symmetrir coordinations und ask how, p;i ven the N F" r; hypotheriir;, 
the Nuclcu:: um! tile :;ut,elllte can· be identi fiecl on n nemantic 
basir;. 
From the !iefinition of symmetric c_o9rdination, it follow~ that 
the relative surface position of X1 and X2 is semantically irrelevant, 
\ 	 as they can switcll places·with no effect on meaning; tb,erefore, 
th.e :fact. that ~2 is domip.ateq. .by the bqxed X in (3.99) is without 
semantic ::;iignifi¢~nce. To·determine which node is the Satellite, we 
must t;i.Sk which one satisfies (3.liii). The answer is that neither 
term i~ optioniµ in·a.n absolute ,sense, as shown by the syntS:ctic 
and semantic deviance of· (3 .127b), but both are optional· in a 
relative sense, as shown by the accepta.tility of both (3.127c) 
arid { 3 .127d); in other wprds, if one term is present, the· 0th.er one 
is opt~onal. 
(3.127) a. John and Bill left. 
b. *Left. 
c. John le:rt. 
d. Bill left. 
Given the evidence, the only status that can be ascribed to 
symmetric coordination is the one stated belov: 
(3.128) 	 Symmetric structures like (3.99) are bi-
directional u 8: s's, in the sense that 
X1 is the.Nucleus a.nd x2 the Satellite, 
and vice versa.. 
As ve shall see in 3,4.2.2, (3.128) vill make it possible to 
explain the syntactic behavior of symmetric c.ordinations with respect 
to chopping rules vithout recourse to additional assumptions. 
However, I beli_eve that ( 3 .128) is not merely !:I. trick which makes 
the grammar work, but a statement which makes sense intuitively. 
{3.128) may give pause at first,' as it may seem self-contradictory 
to call something a Nucleus and a. Satellite at the same time; 
however, ?Jucleus and Satellite are not incompatible properties, 
since what makes a constituent a Nucleus is its ability to represent 
the N & Salone,. without ·further dependents, and what makes· it a 
Satellite. is its e,bility to disappear without altering the 
constructi-op-type of the larger constituent to which it belongs; as 
far as I can see~ both properties are satisfied by ~ynunetric 
coordinate terms. It is important to notice that these properties 
refer to potential, not actual situations; indeed, there is no 
coordination token in which a term is both present and absent. 
But surely {3.128) does not assert that any such coordination token 
does exist. The possible impression of self-contradictoriness 
derives, I think, from the possible mistaken feeling that (3.128) 
does in fact make such an assertion.16 
16(3,128) can be extended trivially ton-term coordination. 
Since oniy one term must be present, but any of the terms could be 
that term, a symmetric coordination with ii ternis in e. N & Sinn 
~; such that in .each way, some term is the Nucleus and the 
remainder are Satellites. 
..  
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I can see. at least four reasons for accepting (3 .'128): 
{a) Constructiqns are either endc:,cintric or exocentric; 
(3; 99) is not exocentri_c, for x0 i_s nece~sarily of the same type 
as either x1 or·x2; therefore, l 3 .-99) must be .endcicentric. · 
(b) If (3,99) is endocentric, and we reject (3,J,28), we may 
regard both x1 and X2 as.Nuclei; in other words, symmetric coordinate 
structures (with n terms) would be ':Poly..:endocentric I. This. hypo-
thesis has some.intuition appeal, and in .fact represents the 
traditional position on coordination. However, this position is 
not without difficulties. First, Nuclei (a.rid Heads in general) are 
never optional; therefore, endocentric constructions would require 
an ad hoc statement to t;he effect that if there is more than one 
head present, only one is obligatory. Second, the behavior of 
symmetric coordination with respect to chopning, etc., rules, does 
not follow from (3,2). ~ndeed, if symmetri~ coordinations are 
pluri-nucleic:, no term can move due to (3.2i), But (3.2ii) 
predicts that Nuclei can be maimed, and in order to make the theory 
conform to" the facts, it would be necessary to regard symmetric 
coordinations as mono-m;cleic, the totality of t·he terms being 
the Nucleus; in that case, 'maiming the Nucleus' could be interpreted 
~'maiming all the terms across-the-board, but in no other fashion 1 , 
which is precisely what we find. This ·' solution I is' however' 
untenable, because the c,l1aracterization of a construction as 
sini.ultanebusiy pluri-nuclei and mono-nucleic is ,clearly contradictory. 
'l'herefore, it would be necessary to include the CSC in the grammar in 
addition to (3,1) and (3.2), This decision would be unfortunate . 
in the extreme, not only because it would add additional apparatus, 
but primarily.because it would claim that Nuclei behave differently 
in N & S's and in ol·-endocentric constructions. 
I conclude that 3.128 is to be preferred to the po~y-
endocentric hypot_hesis fo:r t_he reasons expounded above •. In addition, 
it should be noticed that my prQposal does not really conflict with 
the traditional view; in fact, it includes· the latter, since it 
regards each term as a Nucleus, but it adds the information (which 
the tradit1onal position misses) that e.ach term is relatively 
optional, and thus makes possible a principled explanation .of the 
behavior of symmetric coordination with respect to both chopping 
and maiming, 
(c) If we reject both (3,128) and the poly-endocentric 
hypothes1s, it ~ight be proposed that both x and X2 are dependents1of some third element; as no such element exists,, this hypothesis 
is untenable. To propose that both terms are Satellitei3 would make 
even less sense, for it would then be predicted that both are 
simultaneously optional. 
(d) Finally, it might be proposed that X1 is the Nucleus 
and x2 is the Satellite but not vice versa (as in asymmetric 
coordination); this would be not only wrong on semantic grounds, 
but would also make false predictions on the behavior of symmetric 
coordinat~on with.respec~ to chopping, feature-changing, etc., rules. 
On the other hand, given (3.128), (3.2) and (3.110) make exactly the 
correct predictions, as we shall see in the next ,section. 
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3.4·.2.2. From (3.128). and from (3,2i} ar;td (3;2i_v), it follows 
that· neii_ther x1 norc .x2 in (3,99) can ·he either chopped ·or maimed. 
Thus, the. stronger constraints :On symmetric coordination, as 
compared with ·other construction types, are correctly predicted. 
The· conjunction of· (3,128) and (3.2i}-{3.2iv} is. almost equivalent 
to the CSC., but not quite, since the· latter predicts that the boxed 
X in· (3.99} is also frozen, vhile the former makes · rio such prediction. 
In fact, my proposal leaves Opf;!ri the possibility that the boxed X may 
migr!'J:te from· under x0 • . . . . 
. It is not clear to what extent this possibility is realized in 
English, Ross. {1967) mentions two rules vhich he regards as counter-
examples to his C$C, Conjun~t-Insertion and Conjunct-Movement, 
illustrated in (3-.129) a.nd (3.130) respectively:, 
b .129) a. 
b. 
John will get a bonus on Friday , and he has 
been waiting for that since December. 
John, and he has been waltinp; for that since 
December, will get a bonus on Friday. 
(3,130) a. 
b. 
John and Bill are.similar. 
John i~ similar to Bill. 
(3,129) is a ·counterexample only to the strongest form of the 
CSC, whtch p:recludes all movements or· nodes dominated by a cpordinate 
node. but not to a, wea.li:.er form which allow" rearrangements within the 
qomination of the coordinate node; it appears that Ross ~pheld the 
strong version. {3.129:t>) does certainly not viol~te my (3.2), but 
it 9-oes not support my (3.2iii) either, as the latter allows move-
ments of the b<:>xed :X even out.side the domination of the coordinate 
node. 
(3,130b} does support (3 •.2111) as against the CSC; unfortunately, 
the existence of a transformational relation between (3,130a) a.nd 
(3.130b) has been cast into seri,;ms doub't by Quang (1970), who 
pointed out that the a1leged rule of ConJunct..:Movemeht ~onietimes 
fails to preserve meaning a.nd/or.grammat:i.cal well-fo:rmedness or ill-
. f~rmedness. But even if (3.130a) ~d (3.130b) are not related tra.ns-
formationally, there are sentences in other languages which suggest 
that the constituent formed by ·a second coordinate term plus the 
coordinating conjunction can be moved. 
One such langu,age is Hungarian, where the proposition the 
teacrer sees the boy and a girl can be rendered in any of the three 
foll<:>wing ways: 
(3 .131 ) 	 a tanaar laatJa a fi uu ees ed' laa.Bt 
the teacher sees the boy and a girl 
(3,132) 	 8. tanaar 'a. fi UU CeS ed I laaf'it la.at , 
the teacher the boy nnd o. rr.frl aees 
(~.133) 	 a tanaar a fiuu laatja ees ed 1 ·1aafit 
t~e teacher the boy sees nnd the ~1rl 
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I do not know enough about Hungarian to see whether there is enough 
independent motivation for a Conjunct-Extraposition rule, but 
notice that the above data are consistent with. such a rule, vhich 
would derive (3,133) from (3,132), a.long the lines permitted by 
(3,2iii) ,17 
17Koutsoudas' account is slightly different: he proposes _ 
that ( 3 .133) is derived from ( 3 .131) by fronting the fi_r_~,t conjunct • 
His reasons E!,l'e that :the verb a.greei; in definiteness with the 
closest conjunct in both (3,131) and (3.132), and that the fact that 
it agrees with the first conjunct in (3.133) would ·require a.n ad 
hoc proviso if Agreement applied after the splitting of the conjuncts, 
when both are equidistant from the verb. However, it seems 
plausible to expect the possible governors in object-verb agreement 
to be a fiuu anded' laant, rather than the former and ees ed' iaa.nt . 
.If so, we may allow the second conjunct to move along with the 
coordinating conjunction, and to permit Agreement to operate after 
this movement, for the first conjunct is still closer to the verb . 
than the second conjunct is. 
Another language in which the boxed X of (3.99) appears to be 
movable is Sa.moan, Grinder (1969) points out that the proposition 
the1 girl cuts the boy with the axe and the knife can be rendered in 
one of the following two ways :_ 
(3,134) e sogi e le teine le tame. i le to 1i ma le naifi, 
cuts the girl _the boy with the axe and the knife 
(3.135)' e 	sogi ma le naifi e le teine le tame. i le to'l. 
cuts and the knife the girl the boy with the axe 
It seems that the underscored constituent in (3,134) has been moved, 
in (3,135) for topicalizat:i.on purposes. 
I do not know of any other cases in the literature which have 
been presented as violations of the CSC, but the· cases whi_ch I .kn~w 
of all involve the movement of the boxed X in (3,99), vhich supJ)orts 
my (3.2iii), since that node can only be viewed as a Sateilite. 
If the conjunction of (3.2i), (3,2iv) and (3.128) explains the 
impossibflity of either chopping or maiming one of the terms of a 
symmetric coordination, the conjunction of {3.21), (3.2iv), (3.128), 
and (3,110) explains why across:..the-board maiming of syllUlletric 
coorµinate terms is possible, and why it is in fact the only we:y in 
which symmetric coordinations may be maimed. Indeed, since eac11 
term is a Gatelliteof the other, neither can be maimed without the 
other's being maimed too. The same principle applies tq n-term 
coordinations where any term is a Satellite of every other term {see 
footnote 16 ) • 
I have argued i_n this, chapter that the conjunction of (3.1) and 
(3.2) improvesboth observationally and descriptively on the IC, as well 
as on the island constraints stated in Ross {1967). In the next chapter, 
I shall argue that my proposal, but not the IC, can receive a natural 
explanation in terms of general perceptual principles. 
CHAPI'ER IV 
' ' 
INTERRUPI'ION, CONFLICT, CLOSURE, AND ISLAND CONSTRAINTS 
4.0. This chapter is an attempt to prqvide a plausible 
explanation of Ros~' most important island.constraints :in terms of 
principles discussed in qhapter Two and of their partial reanalysis 
defended in Chapter Three. . 
The constraint (3.21) which fr.eezes Nuclei (henceforth: the 
Frozen Nucleus Constraint) is discussed in section 4.5, where it is 
shown that violations of it can yield two· types of aitµations which, 
it is suggested, can be accounted for by a clo.sure and conflict 
principle respectively. · · · . 
The constraint (3,2iv) which urecludes movements of elements 
of Satellites outside the scope of.the U & Snode (h~ncef~rth: the 
Subservient Sa.tellite Constraint) is disc:ussed in sect.ion 4. 3, vhere 
it is argued that· violations of this restriction p;ive rise to 
perceptual conflict. 
The Dichotomous Behavior Principle (stated in (1.52)) is discussed 
in section 4.4, where it is suggested that the distinction between 
the syntactic phenomena which obey island coristraints and those 
which do· not can 'be accbunted for by assuming that the remote 
relations crucially invoived iri the two situation-types ar~ 
recognized by essential::i:y different ty:pes of strategies, 
The Sentential Subject Constraint is discussed in section 4.2 
within the more general framework of the ,mitigating effect of 
predictability on the complexity of interrupted behavior. In 
contrast to Ross' conclusion that the SSC is not univer.sal, it is 
suggested here that the pertinent constraint (resulting from the 
lower predictability of the location of a partner in a discontinuous 
relationship) can apply non-vacuously only in languages where . 
arguments can occur on both sides of the verb, ancl where moreover one 
of these positions confers upon some argument a distinguished status 
(such as in the SVO languages). 
In view of the fact that violations of island constraints are 
not always obvious from a consideration of the surface str:u~ture, it' 
is nec~ssary to assume that certain decoding operations take place 
earlier than others. Section 4.1 examines some experimental and 
internal evidence which supports the view that some (but not all) 
decoding operations apply sequentially, and considers the principles 
which ma.y govern the ordering of such operations. It is argued that 
the way in which strategies must be ordered for independent 'reasons 
is sufficient to account for those instances of island-constraint 
violations which are not directly observable in surface structure. 
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4.1. In Chapter Two, I pointed out that the theory of perceptual 
strategies assumes that the processes it posit's a.re not· direct 
replicae o_f _!.he.rules of a transformational sra.mmar, even thoup;h it 
is very likely those processes utilize transformational information. 
In this section~ I shall attempt to d~termine t,lle principles whit;:h 
govern the ordering of strategies, and demonstrate their usefulness 
for the explor~ticm of specific const:r:-aints. · · 
Discussions of ordering hs.v:e in general been limited to syntactic 
or phonological transformations; in this respect, the constraining 
power of extrinsic rule ordering (an explicit statement of the order 
in whi_ch ·rules must apply} has been contrasted with intrinsic rule 
ordering (an inherent· property of pa.irs of rules, to the effect that 
if both rules apply in a derivation, there is a unique T)OSsible order 
of application dictated by their formulation) .(Chomsky (1965)). Later 
writers pointed out that extrinsic rule ordering is insufficiently 
powerful to ~ccoun:t for newly discovered da.ta.·, so that .ordering 
paradoxes result unless the grammar is provided with additional 
apparatus' such as (arbitrary) mark_ers, which code information 
available ·at some ~tage of a derivation for the benefit of later 
stages of that derivation (as proposed in Kensto¥icz and Kisseberth 
(1970), Postal (1970a), Koutsoudas, Ganders and Noll (1971), Lehman 
( 1971) , Baker and Brame (1972) etc. ) or, equivs.lently; global rules, 
which enable grilmma.tica.J. processes to 'peek·, at earlier and/or later 
stages of derivatfons (as proposed in Lakoff (1969) , ( 1970b) , (1972), 
Ross ( 1969b) , Postal ( 1970b) , etc. ) • The propo~ents of co.ding or 
global device~ have often 1:1rgued that since such devices can do what-
ever extrinsic rule ordering i:an do but not vice versa, there is 
little point in having both kipds of devices tn. a grarrana.r, and they 
have consequently proposed that extrinsic ordering be disca.rcied from 
linguistic theory: 
Clearly, both extrinsic rule ordering and coding or global 
apparatus a.re still a tar cry f:r:-om providing an explanation of the 
empirically discoverable iinguistic data. The ·reason is that the 
notion 'possibie. tra,nsformation' is at pre.sent undefined in linp;uistic 
U1eo:ty, and while a transformationai granunar without global devices 
is too_·weak in ~iome ways, it is also too stronp; in other ways; that 
is, as has frequently been pointed out, it is possible, given the 
presently available notation, to write a large number of im!)lausible 
transforma.Uons with the same ease with which empirica.lly justifiable 
ones can be written. Thus, it is not in the least clear that the way 
in whi_ch rules have been_ formulated is psychologically correct, and 
since the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic ordering depends 
precisely on specific f'orm_ulations of :rules' that distinction itself 
is up in the air. Sim:iiarly, as there is no presently available 
definition of' the ndtions 'possible coding deyice' or 'possibl~ 
global rule', the enormous power of these devices allows, in_ 
principle, the prediction of a still larger class o:f implausible 
situations,l · 
1•11his undesirable increase in power shows that the elimination 
of extrinsic orderlnr, in favor of global rules is not necessarily n 
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blessing. If extrinsic ordering is retained.and global rules are 
used sparingly, the number 9f :possible grallima.rs that can account for 
some set of data :i.s reduced (provide.d, of course, :that we cari state 
i.n ~ pr:l,ncipled way which classes of phenomena mµst :tie d,escribed 
by rule ordering and which by global rule.a). c_iiomsky has often 
argued ( e .• g. , . in Chomsky ( 1970b) ) that given the extreme ease with 
which children learn their languages, a theory which reduces:the · 
numoer of possible grammars applicable to some corpus has a better 
chance of being psychologically correct than a theory which merely 
reduces the number of formal devices available to grammars. 
Most of the effort expended.in studying perceptual strategies  
so far has been aimed at providing proof of their exi~tence as well  
. as'ade4u~te formulatiOI?,S of them. Not too much attention has been 
paid to the order in which strategies must. apply, presumably for at 
least the following reasons: (a) tQe order of application of specific 
strategies is not at present amenable to direct testing, and (b) the 
only kind of ordering regarded a:s ·interesting in grammatical 
investigations has been the extrinsic one, wid an extrinsic ordering_ 
of strate·giea. appears quite implausible; the reason is that extrinsic 
ordering in gra.mma.rs is aimed at limiting the applicabiUty .of 
specific rules, while extrinsic orciering in perception would seem to 
be perversely aimed at limiting the efficiency of specific decoding 
operations. In the remainder of section 4.1, I shall try to show 
that the orderi~g of perc~ptual strategies is not without theoretical 
interest, as even non-extrinsic ordering constrains the class of 
possible outputs, Specifically, I will consider three syntactic 
problems which cannot, as far as I can. see, be hwidle.d with the 
presently available formal ·devices without loss of generality, and 
will argue that a satisfactory solution can be provided by a consider-
ation of the qrder in which perceptual strategies apply to the 
pertinent structures • 
4.1.1.1, The first problem I shall consider is Ross' (1967) 
output conditio.n, usually referred to as :t'he NP-over-S CoI?,straint: 
(4.1) 	 Internal sentences exhaustively dominated by 
the node NP are unacceptable. 
(4.1) marks ~s unacceptable sentences ·like (4.2a) and (4.2b), but  
does not affect sentences like (4.2c) a.nd (4.2d),  
(4.2) 	 a. *It's that Bill may returri which disttµ"bs 
everybody. 
b, 	*It's for Mary to leave that everyone is 
looking forward to. 
c. 	 It's Bill's playing the piano at all hours 
which got the neighbors furious. 
d. 	 It's Bill's loud pla.yinF, of the piano which 
made his wife ask for divorce. 
True, 	gerundives like the underscored phrase in (4.2c) behave like 
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sentences with ·~espect to a number of ,pyntactic phenomena, but Ross 
disposed of this problem by pointing 'out tha-t constructions like 
the internal ones in (4,2a}-(4.2d} can be nlaced on a 'sentencehood-
nominality' scale, and that (4".l} is sensitive ~nly to the two 
highest degrees ofsentencehood, rather than to absolute categories.
As there a.re maµy syntactic phenomena ~hichrecognize .such'a 
categorial scale (for details, see Ross (in Press}}, this explanation 
can be accepted.. · · 
Th!;!r'e are, however, at least t'W'.O problems with (4.1). The first 
is that it does not always hol.d; thus , (4. 3} seems to me· q1.rlte 
tolerable, particularly if it is spoken with a slight pause after 
the underscored constituent (which is probably what most people 
would do), even though the internal phrase has the highest degree of 
sentencehood. 
(4,3) The doctor expiained that John was sick to the 
many·frlends and relatives who had assembled 
in the hall. 
Second, it is not clear at what level (4.1) must hold. Ross  
regarded (4.1} as a.n output (i.e., surface structure) condition, but  
this is clearly incorrect in view of the acceptnbil.ity of (4.4a) and (4.4b), 	 . . . . .. 
(4.4) 	 a. Is where you live known to the police? 
b, Isn't whoever steals money a thief?, 
If we accept the analysis proposed in various places in the literature 
that fr'ee relatives have lexical heads at some level of representation 
and that e~bedded interrogatives also originate with heads roughly 
like the answer to the question, the ·grammaticality of (4.4a) and 
(4.4b) is explained if we require that (4.1) hold at the level which 
precedes the deletion of the heads o:f ~he internal c:l.auses. However, 
the level in que$tion cannot be a well-defined level of linguistic 
structure, In particular, it cannot be 'shallow structure 1 , if the 
latter is defined·as the output of the cycle, in view of the 
unacceptability of (4.5a); topicalization is a post-cyclic rule, and 
· the head of the free relative· must be present in the string at the 
poi~t at whicl1 Topical! zation applies for the latter to be blocked 
by the CNPC. If shallow structure is defined as the level which 
precedes all post-cyclic deletions, then (4.1) cannot hold at that 
level either, for the head must be pre~ent when certain deletion 
rules subject to the CNPC apply, as ahovn by the unP,re.mmaticality 
of (4. 5b). 
th(l.1.5) 	 a. *Dill, I have heard [ e !~:/hich} Mary told, 
b. *This mount~in is too massive for me to be able 
to conceive of f the object which} destroyed.
l what 
Notice that so far I have assumed that (4.1) is stated at the la.test 
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level possible. There is no re~son ,rby :it could not in principle 
be stated in shallow structµre,. even if it is ilpplicable later on 
as well; however, notice that Subject-Verb Inversion is a post-
cyclic rule, and the underscored phrases in (4.4) would not yet be 
internal at the end of the cycle. One might want to state (4~1) at 
the ievel which precedes post-cyclic deletion, but this creates 
problems of anot.her sort: Kiparsky 8.llci Kiparsky ( 1971) argued that 
the complements of factive verbs modify the NP the fact at some levei. 
This claim has been recently called into question by a number of 
writers (I .shall return to this matter at the end of (4.1.3.1), but 
if we accept it for the time being, we can account for the difference 
in acceptability betwe~n (4.6a) and (4.6b) l:>y assuming that the fact 
is still present in the derivation of the l~tter at the stage at 
which the rule which deletes the coreferent .Pf the rock applies. 
Consequently, the heads of :factive cc,mplement~ must be deleted later 
than shallow structure, exactly like the h~~ds of free relatives. 
(4.6) 	 a. This rock is too heavy :for me to believe 
that you intend to pick.up. 
b.7*This 	rock is too heavy for me to have 
realized that you in~end to pick up. 
However, if we required that (4.1) hold in shallow structure (defined 
as the level which precedes post-cyclic deletions), we predict that 
there is a difference in ~cceptability between (4,7a) and (4,7b) when 
in fact there is none, ) 
(4,7) a. *Was that John was sick believed by the 
captain? 
b. 	*Was that John was sick realized by the 
captain? 
The import of the preceding discussion is that (a) at least 
with respect to factive complements, (4.1) does not hold at a well-
defined level of linguis1;ic s'tructure, and (b) the heads of facti ve 
complemen~s must be deleted earlier thEµt those of free relatives--for 
no independent reason--w:i.th (4.1) holding, say, in the input to the 
rule which deletes the heads of free reiatives. This solution, while 
not impossible, seems to me sufficiently ad hoc to sug~est that it 
cannot receive 'an expla.natorily adequate interpretation. 
4.1.1.2. The second problem to be considered was raised in 
1. 2. 6, and concerns the· fact that certain discontinuities within 
discontinuities, which are intuitively felt to be instances o:f the 
same phenomenon, cannot be stated in the/swne way in the presently 
available grammars, f.pecifically, it was shown that movemento out 
of clauses displaced by Extraposition-from-NP--aa in (4.8d)--and 
movements out of pseudo-cleft ,phrases--as in (4,91>)--or cleft ones--
as in (4,9d)--can only be blocked by extrinsic order2 in the first 
\ 	 . . 
2Independent justification for the ordering of the unbounded 
movement rules before Extraposition-from-NP is supplied by the 
paradigm below: 
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(i) a. You believe ·the girl who ·w.a.s 9ick to. have 
left. 
b, *Which girl do you believe Who Vas Si\'.!k to 
haie left? ·· · · · · · 
(ii) a. You saw a girl who was wearing a red ~at. 
b. Who did you see who was wel:µ"ing a red ha,.t? 
c. Who who was wearing a red h~t did you see? 
As (f) shows, the head of a relative clause cannot be moved by 
Question-Movement. Hut precisely such a movement seems to have 
derived (iib) from (ii.a) without ca.iis:ing unacceptability. The accept-
ability of (iib) c~ be explained if Questfon-Movement derives (iic} 
from (ita) and Extraposition-from-NP then derives (iib} from (iic). 
The ordering Extraposition-from-HP-..;.Question-f4ovement could not 
derive (iib} from· (Un} , for th~ former rule is inapplicab],e to ( iia}. 
unless we allow vacuous Extra:position-from-NP, a move which has 
generally been deplored by transformational grannna.r.ians. In addition, 
floss (1967) shows there are reasons for disallowing the questionin~ 
of a relative clause head after Extra.position-from-MP, as aug~ested 
by the ungrammatice.lity of '(iiib), derived from (iiia) with the 
ordering Extrapositiori-from-NP--Question-Movement; in contrast, ( iiic), 
der:i,ved from (iiia) with the opposite ordering, is more acceptable. 
(iii) 	 a. Sam didn't pick up those packaP,es which are 
to be mailed tomorrow until nine o'clock, 
b. 	*Which packages didn't Sam pick up which are 
to be mailed tomorrow until nine o'clock? 
c. 	 Which packages didn't Sam pick up until nine, 
o'clo~k which are to be mailed tomorrow? 
and by a global rule lik~ (1.86) in t~e latter two. 
{4.8) a, A boy who kissed Mary just walked out.· 
b. *Who did a boy who kissed just walk out? 
c. A 	boy just valked out who kissed Mary. 
d. *Who did a boy ,Just walk out who kissed? 
(4,9) a~ I 	 think thnt what John wants it to kill the 
gir,l.. . 
b. 	*The girl who I think that what ,John wants is 
to kill is pretty. 
c, 	 It's John's courting that girl that I ·strongly 
condemn. 
d. 	*The girl who it's John's courting that I 
strongly condemn is pretty. 
4.1.1.3. The third problem to be discussed concerns the 
paradigm in (1.90), where the greater acceptability of (1,90b) as 
against (I.90a) requires a global rule like (1.91). 
- i~9 	-
(1.90) 	 a. *It's Mary (who) I discussed the claim that 
Bill likes. 
b. 	?It's· Mary (who) I ~de the claim that Bill 
likes. 
c. It's MB!Y 	 (who) I claimed that Bill likes. 
(1.91) 	 Violations of island con~traints are considerably 
reduced in severity if the affected island was 
not an island in underlying represeritation. 
In 1.2.6, I pointed out that (1.91), rather than extrinsic 
ordering, is needed to account for (1.90), because the configuration 
make ,the claim is needed in the cycle for cyclical rules iike Pass~ve 
and Raising to yield (4.lOa), or for Tough-Movement to yield (4.lOb). 
(4.10) 	 a. The claim that Bill likes .Mary is believed 
to ·have been ~ade by Jo. 
b. 	 .The claim that John likes Mary is hard for 
me to make. 
What needs to be explained is why th~ postcyclic unbounded rules 
which move elements out of a complex NP should be sensitive to whether 
the latter is an underlying or derived island. 
4.1:2. The theory of perceptual strategies was described in 
Chapter Two, One point, hovever, bears repetition: the real-time 
operations by which sentences a.re decoded are not, in all likeiihood, 
mechanical replicae ·of the rules of a generative grwnme.r applying in 
reverse order. One argument often given in support of this position 
is that th~ perceptual and .derivational complexities of sentences do 
not always coincide. An even more compelling argument against the 
claim that perception 1undoes 1 derivations is based on the observed 
li~itatioris· of echoic memory. Thus, a great deal of work in cognitive 
psychology suggests that auditory memory is of at least two kinds: 
echoic and verbal (the terminology is Neisser's (1967)). Echoic 
memory is assumed to be a short-term store for unsegmented signals 
which have undergone only global preprocessing operations, while 
verbal memory is regarded as a more permanent store for coded material 
obtained through a synthesis of the echo by the applicatipn of 
perceptual strategies~ Ther.e have been various attempts t.o measure 
the duration of e·choic memory; thus, Guttman and Julesz ( 1963) 
estimate the duration of echoic memory as approximately one second 
long, .Pollack ( 1959) puts it at about four seconds, vhile Ericksen 
and Johnson (1964) allow as much as ten seconds. The range of 
variability of the various measurements seems to pose a problem, but 
Neisser (1967, p. 205) points out that the time values obtained in 
the three sets of experiments were inversely proportional to the 
difficulty of the tasks that the subJects were called upon to perform. 
If we regard speech perception as a. te.sk 01" :i.nterm"dinte difficulty, 
a fair estimate of echoic memory would place itR useful duration at 
about four seconds, Consequently, a theory of perception which 
claims that transformations are 'liridone anticyclically, and which 
therefore requires that no processing take place until the whole 
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·signal :has been stored ..for the highest qycle processes to be activated, 
falsely predicts not only that nothing is understooq until the end 
of a sentence is heard, but·also that only that portion of a complex 
sentence which falls within the final four-sentence span can be 
unde.rstood: For obvious reasdns, a grammar vhich inc~rporates a. 
pre- a.nd/or a post-cycle in ~ddition to the cycle is even more 
,implausible as a real~time model. 
It' seems ~ore plausible t'o assume that .there are units of 
syntactic perception .(which, according to Lehiste (in press) are 
determined by suprasegmental structure) to which perceptual strategies 
are applied in the·ord,er in which the units .are presented. In 
addition to these 'loca.1 1 strategies, we must assume 'integrative' 
strategies (which very remotely resemble the generalized transforma-
tions of early transformational grammar) .which utilize supra.segmental 
cues, 'function words', discontinuous constituents, etc.; in order to 
synthesize the hierarchical relations between the units of syntactic 
percept~on into a coherent formal obJE:lct. Thus, the strategies are 
presumed to make use of every cue in order to emit a fairly narrow 
range ot· hypotheses concerning what may or must foilow, and to. strike 
out hypotheses incompatible with later in-coming cues, until the 
desired reading of the sentence has been zeroed in on (or readings, 
if the sentence.is linguistically and/or contextually runbip;uous); of 
course, the strategies are heuristic procedures, and, unlike the 
analY:tic·procedures of American structuralism, offer no guarantee of 
success. 
Concerning the order of application of perceptual strategies, 
there ha.ve been s9me experiments suggesting that some stratep;ies 
apply simultaneously while others apply sequentially. Thus, Mehler 
arid Carey (1968) presented subjects with appropriate and.inappropriate 
pictu~s followed by a sentence containing either pro~ressive or 
participial constructions like (4.11a) or (4.llb) respectively (it 
was assumed that the latter vas syntactically more complex than the 
former). 
(4.11) a. They are fixing benches. 
b. They a.re performing monkeys. 
The response times were fastest when the progressive construction 
was used and the picture was appropriate, but delayed by the swne . 
amount otherwise. - Thus, it seemed to make no difference '1het~.,both 
the syntax and the semantics, or only one of them, were complex, 
which suggests that at least certain aspects of meaning and syntactic 
structure are processed simultaneously. Concerning the evidence f'or 
sequential application of strategies,. Bever (1971) reports on a number 
of click-localization experiments ,4'hich suggest that subjects are 
immediately aware of cla.usa.13 boundaries, but not of boundaries 
3tehiste (in press) points out that the recognition of clausal 
boundaries is probably itself' not en immediate process, and occurs 
prior to the recognition of suprasep;menta.1 structure. She aup;p;ests 
that Uever I a reoults were due to the re.ct that he asked his aut>Jects 
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to wait to the end of the. sentences before reporting the location 
of clicks; .she repeated the experiment -asking subjects to react 
as soon as the·click was heard, and .got different results. 
It should also be pointed out that.· Bever also claims that the 
primary units of syritacti'c perception :a.re deep, not ·surface, clausal 
boundaries. He bases his claim on the observation that clicks· 
occurring in the middle of .the troops -tended to migrate tc:;> the 
right in (i) ~d to the left in (ii J; thus, subjects seem to be 
sensitive to deep structure boundaries·. 
(i) The general ordered the troops to fight. 
(ii) The general desired the. troops to fight. 
Notice, however, that clicks cannot be attracted to deep clausal 
boundaries unless the elements separated by clausal boundary in 
creep structure a.re still adjacent in surface structure. . Thus , it is 
not clear what the click should be attracted to in (iii)· in order to 
support Bever's hypothesis. · 
(iii)· John definitely seems to be stupid. 
In (iii), the deep boundary is between seem and John. Bever's 
hypothesis becomes totally implausible if a deep structure allowinP: 
lexical decomposition 'is considered~ for it would ·imply that if we 
decompose no man came as (NOT [SOME man cameJ), the boundary between 
NOT and SOME is a· primary s;}tlltactic percept. 
between non-sentential constituents; however., if subjects are asked 
to wait several seconds before reporting the location of the click, 
non-sentential constituent boundaries do appear to cause response 
bias. This suggests that some structural features are processed 
earlier than others. 
·concerning the strategies which apply sequentially, we must 
recognize at least two kinds of ordering, Oa and Di>• Oa is an exact 
replica of intrinsic grammatical ordering; that is, if some strategy 
A creates the very input to some strategy B, it follows that A must 
apply before B,. As a hypothetical illustration, consider the following 
possible ve;y in which the .processing of (4.12) may proceed. 
(4.12) ~ do you think John fears that Mary dislikes? 
If the primary units of syntactic perception are suprasegmental 
rather than structural (as proposed by Lehiste), there must be 
strategies which recognize clauses and segment them into predicates 
and arguments, One we;y in which this may be done is through the 
identification of verbs and the retrieval of the syntacto-semantic 
information associated with them (from some long-term store corres-
ponding to the lexicon}; by recognizing the number and kind of 
potential arguments that a given verb requires, it is possible to 
emit tentative hypotheses about vhich arguments go with which verbs. 
·The underscored word in (4.12) is easily recognizable as a highly 
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proba,bie member cif a 4iscontin~i~y, Slld as the ana.lysis 'by synthesis 
of :tt~~ incoming sign_al: pro<;eeds. the wh..;.word is tested .as, a possible 
argument of the '{a.ripus verbs encountered. Sp~cifice.1ly, who .is 
· not considered ae a. poss.:i,ble obJ.ect c;,f think, a,s the latter requires 
abstract objects; nor of fear,,. for e.1though this verb may take 
a.nimlite obJects, it can t~only one obJect, and is already folloved 
by one; therefore, who can only be an argument of dislikes. ,If this 
oversimplified EJ,CCOunt is in anyway correct, the strategy WQich. 
attempts to match vho vith some verb .can only apply ~ information 
as to the selectional restrictions of that verb has been retrieved. 
~ depends on the nwnber of cues required for the triggering of 
specific strategies, .on the moment in time when those cues become 
available, and on the complexity of the task which the strategiep in 
question are ce.1led upon to perform•. I believe that Ob ca.n provide · 
an explanation for the problems raised in 4.1.Ll and IJ ,1.1.2. Of 
course, there is no reason why specific strategies should not operate 
simultaneously, if the pertinent cues are simultaneously p'rovided, 4 
41t is not clear whether simultaneous application of decoding 
operations involves parallel independent processing or very ra-pid 
shift,ing back and forth from one taslt to another. If we accept 
Neisser 1 s (1Y67) views that synthesis, as opposed to global pre-
processing, is .strictly sequential, we are forced to entertain only 
the latter hypothesis. 
which is, I suggest, the explanation ·tor the problem raised in 4.1.l.3. 
4.1.3. In this sectio~, I propose ~olutions to the problems 
in 4.1.1. 
4.1.3,1. Before considering a solution to 4.1.1.1, it is 
important to recognize that (4.1) is probably a perceptual, rather 
than a formal, constraint. The point is that it is difficult to 
identify a constituent which forms a perceptual unit with the flankin~ 
material when the category to which that constituent belongs is he.rd 
to identify. Thus, the internal constituents in (h,2a) and (4.2b) 
are arguments of a hi~)ler predicate .and theref~re NP's; 9owever, 
they are too sentence-like to be readily recognizable as NP's. On 
the other hand, the internal constituents in (4.2c) and (4i2d) are 
sufficiently noun-like {tlu,y bee;in with genitives. i.e., determiners) to be 
quickly identified a.s such. With re~pect to (4. 3). where the under-
scored constituent is followed by sonie suprnsegmente.1 boundar:r, ve 
are faced with ,a clause internal to the containing clause, but not. 
to the containing perceptual unit (recall Lehiste 1s hypothesis that 
perceptual units are determined by suprasE)!gmental structure) , and its 
recognition as object of explain is thereby facili~ated~ It appears 
that the notion •tnterne.1 NP-over-S 1 must be rerormulated in terms of 
containing perceptue.1 unit.13, rather than clau~es., ,rhich is not at 
all surprising if {4,1) is a. perceptual, rather than a purely formal, 
constraint • 
If (4.1) represents a limitation of the strategy which ·iq.entifies 
arguments of higher predicates, then the contra.st in acceptability 
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between (4.4a) Eµia. .(4.4b) _e,rid (4.7b) is_ rather easy to e~lain: the 
heads of free relatives· orei;nbe9,ded interI'oga.tlves are si1Y1~led by 
the characteristic wh-pronoun, arid can th,er"efore be reconstructed 
before the clause isassigned a. roi~ in the co'ntaining sentence; in 
other words, the strategy which :reconstructs t:tie. he.ads o'f ;icih-cla.uses 
ca.n operate before the strategy which segments put the arguments of 
a higher predicate, in which case the latter· is no longer blocked 
by (4.1), for the internal clause :is no longer exhaustively dominated 
by NP. In contrast, .a mere inspection of t:tie µnderscored constituent 
in ('4.7b) will not tell us whether this constituent does or doesn't 
have a deleted head; it will be necessary to ~a.it fpr the higher. . . 	 /
predicate, and even then the reconstruction of the fact cannot employ 
overt clues, like the wh feature,.but must base itself on the meaning 
of realize, from which it may be inferred that the trut~ of the under-
scored constitµent is pres_upposed, and that it consequl:!ntly modifie! 
a head the fact. Thus, the ·availability of cues as well as the 
relative complexity of the task that strategies have·to perform is 
consistent with the ordering- in (4.13) , whlch. .·provides a straight-
forward . explanation of the contrast between ·c 4. 4) and ( 4. 7b) • 
(4 ,13) 	 (i) Reconstruction of the heads of wh-clauses; 
(ii) 	 Role assignnient to constituentsvithin the 
containing sentence (constrained by (4.1)); 
(iii) 	 Reconstruction of the heads of factive 
complements. 
(4.13) i1;1 a ltttle too strong in asserting that step (iii) 
does take place·; in fact, the data we have considered allow only the 
weaker statement that step (iii) (if it takes place at all) must 
follow both steps (i} and (ii). This weaker statement is in order 
since there is no evidence that the r.act is reconstructed a.tall in 
the decoding of (4,7b). ---
In R. Lakoff (1972), it is argued t.hat there exist certain 
difficulties with the Kiparskys' analysis of factives, and it is 
suggested that their behavior might be more adequately accounted for 
by invoking their semantic properties (in a way unknown at present) 
than by postulating a head NP the fa.ct, Notice, however, that even 
if La.koff 1s arguments a.re accepted and the Kiparskys' e.nalys:i.s is 
rejected, it does not follow from this that hearers necessarily do 
not reconstruct a head for the complement of realized in interpreting 
(4,7b}. To see this, consider embedded inter:r;"ogative clauses like 
I know who left, which have sometimes been analyzed as I know the 
answer to the question: who left. The status of the head the answer 
to the question is at least as queetiona.ble·synta.ctically as that of 
the head the fa.ct which th.e Kiparekys propose, For example, adverbs 
modifyinginterrogative clauses can sometimes be prepoeed beyond the 
matrix verb, as in in case rou have a minute, I wonder whether l 
could talk to you (ct. *in case you have a minute, I wonder about the 
answer to the question whether I could talk to you); also; some 
interrogatives a.re not islands for the purpose of unbounded rules, 
as sholm by it 1s Mag I wonder why Bill left (cf. *it's Mary; I wonder 
a.bout the answer to the question why Bill left). · lfow, the fa.ct that 
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interrogatives do not seem to modify a .Nucleus in some cases does 
not mean that .such a Nucleus is never reconstructed, for .is why he 
left El. real myster;v? or it's who went where that I am puzzled by 
are Just El.S good as· is what you found Ori the table the tissue? 
Consequently, it appears that hearers do reconstruct heads·for 
interrogativ~s, altho.:ugh the synta¢ticjustifica:tion for such heads 
is just as shaky as that for the heads of factives. . -
If one ~ailtM t~ d<mY th~t internal interrogatives ~~   
reconst,ructed with he~ds, one would p.ave to deny that the exhaustive 
domination of the nod.e S by the node NP has anythinr; to p.o with the 
unacceptability of (4 .2a) or (4 .2b). While such a step is possible 
in principle, I propose that it not be taken until a viable alterna- tive is proposed. 
4,1.3,2, \-le now turn to problem 4.1.1.2, which cpnsisted of 
.the difficulty of stating the ungrammaticality of (4. 8d) and (4. 9b) 
as the same phenomena~. b1,2e to specific properties of the· formal 
desc:riptive model, the lower level discontinuity has to b.e created 
before the higher level one in (4.8d), while the opposite -orderinl\ 
obtained in (4,9b). The two cases wil, however, pe reduced to the 
same case if it can be shown that when the integration of the two 
discontinuities is atempted in real time, the existence of the higher 
level discontinuity is recognized before the integration of the lower 
level one.is carried out, That is, when the interrop;ative or 
relative prorioun is matched with the pseudo-cleft constituent or the 
extraposed clause respectively, the perceptual device must have been 
already apprised of the fa.ct that these lar(~er constituents have 
been torn off complex NP's. It seems to me ·that this condition is 
guaranteed by the order of presentation of the various clues. The 
pseudo-cleft construction i:; a highly characteristic one, consistinr; 
of a free or ful relative clause, a copuln, and a pseudo-cleft 
constituent, in that order; therefore, by the time the pseudo-cleft 
con~tituent is presented, the perceptual device wil have been p;iven 
morE? thnn enough cues to recognize that this constituent entern n 
discontinuous relation with the sub,Jec:t relative clnuse5 (sentences 
5of course, a sequence of relative clause folowed hy c9pula 
need not be continued with a pseudo-cleft constituent~ as (i) 
shows. 
(i) What John i;i.te was wonderful. 
HowE?yer, one of the things tha.t speE!,kers kn_ow about pseudo-cleft 
constructions is that the pseudo-cleft constit,uent enters into 
selectional restrictions with some verb in the rel1,1:tive clause. As 
there is no *John ate wonderful, a he~rer wil easily recor,nizc 
that (i) is not n pseu-d6-c1Pft construction. 
As pointed out in Bnch (1yG9), there exi;t mnbiguous construc-
tion~ like whl\t De:.cnrte::; discovered wns 11 proor of hio exintencc. 
I.n such cnse:.1, we predict t;.hnt the nmbir,ulty Ji:, rm1olved when nn _ 
.eiement of the predlcnte has been chopped; thin iG confirmed by (i), 
where the n-nentence ii nmbiguou:i, but where the h-onc in not, n.:i 
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the non-pseud~-cleft reading alone is grammatical. 
(ii) a. What I saw was. a representation of that 
building. 
b. Th.at building, which vh.at I say was a 
representation of, has collapsed. 
like (4,9d) can easily be accounted for in the same way, as the cleft 
construction is also highly characteristic). With resp~ct to extraposed 
clauses as in (4.8d) or (4.14), 
(4.14) Who· .do you believe l *t/t l i ~ is odd that Bill 
· kis1;1ed? · \.: e c a. mJ 
they are recognizable as relatives or complement clauses ~mmediately, 
for they must be introduced by complementizers; indeed, as (4.15) and 
(4.16) show, the complementizer can be deleted when the els.use is in 
construction with its head noun, but not if it is extrapoeed. 
(4.15) a. A boy you met recently has just arrived. 
b, *A boy has just arrived you ~et recently. 
{4.16) a. The rumor John is sick is unconfirmed. 
b. *The rumor is unconfirmed John is sick. 
A clause in sentence-final position can be either an argtUnent of the 
sentence predicate or a dependent of some head noun; by the time the 
extra.posed clause is presented, the remainder of the sentence has 
already been heard, and it becomes possible to see whether the 
clause is more:appropriately matched with a preceding NP or with 
the predicate, 
If the clause is matched with an earlier NP, any discontinuity 
involving this clause and some ·external element will be recognized as 
a violation of the CNPC. . 
4.1.3.3, Concerning the problem in 4.1.1,3, namely, the 
distinction in acceptability between (1.90a) and (1.90b) can be 
accounted for quite straightforwardly in terms of the Mehler and 
Carey experiment mentioned in · 4 ,l.'2, "Thus, assuming that speakers 
have an internalized version of the le~icon, in which lex;i.cal i'l;ems 
are characterized phonologically, syntactically and seTl'antfcally (as 
suggested in the discussion of (4.12)), the recognition of a lexical 
item should involve the retrieval of its characterizing information, 
its syntactic and semantic properties thus becomi~g available 
simultaneously., Therefore, at the point at vhich a hearer attempts 
to integrate the discontinuity in (1,90b), he has already recognized 
that the claim looks like the head of a complex NP, but is not one, 
semantical.1.y, Quite likely; make the claim is stored as one lexical 
item, in fa.ct, a sentential idiom, and it is a general fact about 
idioms that (at lea.st part of) their apparent structure is not 
relevant for interpretation. As we shall see in 4.2,5 structural 
I 
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configurations not relevan_t to semantic interoretatiori cannot 
function as islands ~V'er'l when they a.re repres~nted as islands in 
underlying representa_tion. . 
The sc,mewha,.t more awkvarci char_acter of (L9Db) as compared with 
(1.90.c) may be due to the conflict b_etween what the phrase make the  
claim .that. • • seems to b_e and what it really is. notice that the  
simultaneity of the processing of_ syntactic and semantic cues is  
important; for, if the latter were processed significantly later  
than th"e former (as one would expect. if perception undid the  
derivations of, ~ay, an Aspects-model grammar), (1.90b) would very  
probably be perceived as ungrammatical in the initial processing  
stages, and further processing would be discontinued, thus never  
giving the semantics a cha.nee to right the situation (cf. (1.90b),  
wllich is· immediately interpretable, with Bever' s the horse raced past  
the barn fell, which might not be if raced is interpreted as a  
preterite). ---
.4 .1. 4. I have tried to show in section 4 .1 that the ordering 
·o_f strategies has significant effects on -the acceptability of 
sentences. 
'rhus, I argued in 4.1.3,3 that the simultaneity (or near-
simult~eity) of syntactic and semantic proc.essing can account for 
the a.lmqst complete e.cceptabili ty of (1.90b) • 
In 4.1.3.1, I attempted to show that the ordering proposed in 
(4.13) can provide an explanation for the contrast in acceptability 
between (4.4a) and (4.4b) and (4.7b). That is, in order to account 
for the facts,- the heads -of the internal clauses must be recognized 
before the clauses are assigned a role in (4.4a} and (4.4b), but 
after that in (4,7b). The unacceptability of {4,7b) is particularly 
important, for it shows ·that (4.13ii) fails if the head of the internal 
clause is recognized 'too ia.te'. 
· In 4.1. 3 ,2 • I showed that the two sentences at issue, namely 
(4. 8a.) and ( 4 .,9b) can recei.ve the same explanation. since in both 
cases the higher level discontinuity is recognized before the lower 
level one is resolved, However, in order to show that the order in 
which the discontinuities are integrated is significant rather than 
accidental, it would be necessary to find a grammatical sentence in 
which thf;? existence of the higher le.vel discontinuity would not be 
recognizable when the lower level one is resolved. Constructions 
satisfylng this requirement may be hard to come by, I have, neverthe-
les_s, .been able to con$truct an approµmately adequate para.dip;m in 
Japanese, which fortunately has both leftward and rightward 
unbounded processes capable of violating the CNPC; such processes 
are Topica.lization and Relativization respectively. In Ross (19G7). 
it is pointed out that complement cl!!,uses modifyinp; 'lexical' head 
nouns like syutyoo (the_ claim) a.re impervious to Hele.tivize.tion, 
while clauses modifying the dummy koto (thing) are not, As the head 
· notµ1s of such constructions invariably appear on the rtp;ht -of the 
modif'oJing clauses, o_ne may hope tna.t Topicaliza.tion would be free to 
move elements out of complement cla.uoes, since at the stap;e at which 
the discontinuity is integrated, there vould be no way of knowing 
whether the head of th_e complement clause is a lexical element or a 
dummy. In other words, there should be no more .difference in 
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acceptability between (4~17c) and (4.17d) than·there is between 
(4.7a.) and. (4.7b), w}lile there .should b~ a:difference between 
(4.17b) e:nd (~.17d)~ . 
(4.17) a., Otto ga ~9:butte i-ta, kot<;> e ~ta.k.1,1.&i ga 
Otto we,;i.riQg was t.hi11g I 
sinzita. bo.osi we. a.kai, 
believed hat red 
'The 	hat 'wl).ich I believf;!d that Otto was 
wearing is red. 1 
b. (* )Otto ga kab~tte ita to iu syutyoo .o wata.kusi 
Otto wee.ring was th~t say claim I 
ga sinzita boosi wa a.kai. 
believed hat ·red 
'The 	hat ~hi~h I believed the claim that Otto 
was wearing .-is r.ed. 1 
c. Otto wa, wata.kusi .wa knoo bopsi .o kabutte 
.Q:tt6 I this. hat .wearing 
ita koto o sinzite.. 
was thing believed 
'otto, I beHev~!i was wearing this hat,' 
d, (* )Otto wa, watakusi. we, kono boosi o kabutte 
O.tto ·I · thi~ hat. vearing 
ita to iu syutyoo o ~inzita. 
. was that say cl,aim believed 
'·Otto, _I b_elieved. the cla::L~-wa~ w~aring this 
hat. 1 
However, the fev Japanese informants I have been able to consult have 
assured me that (4.17c) and (4.J.7d) differ in acceptability, while 
(4,17b) and (4,17d) do not,6. While (4.17.d) does not pffer a perfect 
6The star in parentheses in (4,17b) an.d (4,17d) indicates that 
the corresponding sentences .are unacceptable in some_ dial~cts , but 
not in all dialects. 
test case, since the head and the complement clause are adjacent 
(i.e., there is no higher level discontinuity), its unacceptability 
is nevertheless sufficiently significant to suggest that the fact 
that ( 4 .'Bd) and, ( 4 . 9b) could receive the same explanatfon was something 
in the nature of a lucky accident. 
The lack of a distinction in acceptability does not, however, run 
counter t.o t,he explanat:ion I offered in 4,1.3,2, Thus, the fact 
that we find no distinction in a.cceptability between (4,7a.) and (4,7b), 
but we do find one between (4.17c) and (4.17d), is due to the fact 
that there is a distinction between the NP-over-S Constraint and the 
CNPC, the former being a perceptual, and the latter a grammatical 
principle (~n fact, a grammatized oµe, as I will argue in 4,3), Put 
differently,· the latter, but not, the former, is n part of the 
competence of speakers·, and while· we would expect a perceptual 
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· dif:t'foulty to arise orily:when the string tl> be process·ea is complex 
in the·a.pproprtaie way, there-is no.reason why s:uch·an expectation 
should be entertained with respect to a gra:mm~tical (or graJilllU'!.tized) 
constraint. Specifically, even though a hearer presented with (4.17d) 
would in all ptobability not know, at the crucial moment, that the 
complement clause with vhich the topicalized constituent is integrated 
is part of a complex NP; he would still, know that violations of the 
CNPC a.re unaccept_!!,ble and w6ul,d therefore strike out the possibility 
that the cle.us·e in question might mod,ify a lexical head noun. The 
discovery that syutyoo, rather than koto, is the head of the complement 
clause conflicts vith the initial analysis of that clause, and 
unacceptability-a.rises at t~at stage, 
It is worthwhile to pause for a while and consider how the above 
account, if correct, fits within the perceptual framework we have been 
using ·so far. 
Clearly, the difficulty arising from the categorization of the 
complement clause modifying s'.yutyoo in (4.17d) as both a Satellite 
and a: non-Satellite is a t'ypical instance of perceptual, conflict. 
In addition, it is interesting to note that the initia.l. discarding 
of the possibility that the complement clause be a Satellite bears 
certain·simila.rities to erroneous closure; thus, in both situations, 
an a priori theoretic~ly possible analysis of some substring is ruled 
out 'too soon' • An even more interesting ca.se which may be regarded 
as involving 'erroneous ps.rtlai closure' will be discussed in 4.2, 
in relation to the relative complexity. of low predicta.bility. In 
essenbe, it will b'e argued that the lesser complexity of predictable 
structures leads to the hypothesis that they a.re most like;tx to 
occur than non-predictable o~es; consequently, the possibility of 
finding some desired constituent in an unlikely place is 'partially 
ruled ·out1 , as it were, and this, it is 9la.itned, is partially 
responsible for the SSC. 
To return to the problem discussed. before, an English p~adigm 
which ·demonstrates the same point as (4.17) is perhaps (4.18); (4.18) 
is not ari ideal test case either, since informants are far from 
unanimous in accepting its acceptability ratings. 
(4.19) 	 a~ .,Johr,1 referred to the roof of the house in his 
discussion with Mary. 
b. 	 I've just seen two birds on the roof of the 
· house. 
c. 	 It's the house which John referreg. to the roof 
of in -his discussion vith Mary. 
d.*?It's 	the house which I've j'ust seen two 
birds on the roof of. 
e. 	 The roof of the house, John referred to in his 
discussion with Mary. 
f. 	 The roof of the house, I 1ve Just seen two birds 
on, 
g. 	?It's :the house which the roof of-,, John referred 
to in his discussion with Mary. 
h, 	*It's the house which the roof of, I've just 
seen two birds on. 
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The crucial :coristituez:it is the roof of the house, which forms an 
adverbial Satellite in b, d, f, h, but not in· .a ; c, e, g~ · The c 
and d 	pair shows that the maiming of that constituent is considerably 
worse 	in the adverbial case; the··e<and f pair shows thai: the constituent 
in _question ,can be topica:lized in either case; the g and h pair, in 
which 	the constituent is both tbpicalized and maimed, shows that the 
overall 	result is considerably worse when the constituent :a:t issue 
originated as ari adverb~al, 
Clearly, at the stage a,t which the topicalize(I. element is 
encountered in the g or h sentence, there is no way.o:f telling 
whether 	it is a Satellite or not. But the h sentence is much worse 
than the gone, and this fact again suggests that language u~ers call 
upon their knowledge of the Subservient Satellite Constraint to mark 
the topicalized constituent as a non-Satellite. As in the Japanese 
case, 	this initial analysis is incompatible with the remainder of the 
string in (4. 18h) , e.nd the sentence ,is there fore unacceptable. 
4. 2. This section .is essentia,J.ly devoted to the mitigating  
effect of predictability (and the aggravating effect of unpredict- 
ability) on the complexity of interrupted behavior.  
I begin by reconsidering one parameter which Bever regarded as 
significantly determining the colllplexity of discontinuities, namely, 
structural complexity (see (2. 81)), and ..,,hich, to the best of my 
knowledge, has never been satisfactorily defined, Ross (1967) discusses 
the notion of 'complex NP' in relation to the acceptability of 
sentences which have undergone Particle-Movement, and proposes that 
'an NP is complex if it dominates the node S'. On this basis, he 
accounts for the greater unacceptability of ( 4 ,i9c) a.a compared with 
(4 .19a) or (4.19b). · 
(4.19) a. John called the unusually pretty girl up. 
b. John called the girl from San Francisco up. 
c. 	?John called the girl who was from Gan 
Francisco up. 
Boss also points out that structur~l.cornplexity is probably not a 
simple function of length, as he finds (4.20a) more acceptable than 
(4 .20b). 
(4.20) 	 a, I.called almost all of the men from Boston up. 
b, I called the man you met up. 
It appears therefore that, with respect to Ross' dialect (for not all 
speakers share his Judgments about (4,20)), structura.l complexity 
depends, to some extent, on the occurrence of the node S between 
discontinuous components, However, it appears that even though most 
speakers find (4 .19a) better than (4 .19c), some speakers find (4 ,20b) 
as acceptable, ·or even ·more aqceptable, than (4. 20a). This sugp;ests 
.that the length. as well as the number of nodes (i.e. • constituents 
and subconstituents), of the intervening material plays some role in 
determining its structura.l complexity, and the· dialect·aJ. d:i. rferences 
are presumably to be ascribed to the different· 1weip;hts' p;iven to 
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each coµtribu'i;ing factor in specific idi.olects. The situation is 
in fact even more complicated, for cert.ain speak~rs find (4.19b) 
intermediate in. acceptabiUty between (4.19a) and (4 ,19c), e,yeri 
thOU(?;h ~he a and the b-:sentences have roughly the.same length and 
number. of intervening nodes. Several explanations for this · 
disti11ction could. probably be found,. one of which could· b.e the 
higher degree of (perceptual} recoverability of the pruned s-node 
over from San Francisco as compared with the pruned $-node over 
unusually prettl. 
Clearly, a great deal more research must be undertaken before 
a satisfactory explication of the notion of structural c'omplexity 
is arrived at. In the remainder of section 4.2, I will.consider 
several cases vhich suggest that a principle like (4.21) must be 
incorp:orated into any effort to further explicate structural complexity. 
I 
(4.21} The structural complexity of a string is 
inversely proportional to its structural 
pre~ctability. · 
4.2.1. Con.trast (4.22a) and {4.22b). 
{4.22) a. John called the not very well liked but 
quite pretty girl on the next block where 
Jack I:ia.d lived for six years up. 
b. 	 Who do you think Macy told her friends·that 
she sav at the party? 
Most speakers find (4. 22b) considerably more e.ccepte.ble than (4. 22a.) . 
If one of the main factors which make discontinuities complex is 
the number of intervenin senience nodes, then it is not clear why 
sentences like .•22b should be better than (4 .• 22a), since there are 
more S-nodes between who and at the party in the surface structure of 
(4.22b) than between cal·led and ~ in the surface structure of 
(4.22a.). I believe the reason is that the structure of the interveninp; 
material in (4.22b) can be essentially described ~ith a. simple 
recursive pr~cedure, ~hile the intervening material in (4.22~) is 
not Slllenable to such tre~tment. In other words, the intervening 
material in (4. 22b) can be generated by recurs1vely a.pplyinr; the set 
of rules in (4 .23), while many more rules need to be specified for 
the generation of the intervening material in (4.22a). 
(4.23) (i) S ~ NP VP 
(ii) .VP -+ V NP 
(iii) NP + S 
Thus, to say that the pertinent material in (4,22b} is more predictable 
is to say that there are i'ewer unrelated structural relations betveen 
its subconstituents which a langUage perceiver must discover while 
holding the first member of the disi::ontinuity in memory. Consequently, 
the perceiver needs to carry out less processing on that material, 
and the burden on· hi.a immediate memory is a.lleviated., 
But. ~ne·i:n.ay ask ~t this point, how does the language perceiver 
know in !ldvance, at any point, that the incoming material will not 
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necessitate further processing, an9- that it can be taken care of, 
by and la.rge,·by reapplying. an already discovered procedure some 
number of times? The answer is th.at a language USl::!r, who has had 
a certain amount of experience wit_h language. has already extracted 
the generalization that some structures a.re recursively predictable 
while others are, not, Thus, the language user knows (by induction 
over experience,".or with the help.of innate mechanisms, or bOth) that 
structures like (4.22b) where the resolution of the discontinuity is · 
to be sought somewhere 'down the chain of.command' by a. procedure 
roughly-· iilte (4 . 23) are compiµ-at,iyely non-colllplex structur~s • and 
therefore possible .ones. Therefore·a hearer will project~ recursive 
structure of the ·appropriate form, and_, when scanning the linear 
signal, will experience much less difficulty if the s~cond member 
of the discontinuity occurs where predicted by the recurs_ive 
procedure. 
It is rather obvious that additional processing does affect 
acceptability. Thus, (4.24) or (4.25), in which the intervening 
material requires not only the recursive application of (4.23) but 
also some additional processing, a.re iess a.cceptable_than (4.22b). 
(4 .24) It's John who I believe Joe, Dick and Mary told 
the two guys who were in iov~ with Jill and 
Danna respectively that Bab hates most.· 
(4.25.) Who do you think my girl friend from Chicago 
suggested ta the boy who lives across the 
street that Jill laves best? 
Let us consider at this point Ross·• ~IC (see Chapter One) which 
claims that a chopped element must command,. its place of dep~rture ( in 
fact, this constraint applies not_ only ta ch_oppii;-ig, but to a:J-1 the 
situations in which th~ stronger island constraints apply, 1.e. , 
feature-changing, deletion under obligatory coreferentialiiy, semantic · 
neutralization, etc.). Ross hypothesized that the HIC is a universal 
fact about human languages, and, as far as I know, no counterexamples 
have been discovered. I.believe that the HIC can be at least in· 
part explained by (4 .21), since (as I shell argue in detail in 
section 4.4) the situations in which the various island constraints--
including -the HIC--hoid~ ii.re precisely the situations in which a 
structural discontinuity exists.· Notice then that the JIIC reduces 
the complexity of discantinuities ix:i at least two ways: ( i) by 
increasing the predictability of t~e interdiscantinuaus material 
through a recursive procedure, i.e., (4.23), and (ii) by me.kinP. it 
easier to predict the location of the second member of the discontinuity, 
as the latter needs· to be sought only down the. chain of command, 
rather than anywhere in the tree. 
In the remaining subse_ctioris of 4. 2, I will discuss several 
phenomena involving discontinui_ti~s in_ which the following situation 
obtains: 
(4.26) 	 Acceptability increa1:1es in proportion to the 
predictability of C"i) the structure of the 
interdiscontiriuous material, and/or 
(ii) the location of the second member of 
the discontinuity. 
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·· 4.2.2. In 2.1.3, I :proposed the perceptual .principle (2.83). 
{2. 83) Two interrupted .sentences . arii ·perceptually 
~om:pleX if ODE! of t,hem is at i~e.s.t in part 
int~rnal to the other. 
One of the ct;i.ses in which (2.83) takes effect concerns the RRC", 
wher~ there exist two discontinuities, such th!i.t the second is 
created by the resolution of the first. The difficulty is to 
resolve both discontinuities properly when the location.and/or 
structure of the second member of each discontinuity is not easily 
predictab~e, as in {4.27). In note 19 of Chapter Two, I argued that 
sentences like (4.28a) a.re much more accepte.bie ttlan (4.~7) because 
the former does .not satisfy (2.83), the interrupted sentences being 
all resolve4 simultaneously and none bei~g therefore internal to any 
of the others. 
{4 .27,) 'i?What I will tell the Jury that John thinks 
about tomorrow is his luscious mistress. 
(4.28) a. 
b, 
Mary cooked, John found, and Bill ate, the 
cake. 
John bought, Mary cooked, and Bill drank, 
a bicycle,~ cake, .~d a bottle of 
champaign respectively. 
The greater acceptability of {4.28a) with respect' to (4.28b} can 
be additionally illuminated by {4.26). ·Indeed, in {4.28a), as soon 
as the hearer has realized that Mag cooked is a maimed sentence, 
and that what roilows is coordinated to it, he will be able to 
predict that the following '.coordinate terms will e.11 be maimed in 
'parallel fashion' (in the sense of note 14, C~a.pte;,r Three), whatever 
their number. Also' .as (.:lle.imed by { 4. 27 i} ' the ~umber of in~errupted 
sentences will not seriously increase the complexity of the.inter-
discontinuous ma:terie.l, since 'J;he ,.latter is essentiµ,ly.· :e,redicte.ble 
by the recursive application of the rule X + X {. { ~dJ ) X. 
With respect to the requirement made by {4.26ii), the knowledge 
language users have a.bout the scope and nature of Coordination 
Reduction makes it possible.to predict that the resolution of the 
discontinuities will foJ,:low ii;mnei:liately upon the present·ation of the 
la.st ·maimed coordinate term. · · 
The most interesting case for ou,r purposes i.s {4.28b), since 
it violates (2 .83), the int.errupted sequences being separately 
continued, and. nonetheless it is much more acceptable than (b. 27) . 
Notice that in {4.281.i) the resolution of the various discontinuities 
is Just as predictable as in (4,28a.). Indeed, a sentence like (4,28a) 
arises when the ·elements moved by Coordlnation~Reduction are nll 
identical, a.nd a sentence like (4.28b) it.rises when the moved elemento 
a.re not all identical; in the latter cnse, ve cnnppredict that: (a) 
the resolution of the discontinuitieo will boa .constituent of the 
same kind as.the constituent formed by the lnterrupted sequences, 
namely, a coordination; (b) the two coordinations will have the arune 
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number of terms; (C) the disco_ntirn1itie~ wH_l be _resolved in the 
order 	in which: they were presented_, i.e. , ,the nth term of the first 
c_oordination will be re.solved by the nth term of the second 
coordination. 
Thus, we can see that considerations of predictab:ility can 
improve the a:cceptability of sequences which one would otherwise 
expect to be unacceptable (in the case of ( 4 • 28b) , in view .of 
(2.83)). 	 . 
4.2.3. The third phenomenon I shall consio.er ':Tith respect to 
· predictability is the SSC (Sentential Sbbj ect Coristr_aint) • Ross 
(1967, section 4.4~2) points out that th~ unacceptability of sentences 
in which the SSC has been violated is due, to a iarge extent, to the 
fact that the NP-over~s Constrain~ is also necessarily violated by 
the movement of the chopped constituent to the left of the headless_ 
sentential subJe·ct (he gives credit to G, La.koff for this observation). 
However-, Ross -also points out that the SSC is still necessary because 
violations of·the SSC, added to violations of the NP-over-S Constraint 
create slightly greater unacceptability than violations of the latter 
alone, I reproduce two of the examples with which he illustrates his 
claim below; in (4.290) and (4.30a), the NP-over-f. Constraint is 
v:iola.teci, in '(4.29c) and (4,30b), both th'e NP-oy~r-S Cons'traint and 
the SSC are violated. 
(4_.29) a. That I brought this hat seemed strange to 
the nurse, 
b.??The nurse 'who that I brought this hat seemed 
strange to was as dumb as a post. 
c, *The'hat which that I brought seemed stranr,e 
to the nurse was a fedora. 
(4 ,30) a.-??I 	deny that that McIntyre has some money is 
certain. 
b. 	*I deny that that McIntyre has any money is 
certain. 
A second reason mentioned by Ross for believing that combined 
violations of the SSC and the NP-over-S ·Constraint are worse. than 
violations of the latter alone has to do with the Nominality-Sentence-
hood scale (see Appendix Two). Thus, the NP-over-S Constraint is 
applicable when the internal constituent is a that- or for-to-clause, 
but not a gerundial' nominalization' or anythingeven mo;re nominal; 
the SSC, on the other hand, is applicable when the maimed subject is 
a that-clause, a for-:-to clause, or a gerundial. The contrast in 
applicability to ger'undials of' the two constraints is shown in {4,31a) 
and {4.31b) respectively. 
(4.31) a. Ia playing that piano all right with you? 
b. 	*That· piano·; which John's playing is offensive 
to me, is a SteinwEcy" grand, 
Thus, it seems that the applicability of the 8i::;c on top of the NP-over-
s Constraint extends the domain of the latter one further ntep towardn 
the nominality pole~ 
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The reduction in acceptability ·which (4.29).;.(4:.31) -indicate 
should ·be associated iith the, SSC; is' I suggest, ,clue to th~- fact 
that in structures in which the SSC has )>een vipla;t.ed', a si.mple 
recursive search procedure for the second member .of the discontinuity 
becomes inapplicable.; the result is greater psychological complexity, 
as predicted by (4.261::1.). Indeed, notice that the search for the 
slot of a constituent which has been chopped out of an object clause 
can proceed as follows: (a) search for the verb of the first clause 
which occurs in the intf:!r-discontinuous material (this has to be 
done in Eµl.Y c13.se ~. since the segmentati_cm .of sente~ces is .probably 
carried out, to a large extent, by comparing the number of expected 
arguments of the verb with what is actually present in the string); 
(b) move to the'right of the verb, and see whether the chopped 
element can be an argument of that verb; (c) if the answer to (b) is 
no, the verb has a clausal obj~ct; reapply step (a) to this clause,
and continue until (b) succeeds, ·The procedure outlined above 
moves to the right at every step; however, if the chopped element 
belongs in a subject, the procedure must look outside the recursively 
predictable areas. This step causes some perceptual complexity. 
An independe~t piece of evidence which supports my account of 
the SSC is provided by the ma.:l.mability of topicafized constituents,, 
which exhibit the same paradigm a!i subject.s with respect to the 
nominality scale, e.s can be seen by comparing (4.32) and (4~33). 
{4.32) a. *It •·s John who tllat you ki;t.led is clear. 
b. *It's John who for you to meet may be dangerous. 
c,. *It's John who meeting m~ prove dangerous. 
d. 	 It's John who the shooting of has become 
imperative. 
e. It's John who a picture of is in my pocket. 
{4.33) a. *It's John who that you killed yesterday the 
FBI finds incredible. 
b. 	*It's John who for you to meet at noon the 
FBI finds desirable, 
c. 	*It's John who meeting at noon the FBI regards 
as dangerous. 
d. 	{?)It's John who the shooting of in cold blood· 
t~e FBI has been too. ready to condone. 
e. 	{?)It's· Jqhn who a picture of taken on D.. day 
the FBI ha..s been trying- to obtain. 
Not all informants tolerate topicalization i~ embedded ~lauses, but 
those who do feet that the d and e sentences are considerably better 
than the remaining on:es in {4.33), Thus, for the speakers who 
agree with the judglll.ents in (4.32) and (4.33), an explanation is 
available on the grounds that the recursively predictive procedure I 
proposed above is vlolateg in the same way by the maiming of subjects 
or of topicalized constituents, Notice that th.ese two phenomena are 
not statable as one constraint in Ross' framework, since some mark 
over topicalized constituents (such as ADV, or TOP) is probably 
needed in order to dlstinguish formally between topicalized elements 
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and subjects; consequently; the explication of -(4,33) along ·Ross'\ 
lines would, in all probability, require an ad hoc constraint in 
addition to the SSC. 
An interesting pr_ediction that_'. my· account of the SSC makes is 
that the SSC is operative only in s'LU'f'.ace SVO languages, as it is 
only in such languages that argi.un~nts may be positioned on both sides 
of a verb, The languages in which Ross pointed out that the sr,c 
holds are in_deed SVO ones, w}:lile the only language he mentions in 
which the .SSC ~loes not hqld is japa.nese, an SOV language, ·The failure 
of the SSC to hold in Japanese is illustrated in (4.34). 
(4.34) 	 Joh~-ga suki ta to iu koto ga hakkiri shite iru 
John likes obvious 
so no uchi wa kiree da. · 
- house . pretty. 
*'The 	hquse whicb that John l!°kes :i.s obvious is 
pretty. 1 
Of course, no hypothesis can be regarded .as confinned on the 
basis of one language; but I have found two more languages in which 
the SSC fails to hold , .and they are both SOV. 
Tqus, Hankamer (1971) cites t~e following example from Turkish: 
(4.35) 	 Mehmedin yiyecegi ~upheli olan meyva. 
Mehmet Is going t() eat doubtful being fruit 
*'The fruit which that Mehmet will eat i_s doubtful.' 
The well-formedness of (3,35) is significant, for, as Hankamer points 
out, the Turkish rule of Relativization--which always operates by 
deletion, like the Japanese one~-is subject to the CNPC. 
The second SOV language which disobeys the SSC i~ Hindi. Hindi 
Relativization operates by movement toward the relative clause head, 
which usually precedes the clause,1. 
1rn fact Hindi suppqrts the claim made in Drachman (1970) that 
Relativization proceeds by copying and deletion. Thus, a ~ro-form 
may optionally be left behind, as (i) shows. 
(i) yo admi Jieke bareme betaiahe ~i ,r~} bimarke 
the man 	whom about I told you tke (he) sick 
Jacukahe, 
has left 
'The man about whom I told you is sick has left.' 
In ..addition, the relatiire .clause and its head· may be permuted, in 
which case, a copy must appear in the place of departure of the 
relative pronoun, as(ii) shows. 
(ii) jiske bareme beta.iahe ki .C: vo } bimarhe vo 
whom 	 about I told you thh-cne) sick is the 
ad.mi Jacuk.ahe • 
man has left . 
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The facts in (i) and (ii) require the ordering in (1ii): 
(iii) 	 .a. Relativ.e pronoun copying; 
,b. 	 Relative clause prepoi;ing (or, perha.ps •. relative 
head postposing) ; ' 
c. Copy deletion. 
Independently 'qf ordering considerations , the 'facts in (if and (ii) 
above are interesting, as they suggest that'surface structure cannot 
be distorted without limit; thus, if the optional· {iiib) applies, 
{iiic) is blocked, for the former creates decoding problems by 
causing the relative pronoun and the relative cl'ause head to be 
non-adjacent, and the .further perceptual difficulty vhich the 
deletion of the copy brings about can no longer be tolerated. 
Hindi Relativization is subject to the CSC, as shown in (4.36}. 
However • as sho,m by (4 • 37 ) ~ this rule is not subject to the SSC , 
(4.36) ttme la.rka deikta hii yiske ba.reme twnhe ·beta.la.he 
I 	 boy see whom about I told you 
ki John ketae.ke nehi pose.rid kerta a.or Mary 
that John books .dislike~ and Mary 
posand karti he 
likes 
*'I see.the boy about whom I told you that John 
likes books and Mary dislikes.' 
(4.37) 	 VO larks. jise Mary 'cumti he tik he VO bima:i" he, 
the boy vho Mary kisses g9od is he sic)I. is 
*'The 	boy who that Mary kisses is a good thing 
is sick. 1 
4.2.4. The fourth case I vish tp di~cuss concerns. the 
possibility of deriving (4.38b) and (4.38a) (see Ross (1967, section 
4.3)). 
(4.38) 	 a. The government prescribesthe height of the 
l~tt~ring on the covers of the reports. 
b. 	 Reports vhich the government prescribes the 
~eight-of the lette~ing on the covers of 
are invariably boring. 
AB I pointed out in section 3.2.4, sentences like (4.38b) 
constitute en apparent violation of the Subservient Satellite 
Constraint, as the moved element is not only a Sateliite, but also 
an element of some other Satellite(s). By usitlg (4.26)~ we may 
expec't to explain the possibility of violating the Subservient 
Satellite Constraint in this case, since the ititerdiscontinuous 
materiel. is indeed predictaple by a simple recursive procedure 
roughly like (4. 39). 
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(4.39) 	 NP -+ NP NPci [where the subscript on the second 
NP on the right of the arrow is an ad hoc 
abbreviation-to which no theoretical. signifi-
cance should be attached indicating that thnt NP 
is a ·dependent of'the preceding one]. 
This procedure is exceedingly simple, since it predicts a chain of 
NP-'s.- each of which is a dependent of the NP immediatety to its left. 
We may a:Lso hope that (4.26) will explain the difference in 
acceptability between pairs like that in (4.40) (which have already 
been brought up in discussions of adverbials). · 
(4.40) 	 a. The car which a reporter mentioned the scene 
of the cra~h of was a new Mustang. 
b. 	*The car which .a reporter found Mary at the 
scene of the crash of was a new Mustang. 
Indeed, in both (4.40a) and (4.40b) we find a chain of NP's, in 
which every non-extreme NP is a Satellite of the NP to its left and 
a Nucleus of the NP to its right; but only in (4.40b) this whole _ 
chain of NP 's is· in turn a Satellite of a· sentence, namely. a reporter 
found Mary. Thus , we may claim that even though both sentences 
exhibit a right..;branching chain i!'l which each pair of adjacent 
constituents exhibits the Nucleus-Sateilite relation, it is only in 
(If ,40a) that each Nucleus-f>atellite pair is of the same kind; in 
(4. 40b) , the highest pair has the structure I S ADV], while the 
lower ones have the structure CNP NPJ. Thus, it is only in (4.4oa) --' 
that the chain of N & S 1 s can be enumerated with ~ recursive 
procedure. 
We have so ,far established that (4 ,38b) differs from other 
instances, in. which the viola~ion of the Subservient Satellite 
Constraint results in 'Unacceptability, in that the maimed N & S 
is here recursively enumerable by one procedure; we have also 
established that the difference in acceptability between (4.40a) and 
(4.40b) correlates with the recursive predictability of the former, 
but not of-the latter, with one procedure. However, in order to 
explain these facts, it is not sufficient to recognize th.at p;reater 
predictability requires less ·processing, and therefore less strain 
on immediate memory; sonie of the reasons· are: 
(a) Neither in (4.40a) nor in (4.40b) does the recursively 
predictable material constitute the whole of the inte_rdiscontinuoua 
material, and the process1ng of .the latter requires more than one 
procedure in both cases. It seems that the crucial difference 
between the two sentences lies in whether the cha.in of N &: S's, 
rather than the whole of the interdiscontin·uous material, ls recur-
sively predictable with one.procedure. 
(b) As we shall see in 4.4, the unacceptability of structures 
which violate the Subservient Sateliite C6ns"traint cannot be (entirely) 
attributed to the structural complexity of the interdiscontinuous 
material and considerations of memory-load. To see this, we need 
only consider the difference in acceptability between (4.41a) and 
{4;4lb). 
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(4.41.) . a. What did I tell· you Bi.11. l;kes? 
b. 	:ltwhat did I teil you Bill likes and Mary 
hates potatoes? 
In 	(4.41a) apd (4.4ib)., the interdiscontinuous material is identical, 
and therefore equally ·Complex to process~ but only the.latter 
exhibits a v:iola.tiori of the Subservient Satellite Constraint. 
·similarly, in (4 .42 )_, the only element occurring in the inter-
discontinuous ·ma.teria;l wh.ich creates un~ccepte.bility is the head NP 
the.claim. . 
(4.42) Who did you hear (*the claim) that John loves? 
.But the head 	of a coll!,plex NP need not occur between the discontinuous 
components. T.hus, in Japanese, the. head of a complex NP follows the 
modifying clause, though leftward migration of elements of that 
clause 	by Topi.calize.tion is out, as shown by (4.17d, e) and (4.17f, g). 
(4.17) 	 d.(•)otto "!a, wataln1si va. ltono boosi o ks.butte 
otto I this hat wearing 
it~ to iu syutyoo o sinzita • 
. w~ tp.s.t say claim believed,, 
*'Otto,. I believe~ the claim was. wearing this 
\hat.' 
e. 	 Watakusi va otto ga kono bdosi o kabutte ita 
I otto this ·hat wearing was 
t.o iu syutyoo o sinzita, 
that say claim believed. 
'I believed t~e claim that Otto was wearinr. 
this hat. 
f. Kore was 	Mary ga.kabutte- ita koto ga akiraka 
This Mary wee.ring was thinp, obvious 
no boosi de.. 
is hat is 
'Thia 	is the hat vhich it is obvioun that Mn:ry 
. W~ wearing. I 
g. *Mary va, 	kore :wa. kabut~e ita koto p;a akirawa 
Maey this wearing was thing obvious 
na 	boosi da. 
is hat is 
*tMary, 	this is the hat vhich it is obvious was 
lies.ring. 1 
N(?tice al.so _that in (1.36c), the adverl;>ial read:l,.ng of I suppose  
is out, due to the Subservie,nt $atellite Const;ra:lnt, but the Hucleus  
(John is sick) is not part of the interdiscontin~ous material (there  
is' in fact, nq. d:l.scont:inuity here). .  
(I, 36) . c. It' .a me who ;;upp<:>ses tha~ John is sick. 
I conclude that the facts of predictability uncovered. in relation 
to (4.38) and (4.40), even though probably relevant to the data at 
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issue, cannot provide~ explanation pased solely on considerations 
of memory-load, and that something like the following suggests itself: 
(4.43) 	 A recursive procedure does not generate 
significant riew relations beyond those that 
result from· one of its a,ppli<:ations. 
What (4.43)--whose stateme11t should undoubtedly be further 
constrained--purports to say is intuitively c:j.ear: (4.39) generates 
a se~ond NP which bears the reiat~on "nominal ·complement of" to the 
first NP, and no matter how many times the procedure applies~ the 
lower nominal complements will still.be percelved as w.m,iruiJ.._comple.::. 
m.E:nts~ only, not as____p__arts of 11highxft~''.,_p,omifal complemep:tJ;1; in· some 
sense, the application of the procedure (.39) cannot generate new 
relations Just because it has applied more than once. This is what 
we would expect if the structural hYJ)othesis about chains like the 
covers of the reports and the heisht of the lettering On the·cover3 
of the reports is made essentially in the ·s9JJ\e way~ i.e., by~ 
r::ocedure in both cases, The gist of the m.atter is that, p;iven (4. 43) , 
1, ,39) and (4.4oa) are felt as instances of Satellite;...choppinp;, but 
not Of Satellite maiming. On the other hand, the moved·constituent 
in(4 .40a) is both a Satellite of the type 'nominal com.rlement of 
NP' and part of' a Ga.tellite of .the type 'optional adverbial'. There-
fore-:-f4 • 40b) , but not (4. 4oa) :, constitutes a violation of the 
Subservient Satellite Constraint, because the right-branching chain 
of N & S's is.not recursively enumerable with a single procedure, as 
reci.uired by (4.43). · 
We can now reconsider ·the dis.cuss ion in 4. 2 .1, in the light of 
(4 .43). (4 .2.2b) ,suggests that an ;bJe.ct c;mpiement clause can be 
maimed, regardless of its 1 depth 1 • In .other words, a compiement 
clause 'feels the same' regardless of whether it was generated by 
one application of (4.23) or more than one application, so that both 
(4. 22b) and. ( 4 .44) a.re perceived as instances of maiminp; of. complement 
clauses and not of instances of maiming of different kinds of clauses. 
· (4.44) It's 	John I believe.Jill loves best, 
It is tempting, on the basis of the above facts, to proroae a. · 
universal principle like (4.45). 
(4.45) 	 If a discontinuity can involve a constituent of 
type C generated by one application of a 
.recursive 	procedure PR, it can also involve 
a constituent of type C generated by any 
number of uninterrupted applications of PR. 
I do not, at this stage, firmly propos~ (4.45) as a universal of 
language, since I do not quite know·how to account for counterexamples 
like (4 ~46). 
(4.46) 	 a. John is upset [because Mary left him [because 
he is crazy]].· 
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(4.46) b. · It's because Mary left him because. he is 
.crazy tha.t ·~o~n is upset. · 
c. It's because lle is crazy that John is upset 
oecause Mary left him ... 
(4.46a) is a. chain of' right-branching. N & S's generated by a recursive 
procedure (tqat the procedure is indeed recursive ca.n be seen by 
ci:mtfo.ui1>,g C.4 .46e.) as •.•.because he fell on his. head recently because 
soinebo tri · .ed him .•. ). Because-clauses can be ~lefted, as :shown 
lly • b , a 'cleft coiinterpa,rt' of. (4.46a). ii~:rwever,. (4,46c) is 
not a Cleft COU[iterpart .Of (4. 46a) , as the clefted constituent CM 
~m,l..y l;,e understoo.d as modifying John is upset because Mary left him, 
but not. Mary left him! . 
It. appear!:! that the iower because-,.clause in (4;~6a) is felt as 
a part of a Satellite, not Just as a Satellite. Obviously. (4.46a) is, 
in some sense, different from the source or ·,4 .22b )' or f'rom {4. 38a) , 
but stating the dif,ference in a satisfactory way is no eal:l;f task. One 
di fferentia.iing factor .could be the .fact th~t the string in (4. 46~) , 
unlik~ the source of (4.22b) or (4,38a), is p9t~ntial.ly ambiguous 
in ~Y ways, sin.ce any of the because·-clauses can be understood as 
modifyl~g,not .Just the clause immediat~iy to its left; but any of th~ 
clauses to its left in the chain. Some of these pos~ibilities are 
not realized when a clause other than the 01_1e immediately to the right 
of·the main clause is clefted, since clauses modifying the same clause 
are logically co.ordinated, an9 clefting: one of· them is prohibited 
uy the CSC. However, in ( 4 .• 46c), at least two readings are theoreti-
cally possible: the clefted constituent logically modifien either 
Jotm is upset becau(!e Mary left him or Mary left him. If it can be 
!U'v.ued that th!>' .fqrmer reading is psychologically more complex than 
the ~atter (after all, the former is ~learly more complex even in 
.(4.4Ga), since it requires us to under,stand that John ia upset for a 
very :;ipecial ree,.son, that ii;;, that Mt;U"y left him l:iecause he is crazy, 
not Just that she left him; this kind of complexity .increases consider-
ably as the chain is lengthened), then we are faced with a 1trans-
derivational constraint situation' similar to the one discussed in 
2.2.4.1 in connection with Perlmutter'·s a woman hit a girl who was 
pregnant; in other words, the resolution of a discontinuity is waived 
when the optiot) of .a le.ss complex, interpretation is available. 
In all probability, these facts a.re only a "Partial explanation 
of the non-existence of a transformational relation between (4 ,46a) · 
and (4. 46b). In .:any event, I am hopeful that when a l;latisfactory 
explanation becomes available; it will be possible to uphold (4.45) 
as a universal .of language, the non~derivability of (4.46c) from a 
structure i1_1corporating (4.46a) being then attributable to well 
sµpported independent factors,· 
4 .2, 5, Before concluding section 4 .2,. which hae been esaentinlly 
conce,;ned with. tqe effect ofpredictab~lity on structural complexity, 
it is perhapn worthwhile to illustra~e the followinp; rather o1,vloun 
11oint: no complexity ,C in fact, .no structural cons trainta of nn.v kind) 
ehould aria.c when the frii,me in whicll .a discontinµi ty is emh"dded ls 
:itructurally irrelevant, 'l'hus, consider (4.47). 
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('4.117) a. Somebodyi met a man .who. loves 'someone ' s j wife. 
b. Who rqet:a inan who loves .someone.'s yife? : 
c. *Who inet a man who loves ·whose wife? 
.d. Who met a man. who ;Loves Bill's wife? 
We notice that (4.47b) but not (4.47c), can be derive_d from (4.47a). 
The reason is .that in (4.4Jc) a feat:ure-cha.nging rule--wh-ple.cement--
viol'e.tes the Subservient Satellite Cc;mstraint. However-,-(4.47c) is 
all right asan echo-question, when the interlocutor has said some-
thing like (4 •. 47d) and the speaker of (4.47c) did not catch t.he word 
Bill; or as an incredulity-question, when the speaker finds it he.rd 
to believe that his interlocutor should ask that question about 
Bill 1·S Wife . (possibly because he kllOjol'S that she has been deaq. for 
many years, or-that Bill is a bachelor, etc.). Ol?serve, however, that 
echo- or incredulity-interpretations of (4 .117~), the >!'hole s1;ructure 
except for whose is structure.Hy irrelevant, ,;ts it is only supplied 
as a, framework for the hearer to·be. abie to pinpoint the object of 
the illocutionary ·force (request to repeat a phrase, .or expression of 
surprise at the presuppositions of that phrase respectively). As the 
structural frame is not intended for processing, we are confronted 
with the limiting case of structural non.,-complexity; namely, 
structurai irrelevance; and consequently no coQstr~ints of the kind 
discussed in this thesis obtain. 
A similar _situation arises in the case of the so-called 
'exwnination-type questions', ~hat is, questions which are not 
genutne requests for information--since the spealt~r knows the answer, 
and his pµrpose in asking them is only to test his interlocutor's 
knowledge. Stich questions can.violate island constraints, as shown 
·by ( 4 .li7e). 
(li.li7) e. Napoleon was ,a French general who invaded 
which country. 
The grammaticality of (4. 4 7 e) on the examination-read_ing is 
explainable in essentially the .s_BJDe way as its grammat_icality on the 
echo- or incredulity-reading. Indeed, everything in (4.li7e) except 
for the underscored part is assµmed to be conunon knowledge to both 
examiner and exa.minee; I suggest that the non.,-unders~ored part of 
(4.47e) is in fact part of the answer expected of the examinee 
(which the .examiner provides since it is known anyhow), and the 
illocutione.ry force .of the utterance is aomethin(T, like I complete 
the following answer by fitting the correct phrase in place of the 
one marked with a wh-feature'. Again, the nop~underscore9 portion 
functions as a framework, rather thap material,, meant tp he processe<l. 
4.3. This section is devoted to the Subservient flntell:1,.te 
Constraint. ~~or reasons made clear, ,below, the explanation will be 
based on conflict, rather than on interrupted behavior, 
We have already seen tn 4.2.4 that the unacceptability found 
in instances of violation of the Subservient Satellite Constraint 
cannot very well be attributed to the st.ructural complexity. of the 
interdiscontinuous material, since the material on which unacceptability 
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.could be blamed ( that ·.fs, .the Nucleus).· i·s not riecessa.rily part of 
the· intera.iscontinuous m.ateriaL Moreover, it is. implausibie that /: 
the occt4"rence of~ short:,a.rid struc~ure.lly simple.Nucleus like the 
fa.ct or the claim could.place a.load on memory sufficient to·make.all 
the difference between acceptability and unacceptability. 
The first obJection presented a!)Ove is comparatively. easy to 
talte care or.. Thus, rather t.he.n regard .the Nucleus as the 
unpermissible 1 fotervening .material I, We shall attribute that status 
to the N &: s node, by extending the riotion iritervene to apply not 
only to· the linear, but also to the vertical, dimension. (thus, ve 
say that a node A vhich dominates B but not C intervenes between B 
and c). We can see that regardless of the relative.linear ordering 
of the Nucleus and the .satellite, violations of the Subservi~_nt 
Satellite Constraint. vill ahra.;y:s cre!:1,te. a discontinuous S!3,tellite 
vith an intervening N·&Snode, as the element external to the 
Satellite is by definition outside the dominance .or the N .& s ·node. 
Concerning the isecond objection, . I conclude that the complex!ty 
of interrupted behavior can indeed not be regarded as essentially 
responsible for the Subservient Satellite Constraint, and that a more 
plausible account can be given in terms of perceptual conflict. 
Specifically, I propose that the following principle is (at least in 
part} responsible .for the SubservieQt Satellite Constraint: 
(4.4e) A stimulus may not be perceived as simultaneously 
having ~j\2!iimalJ,y~ conflicting values on the 
same classificatory scale. 
In: the Introduction, I pointed out that a generalization like (4.49) 
would constitute a near-truism, and therefore hardly present any 
interest; as ce.n be seen, (4,48) is considerably more specific than 
(4.49} (this was also true of the conflict principie (2.23)). 
(4.49) Conflicting percepts a.re complex, 
Before showing how the Subservient Satellite Constraint follows 
from (4.48), I will briefly argue that such a principle is inde-
pendently needed for linguistic phenomena. Consfder Langa.cker's 
restriction on the occurrence of pronouns: 
(4 .50) A pronoun may- not bear fil relevant primacy 
relations to its antecedent. 
The relevant scale here is one of relative ema.nci;ee.tion. Thus, when 
some notion or referent occurs more than once, on~ occurrence is 
usually regarded as 'primary' while the others are regarded as 'mere 
repetitions 1 • 'rhe primary occurrence CM he identified ln at least 
two ways: positionally e.nd morpholop;ically~ The positionnl rele.tiono 
involve the two available dimensions:~ ~cede, for the hor Izontal 
dimension, nnd commv.nd, for the vertical one (to conv,if.nce ournelvea 
thn.t the relation command expresses n p;enuine psyctxoiop;ica.l renlity • 
we may think of asymmetrically commanding elements as analop;ous to 
commanding officers in a. military unit; the p,ramma.tically irrelevant 
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relation 1higher up in the tree.than' is analogous to the l!iilita.rily 
irrelevant one 'superior.officer of'). In most situations, both 
positional relations are r.eleva.nt; in symmetric coordiriations, only 
precede is, as the terms ar~ hiera.rchica.l equals bf one another. 
In both situations, when all the ·positional evidence points in .one 
direction, the morphoiogical ~vidence cannot point in the opposite 
direction, which is precisely what (4.50) says formally. Observe, 
h.owever, that partial conflict is, if riot ideal, at lea.st tolerable. 
Thus, (4,51a), in which the morphological evidence is contra.dieted 
by the horizontal, but not vertical, evidence, is an acceptable 
sentence, although perhaps less felicitous than (4,51b), in which no 
conflict 'obtains. 
(4.51) a. The man who said that he loves her announced 
yesterday that he would marry Julie soon. 
b. The man who said that he loves Ju~ie announced 
yesterday that he would marry h~r soon. 
In all probability, (4.50) is a gr~tiza.tion of (4.48), and 
thus provides internal evidence in its favor. I do not know of 
specific corroborating experimental evidence (the complexity of 
conflicting percepts has, of course, .already been studied extensively). 
In arguing in favor of (4.52), in fact, a weaker subcase of (4.48), 
Bever (1970) mentions supporting evidence from vis.ual perception. 
(4.52) 	 A stimulus may not be perceived as simultaneously 
having two positions on the same classificatory 
dimension. 
Bever argues that (4, 52) is responsible for the complexity of multiple 
cente~-embedding, of triple negation; of cha.ins of recursively right-
.or left-branching N & S I s, etc. I do not believe that (4. '.32.) is 
soieiy .responsible for the unaccep.tability of the constructions Hever 
considers, .as those constructions differ sharply in degree of 
acceptability (for some .arguments tha.t independent factors a.re 
involved see 2,1.3), Hevertheless, (4.52) does seem to be at least 
partly responsible for the complexity of triple negation, where the 
medial nega.tlve is both 'negator' and 1nega.tee', or for ·the (rather 
faint, in my opinion) complexity of the picture of the O'lo/11er of the 
house, where the o'lo/11er is a. dependent of the picture b'1t the head of 
the house,' (4.52) is undoubtedly a much weaker restriction than 
(4.48), since it Involves a.n apparent, rather than a real, conflict; 
indeed, the medial element in the ca.sea Bever considers is emancipated 
wtth respect to some element and downgraded with respect to another 
element, the only problem being that the two (or more) pairs of 
elements a.re Judged with respect to the same relation; in contrast, 
in cases which violated(4.50), an element (the pronoun) is both 
maximally emancipated and maximally downgraded with respect to the 
same element (the antecedent),8 Consequently, it is to be expected 
81l'he definition I proposed for symmetric coordinate terma 11s 
bidirectional N & S 1s (when there ~re two term~) does~! predict 
.., 184 -
thi:i:~ :symmetric co.ordinations are complex, as (4.48). is not appli-
cable. Indeed, I did not propose tliat·the teriµs are-simultaneously 
perceived as Nuc_lei (emandpated) .and (Satellites (downgraded), 
but rather ·that we can look at · symmetric cciordinaticms in a.s .rilany 
ways ... :~rferently. in the ._..r,. strueture.Fare[ ~~;. 
X1 is Nucleus and X2 is Satellite, but we know that for each such 
structure there is a synonymous one differing structurally from this 
one only in that X2 appears in the posi-tion occupied by x1 and vice 
versa. 
that violations of (4. 48) will be much more severe than violationn of 
(4. '.>2) , and that gr811U'!atizations of the· former will in general occur. 
Having established the psychological reality of (1,. 48) in 
language perception, we turn to the relation between (4.48) and the 
S~bservient Oatellite Constraint, 
Hierarchical relations among coastituents also exhibit a scale 
of relative emancipation, as we have seen coreferents do. ln enq.o-
centric constructions in general, the head bears a primacy relation 
to its dependents, which we shall call the relation of centrality. 
In N & S's, the Nucleus is not only central, but also self-sufficient, 
since the Satellite, unlike other types of dependents, is not a partner 
in the N & S, but an optional addition; we shall say that the Nucleus 
be.a.rs to the Satellite the relation of sufficiencY.:_, These two 
relations transfer quite naturally to -the N & Snode in relation to 
the Satellite, the latter being non-central and non-essential with 
respect to the former. Let non-centrality end nori-essentialness be 
status relations. Then in terms of such status relations, a Satellite 
is maximally downgraded with respect to its N & Snode. 
Let us now consider what the psychological import of a discon-
tinuous Satellite is, when the N & Snode intervenes in the sense 
defined above. In a situation of that nature, the structural 
arrangement is such that the well-formedness of the Satellite is not 
decidable withm~t taking the external element into account; in other 
words, the structural integrity of the Satellite ·depends on somethinp; 
else than the N &Snode or the.material it dominates. Thus, on the 
scale of structural emancipation, the relevant status cues suggest 
that the Satellite is wholly dependent on the N & Snode, while the 
structural,-integrity cues suggest the opposite; hence, a conflict 
which results in complexity, as (4.48) predicts. 
Despite superficial differences, the Subservient Satellite 
Coµstraint is quite similar to La.ngacker's constraint on pronominalt-
zation, In both cases, total conflict is unacceptable and partial 
conflict is not. Thus, analor,ous to t,he accept,abili t,y of .( 4, 5.la) , we 
find the endocentric constituent VI', which may consist of a verb and 
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a complement .clause (as well as other elements· not relevant to our 
discussion); .iii such a case; the.dependent, i.e •. , the complement 
clause, is non-central vith respect to the. VP· node, but .it .is not 
.nqn-essential; consequently, the matming·of the complemeri~ clause is 
permissible. 
Notice that the conflict between status and integrity facts 
which ari-ses due to violations of the Subservient Satellite Constraint 
cannot arise when the.whole Satellite· has been chopped, Indeed, as 
the Satellite does ·not exist t!nder· .the domination of the N & S node, 
it is patent .that its structural integrity cannot be decided on the 
be.sis of the Z11ateriaJ. dominated by the N & Snode, and the opposite 
assumption does not arise. · 
Before conciuding this section; it should be pointed out age.in 
that violations of the Subservient Satellite Con;,traint are not 
always observable from surface structure; this fact has always been 
recognized, und it led Ross to his claims about rule ordering (Hoss 
(1967)), and later scholars to the reformulation of the various 
island constraints as global ones. At least four cases can arise 
in which the surface atructure does not contain all the necessary 
infor.mation; they are illustra.ted in (4,53)-(4,56) below. 
(4.53) *It's Mary who I believe what you told. 
(4.54) *This the girl I saw a boy who likes. 
(4.5~) *It's Mary who a boy just left who likes. 
(4. ~6) (?) I am aware of .the fact that you like someone, 
but I don't know who. 
In (4.53), the intervening N & Snode.is not obyiously present in 
surface structure, since the Nucleus has been de·leted; in (4.54), the 
external element which forms one end of the discontinuity (the 
rel11tive pronoun) has been deleted; in (4.55), it is not obvious· we 
ure dealing with an N & fi, as the Nucleus and the Gatellite nre 
non-adjacent; finally,, in. (4.. 56), the whole N & G is absent, the 
only sup,geation of a discontinuity at some level being the external 
clemcn t who. In the first three cases,- the degree of .unac·ceptauil1t.y 
i.s essentially the same as i,n the corresponding overtly clear cases  
(in fact, (4.55) is probably worse, in view of the difficulty  
involved in integrating a double discontinuity); in the last case,  
unacceptability i.s considerably reduced for most speakers, and non- 
existent for some speakers.  
· negarding (4.53), I argued nt length in 4.1.3,1.that the  
reconstruction of heads on the basis of the double function of  
words like wh-forms is a highly efficient strategy~ and therefore  
the hearer will have, in all probability, reconstructed the N & 8  
node at the point at which integration is attempte9,.  
Concerning (4.54), it is not realiy true that the external  
element is invisible; instead, the external element is now the head  
of the relative clause (the girl), rather than the wh~pronoun which  
could have appeared next to it. The situation is similar to the one  
found with Japanese relative clauses, where the relative pronoun is  
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alvays invisible (in 4.4, I shall argue th&t the (iistiriction betveen 
Japa,n,e.se and EnglJshJ.s a trivial oneL 
With respect to (4. 56) , · the imp:rovemer1t. in. accepta.biiity due to 
the disapp~arence of most of the N & S (as vell as of additional 
material •. in certain cases). deserves a separat~ study:, which I have 
not unde:r:-ta.ken. . The first temptation' is to say that· speakers do not 
necessarily interpret (4.56) by reconstructing the whoie o:f the 
deleted Diaterial, but in. some ad hoc way,. by appending something like 
he is at the end of (4.-56}~ .Another possibility would be t'o assume 
that.even if the d~leted material is reconstructed, it need not be 
reconstructed with a deletion site in place of the moved element; 
but rather with a pronomin!tl copy (we recall that copying rules.are 
not· subject to t:he Subs.ervient Satellite Constrai~t). Chomsky (1970b) 
sugg~sts that 'understoqd material 1 ·~s in (4. 56') should be interpreted 
by 'compositional semantics' , rather than. by· postulati"ng a deletion. 
This pr.oposal, lilfe the guesses I hav~ made above, is insufficiently 
elaborated on to be amenable ·to discussion. 
Any serious proposal along the above lines should.explain why 
.forbidden operations wh,foh 'take place inside deleted strings I some-
times cause unacceptabilities .and sometimes do not. Thus, unaccept-
abilities due to violations of Cross-Over a.re still felt when the 
evidence that ther.e ha.a been a permutation of coreferents ia no 
· longer present in the string, as shoyn by (4.57). 
(4.57) 	*Mary was hit by Billi, but hei wasn't Chit 
b;.y himselfi J. 
It might be suggest,ed that there is no way in which · composi t.ional 
semantics could reconstruct the bracketed pa.rt of (4.57) "'ithout 
producing a co~eferent of !1~:i , while the missing string i~ . ( 4. 56) can 
be reconstructed without actually producing a maimed island. But 
W1til more pertinent data are consinered and until these vague 
proposals are:made precise, there is little point in further 
speculation. 
4. 4 • In Chapter One, I mentioned Ross• obs.ervation that 
certain rules do obey his isla.nd-constre.ints, while others do not. 
His statement, which I called the Dichotomous Behavior Principle (DDP), 
is reproduced below. 
(1. '.>2) · Chopping rules, feature-changing rules, and 
unidirectional rules of pronominalization 
obey the constraints; bidir~ctional rules 
of pronominalization and copying rules do 
not. 
have pointed out i.n various places in this thesis that the DBP is 
inadeq~ate for ·at least the .following two reasons: 
(4 .58) a. Island constraints cannot ,be restricted 
to transformations. 
b. Ross' distinction between unidirectional 
and·bidirectional pronominalization is 
both false and misleading. 
I 
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In relation to (4.58), Ross' distinction is false, because he 
attributes the unaccepta.bi1i ty ·of (4, 59) to the fa.ct that VP--
Dele:tion ( a·bidir.ectiona.l rule) goes into a comnlex NP (as we have · 
s~en, deletion is. in fact irrelevant), · 
(4.59) *John .(is t~ler tlJ,an} I kno:w a boy who is. 
·. las tall a.s 
Furthermore, Ross' distinction is mislea:ding because it misses 
the point tha.t deletion rules are sub~ect to island-constra~nts if 
and only if. there is an obligatory identity condition between the 
'deleter' and .the 1deletee'. The Japanese rule of Relativization is 
a ca,se in, point' and some of the rules· of 'unidirectional pronominal-
ization' Ross mentions cons~itute illustrati.ons of the sam~ principle. 
The ru+es illustrated in (4.60) are particularly interesting because 
the coreferentiality condition between the underscored elements in 
(4 .60a) and (4.• 60b) is invited, in the sense of Geis and Zwicky 
( 1971 ) , rather than real. 
(4.60) 	 a. This ·rock is too heavy for me to -try to 
help Bob to pick (it) up. 
b. 	 'f'he socks are ready for you to put (them) 
on. 
'l'he inference-inviting factor in coristr.uctions like those in 
(4,. 60) is the fact that the for-to :claus.es are I resultative 1 • in 
the sense that 'the .events or state .of affairs eXpressed in them must 
be a consequence of the state of affairs ~xpressed in the main 
clause. Consider, for example, (-4. 61) .· 
(4 ,61) a, This rock is too heavy for John to try to 
lift the table, 
b. 	 The so.cks are ready for you to put on the 
bathrobe, 
Upon being presented with .sentences like (lL6la) or (4.61b}, many 
irifonnants reject them as semantically incoherent. However, when 
some of the unexpressed assumptions are pointed out to them, they 
realize that the. sentences in .question are semantically well-fanned, 
'l'hus, if it is assumed that John is bea;rinp; the. rock on his shoulders 
while trying to lift the table, (4.61) makes perfect sense; the state 
of affairs expressed in the for-to clause now follows from that 
assumption in conjunction 'With the proposition expressed by the main 
clause, Similarly, if we imagine a culture in which one is rorbidden 
to put on a bathrobe unless a pair of socks hangs from the chandelier, 
the for-to clause of (4.61b) follows from that piece of pragmatic 
information in conjunction vith the main clause, and the whole 
sentence becomes entirely coherent. 
It should be noted that, while the for-to clauses in (4,61a) or 
(4.61b) do not contain a coreferent of the rock or the sock 
respectively, coreferents of these phrases must show up in the 
pragmatic presuppositions of the two sentences, which we may formulate 
I 
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.as {4.Glc) and (4.614) respectively.· 
(4,Ql) c. John is .bearing the .ro.ck on his shoulders. 
d. The· socks· m.ust hang from the chandelier 
before one is entitled to put on a 
·bathrobe.· 
do not see how the pertinent .assumptions of (4f61a) and (4.61b) 
could be coherently formulated unless they contain an.occurrence of 
,the rock or the socks respectively. Conse,quently, a coreferentiality 
con.dition must be satis:fied at some level for sentences like (4 .6oa} 
and ( 4.60b-) or· (:4. 6ia) and,,. ( 4. 61b f to make sense. . In the absence 
of assumptions like (4.61c) and (4.61d), a hearer assumes that the 
necessary connection between the main for-to clause in sentences 
like (4.6oa) and (4.60b) will be made explicit in the actual string, 
and expects a cor.eferent ·of the subject of the main clause to show 
up in the for-,.;tO clause, Put differently• the r.eisulta.tive character 
of the for-to clause strongly invites the infez:ence that it Yill 
contain a coreferent of the subject of the main clause. This invited 
infer:~nce is sufficj.ent to cause the rule which may delete the 
coreferent inside the for-to clause ·to be subject to essentially9 
9ti.. Zwicky informs me that the deleted versions of the a.-
sentences in (4.62) and (4.63) are o:ut for him, but that the c-
s~nte~ces are marginal, while .the b~ones are OK, I don't know 
what to make of this fact, except assume that the obligatocy 
coreferentia.lity condition may be less strong for some speakers 
when it is only invited; hovever, I dq not know how to account for 
the gradations in acceptability with:in the above paradigms which 
Zwicky reports. 
the same constraints as rules which delete a coreferent under strictly 
lin@istic conditions of obligatocy coreferentiality. such as 
Japap.ese Helativization. Ross (1967) illustrates the point vith 
respect to the first part of the CSG, and the LBQ .and the BSC, in 
the case of the lieletion rules manifested :tn (4.60); as noqe.of these 
·constraints are subcases .of my 8ubseI7"v~ent ,Satellite· Constr/3.int, J 
provide pertinent illustrations in (4.62) and (4.63), A parallel 
paradigm is constructed for Japanese Relati!ization in (4 .64). 
(4.62) a. The rock is too heavy for me to believe that 
a. boy 	.rilling to pick [•it } up exists • 
b. 	 Thls rock is too heavy for me to both lift 
Mary and pick 't~} up. 
c. 	 This rock is too heavy :for me.to believe that you 
broke your back in lifting t~J up, 
\ 
b. 
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. (4 ,63) a. The bathrobe is ready :for you to ·find a ~irl 
willing _to put fit ] on. 
ready for you to simultaneously 
off and put your-socks on. 
c. The bathrobe is ready for you to ·get decent 
by puttin~r*it J on. 
(4.64) a. *Suki ~a onno no ko ga sotta teel:>ur\l wa Tookyoo 
Likes 	 giri left table tokio 
ni aru. 
in is 
* 'Th_e table which the girl who likes left is in 
Tokyo.'. 
b. 	*John waMa.ry ga suki de, Jim ga suki na onna 
John Mary likes ,Jim likes 
no ko ma kiree da. 
girl pretty 
*'The 	girl who John like3 Mary and Jim likes 
is p;re.tty, ' 
c ~ *John ga suki ta kara Took:yoo e itta. onne. no ko 
John likes becaµse Tokio to went P,irl 
we. okotte iru. 
mf!,d is 
*'The girl who John went to Tokyo becauo~·he 
loves is mad, 1 
It can be seen that (4,(52)..,.(4.64) and (4.59), which Ross lumped 
together a_s .unidirectional pronominalization phenomena, are essentially 
different; thus, unacceptability. arises in the latter case independently 
of deletion, while in the former, ~ t ari~es only whe_n deletion, not 
merely pronominalization, has applied, Al.so, ~oss' only reason for 
rega.rMng the deletion phenomen~ in (~.6b).:.(4.64) as unidirectional 
is that the complement clause of heavy or ready apparently cannot he 
preposed; but, by the same token, there is no re·ason for claiminr: 
that the rule which allows a non-null pro-form in the above examplen 
is bidirectioiuil., and if it is not, then non-null and null pronominal i-
zation appear to behave differently,. Notice that Ross Cf!.nnot claim 
tha_t that rule of non-null pronominalization is the swne as pronominal1-
zation in general, for he choE?e to regard VP-Delet.ion in comp_arat 'i veu 
and equitatives as ~bdirectional and ther~fore differ~nt from Vl'-
Ueletion in general. 
10Actually VP-Deletion in comparative or equitative clause:, 
differs from VP-Deletion in other environments in being_ obligatory, 
as the contrast betveen (i) and (ii) shows. 
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( i ) John is clever; bUt Bili .isn't tol.ever} . 
(ii) John is t~er than Dill is f:a,il} ·-: 
.Ldo not t.hink, however, th.e.t this fact should pe construed 
as an in<tication that the rule which optionally deletes clever 
and the one which obligatorily deletes tan· in: ( i) and ( ii-)-
respectively are j:listiri'ct rules·. --
Given th~ inadequacies of the DBP, I propose to reformulate it 
as the observationally inore adequate (4.65): 
(11.65) 	 The DBP1 : The Subservient Satellite Constraint 
is applicable to chopping, deletion under 
obliga;tory corere·rentiality. feature:...!'.!hanr:inp;, 
and semantic neutralization; it is not 
applicab~e.to no~-null ~ronominalization ~r. 
to deletion without obligatory coreferent1.ahty.11 
11r mention deiet1on under 9bligatocy coreferenUality because 
I do not know of any deep structure conditions mentioninp; obligatory 
!dentity of sense. 
The explanation I propose for (li.6)) is (lt.66). 
(4 .GG) The situations in which the r:ul>servient i;atelll te 
Constraint applies. are perceived a.a involvinP: 
a st.rµ~tura.i discontfouity; the remo.inder ~re 
not. 	 · 
The· point or·the claim made by (4.66) can be seen most clearl.v 
by comparing chopping and copying phenomena, which the DBP 1 assigns 
to different subclasses, as i(how fo (4 .67a) and (4 .G7b) respectively. 
(4.67) a. *This is the girl who you IJ!et a boy who likes, 
b. 	 This is the girl :!fil.2,YOU met a boy_who likes 
her Cdialectaily restri.ctedJ • 
Iri both .sentences, the N &i'' S and the pertipent e:xternal el~ment have 
been underscored. The essential difference is that the natelilte ia 
ill--formed in (4.67a) unless inter.rated with the external element, 
while this i u not so in (4 . 67b) . In th ls connection r propose th<· 
following h,rpothesis: · 
(4.GB) 'l'he relation which obtains between the cxt.ernttl 
element ~d the r:l'~teli!te in sentence~ -like 
(4 .67a) and (4 ,G71J) are processed by · 
essentially different strategies. 
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'.l'hus, in the :former ca..se, the discor:itimii ty Js resolved by structural 
integrat:i.ve,sti-ategies; in the latter, it is handled by str~tegies 
which.reco ize semantic relations between eienients. The recognition
of .identity of reference in • 7b is, I suggest, not ess~ntially 
different from the recognition of· a reJ,.ation of anton~.y or 
'opposition' 'between the underscored constituerits in (4.69a) and 
(4.69b) respectively. . 
(4.69) a. John is clever, but his cousin is ~tupid. 
b, -John doesn't dislike cake.~ he loathes it. 
I hope that it is intuitively clear why I do not regard the sentences 
:i.n (4. 69) as containing structurally discontinu,ous elem~rits, .althouvh 
it is not easy to.make this notion formally precise. Also, I do 
not know qf any experiments which support or co.st doubt on (4.68), 
and it is not easy to see how one would go about setting up pertinent· 
experiments. I hope, however, t.ho.t my proposal is a plau::iihle one, 
and I will try to show in the remainder of this ·section that it 
provides ·a natural and internally consistent explanation for the 
DI3P 1 • 
Notice that it would be possible, in principle, for .sentences 
like (4.67a) to be interpreted by reconstructing a null anarhor in 
the position ..of the object of like, which would be later 'interpreted 
as coreferential with who by semantic strategies. If that were the 
case, we.would expect there to be no .distinction in acceptability 
between (4.G7a) and (4.67b), but the fact that there is such a 
distinction suggests that a null anaphor is not recons·tructed, The 
reason is, I suggest, that the recognition of the existence of a 
necessary coreferent of sbliJe element falerts ~ the integrative 
strategies, so that integration will have to telte place when the. 
chance arises; on the other hand, nothing .alerts the strate,o:ies which 
reconstruct missing elements, and what takes place is integration, 
rather than re.construction followed by recognition of id1mtity. 
'l'he position I have adopted predicts that deletion under 
obligatory identity will always behave identically,,· for the purposes 
of the Subservient Batellite Constraint and other island types, with 
chopping rules •. As ·far as I know, ·thiR prediction is borne out hy 
the facts (see (4.62)-(4.64)). A corollary of this position in that 
whenever the. ,deletion of a pro-form is exempt from island constraints. 
·there is no obligatory condition that a candidate for deletee status 
exist; I. will show below that this corollary is borne out hy the 
available facts. Finally, this position predicts that Neubauer'R 
claim (which I argue against in Appendix Four) to the effect that 
chopping rules behave differently from copying rules followed by 
the deletion of the original cannot be correct 4.n principle., for the 
effect of copying is to .introduce a necessary coreferent_ of the 
original. · 
Notice also that for a theory which regards constraints like the 
Subservient Satellite Constraint as 'purely grammatical' ones, there 
is no way to capture the similarity between chopping and deletion 
under obligatory identity. Indeed, if chopping proceeds in one 
- 1,92  
step, the Subservient Satellite Constraint will be a tra.ri.sformational 
c()nstraint :for. chopping and a glob~l one for .d,elet_i_on ;: it chopping 
proceeds in two steps, the Subservient Satellite Constraint will be 
a global r:ule. in ·both cases~ but it will have .to. mentiori" the: .output 
of copying in oµe (?ase .. and underlying representation in the other. 
-~efore l~aving the 
0 
subject of chopping and deletion under 
obligatory identity, I think it ·worthwhile to di!;!pose of an apparent 
counterexaxnpie to 1l!Y account. · 
{4.70) .*This is the apple which I know a boy who ate. 
In (4.70), the N & Sis not incomplete, since we·can understand it 
as a boy who a.te.somethina. Unlike (4.67), where I claimed that 
nothing alerts the reconatructive str,ategies, the latter are alerted 
in {4.70) by the lexical properties t;>f eat {which allows the· deletion 
of its object if that object is a generic). As reconstructive 
strategies are generally based on 'local cue.s' , i.e. , found in the 
same syntactic perceptual unit as the:missing element, and since 
perceptual unit.a must undergo some processing before they can be 
effectively inte.grated, one would expect reconstructive strategies 
to apply before integrative ones in general. Given such an ordering 
of strategies, the unacceptability of (4.70) seems to pose a problem. 
The problem is, however, a spurious one_: the missing elements in 
(4.70) can oniy_ be reconstructed as a generic, and generics have no 
antecedents. Therefore., if a generic is reconstructed, the sentence 
fails because the semantic l]trategies .cannot establish a connection 
between it ani:l which; if a generic is not reconstructed, the sentencf"! 
fails for the swnereasons as (4.67a).- · 
In contrnst to (4. 70), consider the following para:dip;m (taken 
from Hoss (1969b)) .which shc>vs that the reconstruction or nn an!J,phoric y 
ratner than generic, pro-form does not lead to-unacceptability, 
{4.71) a. *I ll;now that he must be proud of it, but I 
don't know how. [the sentence is unacceptable 
only on the reading 'I don't know how proud 
of it he must be 1 , not on the reading 'I 
don't know in ~hich way he must be proud of 
it'). 
b, Johnny stole someone's wallet, but I forget 
whose, 
The difference in acceptability between (4.71a) and (4.71b) ls due to 
the fact th·a.t there exists a rule which deletes the heads of genitives 
under identity of sense, as in !. like this book, but I don't like_ 
Bill's (book), while there is no rule which deletes the heads of 
dep:ree modifiers, as can be neen in (4,72). 
(4.12) Jill is pretty, but-I don't knovhow(nretty} 
she is. ~----J 
Consequently, the inapplicability of e. head-constructive stratep,y to 
( 4 , 71 ) makes it impossible to recover 1t as ( 4 • 73a) ,. while the 
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applicability of such a strategy to (4.71b) makes possible its 
construction :as (4. 7 3b) • 
(4.73) 	 a. I know tha.t·he inust be.proud of it, but I 
don't kno~ how proud (of. it he must be). 
b. Jo::::r:i~~•';h:~::~t I forget 
Notice that neither (4,73a) nor (4.73b) violate the LBC, while (4,71a) 
does, which expia.ins its unaccepta.bility.12 The contrast in acceptability 
12G. Drachman has pointed out to me that (i) is marginally 
acceptable in his speech. ' 
(i) 	(?)I know that he must be proud of it, but I don't 
know how·much. 
This suggests to me that (i) must be derived from something like (ii), 
because how much is not in genera.I movable from a left branch, as 
shown in (iii). 
( ii ) I know that he must be proud of it, but I don't 
know [ 6 .he must be proud of it to wh-some extent].-
(iii) a. 	 John has a. l,ot of money. 
b. How much money does John have? 
c. *How much does J.ohn hav~ money? 
An apparent counterexBlllple is furnished by (iva). since its source 
seems to include (ivb), rather than the ungrammatical (ivc). 
(iv) 	 a. You don I t knov hov very much John is· in love. 
with Mary. 
b. John is very much in love with Mary, 
c. *John is in love with Mary very much. 
However, the ungre.mma.ticality of (iiic) sugET,eat that (ivc) is, 
after a.11, part of the source of ( i vc) , and ( i vc) must become ( i vb) 
by an oliligatory prepoeing rule. 
I should. like to point out that; while the LBC does indeed 
account for (4.71a), there are certain problems with it which 
suggest that some rea.nalyais would be in order. 
'Phuu, if how may be domino.ted by the catep,ory NI', it ls hard to 
extend this cateET,orization to prepositions and nrticles; still, ouch 
a move ls suggested by the impo~siliility of deriving (vb) from (va) 
or (vib) from (via). 
(v) 	 a.. John is fo love with Mary [not out of love with 
her]. 
b. *It's fo that Job.n is love with Mary, 
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{vi ) 	 a. I s.(l.w the man, pot a. man.  
b; *:What I saw. inan was the, n.ot a.  
Notice that the LBC may be insufficient even if prepositions and 
articles are categorization as HP's, fpr .it is higQly improbable 
.that la.nguages·:w:ith postpo$itions.or .po~t-nominal articles 1,1].low 
the movement of such constit\lents .. 
This would seem to require a RBC ,. ins.tead of the LBC, in such 
lW1guages. Notice, howeve~, the Rumanian has both pre- and post-
nominal articles (the.indefinite and definite ones.respectively), but 
if we impose both the LBC and the RBC in Rumanian, we wrongly predict 
that sentences like (vii) or (viii) are ungrammatical. 
· (vii) 	 Cit e Petre de de§tept!  
How is Peter of clever·  
'How clever Peter is!'  
{viii) D:i.ferenta e enorma intre un cerc ~i un patrat. 
'The difference is en'ormolis between a circle and 
a square. 
I should also point out that Ross' explanation of the freezing 
of the heads of Complex NP' s by the LBC strikes me as in.correct, for 
heads do not move in ,lapanese ei,ther (see (·~ .104 ) and ( 4 .105 } ) , where 
they appear .on the right-,branch of higher NP's, or in Hindi, where 
they may occur on.either the right- .or t'he left-branch of higher NP' s. 
between (4,71b) and (4.70) is thus due to the fact that the empty slot 
in the former is interpreted as a null anaphor, equivalent to 2E!:.• 
,whose antece.dent. h wallet, :while the empty slot in the latter can 
only be interpreted as a generic, ·and therefore non..;anaphoric, or as 
an empty slot, in which case the integrative $trategies a.re alerted. 
We have so far discussed chopping, deletion under obligatory 
coreferentiality and non-null pronominalization (illustrated by 
copying). It remains to discuss the inapplicability of the Subservient 
Satellite Constraint to deletion without obligatory identity, a.nd its 
applicability to feature-cha.ngiµg and deep structure neutraliza,tion. 
With respect to delet.ion without obligatory identity, the 
inapplicability of the Subservient Satellite Constraint follows quite 
straightforwardly from the preceding 9iscussion, as tbe lack of a.n 
pbliga.tory identity condition fails to alert the integr~tive strategies, 
In (4,7l1a)-(4,74d), I illustrate the non-applicability or the CNPC to 
the rules of Genitive-Head Deletion, Super-Eriui-NP-Deletion, VP-
Deletion Md Gluicing respectively. 
( 11 •7 4 ) a.. I know that you 11ke l'lll I n book , hut ,vou mun t 
face the ro.ct that I a.m going to prnmot,r. 
Greg's. 
b, Max was worried that -the fuct. that tt wns 
dangerous to shave himself with hie rusty 
old .blade bothered Shirley. 
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(4;J4) c. Just try to ·square a circle, i:f you believe 
. the guy wh~ 'told you that you can! 
d. Somebody put .ice cream in Jim's·bed and He 
· didn't believe the guys who told him that 
they didn't know who.l~. 14 
13Examples {4.74a)~(4.74d) are from Neubauer (1970). 
--------------- .. ------------· ----· ---------.---------- .- .. --. ----
14•rhe rules illustrated in (4. 74) supply additional :e.vidence 
. that the two parts of th.e csc are different phenomena, being sub-
cases of the Frozen Nucleus Constraint and the f:ulJservient Gatellite 
Constraint respectively. Indeed, while these rules are not subject 
to the latter constraint, they are subject to the former. I 
illustrate the point with Genitive-Head Deletion -below; parallel 
paradigms :for the.other rules can easily be constructed by the reader. 
{i) · I know that you like Bill's books, but I am going 
to promote_ Greg 1s rbooks} and veto everything 
Bill has ever written. 
(ii) I prefer 
In none of the sentences o:f (4.74a)-:-(4.74d) is there a condftion 
requirin6 identity between the deletion-controller and the deletion 
site, as (4;75a)-(4.75d) respectively show•. 
_(4.75) a. I 	know that you like Bill's book, but you 
must face the fact that I am going to 
promote Greg's play. 
b. 	 Max was worried that the fact that it was 
dangerous for Bill to shave himself with 
his rusty old blade bothered Shirley, 
c. 	 Just try to square a circle, if you believe 
the guy who told ·you that you can use a 
pencil adequately. 
d, 	 Somebody put ice cream in Jim's bed and he 
didn't believe the guys who told him that 
they didn't know who had tried to p;et even 
with him. 
Concern,lng feo.ture-cho.nginp; phenomena, the applica.lill ity or the 
Sub!lerv.lcnt :1a~ellite Constraint is entirely expected, Tndeed, 
:,11tclliteo conto.lnlnp; forms like a11t, £_Ver, ~h-pronounu, etc., nre 
- 196 -
not weJ.1-formed unless. commanded by the 8.J?E!OEria.te neutralizer; ·  
unacceptability arises when the latte.:r is outside the dominance of  
the N . ii: s node; since the .structural vell~formea.ness o:r the ·satellite  
ca.n only 'Qe clet.ermi.ned by recognizing an unpe:rin:i.ssible discontinuity.  
Finally, the semantfc neutraliz.ation of th~ 'comparee I by the  
t cqinpar,ator I i:p. c;ompara.tive and equita.tive con,structi.orm :i,s sµbj ect  
to Subservient Satellite Constraint for the same reasons as feature- 
changing; the well~formedriess· of the clause .containing the comparee  
can only be establishe.d by inspecting the comparator. This· ia shoi,rn  
by the contrast in acceptability between ( 4 . 76a) and ( 4 . 76b l, which  
have ·the same adverbial.clause, and where acceptability depends on  
the compata.bllity of the comparator and the comparee ((4.766) shows  
.that 	(4. 76b) contains a possible comparator}. ·· 
{4,76) a. Joanne is m9re intelligent than Jill is 
efficient. 
b, *Joanne loves. her husband more than Jill is 
efficient. 
c. 	 Joanne loves her husband more than Jill hates 
her brother... 
In (l1,76a) and (4,76c), the comparee occurs inside a :Jatellite 
(the comparative clause), but the N .& fl node does not intervene ( in 
the ~ense discussed above)' since the comparator is-precisely the 
Nucleus of this N & S. On the other bend, the sentences in (4,77} 
a.re all bad, bee.a.use an If & S node does intervene between the 
comparator and the comparee, and the latter is part of the correspondi.ng 
Satellite. · 
(4.17) a. *Mary is ~:re} intelligent [!:an} I know 
a boy vho is productive. 
b. 	 Mery ·is (::r:-ej intelligent [ l~an} .you heard 
{*the 	c;l.aim that) she is j.,roductive. 
c. *Mary is [ l!l~;e} intelligent (~an} she is 
prodµctive and an assistant professor. 
d. *Mary is ;more} intelligent (;:an} Bill is'l_a.s . 
in·love with her because she is productive. 
Semantic neutralizt1..tion as in ( 4.76 )-( 4. 77) is subject to the  
Subservient Satellite Constraint in Japanese as well, as illustrated  
for the coordinate subcase in (4.78).  
(4.78) *John wataijuu ga 500 ponto te, tseyoi yori Bill 
John . veight 500 pounds (and) strong than Bill 
w'k mQtto tsuyoi. 
more strong 
~'Bill 	is stronger than John weip,ha 500 pounds and 
is ~trong, '15 
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15It is :inter~sting tp~t whi],e the :ie!Jl8.ntfc neutraUza:tion 
foung. in comparat,iVE?S is subject to the ~ulJserv:i.erit Satel.}.ite 
Constraint ip Jl!.panese, feature neutralization. is. not, at ieaet in 
the cases that I am acquainted with. Thus , Ross. ( 1967) ppinted out 
that Japanese. Re"flexivization is fr~e from his. constraints, and I 
illustrate the same point below with respect to the Japanese counter-
part of Wh-Placement -(i.e., the rule which converts an indefinite 
NP to dare when that NP is the 'target I of. ~ome question verb). 
(i) Watakusi wa dare no sukina onna no ko ga Tookyoo e 
I whom likes girl Tokyo to 
i tta no ka tQ kiita. 
went asked,. 
*'I asked the girl who likes whoni went to Tokyo.' 
(ii) John wa Mary ga suki de, Bill wa dare ga suki desu kn. 
John Mary, like Bill who like · 
*'John likes.Mary and Bill likes who? I 
(iii) Wat'akusi wa John wa dare ·ga sukita kara Tokyoo e 
I John who likes becau~e Tokyo to 
itta no ka to kiita. 
went asked. 
*'I asked John went to Tokyo because he loves who.' 
It should be ppinted out that most speakers of English have the 
feeling that, while violations of the _Subservient Satellite Constraint 
by feature neutralization ~re unacceptable, they are not nearly as 
bad llS the _sentences in (4.77); for example, (iv) is considerably 
more tolerable than (4. 77c). 
(iv) *I wonder wh.o likes Moscow and which other city? 
This suggests that violations .of the Subservient r;ate.lli te 
Constraint by the comparator-comparee relation are, in some sense, 
much stronger than similar violations by the relation holdinp, between 
a neutralizer and a neutralized feature. In fnct, it is not altogether 
unexpected that it should be so, for the neutralization of n comparee 
by a comparator ie semantic, and the:refore of greater impnct than 
feature neutralisation, which is essentially formal (notice that 
feature neutralization, as in (iv), while based on a semantic 
relation between the question verb and some wh-word, nevertheless 
involves no semantic neutralization of the latter by the former). 
However, it should be made clear that the sentences in (4.77), though 
bad enough to deserv~. a <iouple asterisk, are by n,Q means ~emanticall:.:l, 
ill-fanned. For ex~pie, (4.78d) meims that Bill is in love with Mary 
because she is productive and that she is productive to a lesser 
extent than (or to the same extent as) the one to which Mary is 
intelligent; thus, (4,78d) makes perfect sense semantically, and its 
unacceptability must be attributed to some non-semantic principle, 
such as the Subservient_ SatelHte Constraint. 
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.To summarize, I ha.ye a:r;gued in .th.is section t~a.t ~he partition 
determ:j.ned by th~ DBP' on syntactic.phenomena depends on whether a 
9tructura.1 ,dis!!ontinuity ~s or is not perceived. I proposed that 
the ir,.terpreta.t:i.on, of .Satellites which contfiin·a·pro-form whose 
antecedent is outside the N &s requires the recognition of the 
e.ritecedent-anaphor relation, but this does not prevent the Satellite 
from being perceived as whole; similarly, deletion sites can be 
interpreted as:ritill a.riapliors, provided.that there is no indication 
·	the,t some external element necessaril;( belongs irt 1;ha.t ·slot. With 
respect to the phenomena. whfoh are subject to th.e Subservient 
Satellite Constraint, I argued that they do involve a structural 
discon.tiriuity; for chopping a.rid certain deletions, because an 
external element must be integrated with the Satellite, and for 
feature and semantic neutralization, because the well-formedness of 
the Satellite is partly determined from outsid~_the N & s. 
4;5. In t,his section. we consider the prob;I.ems raised by the 
Frozen Nucleus Constraint with respect to chopping (as I pointed out 
in Chapter Th.ree 1 the fact~ are insu,ff'1ciently clear for other types 
of phenomena to warrant an attempt at explanation at this stage; 
I suppose, however, tha.t deletion under obligatory c.oreferentiality 
.can be explained in essentially the same vay ·as chopping) • 
Two kinds of situations can result from chopping the Nucleus  
and leaving a Satellite behind:  
(4. 79) a. The clause out of ·which the Hucleus vas 
lifted appears vell"".formed, or 
b. 	 'l'he clause out of which the Nucleus was 
lifted appears ill-formed. 
I will try to show that both (4.79a) and (4.79~) are perceptually  
complex situations. involving erroneous ci~sure and, conflict:  
respectively (a.~_far ~s I can see, interrupted behavior does not  
seem to be crucially involved).  
(4. 79) is illustrated. in (4 .80) and . ( 4, 81). Contra.st this  
paradigm with the one exhibited in (4.82) and (li.83).  
J4.8o) a. I 	 believe (that) Mary's claim that Bill left 
is false. · 
b. 	*Whose claim do I believe (that) [ 8 that Bill 
left is false)? 
(4.81) a. :t 	think that John, Bill and Mary have left. 
b. 	*Who dot think that C5 Jphn and Mary have 
leftJ.? 
(4.82) a. The dif:ference between X e.Iid Y is clear. 
b. ·c5 ~~ difference is clea.rJ between X and Y. 
(4 ,83') a, You think that the roof of the.~ house was 
blown off by a bomb. 
b. 	 Of which bouse do you think that [ 8 the roof 
was blown off by a bombJ? 
I 
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In b9th (4.oQ)-(4.81)wid (4;82)-(4~83), the clause out of·which 
ail element has chqpped seems well-formed, but. ::the total re.sult is 
. bad in the -former, where a• Nucleus was. mo'ved, while .it -is acceptable 
in the later' 	where a Satellite was moved. . I SU(',gest that the 
unacceptability of the b.,..s!;!nterices in (4.-80)-(4.8"1) is due to a 
principle of erroneous closure, rather similar to (2, 8) . .Specifically, 
claim 	tlia:t the wutccepta.bil1ty of ( 4 .8bb) arid (.4. Blb) is due to 
the fact that 	the bracketed constituents are erroneously apprehended 
as complete .sentences, and that they cannot be coherentiy integrated 
with the remainder of the str.ing ·without undergoinp; significant 
reanalysis. ' 
Thus, 	in (4 .Oo), the string that .Bill left is a possible sub,1ect 
of i1;, 	 false, and is interpreted as such; the correct- integration of 
whose 	claim with that Bil'.i left would require that the analysis of 
the latter as 	a subject of the prackete~ clause be discarded, and 
that it be reinterpreted as~ modifier of another NP whii=h is the 
real subject of that clause (in fact, the Nu~leus of the· subject NP, 
but Nuclei are by definition repreEJentative of their N & 8 1s). 
In cont_rast, even. t,hough t.~e bracketed claµses of ( 4 . 82b) and 
(4.83b) a.re possible clauses, their integration with the displaced 
constituents does not re uire that the be si nifice.nti reane.l zed. 
1"or example, the roof in .83b is esrientie.lly still the subject of 
the bracketed· clause. everi after the optional appendage of \Thich 
house 	has been attached to it. Thus, the difference in acceptability 
between Hucleus-chopping and Satellite-chopping in (4,80)-(4,83) is 
due to the fact that the former, but not the latter, requires a 
s·ignificant reanalysis of the form in which _some substring has been. 
initially construed. 
It should be pointed out that all the cases of erroneous 
closure so far considered involved the significant reanalysis ~in 
the formally undefined, but intuitively clear sense of the above 
account) of the pertinent string; in fa.ct, I suspect that complexity 
arises only when errone.ous clo!,ure resµlts i_n .a p_ercept which· must 
be significa.ntiy reanalyzed at some later stage of processinp;. It 
wquld 	ther.efore be worthwhile to ~ttempt to provide a rigorous 
definition of 	the notion 1signific~nt reanalysis', without which the 
prediction I have just made cannot be,formally stated. 
We now consider case. (b) c;,f (4. 79), which is illustrated in 
(4.84)-(4.86). 	 . 
(4.84) 	 a.. You think those members of the committee nre 
dead, 
b. 	*Which members do you think [s of the committee 
are dead? 
(4.8'.;>) a .. I told you John o.nd Mary have lefL 
b. *Who ditl I 	 tell you ( nnd Mn.ry hnvc l<'ftl?
0 
(Ii .Uu) a.. That· John wa.s fired because he w,w :::ick ls 
appalling. 
b, *What because tie was sick is appallin1-;J[ 5 
is that John was fired.· 
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· (4 . 84 } -: ( 4 . 86) er~ dif:f'erent from ( 4 ~ 8q )-( 4. ijl ) in that the bracketed 
clauses do not appear· to be well..;,formed; · we may exp~ct. this to 
function as a -Olea.r indi~ation· of a slot, thus ma.king integration 
easy. However,· (4.84)-(4.86j. involve a dffiiculty of a different 
sort; unlike (4.82)-(4.83)., the remainder of the N & S's (i.e., of 
the committee, and Mary, and be.cause lie was sick respectively) are 
the vrong kind (in the sense ·or Appendix Twol of category fo~ their 
bt!ing arguments of any sort of· the predicate·s pf the bracketed 
·claus,es, and the initia:l analysis of those clauses is rendered 
difficult by the .percep:tual confikt between tne categorial kind of 
some constituent and the role it is called upon to play. 
Like (4,79a), (4.79b) does not require new perceptual principles 
for its explanation. The unacceptabllity of ('4. 84b), (4. 85h) and 
(4. 86b) is pred,icted by ( 4. 48): see section 4, 3); as there are no  
additional categoriµ or functional cueathat could be brought to  
bear with respect to the pertin~nt bracketed strings, we are faced  
with a situation· of maximal conflict between the role ·that those  
strings must play and the categories to which:they belong.  
· 	 'l'he fact .that Hu;leus-chopping resulta in a. perceptually complex 
situation does not' of cour,se t mean tbat no counterexamples can exist 
in principle. Consider thus (4 •.87b)l6 which exnibits a violation of 
161 am gl"ateful to D. T. :{.,angendoen for j:!aj.ling this ca~e to my 
attention. 
· the Frozen Iiucleus Constraint. 
(4,87) a, I sav someone interesting at the party. 
b. Who did I see interesting at the party? 
Notice that we cannot claim that !JOmeone interesting was moved 
fntegrally by Question-Movement, th·e reduced relative clause somehow 
extra.posing later' for the latter. need nqt appear at the end or a 
clause, as shown in (4.88b). The badness of (4.89b) ie an additional 
ar~ent against extrapoait~on of a. reduced relative, .for a full 
relative can appear in that position, e.s 5 howrt by the acceptability 
of (4 ,89a). · · 
(4.88) a. 
b. 
You showed someone interesting to my girl 
friend from Rome. 
Who did you show inter.eating to my girl 
friend frQm Rome? 
( 4 . 8'9.) a. Who did you meet yeste'rcfo.y who was interesting? 
b, *Who did you meet yesterday interesting? 
To bep;in vith, notice that the class of adjectives which can 
he suµstituted for interesting (4.8Tb) or {4,80b) i.s fairly rentricted; 
thu::i, it lncltiden devaatatinp: ahd frightening, but not rr!!tty. 
- 201 	-
repugnant, surprising; appalling, or astonishing (the adjeGtives 
which behave like interesting do not seem to form a natural class., 
but I have not looked at the problem in detail; nioreover, t;here seems 
· to be serious idiolectal variation in this respect). 
· Secondly, it can be ·sho\lll the. t the structures found in (4. 87b) 
or (4.88b) are complex; since acceptability·decreases rapidly when 
the chopped·elenients belong in more deeply.embedded clauses. Thus, 
compare .the marginal status of (4.90a) an.d the unac.ceptability- of 
(4. Bla) with the acceptability of (4, 90b) and (4. 91b); although the 
interdiscontinuous material is :identic~ in each member of each set, 
(4. 90) a. ??Who did I tell yo1.,1 Mary met interel'3ting? 
b. 	 Who did I tell you Mary me"!; who was 
interesting? 
· (4 .91) a. *Who did I tel). you Bill claims Mary met 
interesting? 
b. 	 Who did I tell you Bill claims Mary met who 
was interesting? 
However,· why can the Nucleµs in constructions like someone 
interesting be chopped at all? The answer is, I believe, that it 
must, rather th.an can, be .chopped, in order to avoid another 
unacceptable construction, Indeed, there exists a constraint (what-
ever its exp:Lanation) which prohibits the sequence who interesting, 
· as shown in (4.92a). Thus, sentences like (4,87) seem to result from 
a trade-off between constraints, such that the conflict is reRolved 
by the (partial) suppression of one of them.17 Certain ad,Jectival 
17Of course, there is no re.a.son in principle why both constraintr. 
could not have held (the me~ing of (4.87b) can be conveyed by usinp: 
a full, rather than reduced, rela.tive clause), and I am prepared to 
believe that there are dialects in which both Constraints hold, with 
the result that both (4.87b) and (4.92~) are out, · 
modifiers are better than others af'ter·a.n interrogative pronoun, and 
my suggestion of a. trade~ff between constraints is supported by the 
paradigm in (4,92)-(4.94), where Nucleus-chopping seems ~o increase 
in acceptability as N & S-chopping decreases in acceptability. 
(4.92) a. *Who interesting did you show (to) the audience? 
b. Who did you show interesting to the audience? 
(4.93) a. ?Who .(wi"j;h -'l,. a red scarf did you ohow (to)Lwearinri.J · 
the audience? 
h,??Who did you show.rwit\ "'la red nco.rf to the 
audience? l,we a.r np:.. \ 
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(4 ,94): ~. Who vho vas inte.resting did you show (to) 
the audience? 
b, *Who did you show vho was interesting to the 
audience? 
It is impo:rtant to distinguish genuine violations o.f the Frozen 
Nucleus Constraint from spurious ones. Thus, there are a number of 
rules which move Satellitiis to the end of the containing clauses, and 
when the N &S originates in clause-final position, its chopping 
folloved by rightward migration of the -Satellite looks as if the 
Nucleus alone had been choppe<;I. Such situati.on~ will not ca.use 
perceptual problems, because the Nucleus will be synthesized with an 
optional slot for a Satellite (as discussed above), and the 
Satellite will not be in a position which conflicts with its 
ca.tegoria.l kindtsince clause final position is ambiguous betveen 
some argument bf the predicate and 'extra.posed' constituent, provided 
that there is a rule of rightward migration relating the Nucleus and 
the Satellite L One such case of spurious Nucleus-chopping was 
recognized in Ross (1967), where it was pointed out that sentences 
like (4, 95c) arise from (4, 95a) through the intermediate stage (4, 95b) , 
rather than directly from (4.95a), 
(4.95) a, I saw a man 11rho w~s wearing a tie; 
b. Who who was wearing a tie did I see? 
c, Who di.d I see who was wearing a tie? 
other instances of N &: 8 chopping followed by Satellite migration 
have been misconstrued, For example, in Stockvell et al., (1968), 
it ·1s claimed that the hea~$ of postnpminaJ. genitival constructions 
like the underscored constituent in (4,96a) can be clefted, yieldinp; 
(4,9tib). I beiieve that clefting yields the intermediate stap;e (4.96c). 
from vhich (4,96b) is derived by the independently motivated rule of 
l~xtro.pos i tion~of-PP; My reasons for thinking AO are that (h. 97b) is 
not derivable from (4.97a), although we would expect (4.97b) to be 
grammatical if Nucleus-clefting were possible, 
(4.96) 	 a. I found a necktie of John's. 
b, It's e. necktie I found of John's. 
c. It's a·necktie of John's that I found. 
(4,97) 	 a, I showed a necktie of John's to Mary. 
b, *It's a necktie I showed of John's to Mary. 
c,?*It's a necktie I showed to Mary of John's, 
(4.97c) is, unfortun~tely, bad for independent reasons (extraposition 
movements cannot cross a prepositionaJ. phrase in general), The badness 
of (4,97b) is, however, a sufficient reason for doubting that (4,96b) 
arises by Nucleus-chopping. 
l>. l'erlmutter (oraJ. communication) hns clnimed that Nl''::i in 
construction with vaa 'all' can he chopped in ::iovenie.n. llin 
o.rp;ument wus thnt ·(4.98) must be n. case of genuine hend-choppjnp:, for 
ves exhlbltri the ordlnary n.ccuso.tive endinp: expected 'if concord tnkr.11 
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place between it and riz prior to chopping; on the oth~r hand, _if 
the head of ves had been copied and deleted through an intermediate 
stage of pronom:i.naliz_ation to~ :Cit), the ·quantifier would have 
agreed with@., e·xhibiting_ the animate accusative ending, as in 
(4.99). 
(4.98) 	 Riz sem zelel projesti ves. 
· The rice I wanted .to eat all 
, . .... 
(4,99) 	 Zelel sem ga pojesti vsega. 
I wanted it to eat all 
Notice, however, that the above facts do not support Perlmutter's 
claim in case there is a rule of Quantifier-Floating in Slovenian,· 
similar to the one exhibited in (4.100) for English. 
(4.100) a, All the boys have left. 
b. The boys all have left, 
c. The boys have all left, 
·d. ?*The boys 	have left all [this sentence has 
bec9me 	 ungrammatical quite recenlty; it was 
perfectiy acceptable in 19th century F.np;lishJ. 
As I am not acquainted with Slovenian, I cannot provide an analysis 
of (4, 98), but I will show that similar facts obtain in Rumanian, 
and that they can be explained the~e by an independently motivated 
rule of Quantifier-Flpating.similar to the one found in English.· 
Thus, consider (4.101) and (4~102). 
(4.101) 	 a. Am vazut Parisul tot, 
I saw Paris all 
'I have seen all of P'l.ris', 
b. 	 Parisul, 1-ani vazut tot. 
Paris, it I 'saw all 
'Paris, I have seen all. Of it, I 
. ( 4 .102) a. 	 Am ,vazut Rominia toata 
I saw Rumania all 
1 I have seen all of Rumania. 1 
b. 	 Rominia, am vazut....:o toata. 
Rumania I saw it all \ 
'Rumania, I have seen all of it.' 
As we can see, the quantifier tot 1 all 1 exhibits the same kind of 
agreement.before and after topicaliz_ation, However, this quantifier 
can also float quite freely,_as shown by (4,103). Consequently, 
se~tences like (4.lQlb) and (4.102b) can be derived from their a-
counterparts in two stages, by topicalizing the entire N & Sand then 
allowing the quantifier to float. 
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(4.103} a. •. Tot:t' ba.ietii au plecat.  
'All the boys· 'h~ve left'  
b, Baietii toti au plecat, . ·  
'The.bbys all have·left'  
c. 	 Ba.ieiii au plecat toti, 
'.The boys he.ve left all' 
The conclusion which may be drawn from the above discussion is 
that once the real and/or appai-ent counte:rexample·s have been accounted 
for in a principled w~. the Frozen Nucleus Constraint emerges as a 
genuine principle of language, which can_receive a straightforward 
explanation in terms of general and independently motivated principles 
of performance, · 
In cont.re.st; consider Ross' account of the freezing of Nuclei. 
He only discus~es this problem in relation to complex NP's, and notes, 
in section 2.3, that the chopping of the head 9f a relative clause 
.or of a complement claus~ 'will be shown to be excluded by either of 
two independent conditions: the Complex NP Constraint ••• or the Pied-
Piping Convention'. As the CNPC.is formulated in his 4.1, it cannot 
freeze the .heads of complex NP' ·s, for it only refers to elements of 
the modifying clause~ therefore, it appears Ross decided to leave it 
to the Pied-Piping Convention (and, specifically, to the Left Branch 
Condition on the latter) to block the migration of the heads of Complex 
NP's. , . 
I believe that it is wrong to account for this phenomenon with 
the LBC (see also note 12), because of the implied·claim that.the heads 
of complex NP's cannot move only when they precede the modifying clause. 
'l'his conclusion strikes me as unnatural in the extreme; moreover, it 
is probably false. Thus, the hea.d noun of complex NP' s always follows 
the modifying clause in Japanese, but they cannot lie chopped either. 
(4.104b) and (~.105b) show that Japanese Topicalization. which moves. 
constituents to sentence initial position, cannot move the head of a 
relative clause or a complement clause respectively. 
(4.104) 	 a. Kodomo go tabete iru sa.kana wa ookii. 
child eating is fish big 
'The fish which the child is eating is big.' 
b. 	*Sakana wa kodomo ga tabete iru ookii. 
fish child eating is big 
(4.105) a. otto ga kono boosi o kabutte ita to iu 
otto this hat vearing was that 
syutyoo o wata.kusi va sinzita. 
claim I believed 
'I believed the claim that Otto was w~arinF, thin 
hat.' 
b. 	*Syutyoo wa, otto ga kono boosi o knhutte !ta 
the clf!,im, Otto this hat we11ri_np; wan 
to iu o watakusi wa sinzita, 
that I believed. 
*'The 	claim, I believed that otto was .weerinp; 
this hat.' 
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I believe:ve can conclude that the freezing of \he h~ads of 
cornplex NP' s i~ m:uch more adequatel,y accoun.ted for by the Fr.ozen. 
Nucleus Constr.a.int thaQ by the LBC; since the ·former, but not th¢ 
·lattel'" can account (a.) for the freezing of complex NP heads which 
f'ollow the modifying elause~ and (b) for the freezing of Nuclei · 
in constructio~s other then complex NP's. 
CHAPTER V 
9UMMARY AND FµRTHER OUTLOOKS 
The·purpose of this dissertation has been twofold: 
(5:1) 	 a. To provide an improved syntactic ana.l.ysis of 
the phenomena known as 'island constraints', 
and 
. b. to offer a natural explanation of those and 
other phepomena in ~ehavioral term~. 
In regard t9 (5.la), I believe the major contribution of this 
dissertation to l.J~ tlle notion Nucleus and Satellite,.fornially definable 
in t~rms of the notions dominate and ca.tegorial .kind; there is over-
whelming evio.ence that the latter two are independently needed in an 
adequate description of natural languages, and a large.pa.rt of iny 
effort has been directed towards sii9l<lng that.the notion of N & fi 
must also be pa,r~ of a. des~ript,ively adequa:tE;! grammatical theory. 
The notion N & S ha.a made· it possible to· recogni~e that tlle. notion 
of island constraint wa,s a c;over tei:111. for two largely ind~pendent 
and weaker constr;aints, the Frozen Nucleus Constraint and the r;ub-
servient Satell-i:te Constraint; more.over, the excessive po'{er of the 
various island cqnstraints forces the recognition of a larp;e nwnber 
of counterexampl~s, an emba~rassment which my proposal, on the.whole, 
avoids. 	 · 
With respect. to its second purpose, this dissertation has 
attempted to shmi that the phenomena discussed in Ross (19(,'{), J>ostal 
( 1971) , and elsewhere, can be accounted for in termo of behavioral 
principles involving erroneous clo~ure, interrupted behavior, nnd 
perceptual conflict. Closure principles underlie my acc;:ount of some 
instances of the frozen Nucleus Constraints, as well as of some 
instances of the ~ight Roof Constraint; interruption principles 
underlie my accounts of some instances of the Cross-Over phenomena 
involving unbound~d rules, of the Right Roof Constraint, of the 
optionality of Pied-Piping, of the possibility of moving elements out 
of arbitrarily deeply embedded clauses, and of the problems created 
by the migration of elements out of pre-verbal clauses in SVO 
languages; conflict principles underlie my accounts of the CrosG-
Over phenomena in~olving bounded rules, of some instances of the Prozen 
Nucleus Constraint, of the Subservient Satellite Constraint, and of 
the Langack.er-Hoss: constraint on backwards pronominalization. 
It has hecome a commonplace nowadays to end a paper by pointinp; 
out th11t I.t has rn1lsed many more questions than it has nnawcreri; 
p;lveli our extremely inadequate knowlecip;e of the mental renllty undcr-
lyinp; syntactic phenomena, such an olmervntion is nlmoat ,i trul nm. 
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· As far as this dissertation is concerned, there are countless 
pertinent issues .it has not even attempted to tackle, such as: 
(5.2} a.. What is a possible behavioral principlt!? 
b, How do behavio~al constraints interact with 
. semantic ones in determining acceptability? 
c. Are.there lingu:i~tic pheIT1omena whi~h can be 
explafoed, in terms of speecl) production, but 
d. 
not of speech perception?
is it possible to predict grammatization, and 
· ifso, what are the nature, the weights, 
and the principles of interaction, of the 
pertinent variables? 
e. · Are there any 1purely syntactic' universal 
constraints? · 
Questions like the above are of p.rea;~ theoretical interest, but I 
do ~qt think the appropriate answers will be forthcoming in the 
near :futur-e • . . 
I believe th~t problems .of more immediate interest concern the 
vork which remains to lJe done in connection Y\!.th the issues vhich 
this dissertation has attempted to. t·ackle. F'i:rst, 8.8 my l"esearch 
has centered largely on English (and poosibly.not even on.ltll.the 
pertinent areas of Englis.li), my proposals are\ seriously under-
determined by the data, and additional resear,1<::h on a reasonalile 
sampie of the languages a.nd dialects of the vorld is an absolute must. 
8econi:i, it is certainly.desirable to submi'I; ~S mUc~'!, as p<;>Spible of my 
analysin to experimental testing, for, even if my proposals are 
plausible· ones, they a.re ~erta.inly hot the only lop;icalb possible 
ones. If this dissertati'on succeeds ·in stimulating such work in the 
future, I will consider that it has accompli~hP.it it« purpose, even 
if every single claim it has made should eventually turn out to be 
. . . . C 
wrong. 
...... 
:.4\PPE11DIX. ONE 
I· do not wish to claim that (2 .• 56) is. the deepest representation 
of (2. 54a) ,. ·but only a ;remote representation of it, because (2. 56) 
is not semantically interpretable. Various ways of clealing with the 
semantic interpretation of (2.56) suggest themselves, the most 
satisfactory of which seems to be (a) below. 
(a) At the deepest level, the boxed NP is empty, exactly like 
the Predicate, and the semantic interpretation of this structure is 
carried out by the same rule whi~h interprets the underlying repre-
sentation of the synonymolls (2.54) (the empty nodes as well as the 
cppula would be disregarlied). This rule of int,erpretation is the 
deep structure counterpart of the surface interpretive rule-proposed 
in Chomsky (1969): while in the latter account, heavy stress is assigned 
op~ionally and the presuppo~ition is obligatorily inferred in the 
presence of stress, in my account, presupposition may or may not _exist, 
and heavy stress is obligatorily assigned in the presence of pre-
supposition. 
'rhe presupposition of a sentence must be a proper subpart of 
the meaninR of that .sentence. Thus, (Al.la) may presuppose not. only 
(/\1.l~), but al~o (Al.l_b, c, or d). 
(/\1.1) a. John saw Mary. 
b. John ·sa_w ,a girl. 
c. John saw ~ person. 
d. John saw someone. 
_e .• John saw something. 
Corresponding to (il.lb )-(Al .·le), the pseudo-cleft .output will be 
(Al.2b )-(Al. 2e) ;respect!yely •. 
(Al.2) b. The. gir.:J_ who .John saw was Mary. 
c. The per,son who John saw was Mary. 
d. The or1e who Johll uaw was Mary~ 
e •. What John saw was Mary. 
:Jimilnrly (Al.3a) may presuppose (Al.3b): in addition to (Al.3c). 
(Al.3) a. I noticed John's grisly sense of humor, 
b. I noticed something about John. 
c. I noticed something. 
Corresponding to (Al.3b) and (Al.3c), we have the pseudo-clefts 
(Al.4b) and (Al.4c). 
(Al.4) b, What I noticed about John was his grisly sense 
of humor. 
c. What I riot iced was John's p,risly sense of humor. 
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S~ntences like (AL4b) have been claimed by Green (1971) to have 
no nori•ps·e,ido-cileft c<;>unterpart am'/. thµs to create serious problems 
for any analysi~ of pseudo-cleft constructions vhich includes a non-
pseudo-cleft counterpart. However, g1-ven universal ·principJ,es of 
semat1tic implication, the non-pseudo..:cleft counterpart of (.Al. 4b) is 
(Al.4a.}, not the ungrammatical *I noticed,John 1s srisly sense of 
humor about him which Green regards ii,s the source of the dif'fictilty. 
In slightly more complicated situations, the presupposition is 
inferrable from the non~pseudo-cleft counterpart in conjunction with 
a number of pragmatic assumptions (for some discus$i9n, see Lakoff 
(1971)}. 
' Consider (AJ.,5a) and the pr~gmatic assumptions (Al,5b}-(Al.5e). 
{Al,5) a. A man lil<,e Hitler was allowed to seize power, 
b. Hitler·was a vicious tyrant. 
c. The W9rld has a·duty to prevent vicious 
tyrants from seizing power. 
d. The worid did not prevent Hitler from seizing 
power~ 
e .• · When one does not d.o one's duty, something is 
wrong vith the one who thus fails. 
1''rom (Al,5b)-(Al,?e); we cari inter (Al.6). 
(Al.5) Sonething ·is.wrong with the world. 
Taking (Al. 5a) as the rion-pseudo-cleft counterpart and (Al.6) as the 
presupposition,. we can construct the pseudo-cleft in (Al. 7}, 
(Al. 7) What's vrohg with the -world is that a man like 
Hitler vas allowed to seize 'power. 
Heturninp, no.t to the simpler (2 ,54a), the remote representation 
(2. 56) is derived by copying something (i.e:, the pro-form corresnondin11: 
tq the fo~us) into the boxed NP, and ~efinttizi!lg it later b.ecause of 
the 'previous mention' (that definite pronouns and determin~rs can 
have their antecedents in presuppositions is shown by sentences like 
~he boy saw Mary, which is meaningless, unless a previous mention of 
the refer.ent of ~he boy is presupposed) • . 
If the rule which inserts a copy of the pro-form into the boxed 
NP seems insufficiently motivated; consider the alternatives: 
(b) We may regard (2.56) as a pre-semantic structure, in which 
case the semantic interpretation would apply to the output of Focus-
Placement ( see below) , that is, (Al. 8). 
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(Al.8), S· 
llP~------. 
NP·.- .. ~ 
NP VP. 
~~ 
.. V NP 
I I 
The thing1 John ate somethingi was an apple 
Presupposition could .also _be determined at _thi_s stage (on the basis 
of the general principle .that restrictive relat,ives wi t.h def'ini te deter-
miners are ·presupposed)·, and so c9u;t.d ·c_orefere.ntiality ~ However, apart 
from the fact that singling out the output of Focus..:Placement for 
semantic interpretation would be 110 less arbitrary than the copyinp: rule 
I have proposed, this solution could not work because Focus-Placement 
has to follow the rule which .determines the dist,ribution of any (see 
the discussion in connection with examples (2.)8) and (2.)9), which 
in turn has to follow Passive, as (Al.9) shows: 
(Al.9) a. *Anybody didn't kill John. 
b. John wasn't tilled by anybody. 
c. John didn't kill anybody. 
d. *Anybody wasn't killed by John. 
But if Focus~Placement has to follow Passive, it would be wrong to 
single out its output for semantic interpretation, for, in case the 
Passive has applied, passive and active structures would have to be 
interpreted by sepe.rate rules, thus missing an obvious generalization. 
(c) Another possibility would.be to regard (i) as essentially 
the deepest representation of (2.1), as proposed in Postal (1971). ;.uch 
o.n an_alysis would .create no probl'em for semantic interpretation, hut 
would entail the loss of all the syntactic generalizations ahout pseudo-
cleft constructions which will be discussed below, namely the correct 
statement of selectional restrictions, the distribution of neutralized 
elements, the impossibility of removing elements from p3eudo-cleft 
phrases, and the fact that the acceptability of pseudo-cleft 
constructions is determined by the principles which limit riP,htward 
movements i.e. , (2. 35c) • Moreover, to derive .sentences like (2. 54h) , 
Postal is forced to regard somethinp; like (2,54a) as a niore remote 
representation and to posit a rule (if Contrast-Movement~ That rule 
would have to apply obligatorily to (Al.lOa) to derive. (Al.lOb). 
'Phe ill-fonnedness of (Al .lOa) appears as an accidental fact in this 
analysis. 
(Al.10) a. *What I saw Bill the table was under. 
b. I saw Bill under the table. 
On the other hand, Lf (Al. 10b) i H rep,arded as more hn!!ic than 
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(Al.lOa), the latter is excluded by the general principle tha.t trans..,. 
i'o:rma:tions do not IllOVe I f'Unction Words I ( or parts Of WOrdS ., as 
pointed out in Chomsky (1969)), 
A still more serious problem is raised by (Al.Ha) which one 
could· say in repiy to (Al .11b) , but for which,. given Postal I s 
analysis; it is hard to imagine a source. 
(Al.ll) a. Ho,. John saw the house. 
b. Jill saw the table. 
Given the untenability of (b) or (c) above on syntactic grounds, 
I have assumed a.n analysis along the lines of (a) in 2.1.3.1, because 
the awkwardness of haying empty nodes in underlying structure is not 
an intolerable difficulty, and because (a) makes it possible to 
handle the syntactic problems involved in pseudo-clefting, which is 
a primary concern of that section.• 
APPENDIX TWO · 
Optionality is in fact not important for its own sake, but 
rather for sh~wing that tne N & S-node is necessarily of the same 
'categorial kind' as in the Nucleus..:.node. The notion of 'kind' that 
I have in mind is ill-defined in linguistic theory at present, since 
the only notation available for labeling categories does not 
differentiate between gerundials, that-clauses and for-to-clauses, 
for example, all being assigned the labels. Nevertheless, there is 
a great deal of syntactic evidence that finer ca.tegorial distinctions 
a.re needed, since transformations are some.times sensitive to dep;rees 
of sentencehood, no!'ninality, or a.djectivalness (for details, see 
Ross (1972)). The failure to recogniz~ such degrees ha·s been 
responsible, I believe, for a great deai of unnecessary argumentation 
in the literature. For example, Emmonds (1969) argued that gerundials 
are NP 1s, not S's, because they do not extrapose; on the other hand, 
gerundials behave like sentences with respect to other syntactic 
phenomena, such as pronominalization constraints. Thus, unless we 
regard gerundials as clauses it is ha.rd to account for the ungrammati-
cality of (A2.l). 
(A2, I) *Hei disapproves of your flattering Johni. 
'rhe evidence, however, no longer appears contrad,ictory if we .POS it 
a continuous scale ranging from non'linality to 3entencehood, such ns 
in (A2 .2). 
(/1.2,2} SENTENCEHOOD 
a. that-clauses 
b; For-to-clauses 
c. gerundial clauses 
d. gerundial nominalizations 
e. deverbal nouns 
NOMINALITY 
A categoriaJ. scale like (A2.2) imposes an implicat'ional constraint, 
in the sense that every rule or constraint which mentions the category 
Sor NP must partition the scale into two continuous sets, one of 
which may be null. That is, the correctness of {A2.2) would be 
challenged by a constraint which wo4ld block (A2.2h) and (/l.2.2d), but 
not {/l.2.2a, c, and e). I do not know o·f such counterexrunples, and I 
p:ive a few examples below which support (A2.2). (11.2.3)-(/1.2,5) s.how 
(/1.2.2} is confirmed by the Se~tentiai fiubject ,Constraint, the NP-over-
r, constraint, nn!i Chomsky's Cpeci fied ·f;ub,)ect Condition hee Aprendix 
'1'hree) respectively.
I 
I 
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(A2,3) a. *It's John who that you killed is clear. 
b. *I;t's John who for you to meet may b.e dangerous. 
c. *It's Johtl vh6 meet:i.ng may prove dangerous .• 
d. 	 It's John who the shooting of has become 
imperative. 
e. It's John that a·picture of is in my pocket. 
(A2.4) a.. *Is that John left obvious? 
b. *Is for.John to leave desirable? 
c. Is John's lea~ing the country de~irabl~? 
d. rs' John'~ shooti~g of' so rnl:I.Ily rabbits legal? 
e. Is John'~ picture of Ma77,,availa.ble to you? 
(A2 .5) a, It 1s John who I was told that you met at· the 
party. 
b. It 1s John who I intend for you .to meet. 
c. *It's John who I am plannin~ on Mary- 1s meeting. 
d. 	*It's 4ohn who I am planning on a q.etective's 
sI1ooting of. 
e. *It 1 s John ~hat I saw ~ill 1s picture of, 
Two.more phenomena. which support (A2.2) are Extraposition and 
Extra.position-from-NP, as she~ in (A2. 6) and (A2. 7) ·reapectively. 
(A2.6) .a. It'.s desirable that John should lea.ye • 
b. It was expected for John to leave, 
c. *It's regrettable John's leaving. 
d. *I.t I s reg:retta,ble Jo.hn I s shooting of the 
* rabbits. 
e. *It ,was unexpected John's proof of the .theorem. 
(A2.7) a. The claim is preposterous that John is a 
traitor. 
b. *'l'he hope is unrealistic for John to get well. 
c. *The prosp~cts .ar.e dim Qf John's getting well. 
d. 	*The ppssibility is frightening of the shooting 
or so many rabbits. · 
e, 	*The idea. l}ever .o.ccurred to me of the proof of 
the theorem. 
Concerning (A2,7e), it should be pointed out that there are 
sentences like (A2.8}, which apparently viola~e the hierarchy in 
(A2.2). 
(A2 •.8) 'Tbe choic.e is hard between A and B. 
Thus, uhlike (A2.7e), {A2.8) is acceptable, even thoug4 the constituent 
extra.posed from NP is a. PP (which is pr~sumably at the nominal end of 
the scale). However, it seems rea.sonable to assume that (A2.8) is 
not der,ived by Extraposition-from-NP, but by another rule (usually 
called Extra.position-of-PP). ·Although I have not investigated the 
domain of applicability of the latter rule, it seems clear that it 
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is more restr'icted than that of' the former, and I suspect t.hat 
d~tai],C:!dinvestig~tion '1.'.0i:.tl~ tU:X-n out~a<;lditional formal di.rferences 
be~ween the two ruies~ 
Another reason for believfng that .the_two r1lle~ should not be 
coliapsed is that there are acceptable cases of ·1Extraposition-of-
NP1; that is, exactly as there ~re grammatical s_en_tences apparently 
derived like (A2, 7e) , ther_e also ar_e grammatical sentences like 
(A2,9) which are apparently deriv_ed like_(A2.6). 
(A2,9) It's awful the way he behaves in front of women. 
That (A2,9) is not derived by ordinary Extraposition is argued in 
detail in Elliot (1971, Ch, 2) , where it is shown that there is a 
separate rule of Extraposition-of-NP restricted to 'exclamatory'· 
predicates.  
· If Extraposition and Extrapositiqn-from-NP are not involved  
in the derivation of (A2,9) and (/\2.8) respectively, the claim that 
these two rules recognize (A2.2) is consistent with the facts. 
_ The ·notion of categoria.l kind as illustrated by (/\2.2) is clearly 
not the only possible or existing one. Although I do not have anything 
like a theory of categorial kinds at present, I feel it is rather 
obvious that a prepositional phrase and the noun phrase it necessarily 
contains are not NP's of the same kind. For example, the doubly-
underscored lW in (A2.10a) cann_ot be substituted for the singly-:-
underscored one, as (A2.10b) suggests. · 
(A2.10) a. I did it for John. 
b. *I did it John:--
Similarly, although coordinations are represented as in (3,99), so 
that the boxed X and X2 belong to the same category, it is quite 
clenr that they are not of the same kind, for the former cannot 
appear in most contexts in which the latter can, as illustrated in 
(A2,ll). 
(A2.ll) a, Bill left, 
b. ~Or Bill left. 
The ungrammaticality or· (Al.lOb) and (A2.llb) is a consequence 
of the obligatory character of prepositions in PP's and of or in 
second- disjuncts, as opposed to the optional charac~er of non-
restrictive relative clauses in NP's. Therefore, even if the notion 
of categorial kind could bemade explicit in linguistic theory, 
replacing (3.1) by another definition (3.1 1 ) which would differ from 
(3.1) in lacking provision (iii) and in having a strengthened 
provision (i) such that X and Y would _be required to belong to the 
same kind of category would be no more than proposing a notational 
variant, so long as optionality is the only reason for claiming 
that X arid Y are of the same kind, _ 
Notice also that (3.i) is trying to capture the intuition that  
it is~ sit~ificinnt fact about N & G's that their .Nucleu3 is of-the  
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same kirid as the entire construction. Thus {A2·.12) contains two 
IiP 1·s· of. the same kind; wbicli are more.over substittitable in the 
context given; however~ the fact that the two NP 1 s· are ·or the same 
kind is not a necessary or sigp.ificant one, a.nd ('3.1) corre~tiy 
prevents the internal NP.from 'being regarded.as 'the Nµcleus of the 
·1~ge;r c:me. 
(A2,12) A man who was talking to a woman had a heiµ-t 
'3-ttack.' 
APPENDIX THREE 
Th~ fact that some cases of Extraposi.'tion-f.rom-IlP are. awkward 
does not indic,ate that (3.2iii )' has 'questional:i1~· status; ;rather, 
the awkward cases can be explained by independent constraints. We 
have already seen two such constraints· {in Chapter 'l'.10): (a) the 
acceptability of extraposed clauses decreases· in proportion to the 
complexity,of the material which intervenes between them and their 
original ·head, and ('ti) all other thirigs being equal, a readinr, of a 
seriterice that involves Extraposition-from;..NP tends to be discarded 
in favor of another reading which involves no extraposition or 
extraposition over less complex material: These constraints were 
shown in Chapter Two to be quite e;enerai and in no wey restricted to 
the rule·in question. I wish to show now that (c) Extraposition-
t;rom-NP yields :increasingly unacceptable results in proportion to 
the degree of specificity of the head NP. Thus, consider (A3.l). 
{A3,l) a. A man Just left who was wearing a hat. 
b. ?'l'he man Just left who was wearing a hat. 
c. ??That man Just left who was wearing a hat. 
d. 	*John's 'brother JU3t left who W~S ~eo.ririg fi 
hat. 
·e. **John's brother's so.n's. dauetlter Jµst left 
who wa.s wearing a ·ha:t. ' ' 
'l'he constraint which is operative in (A3,l) is clearly more ~eneral 
than nieets the eye; indeed, as was originally pointed out by 
Warshawsky { 1966) and recently elaborated on in Chomsky (lY'[l), the 
complements of Ni1 ' s are increasingly impervious to ope.rat:ion_s 
involvine the complement and an element exte:trial to the t~ & f.i in 
proportion t.o the specificity of the determiner of the N~cleus. 
Thus, the reflexivization or chopping of a nominal complement 
exhibit the same ~radual deterioration as that seen in (A3.l), as 
Ghown by (A3.2) and (A3,3) respectively (additional phenomena which 
lwhuv~ uimilurly ure discu:rned in Chomsky (1971)). 
(A3. 2) a. T gave John. a picture of himaelf. 
b. ?I 	gave John that picture of himnclr. 
c. *I 	gave ,John Mary's picture of himnclf. 
d.**I 	gave John Mary's aister's daughter's 
picture of himself. 
(A3.3) a. What did I ,/?:ive you .a. picture .on 
b. ?What did I give you that-picture of? 
c. *What did I give you Bill's picture of? 
d.**What 	did I give you Dill's father'.s brother's 
:picture of? 
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Chomsky proposes to handle these cases by his Specified :SubJect 
Condition, which I +eproduce below: ... 
(A3.-4) NCi rule can involve 2f., !., in the structure 
··.~~••• C'~ •.••~.,. .• -~TYV~ •• J •• ~ 
where~ :i,s the specified subject of WYV in a., 
This condition in effect sta.tes that a discontinuous relation cannot 
c:ross. a specified subJe~t, but (A3,l) shows th~t the crossing is 
irrelevant. Moreover, (A3.l) which is' intuitively .felt to be a 
subcase o:r whatever constraint is operative in. (A3.2) and (A3,3) 
cannot be handled by (A3,4). I suggest that a more observationally 
adequate statement would be· (A3 ~ ~) ~ · · · 
(A3,5) In N & S's belonging to the category NP, (3.2iii) 
becomes increasingly inapplicable in proportion 
t·o the specificity of the Nucleus. 
As shown by (A3.2), the increasing inapplic.ability of (3.2iii) 
concerns not Just chopping, but r:eature-changir.ig as well (similar 
:facts h6ld for tfre distri~~tion of 8.D):". as shown ~n. RC>SS (1967)). 
In fact, ( J'\3. 5) affects the same r.ules as thol:le affectei;t bY ( 3.- 2iv); 
as shown in (A3.6), (A3.5) affects deletion under ob;I.igatory 
coreferentifµity, bµt n~t non-:nuli pronominalization. Copying rules 
are not aff'.ected eith!;?:r (as iliustI'.a.ted in (A3. 7) and (A3.8) vith 
Left ])islocaticm and WH.-Q-d.opying :re~p~ctively, but further research 
is necessary, as I have not been able :to check the acceptability o:r 
(A3.8) with enough informants who qUef!tion by copying). 
(A3.6) MS:l'Y i_s tQo ugly for John to want to own 
a: ·picture of ·1 
this picture of?? {
Ed's.picture of*n ~on 's ,J?icture or**_}...._Bill's 
It should be noticed that the entire set in (A3.6) becomes acceptable 
i.f ~ is added at the erid of each sentence. 
(A3. ',;) My. father, I think I mentionedJ'.l:his 
Bill's 
· .._John's 
picture of him. -
·a 
(A3.8) Who did I show you .that picture 
. Bill's(Mar.r's mother•,J
of .hi~? 
The above fact:;; suggest that (A3,5J should be replaced by 
something like (A3. 9). 
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(A3.9) The phenomena which cannot affect elements of a 
Satellite, as predicted by (3.2iv), are 
prevented from.affecting the entire Satellite, 
(a) if the Nucle\ls is an llP ~ and (b) in 
proportion to the specif1city of the Nucleus. 
If (A3. 9) is COI'.re.c~, then it must be taken into account when 
explanations for (3,2:iv) are. con$idered, for it is suggested rather 
strongly that the fact that the ~ restrictions hol.d for elemen.ts · 
of Satellites and for vhole Satellites under conditions of specificity 
is more than a mere coincidence, 
Finally, notice that (A3,9) explains the often-noted fact that 
many speakers ·prefer·to extrapose relative clauses rather than 
sentences in apposition to NP's like the fact. Indeed, the determiner 
.· of the Nucleus in the latter c;ase can often not be less specific. than 
the, in view of the ill-formedness of *"a fa:ct that John is crazy is 
disturbing (see section 3,2,3), and ijuclei having the as determiner 
tend to inhibit extraposition, regardless of the kind of clause to be 
extraposed. 
.APPENDIX FOUR 
In this Appendix, I consider a.possible explanation of (3,110) 
in terms of (3,2). My suggestion is that (3,110) is in fact 
unnecessary, since whatever purpose it purports to serve is 
essentially served by (3.2iv). Thus, (3.2iv) only pre~ludes the 
migration of an element of a Satellite from under the dominance of. 
the N & Snode, but does not preclude movements within the domination 
of the N .& S node; for example, relative pronouns can be attracted 
to their antecedent. A number of non-chopping phenomena which are 
subject to (3.2iv) create no unacceptabilities when they involve an 
element internal to the Nucleus and another internal to the Satellite; 
this is illustrated with ~-neutralization, deletion under obligatory 
coreferentiality, and comparative neutralization in (A4,l)-(A4.3) 
respectively, · · 
(A4.l) I know no one who ever shot two lions with one 
shot, 
(A4.2) The man (who) you mentioned has ·left, 
(A4.3) John loves Mary more th~n ll.e hates Jill. 
To explain {3,110) we need only t9 ~SS\lllle that when the Nu~leus and 
the Satellite of an·N & S contain an identical element in 'similar' 
positions,. the element in the sate1iHe is first moved into the . 
Nucleus where it is 'gobbled' by the identical element; the latter 
is subsequently moved out of the N &·s. Thus, I am positing 
sequential, rather than simultaneou·s, movements in across-the-board 
processes .. Gobbling rul'es of the type suggested above have been 
proposed in ve.rious places in the literature; the syntactic 
Justification of my proposal is that it avoids the embarrassment 
of regarding across-the-board move~~nts as exceptions to {3,2iv). 
This account makes sense especially in behavioral terms; indeed, 
if the reconstruction of .discontinµities creat.ed by across-the-
board movements proceeds as in (A4,5), a perceptual conflict will 
arise (see section 4.3), b·ut if it proceeds as in (A4.4a) or (A4.4b), 
no difficulty will arise. · 
. A minor a.ppu.rent theoretical difficulty concerns the seemingly 
arbitrary cll.oice between (A4.4a) oi' (A4.lib).in symmetric coordinations, 
'!'he reai-t.ime procedure is probably (A4 .~a), sin~e the first term 
carries no mark of subordination, and there consequently se.ems to 
be no reason for the reconstru·ctive procedure t9 hold the first term 
unresolved until the oecond is encountered, Similarly, inn-term 
coordinations, reconstr·uction very prob'ably proceeds from left. to 
right, 
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. (A4.4) a. N & S--------... 
N S 
~ ~ .. 
(A4.5) 
An alternative way of dee.ling with across-the-board maiming 
while preserving·the ,CSC.is implicitly proposed in Neubauer (1970). 
Neubauer's analysis is interesting to consider because it m.akes the 
claim that copying rules.are exempt from the. constraints vbich affect 
chopping rules, even when copying is followed.bl the deletion of the 
.Q_rigine.1, so that the end produc:t is indisti~guis'.!'lable from chopping. 
Neuba.uer's argument.hinges on tl,le faci;; that ConJm..iction-
Reduction can remove eiements from co.ordinations, unlike Question-
Movement, Relativization, P_seucio.:.Cleftirig t etc. , and argues that this 
is so ,because ConJ.unction-:Reducti~ is a copying and deletion, rather 
than a chopping, rul.e. However, Conjunction-Reduction is the only 
rule considered by'Neubauer which operates across-the-board. Since 
the various chopping rules are also free to opGrate across-the-board, 
and since it would be exceedingly ad hoc to regard them as copying 
and deletion rUles when opera.ting acro~s~the-b~ard and as chopping 
ones ·otherwise, the inevitable conclusion is that chopping rules do 
not apply across-the-board to coordina~e terms, but rather to the 
out.put of some copying and deletion rules. · The only copying ,!Uld 
deletion rule whicp applies to coorciinations in English is CbnJunction-
Reduction, and Neubauer's vosition implicitly claims thnt (A4.Gc) ir. 
deriv~d from (A4. 6a') via (A4. 6b) rather than directly.• 
{A4.G} a. John likes pot~toes ~4 Mary hates potntoen. 
o. John likes, and Mary hates. potatoes. 
c. It's ~otatoes that John likes and Mary hates. 
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Such an 	W1alysis must be rejected for se.veral reasons: 
(a) The pauses indicated by.commas in (A4.6b) are obligatory, 
while no such requirement holds for (A4. 6c) • Conceivably, · one might 
claim that pause insertion is a later rule than Clefting, and that 
the former somehow dep¢nds·on the moved element being to.the right 
of its place of departure. But such a ciaim would dissoive in the 
face of (A4.'T} in which the pa.uses are perfectly optionai, a,lthough 
the moved ele~ent is to the right of its places of departure in 
surface structure. 
(A4.7) What John likes and Mary hates is potatoes. 
(b) Conjunction-Reduction can .only touch initial 8.Ild final 
elements of coordinate terms, ·but chopping rules can touch medial 
elements as w~ll. Therefore, (A4.8a) would have no source, since 
(A4.8b) is ungrammatical and (A4.8c), while grammatical, arises 
through Topicalization.rather than through Conjur.ction-Reduction . 
.{A4.8) a, It's John who I saw in Paris yesterday and 
you saw in London the day before yesterday. 
b. 	*I .saw in Paris yesterday, and you saw in 
London the ·day before.yesterday, John. 
c. 	 John(,) I saw in Paris yesterday and you 
saw in London the day before. yesterday. 
(c) As noted above, across-the-board chopping is possible, with 
various degrees of acceptability, in non-coordinate structures, 
However, Conjunction-Reduction is completely out in such cases, as 
shown in (A4.9)-(A4;ll). 
{A4_. 9) 	 a. It's Mary who John likes more than Bill hates. 
b, *John likes,·more than Bill hates, Mary. 
(A4.!0) a. It's John Mary told that she loves. 
b. ·lfMary told; that she loves, John. 
(Ali.ll) a. It's John who the undisputable effort to save 
suggests a hidden intention to destroy •. 
b. 	*The undisputable effort· to save, suggests n 
hidden intention to destroy, John. 
The only way of upholding Neubauer's position that I can see is 
to posit a copying and deletion rule, call it Mysterious~Reduction, 
which would derive (A4.6b) from {A4.6a) without requiring pause 
insertion, which would also derive structures like the b-sentences 
in (A4.8}-(A4.ll), and which would moreover be obligatorily followed 
by some chopping rule applying to.t.he constituent it has copied., I 
assume that the artificiality of such a proposal is sufficiently 
obvious for the matter not to be pursued WlY further. 
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